Protecting Education Personnel from Targeted Attack in Conflict-Affected Countries
The **Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack** was established in 2010 by organizations working in the fields of education in emergencies and conflict-affected contexts, higher education, protection, international human rights, and humanitarian law who were concerned about ongoing attacks on educational institutions, their students, and staff in countries affected by conflict and insecurity.

GCPEA is a unique coalition of leading international organizations including:

- CARA
- Human Rights Watch
- Institute of International Education’s Scholar Rescue Fund
- Norwegian Refugee Council
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict (PEIC)
- Save the Children International
- Scholars at Risk Network
- United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

GCPEA is a project of Tides Center, a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization.

This paper is the result of an external study commissioned by GCPEA and may not reflect the views of individual member organizations. The study was prepared by Melinda Smith, lead researcher and writer; Cynthia Koons, Philippines researcher; and Amy Kapit, editor and GCPEA Program Officer.

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Protecting Education Personnel from Targeted Attack in Conflict-Affected Countries

2014
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACHR</td>
<td>Asia Centre for Human Rights</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Alliance of Concerned Teachers (Philippines)</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines)</td>
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<td>BCHR</td>
<td>Bahrain Center for Human Rights</td>
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<td>BIFF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters</td>
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<td>BTA</td>
<td>Bahrain Teachers Association</td>
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<td>CAFGU</td>
<td>Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (Philippines)</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Community-Based School</td>
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<td>CDNP</td>
<td>Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
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<td>COMELEC</td>
<td>Commission on Elections (Philippines)</td>
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<td>CONTEND</td>
<td>Congress of Teachers and Educators for Nationalism and Democracy (Philippines)</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>Christian Peacemaker Teams</td>
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<td>CZOP</td>
<td>Children as Zones of Peace</td>
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<td>DepEd</td>
<td>Department of Education (Philippines)</td>
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<td>DERN</td>
<td>Department of Education Election Response Network (Philippines)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>Ecumenical Accompanier (Palestine)</td>
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<td>EAPPI</td>
<td>Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel</td>
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<td>EI</td>
<td>Education International</td>
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<td>ERT</td>
<td>Election Response Teams (Philippines)</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ETA</td>
<td>Ethiopian Teachers’ Association</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan</td>
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<td>FECODE</td>
<td>Federación Colombiana de Educadores (Colombia)</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>LIZOP</td>
<td>Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)</td>
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<td>MRM</td>
<td>Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People’s Army (Philippines)</td>
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<td>PTUZ</td>
<td>Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>SAIH</td>
<td>Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (Norway)</td>
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<td>SRSG-CAAC</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>SZOP</td>
<td>Schools as Zones of Peace</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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Mourners lower the body of Minister of Education Ahmed Abdullahi Wayel for burial in Mogadishu, Somalia, December 4, 2009. A male suicide bomber dressed as a woman attacked a Benadir University medical school graduation ceremony, killing 22 people, including the ministers of education, higher education and health, the dean of the medical school, professors, students and their relatives, and wounding at least 60 more.

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Protecting Education Personnel from Targeted Attack in Conflict-Affected Countries
A fire in a classroom used as a polling station continues to smoulder in Pinagbayanan, Batangas province, south of Manila, May 15, 2007. Two teachers counting votes in the Philippines' violence-marred elections were killed when armed men stormed a schoolhouse where the ballots were being tallied and set it on fire, police said.

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INTRODUCTION

Teachers have risked their lives just going to work in over 20 countries in the past several decades. Targeted by both government security forces and armed groups, education personnel have been caught in the middle of political, ideological, sectarian, and military struggles in conflict-affected countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Teachers have been threatened, injured, displaced, kidnapped for ransom, extorted for payment of their salaries, indoctrinated, arrested, imprisoned, tortured, fired, and killed. Female and male teachers are often affected differently. Depending on the context, one gender may be targeted more intensively, as demonstrated, for example, by Taliban attacks on female teachers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The motives for attacks are also diverse and context specific, but there are trends across countries. They include: opposition to the content of education, including ‘Western’ curriculum; political and military motives including targeting of teachers as symbols of government power; retribution for supporting opposition parties or groups; violence against teachers during military offenses; and punishment for preventing recruitment of child soldiers. Attacks are also linked to sectarian and ethno-religious conflict, including attacks against teachers representing opposed sectarian groups; attacks on teachers engaged in trade union activity or democratic reform movements; and election violence against teachers who serve as poll workers, either as a way to pressure them to support a political party or to punish them for allegedly supporting other parties or groups. Finally, attacks may aim to undermine the quality and equity of education. For instance, members of teachers’ unions have been targeted for their advocacy on state-funded inclusive and quality education.

This briefing paper focuses specifically on targeted attacks on elementary and secondary education personnel and measures implemented to protect them. Education personnel include teachers, education officials, administrators, support staff of all types, and teacher trade union members. The paper addresses the scope, nature, and motives of attacks on education personnel; the impacts of attacks on teachers, the education system, and the larger society; and the range of measures that have been undertaken by communities, policymakers, advocacy groups, UN agencies, and teachers themselves to protect education personnel from attacks and prevent them from recurring. Although many of the measures described in the study have not been formally evaluated and most of the evidence for their success in protecting teachers has been anecdotal, the paper looks at the existing evidence for the effectiveness of these measures. The information presented in the paper has been drawn from academic papers; media articles; reports and documents from government agencies, multilateral organizations, and NGOs; and correspondence with selected individuals and organizations.

An in-depth case study of the Philippines provides a description of a conflict-affected country that has implemented a range of strategies to protect teachers, from community-based measures to attempts to change national policy and law. Lessons learned from the Philippines’ experience may have application in other countries facing similar conflict contexts.

The intended audience includes field-based practitioners and policymakers working in the education in emergencies and child protection fields; government, including education ministries and security forces; community groups and local NGOs; teachers’ unions and organizations, both country-based and international; UN agencies and international NGOs supporting the education sector; and teacher training institutions. The paper is designed to assist policymakers and practitioners from affected countries to develop approaches that will protect education personnel, mitigate the impacts of attacks, and prevent attacks in the future.
1. SCOPE, NATURE, MOTIVES, AND IMPACT OF ATTACKS

Scope and Nature of Attacks

Armed conflict during the post-Cold War period has involved targeted attacks on education institutions, including infrastructure, students, and teachers. Most countries in which attacks on education personnel occur have experienced military or political conflict, recurring cycles of violence, or regimes with poor records of protecting human rights and democratic pluralism. Affected countries face increasing challenges to achieve equity and access to quality education and the Millennium Development Goals. The countries where attacks on teachers occur and included in this review, with case examples, are: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Central African Republic, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

Previous reports on attacks on education, including two UNESCO studies published in 2007 and 2010, identify Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe as among the countries most severely affected by attacks on education personnel. This briefing paper contains updated information about attacks on education personnel through early 2013 from research conducted for Education under Attack 2014, published by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack. The most recent information includes attacks on education personnel in the wake of the political changes, and military and sectarian conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. In countries that were part of the ‘Arab spring’ democratization upheavals, such as Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, education personnel have been targeted as part of a general crackdown on pro-democracy voices, as will be illustrated in examples in this paper. Data also show that attacks on education personnel are ongoing in many countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, and Thailand.

Motives of Attacks

Perpetrators of attacks on teachers include non-state actors and other rebel groups, opposition parties, government armed forces and government-supported militias, and criminal gangs. While perpetrators do not always take responsibility for attacks or state their motives, research and reports have identified a range of intentions. They include a variety of political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, religious, or criminal reasons in the context of larger conflicts.

In the majority of countries experiencing armed conflict, there is a disparity in education quality, access, and provision. Perceptions of lack of access, lack of neutrality and transparency of education governance, biased curriculum favoring the dominant ethnic or cultural group, and unequal provision of education resources can be among the various reasons that education, including education personnel, is targeted. In some instances, in countries where teachers have gone beyond their positions as state civil servants to take on social activist roles that challenge “neoliberal” education reforms or ruling political parties, educators have clashed with the state and have been subject to repressive state responses. Motives of attacks on education personnel, including country examples of each category, are described below:

Political and military motives: The intention of creating instability has been one reason for attacks on schools in general and teachers in particular. In these instances, attacks by dissident groups attempt to achieve a military or political victory; for example, to undermine popular confidence in the government. In political conflict, different groups have targeted teachers for motives such as suspicion of siding with the other faction or party, or
resisting recruitment of students into armed groups. Teachers and principals have been attacked for not allowing insurgents to use their schools to recruit or indoctrinate students, as in Colombia, DRC, India, Philippines, Somalia, and Thailand. In DRC in 2007, rebels from the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CDNP) shot dead a principal in Masisi for speaking out against political and military infiltration of schools by armed groups. In Somalia, after two decades of conflict between warlords and clans, members of the group Al-Shabaab have killed teachers and used them as human shields for resisting recruitment of students. In many countries, govern-
ments have targeted teachers for opposing repressive or undemocratic practices, as in Iran, Ethiopia, Colombia, and Zimbabwe. In India in 2007, village teachers in Kannaiguda said they had stopped going to school because Salwa Judum members, a government supported militia, beat them for allegedly assisting Naxalites. Armed groups in India and Nepal have extorted teachers or tithed their salaries to help fund their insurgencies.

Opposition to content of education: In some countries, education itself has played a role as a trigger of conflict, and teachers have been targeted either because of what they teach or in retribution for their advocacy for education reform. Where political and ethno-religious elites control governmental institutions, the textbooks and curriculum may exclude the narratives, history, religion, ethnic identity, culture, and perspectives of other groups. Marginalized groups may view education as an attempt to impose an alien culture, philosophy, religion, or ethnic identity. Related to the issue of content is the language of instruction, which is also a

CASE EXAMPLES:

Opposition to Content of Education in Thailand and Nepal

Historically, in southern Thailand, the curriculum imposes the Thai language and narrative on the local population, whose language and ethnic identity have different historical roots. Ethnic Malay Muslim separatists still believe the state imposes Buddhist culture and Thai language and history, and have targeted, threatened, and killed Thai Buddhist teachers in government schools serving ethnic Malay Muslim students in response. In Nepal, during the Maoist insurgency, the Maoists attempted to change the curriculum to remove references to the monarchy, promote Maoist political ideology, and discontinue the teaching of Sanskrit, which they viewed as the language of the ruling ethnic elite. They abducted teachers and subjected them to indoctrination camps to learn Maoist ideology, and imposed their version of the curriculum on many rural schools.
disputed issue in many communities that want indigenous languages taught in schools, such as in southern Thailand and parts of Turkey. As an underlying cause for political, ethno-religious, and sectarian conflict, the content and nature of education may be a motive for attacks on education in general and on teachers in particular. Insurgents have attacked teachers for educating girls and teaching secular education topics in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Western education in Nigeria. The popular name of the insurgent group operating in Nigeria, Boko Haram, translates as “Western education is sacrilege” in the northern Hausa language. In Nepal, education personnel have been targeted for refusing to teach Maoist ideology or history.
Sectarian and ethno-religious motives: A number of countries have experienced sectarian and ethno-religious violence that has resulted in the targeting of education personnel. In some countries these motives may be compounded by underlying political or economic conflicts, anti-government sentiment, inequitable distribution of resources, marginalization of ethnic groups, or conflict over land ownership and resource use. Perceptions of lack of equity, neutrality, and transparency of education governance and opportunity can also exacerbate ethno-religious differences. In the DRC, several targeted attacks were reported from 2009-2012, including an attack by Mai Mai fighters who killed a group of seven education workers from the Banyamulenge ethnic group in South Kivu. The Banyamulenge workers were on their way to a teacher training program. In Nigeria, Boko Haram seeks to impose Islamic law in the northeast of the country. In Andhra Pradesh, India, Hindu extremists have threatened and injured staff at Christian schools, warning them to stop teaching.

Opposition to trade union activity: In recent years, teachers in a number of conflict-affected countries, acting through trade unions, have not only lobbied for improved salaries and benefits, but have also taken on the role of social activists, challenging government policies. Teachers have been attacked and punished for advocating for human rights, supporting opposition groups, and in some countries, criticizing neoliberal education reforms which have put teachers in conflict with the state. In recent years, government repression against teacher trade union members has taken place in Bahrain, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Philippines, Swaziland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe, among other locations. Tactics have included death threats, assassination by car bombs or bullets, forced disappearance, abduction, illegal arrests, dismissal, displacement, and torture. A 2009 analysis of attacks on teachers’ unions in Colombia suggests that teacher trade unionists are often active political actors and that these tactics are intended to silence educators who are defending the social, economic, and cultural rights of their members and the larger community as well. Indeed, according to Education International, most of the persecuted teachers in Colombia are social activists.

CASE EXAMPLES:

Attacks on Teachers’ Unions in Zimbabwe, Bahrain, Iran, and Ethiopia

In Zimbabwe, members of the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe see their role as critical change agents and social actors. According to the Union, not only does it empower its members to create a strong foundation for democracy (and even critical analysis of issues) in the minds of the learners, but it also networks with other civic organizations and therefore raises awareness on civil rights and responsibilities. During the pro-democracy demonstrations in Bahrain in 2011, both teachers and teacher trade union staff were subjected to investigation, arbitrary arrest, torture, military prosecution, suspension, and salary cuts. According to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), 66 teachers, mostly women, were reported to have been arrested in July 2011. In Iran, teachers involved in trade union activities have been targeted on charges related to national security, for trade union activity, and for protesting for higher wages. In Ethiopia in 2008, after fifteen years of harassment, a justice decision closed down and seized the assets of the Ethiopian Teachers’ Association (ETA), the largest independent membership organization in the country. Another teacher organization took over under the same name. Attempts by the representatives of the former teacher association to register under a different name have been denied by the Government agency.
Election violence against teachers: In some conflict-affected countries, including Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Philippines, and Zimbabwe, teachers who serve as election workers are sometimes targeted for political or sectarian reasons. As government employees, teachers in countries such as the Philippines are required by law to serve as poll workers. In the Philippines, as well as Zimbabwe, this role as election officers is one reason that teachers have been targeted. According to a human rights report by Research and Advocacy Unit in Zimbabwe, teachers serving as poll workers are “a decided nuisance to any political party wanting to acquire an unfair advantage during an election.”32 During the 2008 parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe, teachers from rural districts suspected of voting for the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), were killed, and the killings were alleged to have been orchestrated by youth militias loyal to the ruling party, soldiers, and veterans of the war against British rule.33
Iraqi policemen and investigators inspect the remains of a car bomb that exploded outside the Ministry of Education in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk on August 22, 2013.

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Impacts of Attacks on Education Personnel and the Education System

The former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernor Muñoz Villalobos, said that “attacks on education institutions, students and teachers mean the direct and brutal attacks on the human condition.” The targeting of teachers in armed conflict, along with students and infrastructure, has had devastating impacts not only on the victims, but also on schools, families, communities, the education system, the society at large, and the progress of development and social cohesion. There has been significant documentation of short term impacts of attacks on teachers, including loss of life; closure of schools and education provision; psychosocial impacts on teachers; massive displacement of teachers; loss of pay and income; and shortage of qualified teachers, which can take a generation to replace. If teachers are the sole bread earners for their households, loss of income can mean hardship for families. Regarding the impact on female teachers, particularly in places like Afghanistan, qualified women educators are reluctant to work outside relatively secure urban centers, undermining access to education for rural girls. Other immediate impacts on the education system include teacher absenteeism and attrition; demotivation of teachers to work; disruption of the flow of resources, supplies, and support to local education facilities; and suspension of aid, which can set back education achievement and continuity and can have a disproportionate impact on students from marginalized groups.

The impact of attacks on education personnel will have ripple effects, including long term systemic consequences related to problems with teacher recruitment, disruption of education and employment cycles, and the diminution of quality education. An entire generation of young people can experience limited employment opportunities due to lost schooling. Any achievements in education system development and expansion of access to education can be lost, further undermining a country’s development.

CASE EXAMPLES:

Impact of Attacks on Educators in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire

The Zimbabwe Teachers Association estimates that 20,000 teachers have left the country in the past decade, due to a mixture of deteriorating education resources and political tension including targeted attacks on teachers and the political use of schools. In 2009, 35 percent of primary posts and 33 percent of post-primary posts were vacant. In Côte d’Ivoire, political violence peaked in 2010, following contested elections. After the violence subsided in 2011, the Ministry of Education estimated that only 20 percent of the government-paid teachers had either stayed at their posts in the North or returned. This was attributed to insecurity and fear of further attacks. Since then, the return of additional teachers has continued to be limited by the lack of security and the military use and destruction of education infrastructure. Schools in the North will continue to suffer from teacher shortages as they struggle to get the education system back on track.
2. MEASURES TO PROTECT EDUCATION PERSONNEL FROM ATTACK

A number of measures have been undertaken to protect education personnel in affected countries, both direct measures designed specifically for protecting education personnel, as well as measures designed to protect education in general, including educators. These include longer term policy, practice, and advocacy intended to address underlying triggers or causes of the attacks on education personnel, or to strengthen long term deterrence.

While other studies have documented protective and preventive measures for education in general, the interventions included in this review are specific to countries in which education personnel have been deliberately targeted. Measures included fall into one of three categories:

• measures to directly benefit education personnel who have experienced or are at risk of attack;
• measures to protect education personnel indirectly, while protecting education in general; and
• measures initiated by teachers or teacher organizations to protect education in general, including education personnel.

The measures described have been initiated by community members and groups, local NGOs, governments, UN agencies, teacher organizations, and education personnel themselves, as well as national and international human rights and advocacy organizations.

Measures that protect education personnel include: arming teachers and using armed guards; using unarmed guards and community protection committees; relocation and transfer of teachers; transportation assistance or protective accompaniment; negotiations with armed forces and armed groups; crisis planning and risk reduction; monitoring and reporting; and advocacy, both country-level and international.

Longer term prevention strategies have also been designed to build a foundation to prevent future attacks on teachers. Many of these measures are indirect: they protect teachers by strengthening and protecting the education system as a whole. They include: accountability measures to end impunity; domestic legislation and policy; and conflict sensitive programming in education sector planning. The following is a description of measures, with country examples and short case studies, along with a brief analysis of their implementation. In addition, guidelines for what to consider in implementing the measures are provided, based on the experiences of selected countries.

Arming Teachers and Armed Guards

In some countries, governments have provided armed guards to protect education personnel on the way to and from school, on school premises, and in other locations. They have deployed local police, army officers, and government supported militias. Armed school escorts or vehicles have been provided to protect teachers and students en route to school in Colombia, Palestine, Pakistan, and Thailand, among other countries. In parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province and the Federally Administered Tribal areas (FATA) in Pakistan, for example, some school administrators have employed their own security guards. In Afghanistan in 2006, the Ministry of Education assigned armed guards from local police to schools and implemented security patrols and checkpoints for a period of time. They later discontinued the use of armed guards since it was believed that the police were targets for attack, putting the teachers and students at greater risk. In Iraq, the Ministry of Education assigned security patrols and checkpoints around schools in Bagdad. These measures were increased in 2009. As in the case of Afghanistan, it is not clear whether these measures predominantly protected teachers or triggered additional attacks. In 2013, Nigerian authorities intensified patrols and put armed soldiers outside of schools in Yobe State in the north of the country.
CASE EXAMPLE:

Arming Teachers and Armed Guards in Thailand

A number of approaches to providing armed guards and arming teachers have been attempted in southern Thailand where attacks on teachers have been numerous. In 2007, the government provided teachers with armed escorts from the Thai Army, allowed teachers to carry guns, and provided over 2,000 teachers with weapons training. The army sent 3,000 extra troops to the region, and the Ministry of Education had police increase patrols around schools. The Teachers’ Federation of Narathiwat asked the government for round-the-clock protection. In Yala Province, the governor assigned security forces to line the road to and from school as an alternative to armed escorts. According to the governor, this approach had the advantage of providing a safe route to school for both teachers and students while not leaving teachers singled out as targets. In general, however, evidence suggests armed escorts and guards increase the risk that teachers will be attacked. For example, in Thailand police escorting teachers to school are targeted alongside the teachers they are trying to protect.
Analysis of arming teachers and guards: There are several concerns with using arms as a measure to protect education personnel. If guards, police, or other armed personnel are themselves the intended targets of violence, their presence could put teachers at further risk for attack. Thus, increasing armed security presence can have the unintended effect of attracting militants. Additionally, while teachers have reported an increased sense of security when possessing firearms, it has also been reported that arming civilians like teachers has increased mistrust. Furthermore, in contexts with extremely high levels of violence, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, it may not be realistic to provide security for the number of potential or targeted schools.

Unarmed Guards and Community Protection Committees

In some countries, community members have served as unarmed guards to provide protection, and communities or schools have organized unarmed protection committees to patrol schools to protect teachers and students. These committees or school governing bodies such as parent-teacher organizations have made decisions about methods of protection and resource use. However, these programs can put community members at risk for attack, and, therefore, require careful planning, risk analysis, and community support in order to implement them. In both Afghanistan and Thailand, unarmed guards have been used as well as armed guards. In 2006, Afghanistan implemented two programs using unarmed guards, including a donor-funded School Guards Program and a Ministry of Education-funded Night Guards Project. These programs were challenged by guards’ lack of technology to communicate with others and by the vulnerability of unarmed guards to attack, with no means of self-defense. The School Guards Program was discontinued. However, the use of security shuras (councils) to protect teachers and schools has been viewed by local communities as the best way to defend schools, according to a 2008 survey.

What to consider when using armed guards and arming teachers:

- Armed guards may be most effective for protecting educators and schools when military or local police are used to patrol roads leading to education facilities, and security forces are used to find and clear bombs or other explosive devices before teachers and students leave or arrive.
- Armed guards outside school buildings or at nearby check-points can stop attackers from approaching. However, these actions can also lead to attacks on both soldiers and teachers. All the risks must be considered when deciding a course of action.
- Security forces should not partially occupy school buildings to defend teachers and students from attacks, since this violates international humanitarian law and can increase the risk of the school becoming a target for attack, damage education infrastructure, or intimidate teachers and students from attending school. If security forces are necessary to maintain safety, they should be confined to the perimeter of schools, rather than set up in camps in schools.
- Governments should consider providing training in international humanitarian law and human rights law to security forces to curb abuses of civilians.
CASE EXAMPLE:
Community Protection Program in Thailand

In 2010, UNICEF supported the implementation of the Santisuk “happy” school program developed by the Faculty of Education, Thaksin University in response to the growing threat to schools by the violence associated with the conflict. The program model was adapted from the “schools as zones of peace” program implemented in Nepal by UNICEF, Save the Children, and other agencies, in which community members play a significant role in creating protection mechanisms against armed attacks on schools. The goals were to create a safe and secure environment in the schools and restore harmony in the community through the zones of peace approach. School committees have planned and implemented the program in six government elementary schools, with a majority of ethnic Malay Muslim students and teachers. It initially relied on escorts for teachers and community members rotating in surveillance around schools in the “red zone.” According to Thaksin University faculty who designed the program, the pilot communities have shown greater social cohesion as a result of the program and attacks have been reduced. However, the program was still not fully effective in preventing attacks on teachers. Indeed, the school escorts were terminated due to escalating violence and the shooting of a principal at one of the pilot schools in late 2012. In the wake of the violence, a military presence has been established around the perimeter of schools in the red zone, and all Thai Buddhist teachers have transferred to other schools for safety reasons.
Analysis of unarmed guards and protection committees:
Approaches involving community committees have had some success in protecting teachers, particularly when they involve negotiations. In Afghanistan, one analysis found that community members perceived community-initiated protection measures to be the most effective way to protect schools and teachers. A CARE study on protecting education reported some measure of effectiveness in negotiations between local shuras (councils) and perpetrators both in preventing attacks and obtaining promises to refrain from further attacks. The study also showed that raising awareness in communities of the benefits of education has been a key factor in preventing attacks. However, these interventions can also bring risk to both community members and education personnel. As noted above, a community/school protection approach was problematic in the pilot Santisuk school program in Thailand. The Santisuk model did not involve negotiations with potential perpetrators to ensure that schools were safe havens from military attack, as per the Afghanistan example or other schools as zones of peace models, so there were no assurances that violence would be curtailed by perpetrators. Sustaining community committees may also be challenging. In Zimbabwe, where voluntary Teacher-Student-Parent Defence-Units were set up to warn teachers of impending danger, a key challenge was that once their children had completed their education, parents lost interest in the groups' activities, requiring continuous recruitment and training of new parents into defense units.

What to consider in using unarmed guards and community protection committees:
• Community participation in the defense of education personnel can be crucial in ensuring their safety.
• A risk analysis is important to ensure the safety of community members when taking measures to protect education personnel.
• Community defense measures may involve negotiation with armed groups and security forces to prevent attacks.
• Protection efforts led by existing community groups, school management committees, or religious leaders can reinforce respect for education in the community and build a wall of protection for education.
• Community leaders involved in prevention should represent the diversity of the community. If leaders are perceived as favoring one political or ethnic group, for example, they may not be able to gain the trust of the community.
• Any existing political or social tensions between community members and teachers must be assessed when setting up protection committees, since these tensions can impact the committees’ effectiveness. Such tensions should be addressed in the context of the committees.

Relocation and Transfer of Teachers and Provision of Teacher Housing
In several countries, governments and other actors have transferred threatened teachers to other locations or safe places. They have also provided housing and other accommodations on school grounds to strengthen physical protection. In Afghanistan, the government has developed a pilot program to provide small residential houses for teachers and other personnel at the schools. In Zimbabwe, teachers who have been threatened have transferred to safe houses with assistance from Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) and the Students Solidarity Trust. The Thai government removed teachers in government schools from zones most at risk for insurgent attack and transferred them to other schools in safer areas. And in Côte d’Ivoire, the government issued a degree for teachers and school administrators who felt unsafe to be deployed to different areas.
Analysis of relocation and transfer of education personnel: There is a risk to relocation and transfer in that teachers can be targeted more easily because of their concentration in one place. In Zimbabwe, some educators transferred to safe houses have been subsequently attacked. Furthermore, since relocating teachers can expose them to attack if their whereabouts are leaked to perpetrators, transfer requires coordination through a network of trusted people. Relocation is also only a temporary solution if the underlying causes of conflict are not addressed, since teachers could be targeted again once they return to their schools after temporary removal. Finally, teacher relocation can leave a gap in education staffing. While Colombia has been able to replace teachers who have been relocated, Zimbabwe does not have sufficient teachers willing to fill the vacated positions, thus leaving schools understaffed, especially in rural areas.

Transportation Assistance and Protective Accompaniment

Several countries have implemented measures to protect teachers from targeted attacks while they travel to and from school. In Pakistan, as part of a campaign to bring female teachers back to school, the government has provided travel allowances to enable teachers to afford to pay for safe public transportation. In Palestine, several accompaniment programs have been implemented by international faith-based organizations to protect both teachers and students on the West Bank from harassment by Israeli settlers as well as by Israeli forces at checkpoints on the way to and from school. The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) and Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) provide accompaniment primarily to students, but teachers are also assisted in getting to and from school. Although the impact of these programs has not been measured, accompaniers report that perpetrators are less likely to harass students and teachers if they know they are being watched.

Analysis of transportation assistance and protective accompaniment: Transportation assistance can be effective in protecting teachers on their way to and from school, but a risk analysis should be undertaken to ensure that teachers or escorts will not be targeted. The Palestine programs are unique among the measures to provide safe passage to school in that they use international escorts. The escorts report that while they have been harassed occasionally by settlers, they have not generally had their security compromised. However, in other high risk countries, such as Thailand or Pakistan, insurgents would probably not tolerate the presence of international escorts, and the presence of internationals might increase the risk to teachers and students.

What to consider in relocating education personnel and providing teacher housing:

- There may be risks in relocating teachers to safe houses and other locations. Parties collaborating in the relocation must be trusted.
- Teacher housing may make it easier for perpetrators to target and attack teachers if housing is not well protected. The risks of attacks must be weighed before making a decision to establish teacher housing.
- Education authorities should plan for the need to replace permanently relocated teachers with trained teachers who can provide quality education.

What to consider in transportation assistance and protective accompaniment:

- Ensure that accompaniment programs do not put the teams that escort teachers and students at increased risk for attack.
- Consider the safety of public transportation, including buses and taxis, if teachers are provided with travel allowances to maintain their safety to and from school.
- If special transport vehicles are provided to transport teachers, consider the risks of the vehicles becoming targets of attack and whether having armed security forces in the vehicles diminishes or increases the risk of attack.
Negotiation with Armed Forces/Armed Groups

In several countries, negotiations with perpetrators have been undertaken to stop attacks on education personnel, students, and schools. Often, these negotiations are comprehensive: they are designed to address attacks on the school and education community, including teachers, holistically. In Afghanistan, the government conducted negotiations with the Taliban; in Nepal and Philippines, local and national NGO leaders negotiated with armed groups; and in the Central African Republic, negotiations between international agencies and armed groups led to an agreement with rebels to create neutral spaces to protect teachers and students. The outcomes of these processes have been variable, and they are also often risky for negotiators. When successful, negotiations can serve either to reduce attacks on education and military use of schools in the short term or prevent them in the long term.

Analysis of negotiation with perpetrators of attacks:
Negotiating with perpetrators could be a strategy to reduce attacks on teachers if protecting education personnel is made a priority. As the Afghanistan example illustrates, however, negotiations may need to include specific protections for different components of the education system, since armed groups may have to engage with individuals such as teachers differently than when they negotiate over school buildings.

Negotiations may also have negative repercussions. In Afghanistan, for example, the concessions made by the Ministry of Education gave the Taliban a stronger voice in education in the areas they controlled. Indeed, for negotiations to be successful, there must be consensus on the terms of the agreement and the types of behaviors that are or are not allowed. A consequence of consensus building may be compromises that negatively impact education in the future.

Negotiations often require intervention by a third party who is trusted or acceptable to all actors. They may take the form of direct dialogue or shuttle diplomacy, if the parties are unwilling or unable to engage in face to face meetings. There are risks involved, especially if negotia-

CASE EXAMPLE:

Negotiation with Perpetrators in Afghanistan

Since late 2010 or 2011, the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) has been negotiating with the Taliban to re-open schools in Taliban-controlled areas and end attacks on government schools, teachers, and students. These negotiations have been complicated because of the Taliban’s divided organizational structure and diverse networks. Indeed, it regulates education through semi-autonomous commissions in Peshawar and Quetta, which largely do not cooperate. Additionally, the MoE and the Taliban have not yet reached comprehensive agreement. Rather, most agreements are localized. Nevertheless, many schools have been re-opened with the MoE approving Taliban-approved textbooks, syllabi, and teachers, along with single-sex education and girls’ education terminating at grade six. However, according to the Peshawar education commissioner, although the Taliban has officially banned attacks on schools, it still permits attacks against education and students. Indeed, if a school does not comply with the Taliban’s rules, the Taliban can order the school closed. If the school does not close, the Taliban can attack education staff. The degree to which negotiations between the MoE and the Taliban have reduced attacks on education is unclear. Attacks against students, teachers, and schools do continue, with the MoE and Taliban largely refusing to take responsibility for school burnings.
tions take place at the local level, since perpetrators must agree to participate in good faith, and there are security dangers involved for third parties as well as participants in any kind of negotiation process. 84

Agreements also require some enforcement or monitoring mechanism agreed to by the parties. Parties must also have sufficient motivation to adhere to agreements, and others must be willing to take corrective action if parties do not comply with the terms.
Crisis Planning and Risk Reduction

Several countries have developed crisis management approaches to protecting teachers and students, based on the concept of disaster risk reduction (DRR). DRR is a systematic approach, often used in planning for natural disasters, for identifying relevant risks and developing strategies to mitigate them and their impacts. In Gaza, UNESCO has trained school principals, district officers and school staff to protect schools and staff from military attacks near the ‘buffer zone’ with Israel. The program has also been implemented in parts of the West Bank. It includes the development of plans for school preparedness and evacuation, as well as the use of SMS to communicate safety warnings between the school administration, school safety committees, and families. Through the SMS system, principals also provide information on how to continue education at home under conditions that are unsafe for staff and students to travel to school. In Colombia, the government has established special committees to assess risks to teachers and provide strategies for their protection, including radio phones, mobile phones, bulletproof vests, and national and international travel tickets to safeguard teachers.85

Analysis of crisis planning and disaster risk reduction: While crisis planning and risk management schemes can reduce attacks, they may not be effective due to flaws in implementation or distrust of government, if it is involved. In the case of Colombia, officials of the teachers’ union Federación Colombiana de Educadores (FECODE) said that while the crisis mechanisms put in place have done some good, there is a lack of trust between teacher unions and the government and skepticism about the efficacy of these measures to protect teachers. In addition, the committees charged with implementing the measures are not functioning in many areas. There is also a continued concern that the underlying roots of violence against teachers need to be addressed—something which crisis planning cannot do.86

What to consider in education and negotiation with armed forces/armed groups:

- Negotiating with perpetrators of attacks at the local level to protect teachers may be effective, if it is safe to do so.
- National-level negotiations can be undertaken between governments and perpetrators to strengthen local-level agreements.
- A risk assessment must be conducted before embarking on negotiations, especially if community members are involved, to protect teachers and civilian populations. Safety must be ensured for parties undertaking education and negotiation roles.
- Negotiation agreements should include stipulations that consider how to protect different parts of the education system specifically, including teachers.
- An enforcement mechanism and consequences for non-compliance should be incorporated into negotiated agreements.
- The potential negative repercussions of agreements, such as on educational quality, should be considered.

Crisis Planning and Risk Reduction

What to consider in implementing crisis planning and risk reduction:

- School-wide preparedness plans should involve administrators, teachers, students, and parents and be rehearsed on a regular basis.
- If an education cluster or working group exists, it should coordinate with the ministry of education in crisis planning and support to strengthen school-based and system plans.
- If technology is used, skilled technicians should maintain it to avoid equipment failure.
- Roles and responsibilities of parties should be clarified and trust should be built to ensure that plans are implemented as designed.
Monitoring and Reporting

Monitoring and reporting of attacks on teachers is an important tool in preventing attacks, and having documented evidence of attacks is an important first step in developing protective measures and moving towards accountability. \(^9\) Attacks on teachers have been well documented in some countries such as Colombia and Zimbabwe, where teachers and human rights organizations have been vigilant in collecting data. However, in other countries, lack of capacity, security concerns, or absence of political will, especially if the government has been involved in attacks, \(^8\) have limited efforts to monitor attacks.

The UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict was established in 2005 through Security Council Resolution 1612 to end six grave violations: recruitment or use of children by armed forces or armed groups; killing or maiming of children; rape and other grave sexual violence against children; attacks against schools and hospitals; denial of humanitarian access to children; and abduction of children. Each year, the UN Secretary-General produces a report to the UN Security Council on children and armed conflict that includes in its annexes a list naming parties to conflict who have committed one or more of the four ‘trigger’ violations. \(^9\) One of the most significant developments in the last five years was the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1998 in July 2011, which made attacks on schools and hospitals one of those trigger violations. \(^9\)

However, there are often challenges in documenting these violations against teachers systematically and reliably. For example, education sector actors in Côte d’Ivoire observed that while attacks may be reported in the media, they are often difficult to verify. Stakeholders in the Philippines note the risks involved in documenting and confirming attacks on teachers, including fear of retribution. \(^9\)

CASE EXAMPLE:

Monitoring of Attacks on Teachers in Zimbabwe

The Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) has documented attacks on teachers during and after the contested election of 2008 through a national survey. The group took the evidence to Parliament in order to advocate for the protection of schools as politics free zones. PTUZ has also taken 22 cases of violations against teachers’ human rights to court. PTUZ has worked with the Norwegian teachers and students advocacy organization Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH) to draw international attention to election related violence by bringing the reports that document the human rights violations to meetings with Norwegian and Zimbabwean ministries, and the group has done extensive work with both Zimbabwean and Norwegian media. \(^9\) In the Zimbabwe elections of 2013, fewer attacks against teachers were documented, but whether this was the result of PTUZ activism, international sanctions on Zimbabwe by the US and EU and other countries, or other factors has not been established.

Analysis of monitoring and reporting: Data collection on attacks on teachers has been challenging, but some methods that have proven effective include enlisting the participation of school principals, teachers, school management committees, and community members to monitor and report attacks on teachers and education in general. Education practitioners in Côte d’Ivoire suggest establishing better collaboration with child protection practitioners, since they may have stronger mechanisms for reporting through community groups, including case management procedures. \(^9\)

Further, there has been a lack of clarity on what incidents to report and on an acceptable process for reporting attacks on teachers to higher levels in the system. Questions have also arisen about the motives for attacks and whether individuals have been targeted as teachers or members of a different group or community, making it difficult to determine which incidents to document. Monitoring and reporting of attacks on teachers can also have negative consequences, depending on who the information is reported to. For example, when PTUZ in Zimbabwe first reported attacks against teachers to the Ministry of Education in order to
seek support from law enforcement agents, there was a backlash from the government, including arrests and further attacks by supporters of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).94

What to consider in monitoring and reporting:
- Education and human rights organizations that collect data on attacks on teachers, regardless of whether the countries they work in are required to report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAAC), can send voluntary reports.
- Those setting up reporting mechanisms should consider whether the government is implicated in attacks when determining where to send reports.
- In countries with UN peacekeeping operations, there may be Human Rights Monitors and a Child Protection Officer. Such monitors should be involved in reporting on education attacks in general and reminded to report attacks on education personnel in particular.95
- There should be participation and collaboration of education and protection sector actors in reporting on attacks on teachers.96
- Education and protection workers should be trained on what data to collect to ensure consistency and on data collection methods that ensure reliability.97
- Education and protection workers should be trained on the ethical and security risks involved in data collection.
- Greater collaboration between the education and child protection sectors may result in better data collection.

National and International Advocacy
Advocacy initiatives have taken place at local, national, and international levels to protect teachers and education in general from targeted attacks. Advocacy can be both a short-term protective measure, and a longer term strategy to prevent future attacks and hold perpetrators accountable. At the local level, citizens and NGOs in countries such as Nepal, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have engaged in advocacy to gain community support to deter attacks on teachers and education. In Pakistan, after the Taliban forced the closure of girls’ schools in the Swat Valley, citizens and organizations across Pakistan collected over 40,000 signatures to protest the attacks and petition federal and provincial civil and military leaders to reopen schools, ensure protection of children, and restore peace in Swat. A peace accord was signed on February 16, 2009, and partially achieved these goals.98 However, the extent to which the public advocacy influenced this outcome is unclear. In Nepal, a coalition of over 30 NGOs initiated a national campaign, Children as Zones of Peace (CZOP), which became a long-term movement involving teachers, youth clubs and human rights advocates. CZOP conducted marches, rallies, media exposure, and lobbying to convey its message that protection of education must be an essential element of any political party aspiring to lead the country.99 CZOP also worked with the Nepali journalists’ association to ensure that attacks were publicized in local and national newspapers with the goal of exposing the violations and preventing further ones.

Alongside communities and NGOs, governmental entities can also engage in advocacy with other government bodies to prevent attacks on teachers and schools. In Thailand, the Ministry of Education advocated against the Army occupying schools in southern Thailand.100 In the Philippines, to protect teachers serving as poll workers during elections, the Department of Education (DepEd) in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) advocated for a change in the national election code to relieve teachers of their polling duties to avoid harassment. In Thailand, the army has reportedly ordered security forces to stop using schools as barracks.101 However, in the Philippines advocacy efforts were unsuccessful due to opposition from the national elections board.102

The most active international organization conducting advocacy on behalf of teachers who have been targeted for political motives is Education International (EI), a federation of 400 teacher associations and unions from about 170 countries and territories, representing 30 million educators and institutions. In March 2013, EI launched an international campaign with the UN Special
Envoy for Global Education to exert pressure on Pakistani authorities to strengthen protection measures for teachers. It circulated an online petition to its membership after the killing of Pakistani female teacher Shahnaz Nazli, and in April 2013, publicized the establishment of a Scholarship Fund to commemorate her and other Pakistani teachers who have lost their lives while carrying out their professional responsibilities. EI also issues resolutions advocating for the human rights of teachers in countries where they are targets of attacks, including Colombia, Fiji, Iran, Korea, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. In 2009, EI issued a declaration on “Schools as Safe Sanctuaries” which protested targeted attacks on teachers and established a Solidarity Fund to assist member organizations whose members were threatened by attacks, war, or other life threatening situations. EI teachers’ union affiliates, such as PTUZ in Zimbabwe, receive assistance in publicizing violations of teachers’ human rights in affected countries.

In addition to EI, the Norwegian Students’ and Academics’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH), is another organization that supports teachers, in addition to students and academics in Colombia, Zimbabwe, and other countries where teachers are under attack. They engage in both advocacy and direct support to student and teacher groups. Additionally, the organization Teacher Solidarity functions electronically as an independent website which provides information on attacks on teachers “who are fighting to defend public and democratic education.” It provides a platform for teachers’ organizations throughout the world to initiate appeals for solidarity from other teacher organizations to support efforts to release prisoners or end attacks and repression against teachers and teacher unions. Importantly, this advocacy is not restricted to contexts of armed conflict, but addresses a wide range of political and labor grievances by teacher organizations throughout the world.

CASE EXAMPLE:
International Advocacy by Education International on Behalf of Teachers in Bahrain

Education International (EI) launched an urgent appeal on its website in 2011 after the crackdown on teachers and teacher union members for their participation in the pro-democracy movement. The Bahrain government dissolved the Bahrain Teachers Association (BTA) and was reported to have used harassment and intimidation, including the suspension of salaries, mass dismissals, arbitrary arrests, and detentions; there were also allegations of torture. EI requested that its member organizations write protest letters to the Bahraini authorities to: 1) release immediately union leaders Jalila al-Salman and Mahdi ‘Issa Mahdi Abu Dheeb; 2) protect them from ill-treatment; 3) set up an independent investigation into the reported ill-treatment of Jalila al-Salman and bring those responsible to justice; 4) reinstate the teachers dismissed and the students expelled, together with their salaries and scholarships; 5) respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of teachers, students, and union activists in accordance with international standards; and 6) engage in respectful dialogue to bring about a peaceful transition to democracy and a fair resolution of the legitimate claims of the Bahraini people. As a result of the appeal, messages from 18 EI member teacher organizations from Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, North Cyprus, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and United States as well as over 3,200 online messages were sent to the Bahraini government. EI also collected evidence of alleged torture of teacher unionists in detention and transmitted the allegations to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. EI submitted a protest letter to the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. The precise impact of EI’s efforts on the outcomes of the trials is unclear. In October 2012, an appeals court upheld the guilty verdict against BTA leaders Mahdi Abu Dheeb and Jalila al-Salman, but reduced their sentences. Al-Salman was released after serving six months. However, in February 2013, Jalila Al-Salman received a letter of job termination a few days after speaking publicly about human rights violations in Bahrain in a meeting in Washington, D.C.
Further, international solidarity campaigns by national and international teachers’ and human rights organizations on behalf of teachers who have been the victims of attacks and rights violations may make a difference. One campaign was conducted with the assistance of all teacher unions in the United Kingdom on behalf of two Colombian teachers who were imprisoned for union activity. Raquel Castro and Samuel Morales, teachers’ union activists, were freed in 2007 after hundreds of teachers’ union members wrote to the Colombian government and picketed the Colombian Embassy in London. The British National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers attributed their release to the teachers’ union advocacy. Other international organizations, such as Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Save the Children, and the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, in addition to UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNESCO, advocate against attacks on teachers through campaigns, reports, media, and direct advocacy with governments to change laws and implement policies that will protect education from attack.

**Analysis of national and international advocacy:** Strong national advocacy campaigns, such as the civil society coalition in Nepal, have resulted in a national consensus on schools as safe havens for teachers and students. However, in some countries, such as Bahrain, Colombia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe, governments view advocacy on the part of teachers’ organizations and unions with suspicion. This is not only because of these groups’ support of teachers’ rights, but also for their alleged political views and affiliations. Acting as a force for social activism, teachers’ union advocacy is viewed as a challenge to the government status quo. In these cases, appeals for assistance from international teachers and human rights organizations may have been more effective in drawing international attention to attacks on teachers.

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Members of teachers’ unions and opposition supporters clash with riot police during a protest against a government attempt to pass a new education bill through parliament in Ankara, Turkey, March 28, 2012. Secular parties argue that the bill is designed to promote Islamic schooling. © 2012 REUTERS/Stringer
Legal Accountability Measures to End Impunity

Attacks on teachers may violate international humanitarian law and domestic criminal laws, and some lawsuits have been filed against perpetrators as a result of advocacy efforts seeking accountability in domestic courts or other international tribunals. Teachers’ unions and human rights groups have taken perpetrators to court or other tribunals for attacks against teachers in Colombia and Zimbabwe, with some successes in Colombia.111

What to consider in conducting national and international advocacy:

• Advocacy can create awareness of the scope and impacts of attacks on education personnel to help protect teachers, improve their security, and reduce impunity for perpetrators.
• Key elements of advocacy campaigns include identifying objectives, target audiences, and messages, and collecting data to support them. Advocacy messages should be tailored to specific campaign audiences and events.110
• Forming partnerships and coalitions with organizations at local, national, and international levels can amplify the advocacy messages to advocate for protection, prevention, and accountability. Further, these partnerships can be beneficial if national advocacy is judged to be too risky.
• Teachers’ unions and associations can play an important role in advocacy to protect and prevent teachers from targeted attacks in many countries.
• Encouraging media to publicize attacks on education at local, national, and international levels can contribute to greater awareness and accountability.

CASE EXAMPLE:
Accountability for Attacks on Education Personnel in Colombia

In an effort to hold perpetrators accountable for violations against teachers, FECODE, the Colombian teachers’ union, set up Human Right Commissions in each of its affiliated unions to establish the National Human Rights Network. The commissions represent threatened or displaced teachers, coordinate advocacy with national and international organizations, and manage a database of violations. In 2004, FECODE developed a Human Rights Training Programme for teachers and activists with assistance from Education International and the National Education Association (US). The program aims to provide teachers with skills to defend their rights in the Colombian courts and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of the Organization of American States. The quality of the work has been mixed due to lack of resources and lack of willingness of some affiliates to undertake human rights work.112 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights can sanction governments rather than individuals for failure to protect teachers’ human rights. FECODE has taken several cases to this court, including the murder of the trade union leader Isidro Caballero and another teacher. In 1992, the court ruled that that the Colombian military was responsible for the murders and was ordered to pay restitution to the families. Despite the importance of this ruling, teachers’ human rights continue to be violated.113
Analysis of accountability measures: Bringing perpetrators of attacks on teachers to justice has often been challenging. There have been some successful prosecutions in places like Colombia, and teachers’ union leaders involved in these cases have maintained that coordination with international organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Labor Organization, may help strengthen accountability.\textsuperscript{114}

Domestic Legislation and Policy
In several countries, attempts have been made to enact laws and policies that protect teachers, directly or indirectly, from attacks. Since election violence against education personnel has occurred in Afghanistan and the Philippines, there have been attempts to change law and policy on the use of teachers and schools during elections. These efforts have met with some success. In October 2013, during local elections in the Philippines, teachers were permitted to refuse to serve as poll workers. Those who did were replaced by members of the Philippine National Police (see Philippines case study below for more details). However, in Afghanistan, polling stations are still being placed in schools.\textsuperscript{115} In Nepal in 2011, the Nepalese Ministry of Education issued a directive that proclaimed schools as zones of peace, after years of advocacy by NGOs and civil society.

Analysis of domestic policy and law: There are only a handful of examples of attempts at legislation and policy adopted by governments designed specifically for the protection of education personnel. Further, there has been little documentation on the effectiveness of these efforts. Additionally, information is needed on what attempts have been made in protective law and policy in affected countries, the role of advocacy, and the challenges faced not only in policy enactment, but also in practice.

What to consider in accountability measures to end impunity:

- States should systematically investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute those individuals involved in ordering, taking part in, or bearing command responsibility for, the range of violations of international law that constitute attacks against education, including attacks on teachers.

- Regional and international tribunals should give specific consideration to the range of violations that constitute attacks on education, including attacks on teachers.

- Informal and transitional justice mechanisms, such as commissions of inquiry and truth and reconciliation commissions, should recognize and concretely address attacks against education.

What to consider in domestic legislation and policy:

- States should ensure that their domestic law criminalizes all elements of attacks on education, including attacks on teachers, in line with international humanitarian and human rights law.

- Where appropriate and it does not pose substantial risk, education sector actors, including teachers’ organizations, and human rights organizations, should advocate with governments to criminalize all elements of attacks on education, including attacks on teachers, in their domestic law.

- Where appropriate, including where advocacy is deemed risky, education sector actors, including teachers’ organizations and human rights organizations, should consider seeking assistance from international organizations in advocacy for legislation to protect education and teachers.
Conflict Sensitive Programming and Education Sector Planning and Policy

In some cases, education content, structure, and delivery may actually instigate violent conflict and attacks on education personnel. In recent years, a number of international education actors, including UNESCO, UNICEF, and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) have emphasized the need for both governments and education sector actors to address the underlying conflict dynamics in their programming and education policy. Educational practices and policies should be assessed in terms of their potential to increase the risk of conflict and attacks on education personnel. In both Afghanistan and Thailand (see above and textbox), curriculum reforms have been intended to address triggers of attacks on education, including teachers.

Analysis of conflict sensitive policies: Some conflict sensitive policies implemented to address attacks may raise concerns from other stakeholders that education quality and access could be compromised, as in the case of Afghanistan’s curriculum revisions to respond to Taliban grievances. Agreements such as Afghanistan’s may serve as short term fixes to reduce attacks, but may involve long term trade-offs. In Thailand, there are no studies so far that measure the level of attacks on teachers before and after the implementation of the bilingual program; although interviews with community members, documented on film by Mahidol University, show a favorable response to the program. Since the use of conflict analysis tools for long term collaborative decision making in education policy among adversarial stakeholders is so new, investments in implementation and evaluation of these processes need to be made by governments and other agencies.

CASE EXAMPLE:
Conflict Sensitive Curriculum Reform in Thailand

In the four southern provinces of Thailand, where the language of instruction is Thai, the ethnic Malay Muslim population has objected to the imposition of Thai language, culture, and history on the education system. This is one of many reasons why insurgents have targeted Thai Buddhist teachers. Mahidol University initiated a multiyear, K-6 pilot program involving action research designed to help Patani-Malay speakers retain their Malay language and identity at the local level and achieve a Thai identity at the national level. Patani-Malay is used as the medium of instruction from K-1, so that children gain the necessary skills in listening, speaking, reading, and writing in their mother tongue, before learning Thai. Patani-Malay Studies, in which the Patani-Malay language is the main component, is also taught throughout primary school. Community members have been engaged in developing reading materials for the pilot program focused on Malay Muslim culture and traditions. The UNICEF Thailand country office has provided support for this program, and has encouraged the Ministry of Education to make it part of national government policy.
Summary

The measures described in this review, both to protect education personnel specifically, or as part of protection of education in general, have had varying degrees of effectiveness. There is some documentation to support the success of several measures across countries, but much of it is based on single cases and anecdotes. For instance, the use of negotiations appears to have reduced attacks in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Philippines, and community involvement appears to have protected teachers and education in Afghanistan and the Philippines. There is also little evidence specifically on the protection of educators. While not academically rigorous, the case study that follows in the next section is aimed at expanding our knowledge on how to protect teachers.

What to consider in conflict sensitive programming and policy:

- Ministries of education with other education actors, including representatives of marginalized communities, should engage in a conflict analysis of the education sector to assess the extent to which education content and delivery have contributed to hostilities.
- Investment in conflict-sensitive curriculum reform and education program design processes that are linked to the findings of the education conflict analysis may be beneficial.
- For UN agencies and NGOs, developing programs with a conflict sensitive lens and supporting government in conflict sensitive programming is critical.
- In keeping with UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report of 2011, governments should “prioritize the development of inclusive education systems, with policy on language, curriculum and decentralization informed by an assessment of the potential impact on long-standing grievances.”
- Research should be conducted on impact of program and policy reforms to assess the impact on education personnel.
Filipina Muslim teacher Anisa Omar (L) attends to her students during the first day of classes in Datu Gumbay Piang Central elementary school, in southern Maguindanao province on June 10, 2008, as 21 million Filipino children returned to school during the first day of classes nationwide. The previous week saw seven days of fighting between a group of Muslim rebels belonging to the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

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3. CASE STUDY: THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines was selected for more detailed analysis because it provides good examples of a range of measures undertaken by diverse stakeholders to protect teachers, and lessons learned could provide guidance to other countries confronting similar challenges. Of the measures mentioned above, the Philippines case provides examples of relocation and transfer of teachers, negotiation with armed groups, monitoring and reporting, and national advocacy, as well as domestic legislation and policy. Details of these measures, including activities that occurred between 2009 and 2013, are discussed with attention to lessons learned and recommendations from the implementers themselves. The information draws on a desk review of organizational documentation and media reports, as well as field research and 25 interviews conducted in November 2013 with staff of international agencies, teachers’ organizations, and local NGOs, and department of education officials. 125 Interviewees provided the recommendations for implementation of protection measures presented in the text boxes. 126

Background of the Conflict

Violence against teachers in the Philippines is related to two main conflicts. In a communist insurgency, affecting all three regions of the country, the New People’s Army (NPA) aims to create a socialist state. Meanwhile, in the Moro conflict, which is concentrated in the south, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIF) are fighting for self-rule. These conflicts have targeted civilians, including teachers via bombings, kidnappings, and killings. Furthermore, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is an Islamic separatist group which has also become involved in banditry and other crimes, including kidnap-for-ransom, and is active in parts of the southern Philippines. Rival clan disputes and criminal activity in Mindanao in the southern Philippines have also compounded these problems. 127 Hostilities in Mindanao have been particularly intense since 2008, 128 although there has been a decrease in full-scale hostilities across the country as a whole. 129 Additionally, while peace talks between MILF and the government have gained momentum in recent years, 130 peace talks between the NPA and the government collapsed in 2013. 131
Scope, Motives, and Impact of Attacks on Education Personnel

Within this context of insecurity, there have been varied attacks on education personnel, for different reasons. Philippine stakeholders agree that teachers have rarely been targeted because of their profession. Rather, education personnel have been targeted while serving as poll workers during elections; extorted for their government salaries; harassed during occupation of schools by armed forces and armed groups; and caught in crossfire during violence. The nature of attacks has involved harassment, kidnapping, injury, and assassination. Local NGO staff in the Philippines identified the following impacts of attacks on teachers: psychological distress, displacement, injury, resignation from the teaching force, and death. Attacks have occurred throughout the country and calendar year, with increased frequency during the months surrounding elections and in the southwestern area of the country. The perpetrators of attacks on schools and education personnel include the MILF, Armed Forces of the Philippines, NPA, ASG, and unidentified actors. In spite of current tracking efforts by a variety of stakeholders, the actual number of attacks per year remains unknown. Some of the reasons for this data gap are discussed in the section on monitoring and reporting.

Political/election-related motives: Voting and schools are tightly linked in the Philippines. Public education personnel are designated members of the Board of Election Inspectors/Tellers (poll workers), and schools are designated election places. Additionally, in some areas, the mayors or governors have had the power to appoint teachers, thus allowing for politics to influence teacher allocation. All respondents agreed that the most common motive for attacks on teachers is election-related. Indeed, one respondent estimated that 90 percent of attacks on education personnel were election-related. NGO respondents described that political and armed groups have attacked teachers before, during, and after election day, when the results are posted. Due to their involvement in the election process and the facilities in which the voting occurs, teachers have been perceived as actors who can manipulate the votes. As one local NGO worker described, candidates and their armed groups have accused teachers of tampering with the votes or, conversely, have punished them for not tampering with the votes as requested. Tactics for attacking education personnel during election season have included coercion, intimidation, threats, bribery, injury, and even killing. During the May 2010 general election, NPA fighters ambushed a government convoy en route to a polling station in Compostela Valley province, killing a school teacher who was a board of election inspector. The NPA later apologized for the incident in a public statement. Attacks have also occurred related to local barangay (village) elections. In 2010 in Maguindanao, three months prior to October village elections, unidentified gunmen assassinated a principal and a teacher at Datu Gumbay Elementary School.

Military motives: Teachers have been attacked when armed groups target or occupy schools. For example, in September 2013 in Midsayap, North Cotabato, the BIFF took 20 people, including 13 teachers, hostage from the Malingao Elementary School.

Occupation of schools by armed groups has also subjected teachers to harassment. As reported by the SRSG-CAAC, both MILF and the Philippines army have used schools for military purposes, with 28 cases of government use between 2009 and 2012. Schools are occupied for a variety of reasons, including security, strategic location, infrastructure, and the Oplan Bayanihan, a government peace and security plan that includes civil-military operations for school improvement projects. A local NGO respondent explained that while education personnel have permitted occupation as a security measure, they have also been intimidated, coerced, or threatened into accepting occupation, since resistance could be perceived as support for opposing insurgency groups.

Financial motives: Increasingly the ASG has used kidnap-for-ransom and extortion tactics to generate financial resources to fund their activities, such as to purchase weapons and military supplies. Public school teachers have been targets for these financially motivated attacks because they are known to have a guaranteed source of income. Both kidnapping and the fear of kidnapping are damaging to teachers. For instance, in December 2010, in Basilan province, education officials ordered the suspension of classes in at least 11 schools after teachers refused to report to their classes because of rumors that more of them would be kidnapped following the abduction of an elementary
school principal a few weeks earlier.\textsuperscript{139} A UN respondent stated that public school personnel have been targeted for extortion because they are known to have a salary on which they may take out loans against future compensation, which can then be paid to the extortionist.\textsuperscript{140} Another financial motivation has been reprisal for teachers not paying “tax” to the locally dominant armed group, as described by an NGO respondent. In October 2009, ASG gunmen allegedly abducted an elementary school principal from a passenger jeep transporting a group of teachers and later beheaded him after his family refused to pay the requested ransom.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{Unidentified motives:} As reported by the SRSG-CAAC, during the period from 2009 to 2012, five cases of extrajudicial killings of school personnel by unidentified perpetrators were verified.\textsuperscript{142} A UN respondent stated that the perpetrators of assassinations are often unidentified assailants, sometimes masked, and on motorcycles.\textsuperscript{143} In February 2012, children watched as two armed men shot and killed a teacher in Palanas municipality, Masbate province.\textsuperscript{144} In the same area in 2010, two teachers were killed and one injured.\textsuperscript{145} Because the assailants have been unidentified, the specific nature of their motives remains unclear. Regardless, these types of criminal attacks illustrate potential origins of the fear of reprisal that so many respondents mentioned as reason for limited verified reports of attacks on teachers.

\section*{Measures to Protect Education Personnel from Attack and Recommendations}

Organizations, legislators, advocates, and communities in the Philippines have implemented measures to protect education personnel from attack. Following is a discussion of five of these measures: election protection; monitoring and reporting; community-based protection; national advocacy; and domestic legislation and policy.

\textit{Election protection:} As described in the section above, teachers have been vulnerable to harassment, injury, and killing by armed groups during and after elections due to their role as election workers. In response to these attacks, in early 2013 the DepEd-ARMM enacted Regional Memorandum Order 26, establishing the Department of Education Election Response Network (DERN) and Election Response Teams (ERTs). To protect education personnel from attack, DERN has established three provisions: 1) an incident reporting protocol for attacks on teachers; 2) a legal assistance network to support teachers who have been attacked; and 3) permission for teachers to temporarily transfer to other schools if they fear they are endangered during elections at their home school. As part of the incident reporting protocol, DERN has included a monitoring system via text message, as well as designated focal persons at each administrative level of DepEd.\textsuperscript{146} The role of DepEd-ARMM personnel is to validate the incident report and, when appropriate, share it with an agency responsible for responding, such as COMELEC (Commission on Elections), the Philippine National Police, or the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In addition to DERN, the DepEd-ARMM, the Education Cluster members, and teachers’ unions advocated for a change in the national election code to exempt teachers from serving as election workers. Recently, during the barangay (village) local elections of October 2013, teachers were allowed to recuse themselves from serving as election workers and to be replaced by members of the Philippine National Police. The barangay elections have been considered to be more violent than others because political candidates are from surrounding areas and know the teachers personally. In ARMM, 490 of 2,470 barangays were labeled areas of concern for violence. According to the Asia Foundation, 1,562 Philippine National Police officers replaced teachers as board of election tellers in barangays labeled as “hotspots” or “areas of concern.”\textsuperscript{147} In the municipality of Talitay, one of the most violent areas, 80 percent of teachers (124) recused themselves from working the polls, according to one DepEd administrator, who went on to explain that the hotspots were determined by teachers’ self-assessments and with DepEd superintendents and secretaries in discussion with COMELEC and the Philippine National Police.

Although the effectiveness of DERN has yet to be formally evaluated, anecdotal reports indicate initial success in protecting teachers. Local NGO and DepEd respondents commented that during the recent October 2013 barangay election there were no reports of attacks on teachers. Respondents pointed out that some of the DERN provisions had been more effective than others. For example the legal network was not used, but the reporting mechanism and transfer policy were. One DepEd-ARMM official reflected that in addition to
Filipina Muslim teachers working as board of election inspectors conduct last minute tests on a vote counting machine in Datu Piang town in southern Maguindanao province on May 8, 2010.

© 2010 JAY DIREITO/AFP/Getty Images
achieving the objectives of protecting teachers, DERN also ensured that teachers felt listened to and supported. The challenge remains to ensure, at all administrative levels, awareness, consistent implementation, and compliance enforcement.

**Implementation Recommendations: Election Protection for Teachers**

- Coordinate with education actors, such as members of the Education Cluster, to share information regarding attacks on teachers during elections to learn the nature and scope of the problem.
- Assess the risks to teachers during elections as well as their roles and responsibilities regarding school security.
- Discuss shared assets that could be brought together to protect teachers. These might include informal monitoring systems that exist within NGOs or the Ministry of Education.
- Coordinate with non-education actors who may be integral in a response mechanism to protect teachers if election violence is reported. In the Philippines this included the election board and the national police.

**Monitoring and reporting:** Tracking attacks on education personnel has been a challenging and complex task in the Philippines. The aim of monitoring and reporting mechanisms is to protect teachers from attack by using the data to: trigger appropriate protective responses; contribute to accountability of perpetrators; and support evidence-based advocacy for policy change that protects teachers. One UN respondent emphasized that the level of effort required to monitor attacks on teachers cannot be overestimated. The respondent went on to describe that risk assessment, building capacity, establishing an information management system, fact-finding, and verification is required at all levels—individual, barangay, municipal, provincial, regional, and central.
Multiple Philippines actors have endeavored to establish monitoring and reporting mechanisms that track attacks on teachers in the Philippines; these efforts are described below.

In 2007, the MRM was established in the Philippines as a result of the listing of parties to the conflict in the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict. The listed parties to conflict were the ASG, MILF, and NPA, all of which have been on the list for over 5 years and are therefore now considered persistent perpetrators. Pursuant to Security Resolution 1998 expanding the MRM trigger to include attacks on schools and education personnel, the Philippines’ MRM Country Taskforce has invested in tracking attacks on education personnel. For example, the MRM Country Taskforce trained partners—such as the security personnel, education personnel, and staff of local non-governmental organizations (50 people total in 2012)—to identify, verify, and submit reliable and timely reports on attacks on teachers. Despite these efforts, only limited information on attacks on teachers is included in the annual Philippine country reports to the UN Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, as explained by one MRM Country Taskforce member.

In a similar but independent initiative, the DepEd-ARMM administrators collaborated with members of the Education Cluster to establish a “referral and response pathway for incident reports of violence and injustice,” including attacks on education personnel in the ARMM. The mechanism has aimed: “to refer and monitor cases related to emergency and education under attack for appropriate action; and to keep a record of the endorsed cases and have information about the survivor and endorsee for feedback and update.” Supervisors and principals from the DepEd-ARMM have been trained on the reporting form and referral pathway with the expectation that they would roll out the same training to teachers. The established process for reporting attacks includes four steps: filling out the form by interviewing the survivor or relation of the victim; forwarding the form to the Education Cluster; submitting the form for immediate response or sharing it with the appropriate government agency; and providing feedback to the survivor or relation of the victim on follow up. Having a well-designed system is only the first step, as one Education Cluster member pointed out; the challenge remains to provide timely, adequate responses to the reports—a crucial component to motivate future reporting. Nevertheless the tools and participatory design process, involving the DepEd-ARMM and Education Cluster members, may be a valuable model for others interested in establishing a reporting mechanism to monitor attacks on teachers.

NGOs have also implemented monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track human rights violations, including attacks on education personnel. Some organizations have done so within their own project mandates to support specific schools or to provide education during an emergency. Other NGOs track attacks as part of their contribution to the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which monitors the implementation of the Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Philippines and MILF and its subsequent implementing guidelines and Civil Protection Component. For example, the Mindanao Peoples Caucus has trained the Bantay Ceasefire, a group of thousands of local volunteers, to monitor and report on violations of the ceasefire agreement between MILF and the government, including attacks on schools.

In spite of the monitoring and reporting mechanisms managed by the MRM Country Taskforce, the DepEd-ARMM, the Education Cluster, and NGOs, few cases of attacks on education personnel are reported and verified. This inhibits the effectiveness of the measures because information remains largely anecdotal and therefore less powerful for advocacy efforts. Indeed for this report, only the manager of one mechanism was willing to share data and only under the agreement that specifics not be repeated in the case study. Managers of other monitoring and reporting mechanisms gave the following reasons for not sharing their data: confidentiality, incomplete information, or a limited number of verified reports. UNICEF and NGO respondents provided several explanations for why data on attacks on teachers is missing, such as: a Philippine culture of silence, fear of retaliation by armed actors, mistrust of confidentiality of information flow, history of impunity of perpetrators of attacks on teachers, limited access to high conflict areas, low incentive to report, no obligation to report, and skepticism of an appropriate government response. An additional explanation is offered by the 2013 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict: “The limited number of verified incidents [violations and attacks on education personnel] can be attributed to the lack of funding and limited human resources capacity for
the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism, and to security constraints for monitors, which affects access to the particularly remote areas of concern.” Whatever the reasons, it is clear that several hurdles remain before a clear picture of attacks on education personnel can be used to advocate for greater protection.

Despite the challenges, evidence of the positive potential of monitoring and reporting measures does exist. As one Human Rights Watch respondent described, data from the Philippines UN Country Taskforce’s MRM was instrumental in negotiations towards creation of the 2009 Action Plan between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the United Nations in the Philippines to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the armed conflict in Mindanao. If similar advocacy and policy achievements are to be achieved for the protection of teachers, greater investment is needed in the implementation of monitoring and reporting measures of attacks on education personnel. As respondents pointed out, this will require providing confidence building measures such as timely and appropriate responses to reported attacks as well as guaranteed confidentiality of those involved in reporting.

**Community-based protection of schools and education personnel:** Philippine stakeholders perceive community-based measures to be one of the most powerful forms of protection for education personnel and learning communities. One such measure is a “zone of peace,” which establishes an agreed commitment of armed and non-armed actors to protect a specified area from hostilities. One of the earliest “zones of peace” that explicitly included schools was established in 2001, when residents of Pikit town of Cotabato Province made the Nalapaan Declaration of Space of Peace from clashes between MILF and armed forces of the Philippines, which included places where children could continue their education.

In 2011-2012, the Mindanao People’s Caucus and Balay Rehabilitation Center, supported by UNICEF and others, implemented the Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace (LIZOP) project in eight Maguindanao villages. The aim of the project was to achieve “durable multi-stakeholder protection of teachers and school children” affected by, or at risk of, attacks. A primary objective of LIZOP was to develop, declare, and enforce a code of conduct to serve as a mechanism for engaging partners to protect and promote the human rights of teachers, among other rights holders. To establish the zone of peace, the implementing agencies engaged a variety of stakeholders, including: teachers, community leaders, parents, armed group representatives, and officials from local government units. While the project steps varied by village, some common actions were: initial awareness raising and advocacy, participatory site selection, capacity building of community-based advocates, and drafting a code of conduct. At the end of the project cycle each barangay stakeholder group declared their commitment to protecting schools—and teachers—through a public ceremony.

There are indications of LIZOP’s effectiveness in protecting education personnel from attack. As reported by several NGO respondents, in the two years following the establishment of
School children displaced by fighting in the southern Philippines watch though the windows of a temporary classroom provided by UNICEF at an IDP camp in Talayan, Maguindanao Mindanao, Philippines.

© 2010 Agron Dragaj/Redux
LiZOP, the eight pilot schools have not suffered a single attack. Although there is not enough data to demonstrate cause and effect, this result is indeed positive for the education community, including education personnel. A secondary result of the project is that local advocates for human rights were identified and trained. These could be valuable resources for future advocacy efforts locally and in neighboring areas, toward the protection of teachers. The project final report and several respondents agreed that the next challenge is to institutionalize LiZOP at the higher administrative levels in order to ensure sustainability.158

National advocacy: The Philippines benefits from a vibrant and active civil society, which includes teachers associations, unions, and human rights organizations.

Implementation Recommendations: Community-based Protection of Schools and Education Personnel

- Raise awareness and garner support of the zones of peace concept at the provincial and municipal and village levels through meetings and dialogue with a variety of stakeholders.159 In the Philippines, stakeholders included: mayors; local and municipal administrators; and insurgent and armed groups to the extent safe and appropriate. If conflict dynamics prohibit multi-stakeholder meetings at each level, meet with stakeholders individually.
- Assess demographics, needs, community capacities, expectations, and experiences of conflict through focus groups, key informant interviews, and community validation of findings.
- Formulate the zones of peace code of conduct, ensuring content related to protection of teachers, based on the initial findings of the assessment.
- Before declaration, make sure to validate the zones of peace code of conduct via workshops with a variety of stakeholders in the community, including, if safe to do so, members from the armed groups.
- Declare zones of peace code of conduct publicly with representatives from all stakeholder groups as well as witnesses from government and non-government agencies.
These groups have advocated to publicize attacks on teachers and to pressure the government to adhere to international humanitarian and domestic laws that protect teachers. For instance, the Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), a self-described “progressive, militant and nationalist organization” of education personnel, has advocated for fair pay and protection of teachers who serve as board of election tellers/inspectors.\textsuperscript{160} The Congress of Teachers for Nationalism and Democracy (CONTEND) has advocated against the Oplan Bayanihan policy, which allows military presence in schools for civil military operations. CONTEND has also written press releases, produced videos, and contributed to a website for the release of political prisoners. Their website proclaims: “It’s part of our academic freedom as scholars, scientists, and teachers to work in the field with the people without being subjected to undue military harassment and surveillance.”\textsuperscript{161} An alliance of human rights organizations, Karapatan, has supported the mass protests by ACT and CONTEND against extrajudicial killing and illegal arrest of teachers. They also monitor violations of human rights, including attacks on education personnel.\textsuperscript{162}

**Domestic legislation and policy:** In addition to policies already mentioned, the Philippine legislative bodies have enacted several laws and policies that protect either directly or indirectly education personnel from attack. An illustrative, but not exhaustive, list is provided below.

- **Republic Act 7610 Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (1992).**\textsuperscript{163} Section 22 prohibits the use of schools “for military purposes such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots” and establishes that “delivery of basic social services such as education … shall be kept unhampered.” While the act targets children, it also recognizes education as a necessary protective system, of which teachers are a critical part. Subsequent to the banning of the use of schools for military purposes in the national legislation, a number of provincial and municipal entities issued similar ordinances.\textsuperscript{164}

- **The Department of Education No. 44 Recognizes Declaration of Schools as Zones of Peace (2005).** This implements the Republic Act No.7610 by declaring, “All concerned personnel in the central and field offices are mandated to make [sic] necessary action to make all schools a place where children can receive utmost security and peace. …with immediate compliance directed.”\textsuperscript{165} Although this policy does not specifically address teachers, protecting education personnel is a necessary step if schools are to be places of “utmost security and peace.”

- **Presidential Executive Order Nos. 56 and 138 Adopting the Comprehensive Program Framework for Children in Armed Conflict, Strengthening the Council for the Welfare of Children and For Other Purposes (2001, 2013).**\textsuperscript{166} These orders and their subsequent memoranda establish the monitoring, reporting, and response system for grave child rights violations in situations of armed conflict as the monitoring arm within the children in armed conflict program framework led by the Council for the Welfare of Children. This mechanism includes collecting and verifying data on attacks on education personnel and schools.

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**Implementation Recommendations:**

**National Advocacy**

- Promote awareness by using a variety of tools (seminars, trainings, mobile phones, Twitter, Facebook) to inform education personnel of their rights to protection.

- Use social networking tools for targeted campaigns to protect teachers. For example, in the Philippines, on the international day against forced disappearances they replaced Facebook profile photos with blank photos to raise awareness of illegal arrests, kidnapping, or extrajudicial killing of teachers.

- Organize mass action demonstration in support of measures that protect teachers from attack. Link with partner teachers’ unions, NGOs, and civil society to coordinate for mass action. Include activities before during, and after the demonstration, such as leaflets, press conferences, community discussions, and others.
• The Armed Forces of the Philippines Letter Directive 34 (2009). This states that “basic infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and health units shall not be utilized for military purposes such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots”. Letter Directive 25 (2013) stipulates, among other guidelines and policies regarding Armed Forces of the Philippines presence in schools, that school administration must provide permission prior to military school occupancy for legal purposes or for civil-military operations (school projects).

• Davao City Council Resolution (2012). An example of city-level policy, this resolution warned the military against setting up any more detachments or similar structures near schools and population centers.

The Philippines’ vibrant civil society, including local and international NGOs and multiple teachers’ associations, are collaborating to advocate for the rights and protection of teachers. Other conflict-affected countries can consider application and adaptation of recommendations made by Philippines stakeholders. For countries confronting election violence against teachers, the DERN program provides an important model. Similarly, the eight communities implementing LIZOP have successfully protected teachers and schools from attack since the declaration of their codes of conduct. The monitoring and reporting procedures implemented in the Philippines provide valuable lessons regarding the process of establishing a mechanism, the importance of confidence building measures for monitors, and the need to ensure appropriate responses and confidentiality. The Philippines also provides several examples of legislation that protect teachers from attack, which could be instructive to other countries in the drafting process. However, the challenge remains to improve both the implementation of existing policies at all levels of the country, as well as the accountability of the perpetrators of attacks on teachers.
RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper addresses the scope and nature of attacks on education personnel and the range of measures that have been put in place to protect them. Many of these measures have not been formally evaluated. Additional research needs to be done in order to understand the dynamics of attacks on teachers and how to most effectively protect them. Nevertheless, valuable lessons have emerged from practitioners’ experiences that can inform future progress in this area. Drawn from the global review above as well as the case study of the Philippines, the following recommendations are proposed to stakeholders in countries that experience attacks on education personnel. They include information, for example, from interviews with stakeholders from the Philippines who have been proactively addressing attacks on teachers for several years now. Other recommendations emerged from interviews with stakeholders from different contexts. The recommendations are directed toward three different groups of stakeholders: 1) government, including ministries of education, policymakers, and security forces; 2) local education actors, community-based and human rights organizations, and teachers’ unions; and 3) international organizations, including UN agencies, INGOs, and education organizations.

Government and Policymakers

- **Legislation and policies to protect teachers.** Adopt national policies and laws in line with international law that protect education personnel, including protection from election violence and harassment against teachers for their political affiliations, and protection of teachers’ right to academic freedom. Enforce existing criminal codes that protect civilians from attack.

- **Security force deployment.** Do not use police or security forces to provide security at schools except where a high risk exists and there is no alternative. If security forces are necessary to maintain safety, under no circumstances should they have a presence on school grounds or in school buildings, since that could compromise the school’s civilian status. Ensure that educational personnel have discretion to decide whether or not to participate in security escorts or convoy travel. Assess the effectiveness and, if appropriate, expand the security for teachers along roadways to and from school rather than to specific individuals. Ensure that security measures don’t further endanger teachers.

- **Military use of schools.** Implement the Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict, including developing strict rules to minimize harm to education personnel and students and prohibiting partial occupation of schools. Governments should provide training in international humanitarian law and human rights law to security forces to curb abuses.

- **Return of education personnel.** Take measures to ensure the return to posts of all administrators and teachers after attacks while taking into consideration the risks associated with the return to the most unstable areas. Establish a system to ensure safety of returning teachers and payment of salaries. Transfer teachers to other posts if safety cannot be guaranteed.

- **Conflict sensitive policy.** Ministries of education should invest in conflict analysis of education content, delivery, and policy and undertake reforms that respect the human rights of teachers and teachers’ unions. Ensure that education delivery and content is conflict sensitive and doesn’t trigger hostilities against teachers.

- **Accountability.** Carry out independent investigations into the killings of teachers, make those findings public, and bring those responsible to justice.

Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
• **Protection measures.** Use risk analysis to develop school safety and security interventions to protect education personnel and students. Consider risks before advocating for armed guards or escorts for education personnel. Seek support from community organizations and parents in designing school-based teacher protection measures and document program effectiveness. Develop school safety plans and early warning systems in coordination with the community and parents.

• **Monitoring and reporting of attacks on education personnel.** Undertake monitoring and reporting of attacks on teachers in cooperation with the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), if it exists, or devise a system of data collection in cooperation with teachers, child protection actors, and communities. Report findings to the SRSG-CAAC and appropriate government agencies if government is not implicated in attacks. Consider reporting violations against teachers to Education International (EI) and other similar international advocacy organizations.

• **Advocacy.** Advocate with government and public authorities for policies that make schools zones of peace and to end impunity of perpetrators through prosecution and legal reform. Form partnerships and coalitions with organizations at local, national, and international levels to amplify calls for protection, prevention, and accountability. If advocacy is judged to be too risky to undertake, consider asking for assistance from international organizations to ensure the safety of education or human rights defenders.

### UN Agencies, I/NGOs, and Other Education Practitioners

• **Conflict analysis.** Promote and support the use of a conflict analysis with government and stakeholders to understand the nature of attacks on education personnel and to inform the design and implementation of short and long term protection measures.

• **Community involvement in protection.** Support community-based protection measures, providing appropriate assistance in program design, implementation, and evaluation.

• **Advocacy.** Lobby the relevant line ministries to adopt policies that protect education personnel, declare schools zones of peace, and end impunity of perpetrators through prosecution and legal reform. Advocate with government authorities, the Ministry of Education, military, and civil authorities for the reopening of schools after attacks on education personnel and for the provision of appropriate security measures for them. Where education clusters are in place, cluster members and human rights groups should advocate for states, military personnel, and armed groups to comply with international law and monitor compliance.

• **Monitoring and reporting attacks on education personnel.** Whether or not there is a UN MRM in place, monitor attacks on education personnel to raise awareness of attacks and use the data to advocate against them. Develop accurate systems to collect information on targeted attacks and threats against education personnel and report them to national or international rights organizations. Foster links with child protection to improve monitoring and reporting of attacks on teachers. Actively investigate all reports involving political violence and intimidation against teachers.

• **Conflict sensitive programming.** Ensure that program interventions undertaken with stakeholders to protect education personnel are informed by a conflict analysis and do not exacerbate existing tensions.

• **Evaluation.** Ensure that an evaluation process is built into teacher protection interventions and programs in order to measure their impact and develop appropriate evaluation tools and indicators.
Endnotes

5 Education under Attack 2014 was published by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack in February 2014. This publication is a continuation in the series published by UNESCO in 2007 and 2010. It is the most comprehensive global survey of attacks on education to date.
8 For example, the CONTEND website from Philippines has an education journal, Pigkian, Journal for emancipatory and Anti-imperialist Education, with an article by Lanuza, G. (2012). Neoliberal Capitalist Assault on Education: Backlash and People’s Resistance. Pigkian, 1(1); and writings on the ‘pedagogical movement’ in Latin America, including, Education International Latin American Regional Committee (2012). Towards a Latin American Pedagogical Movement.
24 Email correspondence with Education International on 20-1-14.
28 Email correspondence with PTOUZ member on 11-1-13.
Chapter 4: The Role of Communities in Protecting Education from Attack: Lessons Learned

55 Interview with Dr. Wittawat Kattiyaamn and Dr. Amornwan Werathammo, Thaksin University, 11/2/13 for case study prepared for UNICEF East Asia/Pacific Regional Office.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
61 Emails from informant supporting education protection efforts in Zimbabwe, provided by researcher Hannah Thompson, May 2013.
66 Interview with UN agency staff, as reported by Hannah Thompson on 17-10-13 via email correspondence.
68 Email correspondence with PTUZ member, 24-9-13.
71 Personal Correspondence with key informant, 10-2-14.
75 Ibid, p. 7.
76 Ibid, p. 15.
77 Ibid, p. 25.
78 Ibid, p. 4.
79 School attacks do continue, and, although responsibility for them and their rate is unclear, there is some evidence that the Taliban leadership has ordered at least some school burnings. Ibid. p. 5 and p. 13.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid, p. 11.
89 The first violation for which a party could be listed was recruitment and use of children by armed forces and armed groups. Subsequent Security Council resolutions added other violations: killing and maiming of children and rape and other grave sexual violence against children (SC Resolution 1882) and attacks on schools and hospitals (SC Resolution 1998). Abduction and denial of humanitarian access do not lead to listing, but are monitored in all situations.
91 Interviews, Manila, Philippines, October and November 2013.
92 Email correspondence, Kari Anette Lindemann, SAIH, Norway on 8-8-13.
93 Email correspondence researcher Hannah Thompson from UN agency staff, Côte d’Ivoire.
94 Email correspondence with PTUZ member, 24-9-13.
100 Information from author’s field work in Philippines and Thailand.
102 See Philippines case study in this paper.
103 Email correspondence with Education International on 20-1-14.
105 See SAIH website at http://www.saih.no/English/index.html
112 Ibid, p. 27.
113 Ibid, p. 27-28
114 Ibid, p. 28.
115 Agence France Presse (2013, December 16). Afghan poll must stay out of schools, clinics: aid groups.
119 Ibid.
120 A short documentary film on the program was shown at the GCPEA Knowledge Roundtable in Phuket, Thailand in 2011.
124 Interviews with community leaders in Philippines implementing Learning Institutions as Zones of Peace.
125 The information draws from a desk review of organizational and media documentation, as well as 25 stakeholder interviews collected in November 2013. Due to security concerns and multiple emergencies (earthquake, typhoon, conflict) affecting the country at the time of the research trip, interviews were conducted from Manila in person or via teleconference and several were cancelled. To protect the identity of those interviewed, in the text the respondents are referred to by type with limited specificity. Where possible, statements have been supplemented with evidence from additional sources, which are cited.
126 For protection of the respondents, comments are attributed to type of stakeholder rather than a specific name.
131 The term “private army” is used in the Philippines to refer to militias of powerful politicians and families such as the Ampatuan. The backing of the militias is complex and greater detail on this can be found in Human Rights Watch (2010), They Own the People: The Ampatuan, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern Philippines. New York: Human Rights Watch.
The role of communities in protecting education from attack: Lessons learned


140 Interview with UN agency staff, 4-11-13, Manila, Philippines.


143 Interview with UN agency staff, 4-11-13, Manila, Philippines.


146 For example, texting green means teachers are safe; yellow means elections pushed through with some degree of threat; red means teachers were threatened and stopped administering elections; and black means an attack against the school and teachers took place, and with casualties. Parede, A. K. (2013). Department of Ed forms network to protect teachers on poll duty. Verifiable.


149 For greater detail on this designation, see the website http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/philippines/.

150 Phone interview, 9-11-14.


152 Phone interview, 6-11-13.


158 Ibid.

159 Parents, teachers, community leaders, children, religious leaders, volunteer teachers, Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, MILF, MNLF, BIFF, politicians, Department of Education ARMM, local nongovernmental organizations, and Education Cluster.


162 Description adapted from the Karapatan website and respondent’s comments: About (n.d.). Karapatan, retrieved on 23 November 2013 from http://www.karapatan.org/about.
OTHER GCPEA PUBLICATIONS

All GCPEA communications materials and publications are available on our website: www.protectingeducation.org or by contacting the Coalition at: gcpea@protectingeducation.org

Education under Attack 2014
2014

Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict
2013

Lessons in War: Military Use of Schools and Other Education Institutions during Conflict
2012

Report from the Knowledge Roundtable on Programmatic Measures in Prevention, Intervention and Response to Attacks on Education
2011

The Role of Communities in Protecting Education from Attack: Lessons Learned
2014

Institutional Autonomy and the Protection of Higher Education from Attack
2013

Study on Field-based Programmatic Measures to Protect Education from Attack
2011

Prioritizing the Agenda for Research for the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack: Why Evidence is Important, What We Know, and How to Learn More
2011
Front cover: A teacher looks out from the ruins of his school in Charsadda, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan, after it was attacked in June 2013.
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