

EDUCATION AND CONFLICT MITIGATION: WHAT THE AID WORKERS SAY

Dana Burde

Amy Kapit-Spitalny

Rachel Wahl

Ozen Guven



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



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by Dana Burde, Amy Kapit-Spitalny, Rachel Wahl, and Ozen Guven²

ABSTRACT

In February 2011, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) finalized a new strategy for its work in education around the world. Of its three key goals, the third goal focuses on “access to education in crisis and conflict environments,” establishing the first explicit reference to the impact of crises on education, and of education on crises, for USAID initiatives. With this change, USAID underscores the importance of supporting education programs for conflict-affected populations. To administer effective programs that are not detrimental to the populations they aim to serve, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of current programs and of the ways education and violent conflict interact. In this paper we seek to answer the following questions: What is the relationship between education and conflict? How might education mitigate conflict? Toward this end, what works and what does not in program interventions? We gather practitioner knowledge of the relationship between education and conflict mitigation to prepare USAID education officers to design, implement, and monitor “education in emergencies” programs and to respond better to partners’ needs in the field.

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² Dana Burde is an Assistant Professor of International Education at New York University’s Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development and an Affiliated Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. Amy Kapit-Spitalny and Rachel Wahl are PhD candidates at NYU Steinhardt, and Ozen Guven is a PhD student at NYU Steinhardt. For correspondence about the paper, please contact Dana Burde, dana.burde@nyu.edu.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In February 2011, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) finalized a new strategy for its work in education around the world. Of its three key goals, the third goal focuses on “access to education in crisis and conflict environments,” establishing USAID’s first explicit reference to the impact of crises on education, and of education on crises. With this change, USAID underscores the importance of supporting education programs for conflict-affected populations. To administer effective programs that are not detrimental to the populations they aim to serve and, moreover, to work to mitigate conflict, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of current programs and of the ways education and violent conflict interact. In this paper we seek to answer the following questions: What is the relationship between education and conflict? How might education mitigate conflict? Toward this end, what works and what does not in program interventions? We gather information about the relationship between education and conflict mitigation to prepare USAID education officers to design, implement, and monitor “education in emergencies” programs³ and to respond better

to partners’ needs in the field.

Research on the relationship between education and violent conflict to date has focused mainly on the way conflict reduces access to education (Bensalah, Sinclair, Nacer, Commisso, & Bokhari, 2000; Sinclair, 2001)⁴ and secondarily on the way education exacerbates conflict (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). More recent research focuses on the relationship between education and conflict mitigation (Barakat & Urdal, 2009). In addition, because weak states are considered to play a key role in creating conflict, a new but significant body of work is devoted to understanding the reciprocal relationship between education and state legitimacy and capacity (Rose & Greeley, 2006). Most of these studies, however, remain confined to

system, rather than in representing most accurately the conditions in countries affected by conflict. Although USAID employs the phrase “education in crisis and conflict environments,” we continue to use “education in emergencies” because it remains the most common label used among aid workers to describe the types of humanitarian interventions in education that are funded and carried out by international organizations abroad.

³ As described below, we recognize that the phrase “education in emergencies” has its roots in the structure of the humanitarian

⁴ A note on in-text citations and references: We refer to publications by author when the author’s name is available, rather than by organization.

practitioner-oriented publications.⁵ At the same time, an extensive body of academic work examines the causes of war, although this literature pays limited attention to education. When education is included in any of these models of conflict, it is usually discussed in relation to access. Specifically, lack of access to schooling is considered a source of grievance that motivates disaffected youth to take up arms.

To consolidate and build on existing knowledge, we collected two kinds of data. First, we conducted a survey of practitioner-oriented and relevant academic literature, compiling, sorting, and assessing key effects of conflict on education and education on conflict. To gather these data, we reviewed more than 200 program documents and academic publications. We synthesized this information and analyzed the evidence that clarifies the relationship between education and conflict to date. We assessed international organizations' responses to the impact of conflict on education

⁵ We use the term “practitioner-oriented literature” to refer to policy papers and documents typically written by and for staff working at organizations such as the UN or international NGOs, or by consultants hired by these agencies. These papers are generally intended to help guide staff in conducting their work in the field and are written for that goal. They provide large amounts of data and often offer the first insight into an important research question or field dilemma facing practitioners. Nonetheless, they may not give significant weight to a research design, may not include empirical data, or may rely on anecdotal evidence or assumed best practices to support their claims. In contrast, academic literature generally refers to studies that are carried out by academics or researchers affiliated with a university. These papers seek to gather enough empirical evidence to identify causal links and theoretical models and perhaps even to allow generalizations across populations. They are guided by theoretical frameworks and a strong focus on research design; their methods are intended to collect data systematically to answer a specific research question. They are externally reviewed before they are published in peer-reviewed journals. Yet they often speak past practitioners and do not provide concrete policy recommendations.

as well as ways outside interventions in education may (inadvertently) contribute to conflict. Our second set of data comes from semistructured interviews with 17 seasoned educator-aid workers who have deep field experience with multiple types of organizations and in many countries. More details on the profile of these respondents and the ways they were selected are provided in Section VI. We summarize our findings from these two sources of data briefly here.

Despite the scant evidence for causal pathways between education and conflict, practitioner-oriented literature shows significant steps toward better understanding this relationship and designing programs to address it. Based on desk and field studies, researchers highlight several ways education and conflict affect each other. First, conflict reduces state capacity to provide education and may increase incentives for discrimination in education provision. It raises the likelihood of danger and sexual exploitation at school and diminishes the quality of learning. Conversely, peace is a precondition for a strong and stable education system. Next, intentionally or unintentionally inadequate and unequal access to education, biased curricula and discriminatory teaching practices, and corruption in the education system increase the likelihood of conflict. In contrast, state provision of comprehensive education, support of fair access to education, inclusive and peaceful curricula and teaching practices, and accountability in the education system increase the chances of peace (UNESCO, 2011b). We draw on empirical research to discuss each of these relationships further, indicating which remain underexplored and warrant further research.

In our interviews, practitioners recounted still other ways interventions in education affect

conflict, for example, positively by strengthening communities or negatively by providing programs inequitably, which results in aggravating underlying conditions for conflict. We highlight the following key findings from our interviews regarding the relationship between education interventions and conflict mitigation. Although the practitioners we interviewed cited many specific examples of successful education in emergencies programs, some of them struggled to describe direct links between these programs and conflict mitigation. When asked about the interaction between programs and conflict dynamics, they focused predominantly on the ways *program implementation* affects conflict positively or negatively, leaving aside particular types of programs to support populations affected by conflict.⁶ Here are respondents' key points:

1. The most effective education in emergencies programs that are also most likely to mitigate conflict exhibit the following features: community ownership, good relations between outsiders and locals, talented staff, and contextual understanding (i.e., they are sensitive to local cultural and conflict dynamics). They also require time and flexibility to carry out. Programs that are likely to be ineffective and contribute to conflict are those that fail to win community support and are hobbled by poor management and planning.
2. The exclusion of education from humanitarian response, poor funding, and poor coordination among aid agencies decrease the ability of weak states to provide adequate education and inhibit education interventions from mitigating conflict. Aid

bureaucracies and mechanisms are often inappropriate for education programs in conflict-affected environments—they are either too slow or too inflexible to be responsive.

3. Respondents identify strong links between education and conflict mitigation. Yet many respondents expressed concern that conflict mitigation efforts are conflated with and subsumed by stabilization and strategic interests. Although they considered conflict dynamics critical to take into account when planning education in emergencies programs, they expressed concern that interpreting conflict mitigation through the security interests of a foreign state narrows the focus, potentially hindering the goals of both approaches.

Several of these observations are not unique to education in emergencies programs and could be applied to any international aid program. Yet these issues take on greater significance for education programs in countries affected by conflict for several reasons. First, in conflict-affected environments, management or implementation errors may spark grave consequences. If an education program is fraught with implementation problems in a stable developing country, children may not benefit from the program. Relations between those promoting the program and the beneficiaries of the program may even deteriorate, but these outcomes are unlikely to lead to conflict. In contrast, if similar mistakes occur in a conflict-affected country, they may lead to rioting among angry community members, as some of our respondents have reported. Negative program outcomes are undesirable anywhere, but they appear to have greater consequences in regions affected by conflict.

⁶ Please see Attachment I for the interview protocol form.

Second, support to education plays a singular role in mediating between the state and its citizens, unlike any other form of aid. States use schools to create national identity, train a work force, and cultivate a particular form of citizenship. In developing countries, schools are generally the most prevalent government institution in rural and sometimes urban areas, outnumbering health clinics, police stations, and post offices. They have a wide impact across the population. For many children, attending school constitutes their earliest and most frequent contact with their state, represented by teachers and school buildings. Because education is formative by definition, positive and negative experiences have a deep and lasting effect on individuals.

To examine the unique and critical role—both positive and negative—that education and educational aid can play in areas of conflict, this paper proceeds in the following sections. First, we discuss the historical roots of education in

emergencies programs. The fact that these programs emerged as part of humanitarian aid and Education for All efforts has shaped the way they include or omit conflict mitigation analysis today. Second, we review dominant paradigms that explain causes of conflict. We combine academic and practitioner-oriented literature to show how education fits into existing conflict models and what these models leave out. We assess the degree to which these relationships are grounded in empirical research. Third and fourth, we show how conflict affects education, how education affects conflict, and how to address this dynamic. Fifth, we highlight key findings from our qualitative interview data showing “what works” and “what does not work” among education and conflict mitigation programs in conflict-affected states and volatile contexts. Finally, we conclude with preliminary recommendations for research and for improving work on education programs in fragile and conflict affected contexts.

II. BACKGROUND

A. **Historical Roots and Tensions**

Education in emergencies refers to a set of program interventions that are supported by international, bilateral, and multinational organizations worldwide to help children living in conflict-affected countries gain access to education. They comprise a subset of programs that overlap with and unite two global efforts: humanitarian response to alleviate suffering and Education for All (EFA) initiatives. Yet, for different reasons, neither one of these global initiatives has whole-heartedly embraced education in emergencies programs. On the one hand, although humanitarians possess the financial and management mechanisms required to deliver aid quickly in hard-to-reach places, they have been slow to include education as a crucial element of emergency aid. Humanitarians vacillate between “needs based” and “rights based” approaches, still prioritizing interventions deemed to be “life saving” (food, water, shelter, medical supplies) over those considered nonessential, such as education. On the other hand, although education is, of course, central to EFA goals, EFA initiatives lack the financial and management mechanisms to support education in

countries and regions affected by conflict and crisis. And both camps—humanitarians and EFA champions—prioritize “service delivery” and access to education over other issues related to education in these circumstances, such as conflict mitigation. Understanding these roots of the education in emergencies field is important to understand and explain accurately the relationship between international interventions in education and conflict mitigation today.

B. **The Rise of Education in Emergencies and Its Relationship to Conflict Mitigation**

The meteoric rise of education in emergencies is an advocacy success story.⁷ As humanitarian action evolved and expanded in the mid to late

⁷ Clearly, the education in emergencies movement has made significant progress since the 1990s. On July 9, 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted the first resolution on education in emergencies, *The Right to Education in Emergency Situations* (INEE, n.d.), and in July 2011, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that “recognizes schools and hospitals as safe havens for children...[and] calls for all parties that attack such facilities to be held accountable” (UNICEF, 12 July 2011). Yet as UNESCO (2011a) notes, education in countries affected by conflict remains woefully underfunded.

1990s, aid workers took the opportunity to promote education as a key activity to be included in humanitarian response. A confluence of global events pressured humanitarian action to expand beyond its traditional activities (delivering food, shelter, medicine) and buttressed the educators' efforts. First, international human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 and follow-up action meetings held by United Nations (UN) agencies expanded, strengthened, and institutionalized the recognition and protection of children's rights. Second, wars changed. Interstate conflicts declined, intrastate conflict increased, and the numbers of displaced or killed civilians surged. According to many sources, by the 1990s, civilians accounted for 90% of casualties in war (Paris, 2004). Third, the September 11 attacks triggered increased attention from western governments to countries affected by conflict. Countries considered to be "failed," "failing," or "fragile" states that international aid donors had neglected or isolated became targets for western intervention. These countries were no longer perceived to be a danger only to themselves; many western governments suddenly perceived them as posing an imminent threat to the world at large and to the western world in particular (Barnett, 2009; Burde, 2011). Finally, and most important, local populations affected by conflict and disaster requested support for education from humanitarian aid donors. Educators, in turn, noted the gap in services provided to populations affected by crisis and advocated for increased support to education (Burde, 2005; Anderson, Martone, Perlman Robinson, Rognerud, & Sullivan-Oyomoyela, 2006).

As calls for education in emergencies increased, humanitarian aid continued to undergo change. Humanitarian action was historically guided by the key operating principles of universality,

neutrality, impartiality, and independence, most clearly embodied by the International Committee of the Red Cross and marked by a needs-based approach to crises. A number of high-profile, tragic scandals in the 1990s, such as the inadvertent support to *genocidaires* in Rwandan refugee camps and the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at the UN-protected Safe Area of Srebrenica, raised questions about the neutrality of humanitarian aid and spurred international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to review their work (Terry, 2002). The Sphere Standards and the "do no harm" principle emerged from this period of introspection. By setting standards and framing them in human rights language, the Sphere project took a step away from a needs-based approach to humanitarian action and toward a more codified, professionalized, rights-based approach.⁸ The Sphere Handbook, coupled with the events that led to it, marked a significant expansion of the humanitarian mandate (see Weiss, 1999; Minear, 2002; Stoddard, 2002; Barnett, 2005; Alexander, Boothby, & Wessels, 2010).⁹

At the same time, educators adopted a number of strategies and initiatives to advocate for including education in the humanitarian response paradigm. First, in 2000 they formed the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) to support education in countries affected by conflict and crises. In doing so, they defined education in emergencies strategically as a category separate from education development activities in order to incorporate education into

⁸ For more information, see <http://www.sphereproject.org/>.

⁹ Tension between "minimalist" (addressing needs) and "maximalist" (addressing root causes) approaches to aid among humanitarians persists. Among minimalists, some perceive support to education to constitute political engagement and therefore an illegitimate component of humanitarian response. Although this position is no longer widespread, concerns about the complicating effects of political influences remain strong.

traditional humanitarian assistance (Burde, 2005). The term “emergencies” signaled its urgency and underscored the relevance of education to the humanitarian response paradigm. Second, because the first Sphere project excluded education, INEE launched the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction (MS) in 2004 to guarantee children their right to education with a minimum standard of quality. The INEE MS followed the language and structure of the Sphere Handbook and was billed as a “companion handbook.” Finally, placing emphasis on delivering education as a “service” that could be packaged (i.e., UNICEF’s “education in a box”) highlighted its compatibility with other forms of packaged emergency aid. Stressing “service delivery” had additional implications. It helped distance education from politics, further deepening its compatibility with core humanitarian principles. It also resulted in a rhetorical emphasis on access over quality.¹⁰

Although these efforts have had significant success in bringing education into the humanitarian aid paradigm,¹¹ the program literature and our interviews show that educators still struggle to insert education programs into typical humanitarian responses. Many international organizations continue to view education as a dimension of development assistance, not a life-saving priority (Winthrop, Ndaruhutse, Dolan, & Adams, 2010). Some important organizations have yet to add education to their humanitarian response (e.g., the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

[OFDA], the Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission [ECHO]). In addition, donors typically separate humanitarian from development funding and view the investment in education as too risky for humanitarian crises (UNESCO, 2011a).¹² For these reasons, many educators around the world cheered when USAID altered its strategy to give priority to education in conflict and crisis-affected environments.

Nonetheless, the post-September 11 efforts to align humanitarian aid with states’ security interests intensify concerns among aid workers and educators over the politicization of aid. Often conflict mitigation activities are linked to stabilization and security goals. For example, this is especially the case in “Critical Priority Countries,” which receive the majority of USAID funds. Adhering to traditional humanitarian principles, such as neutrality, impartiality, and independence, sits uneasily with both conflict mitigation and stabilization activities. Yet many aid agencies that have already expanded their mandates beyond minimalist humanitarian goals extend these humanitarian principles to conflict mitigation approaches. In these approaches, they see their role as that of impartial outsiders who may mitigate the effects of war by addressing the root causes of conflict. In contrast, they see stabilization as narrowly focused and defined by the security interests of outsiders. Educators and humanitarians working in conflict-affected countries express deep concern about the extent to which education may be affected by strategic priorities and subordinated to political goals (UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2007; Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response [SCHR],

¹⁰ Focusing efforts on simply delivering a service and maintaining distance from educational content may have helped aid workers depoliticize their work in education.

¹¹ For example, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, and many international NGOs now include education systematically in their humanitarian responses. This kind of systematic attention to education as part of a humanitarian response was unthinkable even 15 years ago.

¹² For more information on innovative mechanisms for disbursing aid to education, see Caroline Schmidt and Aleesha Taylor (n.d.) “Liberia’s Education Pooled Fund: A Case for Private Foundation Engagement in Post Conflict Education Recovery.”

2010). Notwithstanding caution by international agencies, it is widely recognized that humanitarianism has become increasingly politicized (Duffield, 2002; Terry, 2002; Barnett, 2005; Barnett & Weiss, 2008; Novelli, 2010; SCHR, 2010).

Beyond their ethical questions, humanitarians have other reasons for concern. In the past 12 years, violent attacks on aid workers have increased by 61% (Stoddard, Harmer, & DiDomenico, 2009). The types of threats to aid workers depend on the nature of the conflict. In countries with a prolonged insurgency where the military delivers aid as part of counterinsurgency tactics (e.g., the current conflict in Afghanistan), aid workers may be seen as legitimate targets, especially if they work or are perceived as working in collaboration with the military or the government. Aid agencies work from apartments instead of offices and remove identifying logos on their vehicles to reduce their visibility. Yet low-profile approaches make it difficult for an organization to appear transparent and may raise suspicions (Egland, Harmer, & Stoddard, 2011) as well as delay or obstruct the delivery of aid.

Institutionally, as part of the U.S. State Department, USAID is at the center of this debate. As official aid is bound more closely to states' political objectives, bilateral organizations have sharpened their focus on both conflict mitigation and stabilization initiatives. On the one hand, USAID defines conflict mitigation as "activities that seek to reduce the threat of violent conflict by promoting peaceful resolution of differences, reducing violence if it has already broken out, or establishing a framework for peace and reconciliation in an ongoing conflict" (USAID, 2005a, p. 5). Guiding principles for pursuing these activities call for using a "conflict lens" to approach all traditional aid sectors, such as agriculture, democracy

and governance, and economic growth.¹³ Peace education programs, for example, fit into this framework. On the other hand, those involved in stabilization efforts may work closely with the military to provide social and economic aid explicitly "to build confidence and trust" between a government and its people (USAID, n.d.). Along these lines, while USAID is a principal actor in providing aid, it also plays a key role in deploying mixed civil-military teams to deliver aid as a tool to promote stability (e.g., Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRTs] in Afghanistan and Iraq). Insufficient differentiation between these two kinds of initiatives leads to confusion and undermines attention to conflict dynamics when planning education in emergencies programs.

To date, with few exceptions, education has not been incorporated effectively into conflict mitigation, and conflict mitigation has not been prioritized in education in emergencies programs. The revised INEE (2010) *Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery* stands out as one of the few education tools that are now infused with an awareness of conflict mitigation. The following pages provide additional insights into why education has been incorporated in a limited way into conflict mitigation and vice versa. Educators tell us that they are keen to participate in humanitarian action and promote conflict mitigation through education, while ensuring that their programs "do no harm." They are concerned that conflict mitigation be applied broadly and equitably, rather than selectively as many stabilization programs appear to be. We will discuss these findings further, but first, we explore the theoretical paradigms that support these programs.

¹³ Oddly, education is not included in this list, although "women, health, and HIV" are (USAID, 2005c, p. 6).

III. WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT?

Two distinct bodies of literature examine the causes of conflict and the relationship between conflict and education. Both inform the practice of delivering education in conflict-affected areas. On the one hand, academic scholarship theorizes and examines the nature and causes of conflict, focusing on the motivations of actors who engage in war (often framed in terms of greed, grievance, or both) as well as on the structural constraints and opportunities for it. This literature is important to understand because conflict mitigation work and practical assessments—as well as, to some extent, education in emergencies programs—are premised on it. On the other hand, a practitioner-oriented literature looks at the multiple, complex, and reciprocal relationships between conflict and education.

These literatures are each limited by their neglect of the other. Scholarship on conflict takes a macro-level perspective, explaining it well in a global, comparative context, but neglecting variations in conflict dynamics within particular countries and the role of different political actors. Consequently, it deals with education tangentially, addressing macro-level issues such as access. In contrast, the practitioner-oriented literature,

while informed by academic research, deals with a broader set of issues but remains undertheorized. It engages in little systematic analysis of the interactions between education and conflict, the mechanisms connecting the two, and the factors causing them to vary in particular settings. These gaps result in an inadequate understanding of the relationship between education and conflict and the roles of the various actors involved. Without more comprehensive knowledge of these dynamics, efforts to deliver education interventions in ways that mitigate the effects of conflict and do not further exacerbate it will be limited in their effectiveness.

A. The Greed and Grievance Paradigm: Motivations and Opportunities

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's seminal piece arguing that war is a consequence of either "greed" or "grievance" has dominated the recent study of conflict and work in conflict-affected areas (Ron, 2005). The paradigm focuses on intrastate civil conflict, assuming that the primary actors fueling violence are rebels fighting against their central governments (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2007).

According to the greed theory favored by Collier and Hoeffler's early work, individuals participating in conflict are motivated by a desire for economic gain. The presence of valuable resources makes conflict profitable for particular actors who actively encourage and perpetuate it.

In contrast, the grievance theory argues that political, economic, and social injustices such as inequality or political oppression—or perception of injustices—on the part of different social, often ethnic, groups lead to conflict. Thus, the degree of *ethnic fractionalization* in a country is associated with its risk of conflict. Countries with higher levels of fractionalization are at significantly greater risk than those with lower levels (Collier et al., 2007; see also Fearon & Laitin, 2000; Petersen, 2002).

Greed and grievance, however, are not mutually exclusive explanations for conflict; they often work as complementary mechanisms. Ron (2005) argues that economic factors such as poverty and primary commodity exports do not intrinsically cause conflict. Rather, they trigger it through mechanisms that are social and political as well as economic. Grievances may result from inequality in resources or from forced migration due to resource extraction, or they may develop in response to ineffective governance and inequitable distribution of goods and services (Ballantine & Sherman, 2003; Humphreys, 2005).

The opportunity for engaging in conflict is also important (see, for example, USAID, 2005a). Collier and colleagues (2007) write that conflict occurs where it is *feasible*, regardless of the motivations for it. In this case, state capacity and geographic reach are critical. Weak state institutions result in opportunistic behavior and lead rebel leaders to believe they have greater chances

of success (Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ron, 2005; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005; Collier et al., 2007; Kalyvas, 2007; Murshed & Tadjoeeddin, 2007). These limitations are exacerbated in countries that are large, mountainous, and geographically remote (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2007).

Although the greed and grievance dichotomy has much less purchase in the academic community today, the theory continues to play an important role in shaping how practitioners think about the connection between education and conflict.¹⁴ Education, particularly issues of access, factors into the paradigm because it can fuel popular grievances and because a lack of educational opportunity makes individuals more willing to join violent groups, facilitating conflict and rebellion against a state. The reform and development of education systems therefore are considered critical components for establishing peace, security, and development and for preventing state fragility (Rose & Greeley, 2006; Barakat, Karpinski, & Paulson, 2008; Barakat & Urdal, 2009; Bethke, 2009; Davies, 2009; DeGrauwe, 2009).¹⁵

Drawing on the greed and grievance model, the practitioner-oriented literature holds a key belief that discriminatory education policies and the inadequate and inequitable provision of education contribute to political grievances against the state. Communities affected by conflict typically

¹⁴ The greed and grievance dichotomy has been criticized for its simplicity (Ron, 2005) and is subject to debate over, for example, the degree to which the presence of primary commodity exports actually is associated with conflict.

¹⁵ According to OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), fragile states are "countries with poor governance as identified by a *lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies*" (Rose & Greeley, 2006, p. 1).

demand support for education (Anderson et al., 2006; Barakat et al., 2008). Thus, the provision of education is considered to facilitate peace, state legitimacy, and stability, while its neglect, or unequal provision, serves as a potential source of personal grievance against the state. Because education is often available unequally, different groups within a country may hold grievances to varying degrees. This situation may incur a greater sense of grievance among groups with decreased access to education and may potentially bring them into conflict with others who have better access.

The argument that the inadequate and unequal provision of education fuels grievance against the state has some empirical basis. Thyne (2006), for example, outlines several ways that education may result in state stability and tests for the connection. Along with education being an indicator of state commitment to its people, it may also create social cohesion, reduce inequality, and result in economic growth. Drawing from data on civil war onset and education enrollment rates, Thyne finds evidence that state provision of education does indeed increase stability. However, more research is needed to specify the mechanisms that link educational provision to reduced grievances and, conversely, inadequate education to increased grievances.

Strong evidence shows that the lack of education is linked with the opportunity for conflict by contributing to an availability of recruits. If individuals have no educational opportunities, the cost of becoming a fighter is lower. Conversely, if educational opportunities are available, the cost of forgoing those opportunities to participate in conflict is much higher. Humphreys and Weinstein

(2008) find, for example, that among youth in Sierra Leone, those without access to education were nine times more likely to become rebels than those who did go to school (see also Barakat & Urdal, 2009).

These findings are confirmed by research on the relationship between a “youth bulge,” a large population of (male) youth, and the likelihood of conflict. Global studies demonstrate that youth bulge countries have an increased risk of conflict and that this risk grows with a lack of educational opportunity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2004; Barakat & Urdal, 2009; Brett & Specht, 2004, cited in Ostby & Urdal, 2010). Using a dataset from 120 countries over 30 years, Barakat and Urdal (2009) find a clear and significant relationship among large youth populations; low levels of education, particularly secondary education; and the likelihood of conflict. However, as the authors point out, this relationship is not necessarily causal, and it may vary in different settings. For example, they find that the relationship does not hold in countries with large agricultural sectors. In these contexts, higher levels of education are not significantly associated with lower levels of conflict, and Barakat and Urdal conclude that a different causal mechanism may be at work: highly educated youth may be more easily frustrated by a lack of job opportunities. Similarly, Ostby and Urdal (2010) find that the relationship between education and conflict is mediated by a variety of factors, such as poverty, the presence of natural resources, and type of regime. These findings indicate that while a general, macro-level relationship between high levels of education and decreased conflict clearly exists, the impact of education on conflict may vary in different

settings and in interaction with diverse contextual dynamics. It is important to develop a stronger empirical basis for understanding these varied and complex relationships.¹⁶

B. Limitations to the Greed and Grievance Model and Links to Education

The greed and grievance model has two key limitations. First, its global perspective results in a focus on variables that are broad and static to the exclusion of other, more dynamic factors that could also affect conflict. In terms of education, the factors that receive attention are access to education and the presence of a large youth bulge. However, the education practitioners interviewed for this paper and those writing on the relationship between education and conflict recognize that a myriad of other issues shape conflict as well; for example, the type of education that is taught. These factors are important for clarifying how education and conflict dynamics interact in particular places. Second, the conflict literature focuses on the motivations of and opportunities for rebels to instigate conflict, without significant attention to other actors involved, such as state personnel or international governments and organizations. In education, this focus coincides with insufficient attention to such factors as the actors providing education and their potential role in conflict.

¹⁶Academics whose primary focus is the study of international and comparative education are paying increased attention to the links between education and conflict. See, for example, Mundy and Dryden-Peterson's (eds.) forthcoming publication, *Educating Children in Conflict Zones: Research, Policy, and Practice for Systemic Change—A Tribute to Jackie Kirk*. Although not yet available for review, the book presents important data related to many of the questions discussed here.

Limitation 1: The Factors Shaping Conflict

The macro-level perspective of the greed versus grievance model for studying conflict is unable to account for the diverse and varied local nuances in conflict dynamics. For example, an overarching “master cleavage” or narrative may drive a conflict at the center but may also interact in different ways with local or private issues and actors, resulting in a situation in which “individual and local actors take advantage of the war to settle local or private conflicts often bearing little or no relation to the causes of the war or the goals of the belligerents” (Kalyvas, 2003, pp. 475–476; see also Fearon & Laitin 2003; Varshney, 2002, 2010). In terms of education, the emphasis on access over local conflict dynamics may detract from a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between education and conflict. The provision of education may enhance government stability and contribute to peace only under particular conditions and in conjunction with other development efforts. These conditions and mechanisms have not been sufficiently identified.

Limitation 2: The Actors Instigating Conflict

The second issue from the conflict literature of significant importance to educators working in conflict-affected countries concerns its understanding of the actors involved in instigating conflict. Recent scholarship on the causes and dynamics of conflict and war has focused almost exclusively on intrastate battles. In the 2010 annual report based on the Armed Conflict Dataset collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo, of 36 active armed conflicts, no interstate conflict occurred (Harbom & Wallenstein, 2010). In these civil conflicts, the instigating actors are frequently assumed

to be rebels fighting against central governments (see, for example, Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Collier et al., 2007).

This assumption eclipses a more nuanced understanding of types of conflicts and the range of actors involved in perpetuating them. Conflicts do not necessarily occur between rebel groups and state actors. Instead, wars may be fought between two nonstate groups, between two militaries, or between governments and politically organized opponents (Besancon, 2005; Kalyvas, 2005, 2007). Further, it is not necessarily accurate that rebel groups are the main instigators of conflict. Two other groups of actors are also important, particularly in terms of considering how aid to education, and who is providing education, may interact with conflict: state governments and international actors, including aid agencies and foreign militaries.

Government Actors: State governments may play a substantial role in instigating and perpetuating conflict. For instance, conflict may be intentionally provoked as a way to “justify elite payoffs.” Or, a state may directly target “peripheral strongmen” or respond to “nascent rebellions” indiscriminately, creating “bitter grievances where none previously existed” (Ron, 2005, p. 448; see Cohen, Brown, & Organski, 1981; White, 1989; Wickham-Crowley, 1993; Stanley, 1996; Goodwin, 2001, as cited in Ron, 2005; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sommers & Buckland, 2004). Finally, there is also evidence that democratizing states may be prone to both internal and external conflict (Ellingsen, Gleditsch, Gates, & Hegre, 2001; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, 2002).

Recognizing the role that central governments may play in instigating and perpetuating conflict is important for those providing educational aid in areas of instability and conflict, particularly

as USAID emphasizes building state capacity for education and funding through local governments. According to USAID, “ineffective and illegitimate governance” is the source of instability in conflict-ridden countries (2005b, p. 3; see also Barakat et al., 2008; Bethke, 2009; UNESCO, 2011b). As highlighted below and noted among interviewees, much of the practitioner work relates to bolstering the ability of national governments to provide education. The role that governments play in conflict and instability remains largely unreconciled with the overwhelming emphasis on bolstering government capacity through education. This type of aid is problematic when government actors are also involved in conflict.

International Actors: International aid in conflict zones is not inevitably positive for those receiving it. In particular as our respondents and others note, international actors may fuel conflict by creating new sets of economic incentives for local actors (Berdal & Malone, 2000). The “do no harm” approach is intended to address this concern. However, because education is potentially so politicized, foreign providers of educational aid face a variety of other ways that their work can unintentionally exacerbate conflict, particularly when states that provide aid may also be participating in the conflict, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, although the majority of conflicts worldwide are considered civil wars, it is not uncommon for international troops to be involved. Although 2009 saw no interstate conflicts, 7 of the 36 intrastate conflicts that took place were “internationalized, in the sense that they involved troops sent from external states in aid of one of the warring parties” (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2010, p. 503). An increased understanding of the ways that different actors may contribute to conflict, and an additional examination of how this occurs, is important so that educational interventions do not inadvertently exacerbate hostilities.

IV. HOW DOES CONFLICT AFFECT EDUCATION?

And what to do about it

Although informed in part by the greed and grievance paradigm, the education practitioner-oriented literature has identified a multitude of other ways education and peace/conflict interact. These relationships remain underresearched and undertheorized, but practitioners have identified key problems faced by education in areas of conflict and have posed a series of solutions to those problems. This section examines this research. We first note briefly our methods for reviewing the literature.

To examine how the practitioner-oriented literature views the relationship between education and conflict, we reviewed approximately 200 documents, including field studies, desk studies, and toolkits produced by organizations providing aid to education in conflict-affected areas. We prioritized reports and literature from the organizations that have played key roles in establishing the field of education in emergencies, including, for example, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, UNESCO, UNICEF, USAID, and the World Bank. We assessed these documents to determine their key findings in terms of what works and what does

not work in implementing educational interventions in conflict settings, the key assumptions in which they are grounded, and the degree to which they are grounded in empirical evidence.

Following are the main pathways through which conflict affects education according to the practitioner-oriented literature.

The Negative Impact of Conflict on Education:

Conflict, instability, lack of state capacity to provide education, discrimination in education provision, and the presence of corruption in the education system disrupt access to schooling, decrease trust in the government, become a political or social grievance, and increase fragility.

The Positive Impact of Peace on Education:

Peace, economic stability, and good governance (particularly government capacity and accountability) are assumed to be preconditions for a strong and stable education system.

Thus, conflict has a negative impact on education in several ways. Among these are the following.

A. Danger at School

International organizations report that schools are increasingly targets of violence (Coursen-Neff & Zia-Zarifi, 2006; O'Malley, 2007, 2010; Wedge, 2008; Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2010a, 2010b). This recognition is relatively recent and as such is underresearched. However, analysts suggest several reasons for attacks on education. First, they are attributed to the rise of intrastate conflict, which may make it more likely that combatants will disregard international norms on the protection of civilians. In terms of motivations, analysts suggest that schools themselves may be targeted to punish participation in state institutions. Schools may also become targets when armed groups use them for military purposes, such as for barracks. Rebel groups may attack schools to disrupt communities and interfere with the daily life of targeted groups (UNESCO, 2011a). In addition, students may be directly targeted. Researchers note that schools are often sites of forced recruitment of child soldiers (Temmerman, 2001; HRW, 2002, cited in Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003). For example, in Afghanistan, female students have been targeted by acid attacks. Teachers are also sometimes taken by force when armed groups want to politically indoctrinate them, causing schools to close or preventing children from attending if they remain open (Wedge, 2008). Even if schools are not directly targeted, they may be located in violent areas, posing general risk to children and teachers and presenting a serious obstacle to attendance to parents (Zartman, 2007, cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010; Dryden-Peterson, 2010). Even if attendance remains high, direct violence against schools may destroy school buildings, necessitating a reorganization and new approach to educational provision.

What to do about it: Although they have not been systematically tested, two models for addressing attacks on education hold promise, depending on the type of conflict. First, in countries where government school buildings are under attack, community-based education in existing community structures may enhance protection for students, teachers, and administrators. Community organizations also help protect these schools by negotiating with or fending off would-be attackers (Glad, 2009; Burde, 2010). Second, in places where community-based schools are targeted for attack, nationwide citizens groups successfully argue for protection. In Nepal, the “Schools as Zones of Peace” Campaign involved the development of codes of conduct to safeguard schools, whereby local community members negotiated with the Maoists, the army, and other stakeholders to keep violence out of the schools (Smith, 2010).

B. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Schools, and Underattendance of Girls

Researchers also stress that the breakdown of social norms and the rule of law makes it easier for teachers and other school authorities to sexually exploit and abuse children. Often, this means that groups, such as girls, who may already be disadvantaged or subject to sexual exploitation during peacetime, become more so in unstable environments. The threat of kidnapping, sexual violence, or general lawlessness can cause parents to view the journey to and from school as too dangerous for daughters. Because of risks of sexual exploitation or pregnancy, parents in unstable locations will often keep girls home from school even if distance is not an issue (Kirk, 2006). An investigation of refugee communities in West Africa found that

teachers and NGO staff regularly demand sex from young girls in exchange for aid intended for the children. This included demands for sex from children in exchange for admission to education and training courses, as well as for good grades (UNHCR & Save the Children, 2002).

Several factors have been found to exacerbate the potential for sexual abuse and raise parents' concerns about it, which may cause parents to keep girls home from school. First is distance, particularly when nearby schools are damaged, leaving children with an even longer walk to school. Girls are vulnerable to attack during the walk, and parents may consider it inappropriate for girls to travel such distances if an escort is not available. Second, a lack of female teachers reduces the likelihood that parents will send their daughters to school in cultures in which it is considered inappropriate or dangerous for girls to be taught by men (Kirk, 2006; Guimbert, Miwa, & Nguyen, 2008). Third, if conflict has kept children out of school, classes may contain children of varying ages, and the presence of older boys in classes with girls may also pose a threat to girls (Kirk, 2009). Fourth, a lack of separate sanitary bathroom facilities poses particular challenges for girls (Kirk, 2006). Sexual assaults can occur in co-ed bathrooms or when a girl isolates herself for such purposes in lieu of using the co-ed bathroom. As a result, researchers assert that girls are often kept home if there are no sanitary sex-segregated bathrooms, especially during menstruation (Kirk, 2006; Okwirry, 2006). Fifth, if girls are mentally or physically disabled as a result of the crisis, reports note that they are likely to be kept at home. Finally, teachers may themselves be traumatized by conflict, which can worsen their abuse of students (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003; UNESCO, 2011a).

What to do about it: Several strategies have been found to have some success in limiting sexual abuse and increasing girls' enrollment in school. First, carefully vetting teachers is important. In addition, although female teachers can also be perpetrators of abuse, hiring female classroom assistants and teachers can help prevent harassment and support girls' educational attainment (Kirk & Winthrop, 2006). Engaging parents and communities can also help. In places like Sudan, parent-teacher associations play an important role in girls' education by reporting abuses of girls in school and encouraging support for girls' education. Adult literacy classes also help encourage support for girls' education among parents (McKenna & Robinson, 2006, cited in Nicolai, 2009). Strong qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that community-based schools are a particularly successful way to reach girls in conflict. In Afghanistan, the provision of community-based schools has eliminated the enrollment disparity between girls and boys (Burde & Linden, 2010).

C. **Effects of Trauma on Learning**

Researchers suggest that the psychological impact of violence and exploitation on children and teachers is less visible but no less damaging than physical injuries. Evidence indicates that trauma can significantly impede learning. Studies in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gaza, and Sierra Leone show that learning is impaired by posttraumatic stress (Boothby, 2008; Betancourt et al., 2008; Elbert et al., 2009; Tamashiro, 2010, cited in UNESCO, 2011a).

What to Do About It: Education provides important physical and psychosocial protection for children, but schooling must occur in a safe place. Psychosocial programs that attend to emotional

needs and promote the healing of children and communities help children move forward, breaking patterns of violence that perpetuate conflict (Boothby, 2008). Therapeutic interventions can support children's learning throughout their life as well as increase their capacity to contribute positively to society once conflict has abated (Miller & Affolter, 2002; Betancourt et al., 2008; Elbert et al., 2009; Tamashiro, 2010, cited in UNESCO, 2011a; see also Inter-Agency Standing Committee [IASC] guidelines for more information about psychosocial support).

D. Diminished Quality

Conflict affects the quality of education in several ways. First, a significant lapse in teacher-training programs may leave few or no trained teachers available, and teachers may have fled or have been displaced, injured, or killed (UNESCO, 2011a). In addition, because they may not be paid regularly, teachers may not arrive to teach. Second, corruption in schools often increases in unstable environments, exacerbated by the breakdown of law and order that accompanies conflict. Exam questions may be sold in advance, and grades may be bought. Teachers may obtain their certificates and jobs through bribes and other corrupt means, and schools may misuse the funds that are intended for educational items (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009).

What to Do About It: To improve the quality of education, agencies suggest reforms such as training teachers in learner-centered methods. However, in implementing reforms, practitioners face many obstacles. Teachers may have difficulty implementing learner-centered techniques due to large classroom sizes, lack of previous experience with learner-centered methods, lack of extensive teacher training more generally, and norms

governing adult-student relationships. In unstable environments, traumatized teachers may be more reluctant to cede control of their classroom. If they are teaching in a language that is not their mother tongue, lecture may be easier for them than more open-ended interactions. Teachers may also struggle to manage classrooms in which refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from different communities, ethnicities, or language backgrounds are put together (Chick, 1997; Arthur, 2001, cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010). In addition, practitioners in the field often emphasize securing materials or restoring normalcy by getting children into a school routine, which can leave less time and attention for the quality of instruction once children are in school (Lockheed, 2006; Davies & Talbot, 2008; Piper, Dryden-Peterson, & Kim, 2006 cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010). More systematic analysis of these programs and their effects is warranted in order to provide more comprehensive recommendations for improving school quality in conflict-affect areas.

V. HOW DOES EDUCATION AFFECT CONFLICT?

And what to do about it

Practitioner-oriented publications and some academic work outline a number of ways education affects conflict. The following section discusses these pathways and offers suggestions from the data for addressing them.

The negative impact of education leading to conflict and state instability: Education can decrease stability through several subpaths:

- Unequal provision or segregation of the education system may reproduce social inequality and exacerbate political or social grievances.
- Biased curriculum may reinforce stereotypes.
- Corruption or misguided interventions may exacerbate grievances.

The positive impact of education on state stability and peace: Education leads to increased stability and peace through several subpaths:

- State provision of education increases trust in the government.
- Education strengthens individual capacity for effective governance.

- Education contributes to a shared identity and social cohesion through curriculum and an integrated system.

A. **Educational Content and Teachers: Negative Effects on Conflict**

Curriculum is a potential source of intergroup tensions. It may lead to conflict if it is designed to promote one group and denigrate another through negative portrayals of certain groups, as well as through teaching the culture, language, religion, and history of the dominant group and prohibiting minorities from doing the same (King, n.d.; UNESCO, 2011a). Further, after a conflict has ceased, how teachers and textbooks should present the history of the conflict and the role of each group in it tends to be the subject of much tension. Countries may choose not to teach history at all for a period of time or may neglect sensitive subjects (Nicolai, 2007). There is no consensus as to the best approach. Some suggest that it is important for students to engage with their history and learn to think critically about it (Dryden-Peterson, 2010) but note the significant challenges governments face in determining the best way to teach history and the serious implications of missteps (King, n.d.).

However, even if the curriculum is vetted for discriminatory material, teachers may intentionally or unintentionally reinforce social cleavages in their treatment of students and comments in class, as well as by segregating students of different groups into separate classes or areas within the class (Dupuy, 2008). These practices can normalize discrimination and reinforce in-group/out-group identity formation. Empirical data support this claim. In interviews, Rwandans revealed that they believe that schooling practices made it clear to which ethnic group children belonged and attributed meaning to this cleavage. Rwandans also felt that teachers' and the history curriculum's devaluation of one ethnic group in classes, tolerance of student harassment of other students during break times, and schooling that emphasized obedience rather than critical thinking all contributed to the conflict (King, n.d.). Aside from discriminatory behavior, teachers can reinforce and legitimate violence as a normal solution to problems by using corporal punishment in class or by failing to prevent children from being violent with each other (Dupuy, 2008).

Finally and most important, international agencies too often assume that in contrast to the education provided locally that may have initially fueled the conflict, the education they provide is devoid of discriminatory practices. However, this is not necessarily the case. For example, from 1986 to 1992, U.S. education aid to Afghan refugees living in Pakistan supported the development of pro-mujahideen textbooks designed to indoctrinate Afghan children to fight against the Soviet occupiers of their country. These books included lessons such as "J is for Jihad" and "K is for Kalashnikov" as well as math problems that used bullets for counting (Davis, 2000). In postwar Bosnia, the international community supported an education

model titled "two schools under one roof," which was originally intended to increase access to school among minority students but in fact perpetuated group separation based on ethno-religious distinctions (Perry, 2011). Despite the discussion of potentially negative consequences of educational aid, those developing and implementing educational programs in conflict-affected areas often assume that international organizations do not make mistakes in supporting educational content or structure and as a result may not examine their work sufficiently critically.

What to do about it: Just as curricula can teach discrimination and legitimate violence, education can contribute to peace and reconciliation by imbuing the regular school curriculum with an inclusive and tolerant conception of citizenship and nonviolence (UNESCO, 2005, cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010). Special classes on peace education and conflict resolution that complement the academic curriculum in school or are provided by NGOs outside of school can also build peace and reconciliation (Nicolai, 2009; UNESCO, 2011a, p. 236; see Bar Tal & Rosen, 2009, for a thorough review of peace education programs). More generally, when curricula and teaching practices are inclusive and minimize discrimination and inequity in the classroom, education has the potential to mitigate the motivations for conflict of both dominant and minority groups (Wedge, 2008). It may expose students in the dominant group to more positive treatment and portrayals of minorities, and teachers may model behavior that eschews stereotypes and discrimination. Alternatively, students and parents who belong to minority groups may have less incentive for conflict if they are treated fairly in school and are represented in the curriculum. However, some researchers warn that changes to the curriculum

and teacher practice must proceed with caution: curriculum reform can draw attention to the political implications of schooling and generate potentially violent controversy in the community (Dupuy, 2008). In addition, while some evidence supports certain additive peace education programs (Bar Tal & Rosen, 2009), more research is needed to understand how these programs work on a large scale and in the long term.

B. Access: Negative Effects on Conflict

As discussed above, discrimination (through either intent or neglect) based on ethnicity, religion, geographic region, or social class and the perception of patronage or discrimination fuel conditions for conflict by undermining the legitimacy of the state and encouraging grievances against the state. Inequity can occur in several ways, such as systematically failing children from certain groups; having an unequal geographic distribution of schools (Sommers, 2005); selectively charging fees to children of certain groups while waiving school fees for others (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009); or making insufficient effort to reach disadvantaged groups. Exclusion can also be linked to the content of education; for example, because students do not speak the language of instruction or because parents disapprove of the curriculum and do not send their children to school.

What to do about it: Reports suggest that program designers and educators should track not only who does not attend school but also who is dropping out and for what reasons. This knowledge can inform the design of programs to reach these students (Baxter & Bethke, 2009). Researchers also suggest that international organizations should take care not to reproduce existing inequalities (Sommers, 2005).

Practitioners recommend that interventions that support access to education be equitably available to diverse groups of children across a conflict-affected region regardless of ethnicity, language, religion, or any other identified differences. Refugees and IDPs are especially subject to disruptions in their education, particularly because they tend to displace to areas with low educational access. If they have access to education, a plan should be in place for their reintegration into formal schooling, in the host country or at home. This requires creating the means to officially recognize children's educational attainment so that they can be admitted into schools later (Kirk, 2009). Typically for children confined to conflict-affected environments, accelerated learning programs aim to reintegrate children who have missed months or years of education into the formal schooling system. Similar programs may seek to provide learners with at least basic numeracy, literacy, and vocational skills even if they are unable to return to formal schooling. These programs may help fill the gap for older children who are disadvantaged by the emphasis on primary school education from most international support (Baxter & Bethke, 2009).

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it is important to recognize that an emphasis on access alone may be a faulty strategy. Even if students have access, educational content can fuel conflict. Further, poor-quality education is unlikely to provide a sense of hope for a better future that could dissuade parents and older students from joining violent movements, and young men may be more likely to join violent movements if quality education is not well matched to local employment opportunities (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier & Chauvet, 2007; Fredriksen, 2009, cited in Dryden-Peterson, 2010; Dom, 2009).

C. **Community Engagement: Mixed Effects on Conflict**

The importance of actively engaging local communities in planning, implementing, and monitoring development projects is widely recognized in the literature and is believed to play a particularly important role in societies recovering from conflict. Violence often disrupts community relationships and social cohesion. Cultivating community cohesion and empowering communities are often primary goals of development projects in building schools or starting community-based schools. Decentralization initiatives often work in partnership with these efforts. Agencies such as USAID (2007) assert that community-based development (CBD) can help communities restore social cohesion through shared goals pursued through peaceful means. Agencies also use CBD to help mitigate the roots of conflict by including marginalized populations such as women, the elderly, youth, and ethnic minorities in decision making and in project benefits as well as by creating democratic, transparent processes within the community. Academic research suggests that programs to build community cohesion can have a lasting effect on behavior (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009).

Yet several problems can arise from community-based development. First, placing authority in the community can reproduce inequalities within groups and stoke tensions between groups. For example, girls may not be given equal access to schools, and schools may be segregated by ethnicity. Teachers and other staff may be selected for reasons other than qualifications, which can both degrade the quality of education programs and fuel grievances. Communities may also choose to hold instruction in a foreign language even if it is not the best pedagogical choice. Impoverished

communities may lack the resources to provide education. Further, even if minorities are included in decision making, it can be difficult to determine who should “speak for” an excluded group. Finally, because educational provision is important for trust in the state, placing too much responsibility on local communities may run the risk of undermining trust in the state.

What to do about it: Despite these drawbacks, general consensus asserts that community engagement with and some measure of control over education is positive and should be pursued. Some evidence indicates that introducing transparent, democratic approaches to community decision making may reduce the likelihood of exclusions within the community and increase the equitable distribution of resources. For example, a study of the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan shows that rural communities that employed democratic decision making in determining how to spend local funds showed a greater rate of participation among women, although it did not change the traditional leadership structure of these communities, where men remained in charge (Beath, Christia, Enikolopov, & Kabuli, 2010). Mandating girls’ attendance in community-based schools that receive outside support helps increase attendance among girls. Linking community education programs closely to the central government by establishing clear lines of communication between communities and government and including local community and government leaders in training programs may help ensure that community development does not eclipse the state (Anastacio & Stannard, 2011).

D. **Corruption: Negative Effects on Conflict**

Corruption in education systems contributes to conflict by delegitimizing and destabilizing the government. Corruption is generally defined as the use of resources and the abuse of authority for personal and material gain. The assumptions that underpin practitioner understanding of the relationship between corruption and conflict are first, that visible corruption in government services fuels anger and resentment among the population, undermining the legitimacy of the state. Second, corruption weakens state institutions, making them more susceptible to attack. Education is considered important in relation to these issues in part because it is “often the single largest expenditure item, possibly after defense, and teachers are often the single largest group of state employees,” often consuming between 20% to 30% of the total budget (World Bank, 2005b, p. 9; Hallack & Poisson, 2007, p. 23; see also CMI, 2006; Heyneman, 2004, 2007; Poisson, 2010). Although corruption is notoriously difficult to measure (see Poisson, 2010), some research shows that up to 80% of education expenditures are lost to corruption in some countries (Hallack & Poisson, 2007).

Typically, corruption is divided into two categories: “grand” or large-scale corruption, which has a significant economic impact, and petty corruption, which involves small amounts of money and has little economic impact, although it can have significant social impact (World Bank, 2005b; Hallack & Poisson, 2007; Poisson, 2010). In the education system, large-scale corruption may involve high-level decision makers and political manipulation of the education system. Petty corruption may include problems such as “ghost teachers” who receive teaching salaries but do

not actually teach, illegal enrollment fees, fees for higher grades or passing exams, or manipulation of tutoring (Sommers & Buckland, 2004; World Bank, 2005b; Tebbe, 2009; Poisson, 2010). The perception of corruption reverberates throughout a population and is difficult to eliminate (World Bank, 2005b).

What to do about it: Although corruption within education is considered a particularly significant problem, education is also “central in preventing corruption” (Hallack & Poisson, 2007, p. 24). For instance, the World Bank (2005b) advocates public reporting of the monthly transfer of funds to school districts in radio broadcasts or newspaper articles. Teacher codes of conduct may be effective in reducing corruption, although their effectiveness is constrained by other factors, such as the degree to which the codes are seriously enforced and are readable and publicized (Nuland & Khandelwal, 2006, in Poisson, 2010). UNESCO argues that “fostering attitudes that do not tolerate corruption should...be one of the priority tasks of education. Indeed, ethics education for pupils and young people can help break the cycle of corruption, as today’s youth are the potential leaders of tomorrow” (Hallack & Poisson, 2007, p. 24). There is some evidence that community monitoring of teachers does reduce the “ghost teacher” problem by improving teacher attendance (Bjorkman & Svensson, 2009). In general, however, few studies evaluate these claims, and none assesses the extent to which these suggested interventions might mitigate conflict.

In terms of systemwide reforms, there is some debate on the most appropriate ways to address corruption. On the one hand, complicated systems and decentralization may increase opportunities for corruption. In the context of

decentralization, tracking the flow of resources is difficult, and corruption tends to flourish in the absence of locally established management procedures, the lack of training in management of funds, and the lack of oversight at the local level. Simplifying the rules and standards of the education system may therefore enhance transparency and reduce corruption (Poisson, 2010). However, UNESCO (2011b) points out that in Afghanistan, decentralized reform created possibilities for accountability and increased transparency. In light of these contradictory findings, it is important to develop a more comprehensive framework for determining where—at the state, regional, or community levels—to focus reforms to eliminate corruption.

E. Lack of Government Legitimacy: Negative Effects on Conflict

Many practitioners assume that the mechanism linking the provision of education to conflict or peace is government legitimacy. The inadequate and inequitable provision of education increases the likelihood of conflict because it decreases a government's legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Under the EFA framework, the provision of universal education is considered the responsibility of the state (Rose & Greeley, 2006; Barakat et al., 2008; Bethke, 2009; De Grauwe, 2009; Sigsgaard, 2011). Accordingly, practitioners believe that populations commonly perceive education as a “barometer” of the degree to which a government is committed to them (Barakat et al., 2008). For example, a state's ability to pay teachers is assumed to help restore confidence in governments (Rose & Greeley, 2006). Education is considered even more critical than other services in this regard. Although state provision of services in general is a prerequisite for legitimacy,

“Education is particularly key given it is the largest, most widespread and visible institution in the country” (Rose & Greeley, 2006, p. 4).

What to do about it: Practitioners consider investing in the capacity of the government to provide education a prerequisite for government legitimacy and a fundamental component of peace and stability (Rose & Greeley, 2006; Bethke, 2009; Davies, 2009; De Grauwe, 2009). Although these assumptions are embedded in a strong logical framework, these efforts are problematic in that the concept of state capacity is insufficiently theorized, making it difficult to measure empirically and analyze the connections between state provision of education, government legitimacy, and conflict and to determine the most effective practices for building capacity. Consequently, capacity developers tend to focus on developing individual-level abilities, which are easier to measure and evaluate, to the exclusion of organizational or institutional reform or broader contextual transformations (Sommers & Buckland, 2004; Davies, 2009; De Grauwe, 2009; Bethke, 2009; Sigsgaard, 2011). The presence of different types of capacities, however, may hold varying implications for the likelihood of conflict. For example, some researchers suggest that institutional reforms are more effective than individual-level trainings for mitigating the potential for conflict (Sommers & Buckland, 2004; De Grauwe, 2009; Bethke, 2009). It is important to develop a stronger framework for understanding state capacity, assessing the links between different types of capacity for delivering education and the likelihood of conflict, and constructing indicators to measure the degree to which capacity already exists and to evaluate progress toward building it.

VI. INTERVIEW DATA: What the Aid Workers Say

This section highlights the key points that emerge from our interview data in response to questions regarding (1) education in emergencies program success or failure in achieving its objectives and mitigating conflict; (2) staff training and USAID competencies; (3) corruption; and (4) the relationship between education and conflict mitigation. (See Attachment I for the interview protocol.) We allocate scant space to success stories, although there are many. Instead, we direct readers to our reference list. Among our references, readers can also find a variety of programs that respondents listed as successful examples of education programs in conflict-affected environments. We allocate more space to negative, conflict-conducive experiences, in the spirit of endeavoring to mitigate them in the future.

As noted above, USAID commissioned this paper to learn more about the relationship between education and conflict, including how conflict affects education, how to address these effects, and how education might mitigate conflict. The task included gathering data on education interventions that confronted these issues successfully and unsuccessfully. To collect deep, varied, and authentic data, we conducted semistructured

interviews with 17 key informants.¹⁷ We selected respondents on the basis of the following criteria: (1) length of time working on education in emergencies programs; (2) types of organizations worked with; (3) varied regions worked in; and (4) variety of conflicts exposed to. Few trained aid workers have had many years of experience managing and implementing education in emergencies programs around the world. The people selected for this study are representative of this small group of experts.

Collectively, these respondents have worked for international NGOs, multinational agencies (UN and World Bank), foundations, and bilateral organizations (USAID). Taken together, they have been working on education in emergencies programs since the early 1990s for an average of approximately 14 years, and they have worked on every continent. Their field experience ranges from Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Caucasus to Central, South, and East Asia; from Central and South America to West, South, North, and East Africa; and from the Middle East to the South Pacific and Oceania. They are predominantly from

¹⁷ Seven additional interviewees were unable to speak during the available time frame.

the United States or Europe. They all work as international staff for international organizations. We explicitly did not include national staff in our sample because, by definition, they have the experience of only one country. Although interviewing national staff would have added richness to our data, time constraints prohibited this option. To allow frank discussions, we omit names of respondents and generally of organizations in the text, although we have listed most respondents in Attachment 2 and do mention USAID in the text a few times. To preserve anonymity, we have removed references to countries if noting the country's name would likely reveal the identity of the respondent.

A. Successful and Unsuccessful Patterns Among Programs

According to respondents, the most successful education in emergencies programs exhibit the following features: **community ownership**, **good relations between outsiders and locals**, and **talented staff with contextual understanding**. Successful programs also require **time and flexibility**. Success is usually defined as responding effectively to perceived community needs. Respondents from all organizations nearly universally note that the most successful programs are those that work closely with communities and belong to communities, ideally stemming from existing local work. This is most frequently referred to as garnering “community buy-in” and “community ownership” from a wide range of diverse people living in neighborhoods and villages that the organization intends to support. One aid worker describes an example of a successful program in South Sudan, “It was like a community center, and it worked because it was a model created by a Sudanese nun who was dynamic and had extensive contacts

within the community. This school—the way it was run—it worked because it was her model; it wasn't imposed by anyone from the outside.” Many respondents add that talented staff make a difference. The right people with the right training are important ingredients for creating a good program.

In contrast, unsuccessful programs fail to win community support and are hobbled by poor management and planning. Many problems occur at the organizational level (within the organization or between the organization and the community) and usually involve poor relations with the community, poor understanding of the context, and limited planning. Other shortcomings occur among international organizations or between organizations and donors. Failures often include breakdowns in interactions at all levels—donor with organization and organization with community or government. The following examples from different respondents illustrate the range of dilemmas that aid agencies face.

B. Include Community, Understand Context, Allow Time and Flexibility

Respondents argue for including communities in program design from the outset and note that a lack of transparency about the decisions behind the way aid is distributed can stoke anger and resentment. It can also create misunderstanding between aid workers and aid recipients. This situation is particularly worrisome in an already volatile environment. Stabilization initiatives may raise particular challenges both in community engagement and in the desire for transparency clashing with the need for security for program staff. One respondent notes:

USAID gave funds to support stabilization initiatives in a short time frame. [With this type of program] my belief is that it's important to include communities in making decisions about how to spend these grants. But this didn't happen in practice. Instead, it was like we were getting shopping lists from the school principals...rather than ideas from the teachers, parents or students on how to improve their school. And when materials arrived at the schools, the staff who delivered the items were sometimes too nervous to associate themselves with the government or international aid agencies. So instead of saying the aid was from the government (which is the main thrust of stabilization initiatives), they said that it was from a rich man in [capital city] who was making a donation which is common in Muslim societies (*sadaqa*). Then, because USAID had dictated the districts that needed to receive the stabilization initiatives, some schools received grants, and some did not. There was no time to put a proper communication system in place to explain to these villagers why some schools received aid and others did not. It made some people resentful and created inequity.

This aid was also delivered in the context of other, far larger programs that were carried out in nearby villages at the same time. Our program was spending comparatively small grants of around \$30,000 [USD]. But this was in contrast to a larger program that was spending millions at a time for large scale infrastructure. Villages that received petty amounts from us didn't understand why this was so, and they felt resentful that they weren't receiving the big funds.

Although creating a variety of programs to address different needs within communities may make sense for a donor, the rationale behind these kinds of decisions is not always evident to a group of villagers.

Respondents are concerned about donors and aid workers who do not understand the context within which they work and design programs that are ineffective at best or create unintended negative consequences at worst. Several respondents cite as an example a demobilization program that went awry. In the words of one of the respondents:

About 10,000 child soldiers were demobilized, and they were supposed to get an in-kind equivalent of 500 dollars per child. In some cases, former commanders placed their own children and their relatives' children on the list of children to be demobilized even if they had not been involved so as to receive a financial benefit. The program created a perverse incentive to increase the numbers of kids who were labeled as child soldiers. In addition, there were all these other children who had suffered during the war, but were not involved in the fighting, and they did not receive post-conflict aid. It sent a message—"if you want to receive attention, be involved in fighting."

The respondents note that designing a program that provided unequal benefits to vulnerable children living in close proximity to one another appeared to award those who had participated in the conflict while penalizing others. They also question the way vulnerabilities are defined and the consequences these definitions may have for those who do not fit clearly into a particular category but who may be equally vulnerable for other reasons.

Finally, respondents note that time and flexibility are particularly important for people working on education in emergencies programs. They point out that rigid, externally imposed time frames may be counterproductive and may exacerbate existing volatility. For example, in some countries, USAID determines that certain groups are more likely to contribute to conflict. As noted in the literature review above, this focus is often on out-of-school youth, but it may also be on any particularly restive region. USAID directs programs to these populations, often requesting that international NGOs respond quickly. Because international organizations prioritize local engagement, they may search for local partners or community groups with whom to work. Yet rigid, short time frames are not conducive to cultivating sufficient skills and constructive engagement among these organizations or engendering lasting change. Respondents note several instances when these kinds of rushed, targeted programs have resulted in significant misunderstandings between local communities and international aid organizations, leading to explosive and potentially violent interactions.

Another respondent underscores that developing a good program with the requisite community involvement takes time and flexibility, adding that flexibility is particularly important in conflict-affected environments, saying, “It’s critical to have local people delivering the program locally. Invest in their development. Build relationships. Having the time and flexibility to build relationships is the most important aspect of this work.” Another respondent highlights the importance of organizations being able to respond to changing conflict dynamics, for example, as refugees and IDPs move sometimes quickly and unexpectedly. As noted above, respondents frequently cite

flexibility as a key ingredient for effective programs. They describe the work style required for conflict-affected, fast-paced environments where security may deteriorate quickly, within a matter of days or weeks, noting that staff must be able to identify, understand, and respond quickly to these changes. These environments, they say, require a different approach from that typically used in peaceful contexts. Staff must understand that plans made one day may need to be completely revised the next and that the changes often require creative solutions and expansive thinking.

These examples illustrate the respondents’ position that the single most important ingredient for a program to be successful and avoid conflict, or avoid contributing to conflict, is community involvement/buy-in/ownership. They also argue that aid workers must have a deep understanding of the context within which they work. And, they argue, setting rigid targets is counterproductive. Time and flexibility are essential to carrying out good work in conflict-affected environments.

C. Include Education in Humanitarian Response, Improve Coordination and Funding

Respondents also raise problems inherent in the structure of international aid, such as poor coordination among agencies, inadequate funding mechanisms, and poor regional planning. At the most fundamental level, they still struggle to convince those directing relief efforts to include education in a humanitarian response. They note that 6 months after the 2010 floods in Pakistan, it was still difficult to convince aid workers who support other relief activities to discuss support to children’s education. NGOs, governments, and donors often focus on education after too much

time has passed and children have already lost out on schooling. Another aid worker notes that many donors take a “one size fits all approach” to education. Even when the donor prioritizes stability in a country that it considers important to its security interests, education programs are not designed to respond explicitly to factors that could increase instability. In fact, “some program officers are stuck in traditional mandates, and they don’t want to do conflict related programming” at all.

Several mechanisms are in place to improve coordination among education actors, but several respondents note these systems have a mixed record. One says,

The [UN] cluster process is problematic. Because a flash appeal has to consist of concrete projects, agencies who participate need to compete to get their projects into the appeal. The final say lies with OCHA, but de facto, it’s the cluster coordinator who puts together the appeal. Usually this is a staff member from a particular agency. The staff member is supposed to prioritize his/her work for the cluster, but it’s hard to act as though you don’t work for the agency that you do, in fact, work for.

In some locations, however, the UN education cluster system is reputed to have worked well, launching effective group assessments and advocacy for greater support to education from governments and donors.

Several other respondents point out that the structure of USAID funding conflicts with efforts to coordinate. “USAID...tends to create a

competitive environment and pit different NGOs against each other” by the way it requests proposals. They argue that although competition among organizations occurs in all countries that receive aid, the delays and mistrust it can garner can have more severe consequences in countries affected by conflict.

Finally, respondents cite funding gaps in the education cycle, noting that the compartmentalized aid between humanitarian and development environments creates gaps in services. For example, one respondent notes that a program that supports young people for basic, or perhaps secondary, education, may abandon them abruptly, without considering either the importance of continuing education for the children receiving it or the resources that these educated young people could offer to their communities. These interventions fail to cultivate teachers among the populations served by these education programs. Respondents frequently note that “short term funding creates short term planning.” They reiterate that aid management and funding mechanisms designed for developing stable countries are not adequate for supporting education in countries affected by conflict.

These responses illustrate key structural dilemmas facing aid workers. They believe that education has yet to be fully integrated into humanitarian aid despite the years devoted to advocating for its inclusion, as noted extensively in the practitioner-oriented literature discussed above. Even when it is included, they point to institutional barriers such as weak coordinating mechanisms and short-term, mismatched funding cycles that block education programs from reaching their full potential.

D. Training and USAID Competencies

Part of the assignment for this paper entailed asking respondents to give explicit feedback to USAID about the agency's work. In this section, we focus on key constructive messages for USAID staff from respondents, as they relate to education in emergencies. It is important to situate these comments in the context they were intended. Respondents note that they have worked with a range of USAID staff—many who were competent and well trained and some who were not—and that all USAID staff are faced with the constraints that accompany a large, political bureaucracy as well as the challenges in the often uncomfortable living conditions in these environments. The following paragraphs summarize representative recommendations that aid workers offered to USAID education officers in the spirit of constructive criticism.

First, a number of respondents are knowledgeable about the internal workings of USAID and offer explicit suggestions for additional training for USAID education officers. They speak highly of the USAID Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) trainings and suggest that this training be “better connected to USAID education programs.”

Beyond conflict assessments, respondents recommend more precise training for USAID education officers on navigating U.S. government bureaucracy. Education officers “don't need only to know how to do a conflict assessment; they also need to know how to pay for it, what approvals are needed, how to operationalize it. Does CMM do this? Do they have money for it? Who has to be involved?” Because aid money is earmarked, respondents suggest making guidelines on funding

mechanisms at USAID clearer, such as whether education funds can be combined with other sectors such as Democracy and Governance. A respondent notes that “earmarks for aid have to be interpreted, and conflict-affected places have a lot of earmarks.” This requirement may enhance the tendency to work in “silos” without communicating with other parts of the agency when the work overlaps. For example, one section of USAID may be building schools as part of a stabilization program in one area of the country, but it does not link these schools to the USAID education program once the building is completed and the first division's responsibility for the project comes to an end.

Second, in the context of stringent security requirements for U.S. government employees, respondents voice concern about the way these requirements increase the isolation of USAID education officers from the communities they serve. They note that this “sequestering” tends to increase USAID officers' reliance on secondary sources for information, such as Ministry of Education (MoE) staff who live in the capital city. One respondent expresses concern that “many of the MoE staff rely on secondary information, too,” and in addition, they may view USAID “as a source of funding for themselves,” not only for the education system. Another respondent notes that “isolated aid workers who are relying on secondary sources...run the risk that those sources have been ‘captured’ by one group or side of a conflict” resulting in programs allocated inequitably. Thus, secondary sources may not offer the most accurate view to their USAID colleagues.

Respondents highlight the simultaneous effect that *isolation from and power over* communities may have on USAID education officers' perceptions.

They note that it is difficult for USAID officers working in conflict-affected environments to be aware of the effect that their U.S. identity has on their work and that most communities will not perceive USAID officers as neutral, impartial aid workers. They urge USAID education officers to “find structured ways to spend time with communities...to explicitly engage with marginalized communities and understand sensitivities among communities,” but to do this with sensitivity to the conflict. One respondent notes that in some countries, when USAID officers travel to communities, they need military escorts; in sensitive areas, the presence of the U.S. military may put communities at risk. Along these lines, one respondent notes that as the risk has increased for U.S. citizens working for USAID, more responsibilities have shifted to national staff, some of whom are well trained and others who are not.

Third, respondents again express concerns about flexibility in the face of bureaucracy. They offer examples ranging from behaving more diplomatically in sensitive situations to thinking more nimbly in the midst of politically charged, complex, and fast-changing emergencies. With respect to diplomacy, one respondent notes that even in circumstances where the U.S. government does not have diplomatic relations with a particular country, a USAID officer can choose to diffuse or escalate tensions. For example, in one country “USAID has interpreted regulations to mean that they should walk out of a meeting if someone comes in [representing a government with whom they don’t have relations].” The respondent notes that in countries where “saving face” is a cultural norm, this kind of behavior increases tension, potentially turning a meeting into a show of public embarrassment. Cultural literacy is essential in any organization and in any setting.

Across the board, respondents laud flexible, nimble thinking in USAID education officers and link it to politically astute management and interpretation of government regulations. According to one respondent, “rigid thinkers” or “bureaucrats” undermine aid outcomes. In contrast, “lateral thinkers” understand and set realistic program targets and are “a better investment for USAID” in the long run. Flexible thinkers know the difference “between working in a conflict environment and a more stable place.” Interviewees recommend that USAID education staff gain training in conflict sensitivities and disaster contexts, as noted above.

Finally, beyond communicating effectively with communities and aid agencies, respondents note the important role that USAID education officers must play in relation to the U.S. government. They urge USAID staff to find ways to communicate the complexity of the circumstances within which they work to Congress instead of providing unrealistic targets that appear to satisfy requirements at first but fail to meet goals later. Another respondent notes that “USAID officers have the latitude to be able to influence policy...they therefore need strong negotiation skills.” Respondents point out that the pressure to expand programs quickly “discourages piloting and innovation” and creates tension between two demands. “On one hand, [USAID] stress evidence-based programming. On the other hand, they want to reach as many people as fast as possible.” It is difficult to accomplish the second aim while satisfying the first. As noted above, given the lack of empirical evidence underlying assumptions about how an education program mitigates conflict and what causes it to fail, this observation points toward the importance of balancing the need to provide services with gathering more systematic data on how they work.

In sum, respondents encourage USAID education officers to hone their conflict analysis skills and develop education programs that are sensitive to local communities as well as to all aspects of conflict. They urge USAID officers to cultivate flexible thinking and stellar communication and negotiation skills in these complicated contexts.

E. Corruption

Nearly all respondents agree that corruption happens everywhere. They offer examples of corruption at all levels—among communities and local partners; within local governments and their own agencies; and from high-level political influence. They note that a number of factors increase the likelihood of corruption and offer several competing suggestions for addressing the problem. The following paragraphs provide respondents' examples and recommendations.

At the local level, respondents note that corruption in education may include teacher absenteeism, diversion of grants from schools, cronyism and nepotism, textbook hoarding, and textbooks that never arrive at schools. One respondent lists corrupt activities she has witnessed: "Things that were given for free and supposed to get to every child—they don't get there. Procurements are authorized and many do not get to schools.... Salaries not reaching teachers; directors, and teachers hired based on who they know." Respondents also point out that in countries accustomed to high levels of corruption, bribes are so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. One respondent asks, "Do we call it corruption if we have to give a bribe for supplies to reach their destination?" Requiring staff to adhere to no-tolerance policies seems futile in some circumstances.

Respondents also note that chaos is conducive to corruption and that requirements to spend large sums of money quickly aggravate the problem. One points out that "conflict provides opportunities to overcharge. There's big money, little time, and not a lot of checks and balances along the way."

Aid workers point out that corruption can be hard to recognize and root out in a different cultural context. For example, foreigners may not realize that a transparent bidding process may elicit a number of quotes, but the quotes may all be from the same family or clan. This situation may be compounded by high rates of illiteracy. If potential bidders cannot read or write, "they might all go to the same guy who writes himself into each bid." In addition, people living in the same community often want to help one another and work together. "Illiteracy combines with a tendency to want to help and produces what looks like corruption to us."

Finally, respondents note the insidious effects of political influence on aid workers and their programs, particularly in high-profile conflict-affected environments. In some cases, powerful, well-connected local political actors wield their influence over a U.S. government education project. A respondent notes that it is difficult for U.S. foreign service officers to deal with these powerful people. "Then the USAID officer pressures the NGO or contractor to conform to what this powerful person wants. Then the project is audited and the ax falls on the contractor, or on the USAID foreign service officer when things don't add up. Often we are put in a position where we are damned if we do and damned if we don't."

Respondents offer various recommendations for addressing corruption. They all suggest planning for it more than is currently done. One suggests that USAID and NGO staff could “look at the whole system and draw a diagram to see where we are losing, for example, textbooks.” Models and regulations are important, “but requiring more paper work doesn’t necessarily always work. The paperwork can get in the way of the job and doesn’t necessarily prevent corruption.... Sometimes it can even cause more.”

Another respondent argues for greater “authentic accountability,” including transparent budgets and salaries. This respondent notes that it is essential to be “transparent about everything. About how much we spend, and what we do with the money. Budgets should not be secret. Communities should know how much an international staff member earns.”

Finally, one respondent notes that different organizations have different standards in dealing with corruption, complicating efforts to address it.

For our organization, addressing and deterring corruption has been one of the central foci of our mission...we would rather stop a project than continue supporting a project that is corrupt. Our own programs have strict guidelines. Unlike many other agencies, for example, we cannot hire people from the MoE as consultants. For other organizations, often hiring someone from the ministry as a consultant is used to get quicker approval for program implementation. Corruption surrounding tenders and infrastructure projects can be perpetrated by ministry officials with donors turning a blind eye....But the bigger problem is with infrastructure, rather than soft inputs.

In sum, respondents consistently note that corruption is exacerbated by conflict and the accompanying breakdown in law and order. They suggest ways to manage it, if not end it.

F. Conflict Mitigation

We asked respondents to consider the way the issues they describe affect “conflict dynamics.” They note that conflict is important to consider when designing and implementing education programs in volatile regions. They interpret conflict dynamics broadly to range from the “drivers of conflict” (proximate causes) to issues of equitable provision of services (structural causes). But they also raise framing questions about the relationship between education and conflict mitigation when conflict mitigation is blurred with security goals. This section summarizes key points from their responses.

First, respondents note that countries emerging from conflict ignore issues related to curriculum content at their peril. One respondent offers anecdotes from several countries that experienced civil wars in the 1980s. Among several similar post-civil war countries that have achieved high educational performance, the respondent notes that those that discuss the “roots of the conflict” in their curricula appear to have moved further away from the war, while those that repress any discussion of the war history are experiencing reemergence of conflict. “There were positive changes...in schools that address and discuss the conflict. Children make sense of the conflict; teachers talk about it and make meaning of it at any level, including painting for small children.”

Respondents universally note that their work must be equitable, both in providing access to education for all members of a society and in

hiring staff who work on international education programs. Inequities affect conflict. With respect to educational access, respondents note that poor coordination among aid agencies can create gaps in coverage that result in inequitable provision of services. One respondent notes that “potential internal conflicts can flare up because of an uneven focus on one area over another.” The same principle applies to staff recruitment. Interviewees point out that international organizations have at times inflamed conflict by making poor staffing decisions that do not take ethnic/religious/linguistic cleavages into consideration. As another interviewee says, “The processes international agencies use to hire local staff often perpetuate conflict. We need to reflect further on ‘do no harm’ strategies.”

While citing specific interactions between international interventions in education and conflict dynamics, some respondents express concern that conflict mitigation may elide with strategic security goals. As a result, some interviewees exhibit discomfort and tension over this relationship. The following paragraphs summarize their observations and concerns.

First, respondents consider aid to education in the context of “conflict mitigation” and “fragility” a relatively new approach. One respondent notes:

Education in emergency programs have not typically been designed as a response to conflict. Their purpose has more often been to respond to education needs, with conflict mitigation as a secondary concern. Programs start with education objectives, and while there may be recognition that conflict dynamics affect educational access, the program design responds to the access problem. As a whole, these programs don’t go in to address

conflict, they go in to address educational issues.

Respondents note that two paradigms have shaped education in emergencies to date. As *educators*, they work toward EFA and Millennium Development Goals. As *humanitarians*, they subscribe to the “do no harm” imperative. According to this position, neither of these frameworks encompasses nation building or stabilization initiatives. And, as one respondent points out:

Conflict mitigation is not a part of the imperative beyond “do no harm.” We rely on neutrality and impartiality, but education is inherently political. We have to work hard to stay neutral. When education is supported because it’s about nation building/stabilization, there is pressure to support political interests. It’s useful to keep education separate from that agenda. Focus instead on education outcomes, rather than on conflict mitigation outcomes....In certain forums, access to US-AID money includes this [conflict mitigation/security] agenda. There are huge risks in this approach to aid. We should include assumptions about conflict mitigation in the program design phase—but not overtly.

Another respondent puts it this way:

The link between education and stabilization is inconclusive. From a humanitarian perspective, everyone has a right to education. It’s not meant to win the war on terror. We get educated to build a country. To build our own minds. Taking education into account for security is too narrow. Education in emergencies is all about providing education for all in all circumstances.

Respondents believe that there are strong links between education and conflict mitigation and that conflict dynamics should be considered when designing education programs. They are firmly committed to education programs that will not exacerbate conflict. Yet because conflict mitigation has been conflated with security and stabilization initiatives, many express concern that prioritizing the links between education and conflict mitigation risks subordinating the educational needs of vulnerable communities to the security interests of outsiders. They point out that allocating aid to education on the basis of security concerns excludes important aspects of education support and often prioritizes one region or group over another, potentially contributing to conflict instead of mitigating it. The next section integrates these findings and points to a more comprehensive understanding of conflict mitigation that is not defined by security interests.

VII. INTEGRATING PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA:

Research recommendations

In this section, we integrate briefly the key findings from the interview data with several key assumptions relating to causes and effects of conflict, discussed above. Respondents first buttress and expand on the importance of examining the role of bilateral organizations, international actors, and national governments in providing support to education interventions and the effect these actors have on conflict mitigation. Second, they echo the emphasis on community ownership often described in practitioner-oriented literature. Because most respondents work to provide education programs at the local level, they are particularly sensitive to community participation in program decisions and management. Even those whose jobs involve working closely with governments point out that inauthentic links to communities will doom any program, no matter how well conceived. Third, their assessment of corruption corresponds to assessments found in practitioner-oriented literature but is more nuanced and detailed. More important, our respondents note corruption at all levels—from donors to communities. No one who plays a role in aid programs is exempt. We expand on each point briefly below. Given the breadth of the discussion, here we focus only on points that multiple

respondents raised and the ways these shed light on what we already know.

First, respondents' observations highlight again key tensions that arise in assessing and promoting education to mitigate conflict. Respondents focus less on the relationship between education and conflict broadly and more on how programs are delivered and the way this process can affect conflict. In relation to the conflict paradigms discussed above, these concerns corroborate the potentially harmful effects of humanitarian aid. Research that focuses on the negative consequences of aid, however, typically focuses on how local strong men and belligerent groups commandeer aid, stealing food supplies and managing deliveries within refugee camps for political purposes (De Waal, 1997; Terry, 2002). Although our respondents include these kinds of examples in their concerns about harmful effects of aid, they focus more extensively on the negative effects of inequitable and inadequate support to education from international aid agencies. This warrants further exploration.

Second, along these lines, concern and confusion surround the use of aid to education as a tool

for stabilization. Although USAID distinguishes between conflict mitigation and stabilization/security initiatives, the differences between these initiatives appear underdeveloped. Further research is warranted to outline these differences, the relative merits of each approach, and the contexts in which it is more appropriate to adopt one lens or the other. In addition, the relationship between violence and aid in internationalized conflicts is weakly understood. Scholars are just beginning to examine these questions (see, for example, Berman, Felton, & Shapiro, 2009; Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2011). More research is critical to understand better the relationship between aid and conflict and to create clear guidelines for humanitarians.

Third, respondents stress community ownership as a key ingredient for conflict mitigation. Evidence supports the relationship between community involvement in designing, managing, and delivering aid programs and conflict mitigation in so far as it may contribute to community cohesion (Fearon et al., 2009) or strengthen civic skills through participation in community associations. The notion of the importance of “empowerment” has received little systematic attention in the context of humanitarian aid, and a more complex understanding of this well-worn concept may offer insights for conflict mitigation in the future. However, the perils exist of inadvertently contributing to community divisions by supporting self-identified or despotic community leaders. Respondents stress the importance of outsiders gaining deep knowledge of the communities they work with to avoid these pitfalls. In addition, understanding the relative merits of community ownership/decentralization versus state involvement/centralization as it relates to education is an important area for additional research.

Fourth, a fundamental assumption runs through practitioner-oriented literature as well as our interviews that education increases state legitimacy, which in turn diffuses or prevents conflict. As discussed above, this assumption is grounded in evidence showing that lack of access to education fuels grievances and violence. Educators suggest additionally that education is more important to populations than other state services and therefore more important for increasing state legitimacy. This claim warrants further research. Educators also emphasize addressing the legitimacy problem by investing in state capacity to provide education. The concept of capacity, however, is undertheorized, and there is a need to develop better ways of assessing where and how investment in capacity development can be most effective in terms of mitigating conflict.

Fifth, as we have discussed above, access, an issue highlighted by the greed versus grievance paradigm, is clearly not the only educational issue that has the potential to ignite conflict. Important and robust qualitative research conducted in Rwanda shows that discriminatory education—in both content and access—helps underlie conflict (King, n.d.). It is important to expand research like this to other countries to understand the various ways negative or positive education affects attitudes and behaviors that may create or mitigate conflict.

Sixth, although macro-level studies find a clear and significant relationship between low levels of education and the likelihood of conflict, it is also apparent that this relationship varies across settings and in interaction with diverse contextual factors. As several recent practitioner publications have contended, it is not clear that investment in education will have a significant impact in

mitigating conflict without simultaneously making progress on other fronts. For example, increased educational attainment may not contribute to peace if it is not matched by job opportunities or is without directed efforts to resolve particular drivers of conflict (Richards & Bekele, 2011; UNESCO, 2011b). However, the conclusions that have been drawn thus far have been based on only a few case studies. More extensive research is needed to examine the interactions of education with other factors in order to understand better its relationship to conflict.

Finally, corruption in aid discussed in academic literature is typically subsumed by the larger discussion of abuses of aid by recipients. Our respondents almost unanimously consider corruption a universal challenge that undermines humanitarian aid at all levels, as noted above. Clearly it has the power to stoke resentment and fuel grievances. It is important to examine variations in the types of corruption and their impact on conflict mitigation efforts.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has sought to answer three large questions. What is the relationship between education and conflict? How might education mitigate conflict? What works and what does not work in program interventions? We have made notes throughout the paper about the degrees to which certain assumptions appear to be well supported by the available evidence. Here we provide a brief final summary of key points, followed by recommendations for programs.

A. Summary of What Works

International interventions in education that hope to mitigate conflict search for entrée in complex and sometimes indirect ways—they seek leverage over factors considered to trigger conflict. When education is provided that is non-discriminatory in access or content and of high quality, it has the potential to make vital contributions to peace building and stability. The potential benefits are diverse, including the promotion of active citizenship by engaging community participation; trust in the state and the state's intention and capacity to serve the population; nonviolent norms through peace curricula and codes of teacher conduct; social cohesion through inclusive curricula and structures; and greater equality in society

through equitable access and through gender-sensitive curricula and policies (UNESCO, 2011a). Education may also deter young men from joining armed groups. It is vital to engage with the needs of the local community and local dynamics of conflict in designing education programs. Education professionals can help ensure that school access is equitable by examining who is not being reached by school and taking the necessary steps to reach them. This includes groups of children from excluded ethnic, religious, linguistic, or geographic groups, as well as children within those groups, such as girls and children who are disabled.

B. Program Recommendations

Many worthwhile suggestions for ways education can mitigate conflict and its effects emerge both from the practitioner-oriented literature that we have surveyed and from our respondents. We have already discussed a number of these recommendations in two previous sections: “How Does Conflict Affect Education?” and “How Does Education Affect Conflict?” In the following paragraphs, we summarize these and highlight additional critical recommendations.

For USAID:

Make clearer distinctions between conflict mitigation and stabilization programs:

A number of misunderstandings exist about the relationship between conflict mitigation and stabilization. Conflict mitigation activities attempt to reduce violence among all parties, whereas stabilization efforts implicitly back one party over another and are linked to outsiders' security interests. Thus, conflict mitigation initiatives are more compatible with the "do no harm" principle. This distinction should be emphasized.

Use humanitarian aid equitably even when it is employed for stabilization programs:

Better evidence to show how aid and security interact will help guide program decisions on this sensitive topic. In the absence of that evidence, we recommend that decisions to grant humanitarian aid be made transparently and be based on a whole-country analysis to avoid stoking resentment across villages, regions, or ethnic groups.

Coordinate internally: Coordination within USAID and between USAID and other offices within the State Department should be improved. Aid officers should have content knowledge (e.g., the way education works) in addition to institutional knowledge (e.g., internal guidelines for managing earmarks and coordinating with other parts of the agency).

Include education in the USAID OFDA

mandate: OFDA is one of the largest funders of emergency relief. Given the links identified above between the lack of access to education and conflict, we urge OFDA to include funding for education within its current mandate.

Cultivate flexible thinking: Consider the need for realistic timeframes and flexibility when designing programs in conflict-affected countries.

For International NGOs:

Ensure staff security: Ensuring staff security involves neither risk avoidance nor recklessness, but "risk management" (Egeland et al., 2011). Agencies should define their accepted level of risk, make sure it is clear to all staff, and be attentive to the different security needs of male and female staff. It is critically important that agencies provide psychosocial support to staff in conflict zones. In addition, international organizations must better protect their local staff because the disparity between protections for international and local staff is highly inequitable. Also, it should not be assumed that national staff from another part of the country will be accepted as "local" (Egeland et al., 2011). (Agencies planning for the security of their staff can refer directly to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) framework for assessing risk and strategies to reduce it; see Egeland et al., 2011).

Integrate conflict assessment into education program design:

Design projects on the basis of an assessment of conflict dynamics related to education, particularly in relation to structure and content, and in terms of the role placed by various actors, such as education personnel, government actors, or implementing partners.

Avoid aggravating ethnic/linguistic/religious and other tensions: Hire local staff equitably from diverse groups and allocate program benefits evenly.

For All Actors:

Management and training:

Expect to encounter corruption and train accordingly: Encountering some form of corruption in aid work, particularly when sums of money are large, is clearly the norm, not the exception. However, little to no training is offered to aid workers on how to handle corruption when it appears. Aid workers should be better educated about what types of corruption they may encounter, how to aim to prevent it, and how to address it when it arises. This training should be tailored for the particular types of corruption that emerge in education systems and programs.

Train staff to understand differences between working in conflict-affected versus peaceful countries: Working with societies affected by conflict requires resourcefulness, an ability to troubleshoot, and an understanding that plans may need to be altered quickly. It also requires greater sensitivity to unexpected outcomes of all kinds. Flaws in programs administered in countries affected by conflict can have greater effects than those of programs administered in countries at peace. Finally, it requires a psychological fortitude, a factor that is critical but often overlooked.

Hire staff who have deep contextual knowledge, or train staff to acquire this knowledge: Understanding local cultural, historical, and conflict dynamics is critical to working effectively in countries and regions affected by conflict.

Program implementation:

Protect education from attack: Consider support to initiatives that show promise in protecting education from attack.

Protect girls from violence and increase their enrollment: Hire female classroom assistants and teachers to reduce gender-based violence. Support community-based education to reduce the distance that girls need to walk to school.

Ensure that educational content is inclusive and nondiscriminatory: School curricula should support inclusive and tolerant conceptions of citizenship and nonviolence.

Ensure that educational quality is given as much attention as access and enrollment. See above.

Engage communities equitably, without undermining the state. See above.

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ATTACHMENT I: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

**Dana Burde, New York University,
dana.burde@nyu.edu**

**Education and Conflict Mitigation for
USAID, AIR, EQUIPI**

**Interview protocol form for education and
education-related interviewees**

April 8, 2011

Introductions, explain the study—see project summary (for USAID; strategy change; collecting evidence to create guidelines for USAID education officers, 1-2 hours, anonymous unless you specify otherwise).

Semistructured Interview Questions:

1. *[Experience]*: Tell me about your experiences designing and implementing education in emergencies programs. Where have you worked? What types of programs have you worked on? To what extent do your programs explicitly address conflict dynamics/stabilization issues?
2. *[Program success]*: Can you give me an example of the way a program was implemented successfully? Did you draw any conclusions about the way the program affected conflict dynamics, based on the program's success? What made you think this? What role do you think the program design played in its success? What role might the design have played in mitigating drivers of conflict, if any? Do you have any reports or data on the program that you can share with me?
3. *[Program failure]*: Can you give me an example of unsuccessful program implementation (e.g., resulting in unintended negative consequences)? How did you respond? Did you draw any conclusions about the way the program affected conflict dynamics based on the program's difficulties? What made you think this? What role do you think the program design played in its lack of success? What role might the *design* have played in exacerbating conflict, if any? Do you have any reports or data on the program that you can share with me?

4. *[Training]*: Think about the training you've had over the years for your work in education in emergencies or conflict affected environments. Can you give me a couple of examples of some of the most useful training you've received? What is your favorite source of information for on-the-job training? What are 3 key points you would tell someone about designing an education program in a country affected by conflict?
5. *[Capacity MoE]*: What kind of training have you or your organization provided to Ministry of Education employees? Can you give me an example of training that worked well? An example of training that didn't work so well? Why do you think this is the case? What were the obstacles you encountered?
6. *[Capacity USAID]*: What kind of "conflict competencies" would you like to see in the USAID staff who manage education in emergencies programs? *[If you have interacted with USAID staff]* From your experience, how would you describe the USAID staff knowledge/awareness of conflict dynamics? How does this relate to the "reality on the ground"? What should a USAID education officer know about conflict dynamics or conflict mitigation to be effective?
7. *[Relationship to international political actors]*: Conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and statebuilding are typically addressed by the U.S. State Department, sometimes in conjunction with the Department of Defense. Have you ever interacted with conflict mitigation (or peacebuilding, statebuilding) teams in the field? *[If yes]* Can you give me some examples of these interactions? What worked? What didn't? What would you do to improve this interaction? *[e.g., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, Iraq]*. The U.S. Department of Defense has stabilization and conflict mitigation models and tools available for program interventions. Are you aware of them? Do you use any of them? Why not?
8. *[Corruption]*: How have your programs been affected by corruption? Can you give me some examples? Do you take corruption into consideration when designing your strategy and programs? *[If yes]* How? How would you characterize the relationship between corruption and conflict? Can you give me some examples? How does corruption impact peacebuilding?

ATTACHMENT 2: RESPONDENTS

1. Anita Anastacio
2. Lyndsay Bird
3. Dean Brooks
4. Stephen Hanmer
5. Cornelia Janke
6. Kate Lapham
7. Rachel McKinney
8. Jordan Naidoo
9. Susan Nicolai
10. Joel Reyes
11. Pilar Robledo
12. Jennifer Sklar
13. Erin Tanner
14. Aleesha Taylor
15. Rebecca Winthrop
16. Anonymous
17. Anonymous





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