



United Nations
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization



International Institute
for Educational Planning

Opportunities for change

Education innovation and reform during and after conflict

Edited by Susan Nicolai



Education in emergencies and reconstruction

Opportunities for change

Education innovation and reform during and after conflict

Opportunities for change

Education innovation and reform during and after conflict

Edited by
Susan Nicolai



United Nations
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization



International Institute
for Educational Planning

The views and opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of UNESCO or IIEP. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this review do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO or IIEP concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

Published jointly by:
International Institute for Educational Planning
7-9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Paris, France
info@iiep.unesco.org
www.iiep.unesco.org

Cover design: IIEP
Cover photo: Dan Alder/Save the Children/Colombia
Typesetting: Linéale Production
Printed in IIEP's printshop
ISBN: 978-92-803-1328-4
© UNESCO 2009

Acknowledgements

A great number of individuals have been indispensable in the development of this publication. Not least among these are the ten case study authors whose research and writing form the core of this volume.

Vital to delivery was the research partnership that commissioned this publication. Special thanks go to Chris Talbot, Cynthia Cohen, Lyndsay Bird, Leonora MacEwen and Lorraine Daniel of the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP); Mario Novelli of the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt) of the University of Amsterdam; Joris von Bommel of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); and Rebecca Winthrop and Nina Weisenhorn of the International Rescue Committee (IRC). In addition, Jackie Kirk, who was concurrently working on a publication regarding certification, played an important role in this volume's development prior to her untimely death in Afghanistan.

Participants in a January 2008 seminar in Paris also made significant contributions to the content and conclusions of the overview and several chapters.

A special thanks goes to Margaret Sinclair, who provided invaluable comments and editing support at several stages of the writing process.

Finally, the field-based individuals and organizations who hosted authors deserve credit both for their generosity of time and information. Perhaps more than this, they deserve applause for their daily dedication to the cause of education. It is because of these unsung heroes that opportunities for positive education change are regularly found during and after conflict.

Foreword to the series

UNESCO is increasingly being requested to provide an educational response in emergency and reconstruction settings. The organization is in the process of developing expertise in this field in order to be able to provide prompt and relevant assistance. It will offer guidance, practical tools and specific training for education policymakers, officials and planners.

The fifth of the 11 objectives adopted by the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children in emergencies. The *Dakar Framework for Action* (World Education Forum, 2000) calls for national Education for All plans to include provision for education in emergency situations. Governments, particularly education ministries, have an important role to play in an area that has often been dominated by the actions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies.

The field of education planning in emergencies and reconstruction is still young. It must be developed through further documentation and analysis. Accumulated institutional memories and knowledge in governments, agencies and NGOs on education in emergencies are in danger of being lost due to the dispersion of documents and to high staff turnover in both national and international contexts. Most of the expertise is currently in the heads of practitioners and needs to be collected while memories are fresh. Diverse experiences of educational reconstruction must be more thoroughly documented and analysed before they disappear from memory.

This task includes the publication in this series of country-specific analyses of the planning and management of education in emergencies and reconstruction. They concern efforts to restore and transform education systems in countries and territories as diverse as Pakistan, Burundi, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Rwanda. This series has been initiated and sponsored by IIEP in close collaboration with colleagues in other UNESCO offices.

The objectives of the case studies are:

- to contribute to the process of developing knowledge in the field of education in emergencies and reconstruction;

- to provide focused input for IIEP training programmes for government officials and others in education in emergencies and reconstruction;
- to identify and collect documentation on the management of education in various countries;
- to capture some of the undocumented experiences of practitioners;
- to analyse the responses in different situations to education provision in times of crisis;
- to increase the dissemination of information and analysis of education in emergencies and reconstruction.

IIEP's larger programme on education in emergencies and reconstruction embraces not only these case studies but also a series of global, thematic and policy-related studies. In addition, IIEP has published the *Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction* for ministry of education officials and the agencies assisting them, and is developing training materials for a similar audience. Through this programme, IIEP will make a modest but significant contribution to the field of education in emergencies and reconstruction. Its hope is to enrich the quality of the planning processes applied.

Mark Bray
Director, IIEP

Foreword by donor

Throughout the world, people continue to suffer under political instability, endemic violence and forced migration. Women and children – who form the majority of displaced people – feel the far-reaching effects on their safety, health, nutrition and education. Millions of children have experienced the violent disruption of families and community structures.

Yet crisis can also be a breeding ground for social change. And education, although often severely affected itself, is an important agent of change. Incorporating well-planned educational programmes into emergency relief efforts enables the long-term benefits for societies in crisis. Education has proved to be a major contributor to lasting solutions, enhancing the successful reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. Education is a key factor in restoring normalcy and can be a first peace dividend in post-conflict societies.

Hence, a research partnership has been formed to develop knowledge on two specific issues:

- certification of the learning attainments of refugee and internally displaced pupils, and
- opportunities for change within the education sector in conflict and post-conflict situations.

The partnership is unique and brings together the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the University of Amsterdam's Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This alliance not only strengthens the partners themselves, but also reinforces the strategies used to achieve common goals for education in emergencies and post-crisis situations.

The purpose of this partnership is to contribute to the Education for All goals through research on education in emergency situations, aiming at the development of knowledge on specific interventions, strategies and methodologies that can be used to improve access to quality education for all. This dovetails perfectly with the IS Academy on Quality Education, a five-year joint initiative between the University of Amsterdam and

the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This initiative seeks to improve interaction between policy-makers, practitioners and academics working in the area of education, development and quality.

This publication *Opportunities for change: education innovation and reform during and after conflict* explores opportunities for transforming education during periods of conflict and recovery. It is at these times that prospects of transforming both education systems and other sectors are promising. Seizing opportunities within education systems can bring about positive change and thus improve both access to and the quality of education. Moreover, educational interventions in emergencies and post-conflict countries should not simply be an end in themselves, but the first step in a continuous process that will get countries back on the path to development.

Considerable progress has been made in making external aid to developing countries more efficient and more effective. Support to fragile states and countries in crisis and post-crisis situations must also benefit from this new focus and these new standards of coherence. However, in fragile states, country ownership and leadership, alignment with national priorities and harmonization of donor processes pose an even bigger challenge. I hope this publication will provide a useful insight for further strategic planning and for building new partnerships to support education in crisis and post-crisis situations.

Bert Koenders,
Minister for Development Cooperation
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Contents

Acknowledgements	5
Foreword to the series	7
Foreword by donor	9
About the authors	13
List of abbreviations	17
List of tables	21
List of figures	21
List of boxes	22
Executive summary	23
Section I Overview	25
Chapter 1 The best and worst of times	26
Chapter 2 Windows of opportunity	37
Chapter 3 Towards transformation	52
Chapter 4 Facing constraints	74
Chapter 5 Supporting positive change	81
Section II Case studies	89
Chapter 6 Reaching education goals in countries affected by crisis: maximizing partnerships	90
Chapter 7 Moving from innovation to policy: IRC's work with community-based education in Afghanistan	103
Chapter 8 The Teacher Education Package (TEP) and NRC's emergency education support in Angola: 12 years and 212,000 children	115
Chapter 9 Expanding primary education access in Cambodia: 20 years of recovery	127
Chapter 10 No looking back: the creation of a new education system in Southern Sudan	139
Chapter 11 Power structures, politics and change in Kosovo's higher education system	151
Chapter 12 Resisting change: former Afrikaner schools and education reform in post-apartheid South Africa	163
Chapter 13 Building new realities for teacher training in Kosovo	177
Chapter 14 Political violence against teachers in Colombia: opportunities for change in the midst of conflict?	189

Contents

Chapter 15 Teaching for peace – overcoming division? Peace education in reconciliation processes in Sri Lanka and Uganda	201
Chapter 16 Teaching history: looking for unity in Rwanda’s classrooms	218
References and further reading	231

About the authors

Susan Nicolai has worked in the area of education in crisis-affected contexts for the past decade. She is currently a senior education adviser and deputy cluster coordinator for the IASC Education Cluster on behalf of Save the Children, having worked for the agency in previous roles. She has been a member of the INEE steering group and working group on minimum standards, and was recently part of the Machel Strategic Review at the UN Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, reviewing ten years of policy and practice developments in relation to children affected by armed conflict. She has written extensively, including several other publications for IIEP-UNESCO.

Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer has worked on education programming in conflict-affected countries for over two decades and currently is a senior director at Save the Children US for Rewrite the Future, a global initiative to support improved funding and programming for education for children affected by conflict. Prior to her work at Save the Children, she worked as a task manager of World Bank-funded education programmes in several regions and has also taught at Catholic University, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs and George Washington University.

Jackie Kirk (1968-2008) was a technical specialist in education in emergency and post-conflict in fragile states, focusing on gender- and teacher-related issues. She was an education advisor at the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Jackie completed her PhD in education at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and was an adjunct professor in the Department of Integrated Studies in Education.

Rebecca Winthrop has worked with displaced and conflict-affected populations for over 14 years. She is currently the senior technical advisor for education at the International Rescue Committee. She is pursuing her PhD at Teachers College, Columbia University. She also teaches courses on education in emergencies and post-conflict contexts at Columbia University's Teachers College and School of International and Public Affairs.

Eldrid K. Midttun has been working on education for refugees, displaced and other affected persons in countries of conflict for more than 20 years. She is the Senior Education Adviser with the Norwegian Refugee Council

(NRC), her employer since 1987, and works on education projects in several of the NRC programme countries. She has been a member of the INEE Steering Group since its establishment in 2001.

Mike Ratcliffe has had over 30 years' experience in planning education reform in a range of fragile and conflict-affected or post-conflict states. This includes a number of post-independence southern and east African countries in the early 1990s; and South-East and central Asia, Eastern European and Central American countries in the past 15 years. He has also led the design and implementation of a number of large cross-country studies on education policy dialogue (for EC/ACP), aid effectiveness and social sector governance (for JICA, ADB, World Bank and Sida), which incorporated a large number of fragile states. He has extensive experience of education reform in environmentally fragile states across eight Pacific and ten Caribbean Island states.

John Lodge Patch has worked on education policy and institutional reform since the mid-1990s, including in South-East Asia, southern and eastern Africa. He worked in Cambodia from 1996 to 2002. For over five years he was an education adviser in the European Commission, with a focus on support in fragile situations. He is now a principal consultant at CfBT Education Trust.

David Quinn is an education policy, strategy and planning adviser with over 19 years' practical and academic experience in education and development, including five years in Cambodia. He has an MAEd in Education Policy and Planning from the University of Manchester and is currently the Team Leader, Policy and Strategy Adviser for the EC Sector Budget Support to Basic Education in Cambodia for 2008-2010.

Margaret Ayite is currently a technical adviser seconded by Save the Children to the Directorate of General Education, Department of Alternative Education Systems (AES) in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in Juba, Southern Sudan. Margaret has 17 years' experience working in the education sector in both northern and Southern Sudan. In early 2000, she volunteered her services to the then Secretariat of Education (SOE) as one of the pioneers of setting up the Alternative Education Department until she joined Save the Children in 2004 to manage its pilot accelerated learning programmes. Margaret holds a Master's degree in Education.

Emily Echessa has 18 years' experience in development and education work. She is currently an education adviser for Save the Children, supporting eight conflict-affected fragile states under the Rewrite the Future Campaign. Emily was previously based in Africa where she worked on the Kenya-Somalia border, as well as in various education-related civil society strengthening programmes. From 2005 she was based in Southern Sudan as an education coordinator, among other postings. She holds a Master's degree in Development Studies.

Rose Wahome has worked in education for six years. She worked in Nuba Mountains in a teacher training institute, later joining Save the Children as an education officer in Southern Sudan, progressing to Programme Officer in 2006. Rose is currently the Education Programme Manager for Save the Children in Western and Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Southern Sudan. She holds a Bachelors degree in Education.

Elizabeth Heath has worked in higher education for the past four years. She is currently project manager for education at Spark, a Dutch NGO that specializes in higher education and private sector development in south-east Europe (www.spark-online.org). She recently completed a Master's degree in International Development (University of Amsterdam) with a focus on higher education development in post-conflict areas.

Jacob R. Boersema has a Master's degree in Geography from Utrecht University and one in History from the University of Amsterdam. He is currently pursuing his PhD on the topic of 'Afrikaners after Apartheid' at the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies. He has published on topics as diverse as the role of emotions and morality in sociology, the local dynamics of the Rwandan genocide and holocaust education in the Netherlands.

Dukagjin Pupovci is Executive Director of the Kosova Education Center, the most prominent non-governmental organization active in the field of education in Kosovo (registered with UNMIK since January 2000). He is also professor of computer science at the University of Pristina, and has contributed to major reforms in the education and research sector.

Mario Novelli is a lecturer in International Development Studies at the University of Amsterdam. He is the coordinator of a five-year research partnership on Education and International Development. He has published in journals such as *Globalizations*; *Globalisation, Societies and Education* and *Journal of International Educational Development*.

Mieke T.A. Lopes Cardozo is currently undertaking PhD research as part of a wider research group named the 'IS-Academie: Quality of Education' at the University of Amsterdam. In 2006, she conducted research in Sri Lanka on the state of peace education. In early 2007, she was involved in the organization of a conference on conflict and education in Amsterdam. She presented a joint paper (with Mario Novelli) on this theme at the World Congress of Comparative Education in Sarajevo in September 2007. She specializes in the themes of peace education, intercultural education and teacher training, presently with a focus on Bolivia.

Anika May holds a Master's degree in International Development Studies from the International School of Humanities and Social Sciences (ISHSS)/University of Amsterdam. She has experience in working for several development agencies in different European countries and is currently employed as a consultant on civic-driven change at Context, based in Utrecht. She also works as a lecturer for peace and conflict studies at different institutes of the University of Amsterdam. In 2006, she evaluated a peace education programme implemented countrywide in Uganda for the German Development Service. Her findings were published by the African Studies Centre in Leiden in the book *Teaching peace – transforming conflict? Exploring participants' perceptions of the impact of informal peace education training in Uganda*.

Sanne Bijlsma holds a BA in Social Work and a BA in Anthropology, and finalized her MA in Conflict Resolution and Governance at the University of Amsterdam in 2007. She is a project officer at Cordaid based in The Hague in the Netherlands, responsible for the programmes on Women and Violence in Sierra Leone and Ghana.

List of abbreviations

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AES	Alternative Education Systems
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
AMIDSt	Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development
ANC	African National Congress
AVP	Alternatives to Violence Project
BESST	Building Education Support Systems for Teachers
BMC	Budget Management Centre
CCJ	Comisión Colombiana de Juristas
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CINEP	Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular
CODHES	Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPP	Cambodia Peoples Party
CREPS	Complementary Rapid Education Programme for Schools
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CSOPNU	Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda
DESK	Developing the new Education System in Kosovo
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EBSWG	Education Budget Sector Working Group
EC	European Commission
ECCD	Early Childhood Care and Development
ECTS	European Credit Transfer System
EFA	Education for All

List of abbreviations

ELN	Army of National Liberation
ENS	Escuela Nacional Sindical
ERDF	Education, Reconstruction and Development Forum
EU	European Union
EUA	European University Association
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FECODE	Federación Colombiana de Educadores
FHAO	Facing History and Ourselves
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GESP	Gender Equity Support Program
GoR	Government of Rwanda
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning (UNESCO)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KEC	Kosova Education Center
KEDP	Kosovo Educator Development Programme
KIE	Kigali Institute of Education
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Netherlands)
MINARS	Ministry of Social Affairs (Angola)
MOE	Ministry of Education

MOEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MOEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
NAR	Never Again Rwanda
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCDC	National Curriculum Development Centre
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIE	National Institute of Education
NPSE	National Primary School Examination
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACE-A	Partnership for Advancing Community Education in Afghanistan
PAP	Priority Action Programme
PEER	Programme for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (UNESCO)
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RTTI	Regional Teacher Training Institutes
SAC	Structural Adjustment Credit
SASA	South African Schools Act
SFAI	School Fees Abolition Initiative
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SOE	Secretariat of Education

List of abbreviations

SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach
TEP	Teacher Education Package and Teachers Emergency Programmes (Angola)
TISA	Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
TTRB	Teacher Training Review Board
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USA	United States of America
WAEC	West African Examinations Council

List of tables

Table 14.1	Select human rights violations against educators (1991-2006)	190
Table 14.2	Protection measures provided by Committee for the Evaluation of Risks for Trade Unionists	196

List of figures

Figure 7.1	Primary school enrolment in Afghanistan from 2000 to 2004	108
------------	---	-----

List of boxes

Box 1	Selection of key literature on education in emergencies	30
Box 2	Poverty, global security and development	41
Box 3	Education reform in Japan and Germany post World War II	44
Box 4	Conditions that may enhance education reform adoption	45
Box 5	Turnaround, education and community involvement	50
Box 6	Building education system capacity in Southern Sudan	54
Box 7	New governance and increased enrolment in Timor Leste	56
Box 8	Enrolment surge through abolishing school fees in Sierra Leone	58
Box 9	Increases in girls' enrolment in Darfur	60
Box 10	Quality indicators and the INEE Minimum Standards	62
Box 11	Curriculum reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territory	64
Box 12	Teacher training for Liberian educators	66
Box 13	Education responses specific to conflict and recovery	69
Box 14	Sierra Leone's Complementary Rapid Education Programme for Schools	70
Box 15	Peace education and related initiatives	73
Box 16	Ethnic and language divisions in Kosovar Education	78
Box 17	Terminology of programmes for a backlog of uneducated children and youth	117
Box 18	Early dilemmas in providing catch-up education	121
Box 19	Brief history of the University of Mitrovica	156
Box 20	Peace education in the 1997 General Education Reforms in Sri Lanka	207

Executive summary

Conflict and the displacement that often follows have considerable ramifications for the education sector. They create distinctive challenges for education practitioners. However, opportunities for reform and positive change within the sector also arise simultaneously during and after conflict. This book explores some of the prospects for positive transformation. It looks at how ministries of education, together with other implementing partners, have in certain cases seized these opportunities to bring innovation and reform to education systems. It examines how practice can be changed to improve education access, quality and system management.

A series of ten case studies presents specific examples of how positive change has been implemented in the education sector in several different conflict and recovery settings. Some of these demonstrate that there can also be resistance to transforming the education sector. The Afghanistan and Angolan case studies examine innovative education programmes that have been initiated as a response to conflict, while case studies on Cambodia, Southern Sudan, Kosovo¹ and South Africa address issues of system change in post-conflict situations. Efforts to improve teacher conditions and training are examined through the case studies on Colombia and Kosovo. Finally, case studies on Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Uganda deal largely with curriculum transformation in terms of history and peace education during the reconstruction period.

Although there is no single, standardized way in which change should occur, this book puts forward a series of conditions that facilitate positive educational transformation. It suggests that it is vital to provide early support to the education system as well ensure those interventions are maintained for the longer term. It is equally important to strike a balance between change and continuity in the system. A variety of agents of change, including national actors and communities, may be involved in transforming the education sector. In times of reconstruction and recovery, it is important to seek consensus among these different actors.

1. All reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text, shall be understood in full compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.

A cross-cutting theme in this book is that establishing partnerships is key to initiating educational transformation in conflict-affected settings. Implementing innovation through coordinated partnerships and long-term investments can significantly improve access to and the quality of education in post-conflict settings. Related recommendations are reflected throughout, as the coordinated management of partnerships is particularly critical when development assistance and aid is increasingly distributed through multiple mechanisms.

During a crisis, although systems may be more flexible given the physical destruction that may have occurred, there tends to be limited capacity for system reform. The book brings to light the need for capacity assessment and corresponding capacity development early in the reconstruction process so as to encourage national ownership and strategic planning. It also highlights the opportunity during the recovery period to help governments that may be in a state of collapse to rebuild their institutions both through improving security and ensuring that education contributes to peace-building efforts.

The various case studies describe ways in which education systems can also be strengthened through improvements in access, quality and through innovations. International trends in enrolment indicate that improving access to education may accompany post-conflict situations, due to the population's aspirations for a better future. This optimism is frequently harnessed by ministries of education and other implementing partners through back-to-school campaigns or in abolishing school fees. Some of the positive and negative aspects of such initiatives are presented in this volume and ensuring equitable access for girls is also addressed.

Although conflict and emergencies may negatively affect the quality of education provision, the case studies show how there can be windows of opportunity for curriculum reform and innovative teacher training approaches as part of a quality improvement process. The prospect of introducing alternative education programmes and subjects such as history and peace education may likewise contribute towards positive change.

Finally, this book emphasizes that the protection of students and teachers coupled with conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives should be prioritized and promoted throughout the education system to ensure that the opportunities for positive change are indeed fully realized.

Section I

Overview

Chapter 1

The best and worst of times

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times; ... it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness; it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair; we had everything before us, we had nothing before us...”

Charles Dickens

“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”

Nelson Mandela

Armed conflict and its aftermath often provide a lesson in contradictions: brutal violence contrasting with remarkable acts of kindness; grave injustice met with justice served; terrible destruction followed by regeneration and renewal. Amidst such chaos and recovery there are countless opportunities for change, including in the education sector. The hope often brought about by education innovation and reform during and after conflict represents some of the best of times, amidst some of the worst. Likewise, global progress in the education sector has struggled with the realities faced by countries affected by armed conflict.

Since the early 1990s, global recognition of the importance of education has been growing. Long established as a human right, the 1989 Convention of the Rights of the Child again emphasized education as a right of all children, regardless of their circumstances. Global targets to achieve Education for All (EFA), which includes not only basic education but also early childhood and adult literacy, were set at a conference in Jomtien in 1990. When EFA was not achieved by its original deadlines, new targets were reinforced and re-envisioned at Dakar in 2000. That year, education also emerged as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), focusing global development efforts on universal primary education and the elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary schooling by 2015.

In the five years from 2000 to 2005, over 34 million additional children attended primary school; this constitutes “one of the most

massive expansions of schooling access in history” (World Bank, 2007: 4). Likewise, education has increasingly expanded beyond primary levels to reach older children; between 1999 and 2005 the global gross enrolment ratio (GER) in secondary education increased from 60 to 66 per cent. Girls’ access to primary and secondary schools is improving, although it remains an issue in certain countries where overall participation levels are still low (UNESCO, 2008: 32-24). Opportunities for change, through innovation and the reform of education systems, have been found in many parts of the globe.

Meanwhile, political instability, endemic violence and forced migration continue to afflict civilian populations throughout the world and to impact negatively on education. The 1990s were some of the most conflict-ridden years in the second half of the twentieth century, with media images of war in the Balkans, Rwanda and elsewhere imprinted on the global conscience. The world emerging during the following decade has seemed no more peaceful, with instability, insurgency, terrorism and asymmetrical warfare seemingly endemic. Attacks and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, Darfur and Iraq have hit the headlines, while forgotten crises continue outside of the spotlight. Where armed conflict has purportedly ended, recovery and reconciliation have sometimes faltered, leaving the legacy of a violent or divided past to endure.

In conflict-affected countries and those experiencing other kinds of fragility, although data is often patchy or unavailable, there seems to have been particularly slow progress in terms of education. Where data is available, only 11 per cent of fragile states have achieved or are on track to universal primary completion, and 50 per cent are seriously off track, according to the World Bank’s analysis (2007: np).

Save the Children (2008b: 1) puts the overall figure at 37 million primary-aged school children out of school in conflict-affected fragile states, which comprises just over half of the global total of children out of school. These figures worsen significantly after primary levels. Only 6 per cent of all refugee students are enrolled in secondary education and there are even fewer opportunities in secondary education for IDP youth (Women’s Commission, 2004). The state of girls’ education in conflict-affected contexts is equally worrying; in one recent attempt to measure progress on gender parity, it was found that “countries with long and devastating histories of war or repressive government are at or near the bottom of the league” (Unterhalter *et al.*, 2004: 7).

Armed conflict and displacement cause demographic shifts that have serious ramifications for society as a whole, and for education systems specifically. It is not unusual in conflict-affected countries for schools to operate in multiple shifts and with shortened class periods. Too often teachers are both poorly trained and poorly paid, having to survive by holding multiple jobs or charging students for extra tuition. It can be the case that the majority of schools require repairs or reconstruction, following acute conflict. War and displacement clearly have dire consequences for education.

Despite the challenges, at such times opportunities do also emerge. Armed conflict and its aftermath by their very nature create flux and change in a society. This instability can leave windows of opportunity, even amidst and after the terrible violence of war. Thus during periods of conflict and recovery, there are real prospects for transformation of education systems along with other sectors.

However, there is no easy science or set of rules for enabling education transformation. Changes to regimes might bring political space, but weak authorities are not best positioned for reform. The public might have high expectations for renewal, but civil society is often in disarray or opposes those in power. Bureaucratic resistance might be weakened, but this can mean the lack of an effective administration. New and more flexible resources may be available, but unpredictable financial flows make sustained efforts difficult. In fact, as one author describes it, post-conflict is “the best of times and the worst of times, both an opportunity and a constraint” (World Bank, 2005: 25).

Even with such contradictions, there are a number of lessons that can be learned from country experience, through examples of successful educational innovation and reform, as well as those of resistance. This volume highlights efforts to open windows and find positive opportunities for education change across a range of conflict-affected countries or regions and those going through recovery. From Cambodia to Southern Sudan, Kosovo to Colombia, Afghanistan to Rwanda, and more – a diverse group of authors here shares its experience and perspectives.

Framing this study

This publication explores how positive change in education can be realized by conflict-affected education systems and the agencies assisting them. It considers the question in general and through specific cases of change in education systems affected by conflict. The aims of the volume

include documenting specific examples of positive change, exploring resistance to change and beginning to systematically identify the conditions facilitating positive educational transformation. It examines ‘opportunities’, in the sense of new opportunities as well as those that may help a country ‘catch up’ with good regional or international practice.

Produced by a consortium of research partners – UNESCO’s International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP), the Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt) postgraduate students and faculty, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) – the study also includes chapters from a number of invited contributors. Beyond the above-mentioned institutions, a number of other organizations have played a role in this publication through hosting a researcher or contributing to drafts or meeting discussions.

The stories of educational change in conflict-affected countries found here are diverse. What is clear is that there is no one path to successful education reform or transformation; in practice, numerous factors and dependencies make a clear road map virtually impossible. Therefore, rather than attempting to lay out a set formula for change, a consolidated set of lessons learned is offered.

Central to this volume and its thesis was an influential UNICEF Working Paper published at the end of the 1990s, entitled *Education in emergencies and reconstruction: a developmental approach* (Pigozzi, 1999). This paper argued that emergencies in fact provide an opportunity for positive educational change, even for system transformation. Explaining that opportunities for change in education systems could be either radical or incremental, the paper claimed that a time of crisis could be an opportunity to review past weaknesses and to develop a more coherent and unifying education system for the future.

An emergency can provide a ‘crisis situation’ in which immediate change is possible. In fact it may be much easier to introduce change into education systems as a result of an emergency than in peaceful, orderly times. Emergencies can thus provide an opportunity for transforming education ... (Pigozzi, 1999: 4)

Since the publication of Pigozzi’s paper, a considerable amount of research has been conducted – by the World Bank, IIEP-UNESCO, UNESCO IBE, Save the Children and other organizations – on processes of educational reconstruction after conflicts. As outlined in *Box 1*,

some of that work has been descriptive, reviewing efforts at education system reconstruction by multiple actors, while other research has been analytical, seeking to identify the reasons for particular outcomes in education system reconstruction. Even with this progress in research and analysis, there are gaps and many stories still to be told. It has been pointed out that “education in conflict and post-conflict situations, as a recognized practitioner and research field, is in its infancy” (Tomlinson and Benefield, 2005: 13).

Box 1 Selection of key literature on education in emergencies

To date, significant work exploring the interface between education and crisis is limited, whether by practitioners or academics. Key and often-cited work includes: Aguilar and Retamal, 1998; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Crisp, Talbot and Cipollone, 2001; Sommers, 2002; Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Davies, 2004; Sommers, 2004; Women’s Commission, 2004; World Bank, 2005; and Save the Children, 2007, 2008*b* and 2008*c*. Of increasing importance is research on education service delivery in fragile states, including Rose and Greeley, 2006; Sperling, 2006; USAID, 2006; and Berry, 2007.

A growing body of case studies is documenting education system issues in countries affected by conflict or natural disasters, notably a series for IIEP-UNESCO made up of Bird, 2003; Nicolai, 2004; Obura, 2003; Sommers and Buckland, 2004; Sommers, 2005; Nicolai, 2007; Kirk, 2008; and Obura, 2008. Through UNESCO’s International Bureau on Education (IBE), a number of case studies on curriculum reform in recovery situations was put together in Tawil and Harley, 2004.

Practical guidance for the education response in conflict-affected situations includes some useful handbooks for practitioners in ministries of education, NGOs, UN agencies, development banks and donor agencies. This includes, for example, Sinclair, 2002; UNESCO IIEP, 2006; FTI, 2007; and Save the Children, 2008*a*.

Finally, the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) has led a process that pulls much good practice together through the articulation of the *Minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and reconstruction* (INEE, 2004), with members currently engaged in training agency staff and implementing the minimum standards. INEE also has a Working Group on Education and Fragility, which has commissioned several studies on the issue (CERG, 2008; Brannelly and Ndaruhutse, 2008). A large number of the above resources, along with a variety of others, are available through its website (www.ineesite.org).

The preparation of the overview and the conclusions of this volume have largely been based on information gathered in a review of existing literature and contributed studies, and on discussions during several face-to-face meetings on the topic. Additional email, telephone and face-to-face interviews were conducted with individuals from NGOs, the UN and bilateral donors. Also significant in shaping the direction of the overview were field visits made to Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Hosted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UNICEF, respectively, numerous interviews were conducted in each site with ministry of education officials, UN staff, NGO actors, donors and school officials regarding their thoughts on opportunities for change in the education sector.

Case study chapters

The countries and regions included in the case study chapters encompass both conflict and recovery contexts, with perhaps more emphasis on the latter. In some cases, as in Afghanistan, Colombia and Sri Lanka, insecurity and ongoing conflict continue. In others, like Kosovo, violence has ended but at the time of writing a lasting peace had not yet been restored and stability seemed elusive. Some situations reflect the early years of recovery, as in Angola, Southern Sudan and parts of Uganda. In countries such as Cambodia, Rwanda and South Africa, the effects of or tensions surrounding conflict are still present, even though the process of recovery is a decade or more old.

Amongst the case studies, change in education can be found at a number of different levels. The chapter on Cambodia describes reform at the primary level, while the case study describing the catch-up programme in Angola highlights education for adolescents, and a chapter on higher education change and challenges in Kosovo illustrates tertiary level reform.

A major theme that runs through the chapters in this volume centres on partnerships and their importance to any process of educational transformation. Whether the partners are governments, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, community-based organizations or communities themselves, efforts at transformation during and after conflict require the perspectives and commitment of a number of actors. The first chapter in this volume thus goes beyond country-focused case studies and explores the importance and future of partnerships for education in emergencies and recovery.

As part of the partnership supporting this publication, a number of the case study chapters were written by University of Amsterdam graduate students and faculty members. To add a broader perspective, a variety of other contexts and voices were brought in by authors who have worked in the field with governments, donors, the UN and NGOs. In each instance, an author was asked to reflect from his or her own perspective on their chosen case of education change in a conflict-affected context.

Not only are the authors' backgrounds diverse, coming from academic, operational and policy worlds, but there has been similar diversity in their research processes. Some authors worked in-country and played a direct role in the education change described. Others provided technical and policy support from their headquarters over a period of time. Still others' in-country experience was tied specifically to research for this book. While individuals have necessarily employed their own methodology to some extent, all have included interviews with key informants, a literature review and time in the field. It is hoped that this diversity of perspectives adds to the richness of the volume, with each author being provocative in their own way. Brief abstracts of each of the case studies in this volume follow.

Reaching education goals in countries affected by crisis: where next for the partnership model?

This chapter considers the broad picture of education partnerships, beyond the country-specific portraits presented by other cases. Issue-based investments, rewards for good performance and multi-stakeholder trusts are explored. The differing approaches to aid mean that short-term, needs-based activities do not necessarily link well with longer-term development goal efforts, even though the principles of coordination and partnership are enshrined in most of the development language and literature. Several opportunities for improvement are identified, including taking education partnerships more seriously; placing more emphasis on research, information sharing and technical cooperation; and ensuring a broader range of implementation and funding mechanisms.

Moving from innovation to policy: IRC's work with community-based education in Afghanistan

Years of conflict and instability in Afghanistan have taken a heavy toll on access and education quality. Along with other agencies, IRC began developing a home-based or community-based education model during

the Taliban regime. The model was particularly important in increasing girls' enrolment. This work continued under the current administration, moving from a policy of shadow alignment towards integration with the government's education system. The authors attribute the growing success of this transition to community initiative, coordinated NGO advocacy and efforts to take advantage of key policy openings with the government.

The Teacher Education Package (TEP) and NRC's emergency education support in Angola: 12 years and 212,000 children

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) established a presence in Angola in 1995 and, until phasing out in 2007, focused on catch up opportunities for children who had missed out on basic schooling during the conflict period. In Angola, an existing tool – the UNESCO-PEER Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) – was considerably expanded in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, reaching 12 of the 18 Angolan provinces during the tenure of NRC's work. Angola was the first country where NRC worked 'hands on' as an implementer in education and thus has served as a model for its work in other countries. The author explores how partnerships at different levels were instrumental in achieving results.

*Expanding primary education access in Cambodia:
20 years of recovery*

This chapter reviews the restoration of education in post-conflict Cambodia, from the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 through to the present day. It focuses on the need for more systemic transformation, beyond the immediate access gains that came with the restoration of peace. However, enhancing the use of government systems for financing education has only been possible recently as the post-conflict period created certain negative policy and operational legacies. The authors explore whether earlier efforts to ensure inclusive policy-making, cohesive leadership and partnership around government-led reforms might have accelerated the opportunities for systemic education change.

*No looking back: the creation of a new education system
in Southern Sudan*

Southern Sudan, having experienced several decades of civil war with the north of the country, finally ushered in a new era in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. An autonomous

education system was born during the years of the war, forming an important foundation for the current system. Along with other actors, Save the Children supported a number of innovations during the conflict that have since been consolidated and further developed. While Southern Sudan continues to have some of the lowest primary education enrolment ratios in the world, this chapter shows how the sector benefited from capacity building during the years of conflict and reviews education innovation and change in recent years.

Power structures, politics and change in Kosovo's higher education system

Kosovo's higher education system has a complex history, influenced by politics at the local, national and international level. This chapter, focused on the ethnic-Serb University based in Mitrovica, discusses how the region's political environment has an impact on the way in which existing opportunities are viewed. Despite political constraints at the local and national level, some positive education change has emerged. Education in Mitrovica has experienced some 'opening up' and space for critical thought since the 1999 conflict. However, as this chapter shows, when there are ongoing tensions, international agencies may struggle to balance their need to show visible success with the need to create small, incremental changes that sit 'below the radar'.

Resisting change: former Afrikaner schools and educational reform in post-apartheid South Africa

This chapter looks at the impact of education reform policies on the desegregation of former Afrikaans schools in South Africa. Its focus is therefore on the role of the losing party – the Afrikaners – in obstructing change after conflict settlement. Starting with an analysis of the impact of the protective measures of the white National Party in the waning days of apartheid, it details the strategies of the ANC to overcome these measures, relying mainly on lawsuits to overcome the status quo. The author argues that while the government has successfully forced what is ostensibly a morally positive change, its methods run the risk of alienating large sections of the Afrikaner population.

Building new realities for teacher training in Kosovo

Despite remarkable efforts to maintain the education system in Kosovo during the oppressive Milošević regime, the quality of teaching and learning was inevitably affected. Following the war in 1999,

numerous international agencies arrived and offered teacher training. While most initiatives were short-lived, they introduced learner-centered methodologies and laid the ground for more effective teacher training systems. Since then, in-service training has reached more than 70 per cent of Kosovar teachers, whereas pre-service teacher training has made a departure from strongly academic to more learner-based content. The chapter concludes that cooperation with local partners and investment in local capacity was an important contribution to these quality improvement efforts.

*Political violence against teachers in Colombia:
opportunities for change in the midst of conflict?*

This chapter seeks to analyse how Colombian educators have been affected by the ongoing armed conflict, and highlights ways in which the organized education community has attempted to respond to these violations. FECODE, the major teacher trade union, and other trade union and human rights organizations, have developed innovative strategies to seek to defend and protect the human rights of their members. Despite these innovations, concerted efforts from all stakeholders – trade unions, the Colombian Government, and the international community – are needed to ensure that societal conflicts in Colombia are managed through dialogue and negotiation, and not violence.

*Teaching for peace – overcoming division? Peace education
in reconciliation processes in Sri Lanka and Uganda*

Peace education can contribute to peace building and reconciliation, and help prevent the recurrence of violent conflict. In this chapter, the authors identify five dimensions of peace education that are important for the process of reconciliation. Case studies from Sri Lanka and Uganda are then used to explore approaches in formal and non-formal peace education. The lessons learned show that peace education needs to be included in a wider societal process of peace building and reconciliation, that both formal and non-formal peace education actors need to cooperate in their efforts, and that teachers are crucial and need constant quality training and sustained support.

Teaching history: looking for unity in Rwanda's classrooms

Throughout Rwanda's past, history has been manipulated by Europeans, Tutsis and Hutus, who over time each privileged one ethnicity and shaped the nation to reflect their bias. Since 1994, the post-genocide

government has also engaged in the ‘politics of memory’, only this time the approach is not divisive but instead focused on unity. This chapter explores how the education system, and the teaching of history, can be one of the most important ways to promote reconciliation. However, focusing on curriculum development, the author considers how teaching one single version of history can be detrimental to a democratic and active citizenry, especially in post-conflict societies like Rwanda.

These chapters cover an impressive breadth of conflict settings; however, many unexplored facets of education innovation and reform remain. Greater attention to challenges within the education, humanitarian and post-conflict worlds in recent years has raised the profile of education in emergency and recovery situations. This attention is beginning to lead towards more concerted efforts to find opportunities and address the difficulties of change. Additional perspectives on opportunities for positive educational change could usefully be explored through further research – it is hoped that perhaps this volume and its stories can inspire just that.

Chapter 2

Windows of opportunity

“Today there is hope, today there is opportunity. I’ve lived through war, but the worst I think that happened to us was losing our chance for a good education.”

Young woman, Sierra Leone

Any kind of conflict in life ushers in some kind of change. Armed conflict, with its overt scramble for power, tends to do so to the extreme. Whether political or economic in motivation, whether waged to expand borders, eliminate opposition or control natural resources, wars are fought because certain actors seek an opportunity to change the status quo, while others would like to keep things the same. For civilian populations, violence, displacement and increased poverty are commonly the impact of armed conflict.

During and after wars, the needs are great – sometimes desperate. In grim circumstances and with limited access to livelihoods, it is remarkable just how often support to education is prioritized by those affected. Citing examples from Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq and Indonesia, Martone claims that, “In many cases the demand by refugee leaders for children’s education can exceed requests for food, water, medicine and even shelter” (2007: 6). People living through a time of crisis can sometimes be the first to see windows of opportunity for education. They see this opportunity because it will change their lives for the better.

The words change, innovation, reform and transformation have been used throughout the text in this volume. Change refers to the process of making or becoming something different; it is not necessarily a guided process and can signify either the positive or negative. Innovation goes beyond mere change and is the act or process of inventing or introducing something new. Reform refers to change that is structural and mandated at a policy level and tends to have a positive intent, if not always the result. Transformation is associated with large-scale shifts in both attitudes and actions, and describes positive outcomes of reform efforts. With regards to education, these terms are somewhat interchangeable in common usage and are sometimes used as such throughout this volume.

The early twentieth century sociologist Durkheim claimed that “changes in society always precede changes in the educational system” (Fagerlind and Saha, 1989: 36). Millo and Barnett, in a discussion on educational change in Timor-Leste, sum up this phenomenon in a way that has broader application:

Transitions from colonial rule to independence, after violent conflict, or from changes in systems of governance, result in new leadership regimes with new development plans and new conceptions of national identity. Because of its integral role in development, in generating new conceptions of the nation, and in institutionalizing change, changes in the practice and content of governance almost inevitably demand changes in educational systems (2003: 2).

The nature of these societal changes is, of course, central to the resulting opportunities. Not all change is the same; for example, the degree of change, whether abrupt or gradual, is important. The intensity and extent of change in society are also important factors to consider. Mitchell (2005: 9) suggests that one thinks about change in the framework of five major dimensions that create and shape conflict – and consequently recovery:

1. major change – large in scope and intensity;
2. sudden change – taking place abruptly;
3. unexpected change – with no prior indication, warning or time to prepare;
4. rapid change – taking place over a short time period;
5. irreversible change – with no way of returning to the pre-conflict status quo.

Among the chapters in this volume, one finds prime examples of each of these dimensions. The broader picture of conflict and change has certainly influenced potential education innovation and reform. For instance, major change – large in scope and intensity – has been seen in places like Southern Sudan where entirely new governance systems have been created, equally necessitating the creation of a new education system with an attendant ministry of education. Sudden change, such as that in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, immediately creates new opportunities for education actors to expand programming and innovation.

Unexpected change, such as renewed conflict or incidents of insurgency like those seen in Sri Lanka and Colombia, gives rise to opportunities to combat violence through education both within and outside of the school. Rapid change, like that in Kosovo, which moved quickly from provincial status to war, and then to a transitional administration – all in less than a decade – can lead to concentrated donor investment. Extraordinary historical events, as seen in places like Cambodia, South Africa and Rwanda, where oppressive regimes made way for democratic governance, have led to what one hopes is irreversible change and have given rise to opportunities for education to play a role in advancing peace and reconciliation.

Some windows of opportunity for education innovation and reform may be linked to the specifics of a conflict or post-conflict situation, while others relate to improvements in access, quality and system management in general. Examples of education efforts that specifically address conflict-related issues include catch-up or accelerated learning programmes, which typically serve young people who have been unable to go to school due to their displacement or recruitment by armed forces, although they often reach other children as well. There may also be special measures to increase the protection and security of students and teachers, such as accompaniment to and from school, identity cards or teacher codes of conduct. Initiatives such as these can be important in times of stability but become more of a priority in periods of conflict and instability. In contrast, other innovations or reforms, such as piloting a new curriculum, introducing new approaches to girls' education or adoption of new teacher training models, may happen whether or not there has been a crisis and may prospectively be scaled up as part of education for an increasingly stable society.

While changes such as these are potentially exciting and can lead to real education transformation, it should be emphasized that “moving from war to peace entails continuity as well as change” (Paris and Sisk, 2007: 4). In all cultures, no matter how damaged by conflict, a balancing act between change and continuity is required in order to transform the previous system without reproducing the problems of the past. In Cambodia, for instance, reform of the education system has been a slow process, requiring small steps and building on each successive recovery period. In South Africa, tensions around education continuity have sometimes fallen along old apartheid-era battle lines, with some actors feeling that change has gone too far. These are but two examples; the

importance of continuity can be seen in almost all of the chapters in this volume.

Conflict and recovery

Around the world, the number of people affected by armed conflict is immense. One research team counted 118 conflicts in 80 locations, when reviewing the 14-year period from the end of the Cold War in 1990 through to 2004 (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). Despite the scale of the problem, there is some promising news in that it does not seem that the incidence of formally recognized armed conflict is growing. For the five years from 2002 to 2007, several respected studies found that the number of active conflicts has held steady at around 30 per year (Mack, 2007; Harbom, 2006).

However, conflicts tend to be long lasting: for instance, among active armed conflicts in 1999, “66 per cent were more than five years old, and 30 per cent had lasted for longer than 20 years” (Smith, 2004: 4). Even when a conflict is thought to be over, it is rarely the end of the story, as “around half of all civil wars are due to a breakdown in peace in their first post-conflict decade” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 17). When active conflict does not re-erupt, tensions can linger, with “the term ‘post-conflict’ [...] not necessarily imply[ing] absolute peace” (Slaymaker and Christiansen, 2005: 7).

An attempt to quantify armed conflicts in scale or scope does not paint a full picture of the extent of insecurity around the globe. The prevalence of intra-state war, the involvement of non-state actors, and one-sided violence deliberately targeting civilians has brought an increasing complexity to modern day conflict. Recent thinking has introduced the label of ‘fragile state’, described by the OECD Development Assistance Committee as countries which “lack either the will or the capacity to [...] ensure security, safeguard human rights and provide the basic functions for development [...] [and face] particularly severe development challenges such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war” (2007: 4).

Whatever the label, there is such diversity of context that collective groupings often do little justice to the range of conflicts that exist. This can include, for example, recurring violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, active insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, prolonged civil

war in Colombia, or economic deprivation and chaotic violence in Haiti. Conflict can, for decades, continue to have an impact on periods of recovery and transition, for instance as described in the chapters here on Cambodia, Rwanda and South Africa.

Where government functions the least, due to a lack of capacity, limited resources or poor infrastructure, armed conflict seems to thrive and recovery is prolonged. This has been the case in Southern Sudan, for instance. It is in such places that the worst long-term human development outcomes are generated. In a kind of vicious circle, it also seems to be the case that wars tend to be fought in poor countries where indicators of well-being are at their lowest. *Box 2* highlights this important and complicating factor.

Box 2 Poverty, global security and development

While the fact that war causes poverty may be obvious, there has been mounting evidence that poverty itself can increase the likelihood of civil war, creating what has been termed a “conflict trap”. “Countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita incomes [...] face dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict.” (Collier, 2003: 53).

There is an integral relationship between global security and development. A few years ago, the influential United Nations *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* laid out a comprehensive set of plans to strengthen the world’s collective security. In welcoming the report, then Secretary General Kofi Annan supported its “emphasis on development as the indispensable foundation of a new collective security”. He went on to say that:

Extreme poverty and infectious diseases are threats in themselves, but they also create environments which make more likely the emergence of other threats, including civil conflict. If we are to succeed in better protecting the security of our citizens, it is essential that due attention and necessary resources be devoted to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (UN General Assembly A/59/565, 2004: 2).

The failure of security and the rule of law entails, among other aspects of societal decline, the disappearance or weak functioning of schools and other government infrastructure (Ballentine, 2005; Macrae *et al.*, 2004). Money spent on war is money taken away from other government responsibilities, such as education. In Colombia, as pointed out in the related chapter, education as a percentage of annual

government spending decreased from nearly 17 per cent to 12 per cent during some of the more intense periods of conflict.

Thus it is all the more important to support early and longer-term efforts at recovery in post-conflict situations. The overall focus of a recovery approach, according to UNDP, is to “restore the capacity of national institutions and communities to recover from a conflict or a natural disaster, enter transition or ‘build back better’, and avoid relapses” (CWGER, 2008: 9). Now facilitated by an early recovery cluster or network in most humanitarian crises, recovery programming works to restore basic social services, infrastructure, livelihood opportunities and governance capacity.

While improving security and support to recovery is essential, there has been new attention in recent years beyond merely ending war towards questions of ‘building peace’ (Call and Cousens, 2007). The concept of peace-building refers to the reconstruction and development processes that help a country move from war to peace in post-conflict situations, making it the final component of the ‘peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building’ triad (Peacebuilding Commission, 2007). It can span many activities and scholars have suggested that comprehensive efforts at peace-building imply significant changes be made at different levels: individuals’ perceptions and behaviours; relationships between parties; and political, social and economic structures (Shapiro, 2006; Ross, 2000).

The windows of opportunity available through education can contribute to broader peace-building aims. The provision of quality education is increasingly recognized as a means of promoting stability in countries affected by conflict, with “the failure to deliver improved education services [described as] a potential source of exacerbation to security conditions”. As governments work to build their legitimacy through providing services and security, “[e]ducation is particularly key given it is the largest, most widespread and visible institution in the country, evident even in remote regions” (Rose and Greeley, 2006: 4). The role of education as a stabilizing force is evidenced through its inclusion in a number of peace agreements – in the years from 1989 to 2005, 26 of 37 publicly available peace agreements mandated some type of education reform (Save the Children, 2008c: 8).

Education reform

As already discussed, major change in society, whether induced by conflict or not, is nearly always a catalyst for some level of reform to the education system. Since the end of the Cold War, a large number of countries affected by war and conflict – for instance Cambodia, Rwanda, South Africa, Timor-Leste and much of the former Yugoslavia – have experienced transitions that led to the rebuilding of their education systems. Education reform typically represents a reaction to both a country's political and economic environment, as well as its existing education policies. This link is clearly described in one review of recent education reforms across 16 different developing and industrial countries:

A nation's priorities are typically reflected in its education system. As a result, when a country is subject to major societal shifts – political, demographic or economic – it focuses its attention on its education system and seeks to 'reform' that system so it becomes more consistent with the changing societal context (Rotberg, 2004: 11).

Events that at first glance can seem to have little bearing on an education system, often introduce changes to that very system. Political, demographic or economic shifts can lead to a change in administration, a new sector plan, a different language of instruction, a fresh model of teacher training, the formation of a new curriculum, or the introduction of special initiatives. A modern day look at educational change as linked to conflict might best begin with a brief reference to post World War II reforms in Japan and Germany, as highlighted in *Box 3*.

Some of the case studies included in this volume illustrate more recent examples of opportunities for large-scale education reform that can accompany conflict. For instance, Cambodia, Southern Sudan and Kosovo all essentially experienced the creation of new education systems during or following their respective wars. Countries like Sri Lanka, Uganda, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Angola have undergone extensive transformation of the previously existing education system, with elements of innovation or reform highlighted in the respective chapters.

A World Bank paper has posited that from the 1990s, education reform became a top priority in both developed and developing countries. Two major reasons were identified: the first is that the creation

of an educated workforce has been shown to aid international economic competitiveness; the second, that domestic constituencies increasingly saw quality education as a key component of higher living standards. Additionally, external pressure for education reform grew during this time, as “multilateral lending institutions [began to] customarily include education reform as part of their package of economic and state reforms” (Corrales, 1999: np).

Box 3 Education reform in Japan and Germany post World War II

With Japan and Germany under American occupation following World War II, both countries saw significant change in their education systems. These efforts towards reform perhaps form the first modern day example of education in a recovery situation, with outside actors – in these cases, primarily the United States – playing key roles in suggesting or leading education innovation and reform.

In Japan, the centralized control of schools was decentralized, rote memorization shifted to interactive teaching and parents for the first time were allowed to vote for school boards (Phillips and Ochs, 2004). In Germany, the focus was on educational ‘reorientation’ to eliminate Nazi doctrine, while attempts were made at wider reform (Dorn, 2005). According to Masako, while reform was largely accepted in Japan, this was less the case in Germany, where much of the traditional system remained (2005).

It is indeed the case that in the past several decades, many countries have launched major reform processes. China and Russia, following major political shifts, found themselves rethinking their approach to education. In France, Sweden and other Western countries, an increasingly diverse student population demanded greater attention to and subsequent adaptation of policies and curricula. In countries as diverse as Singapore, Turkey and Chile, economic transition and globalization have led to an overhaul of their education sectors. In south-east Europe, following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, more than half of the countries launched major education reform processes (Rotberg, 2004).

In reviewing educational reform efforts in places as diverse as Argentina, Jordan, New Zealand and South Korea, the World Bank synthesized a set of useful lessons about conditions needed to better enable the adoption of education reform, as summarized in *Box 4*.

Box 4 Conditions that may enhance education reform adoption

Changes in reform type:

- combining access elements with quality reform;
- following an incremental rather than all-encompassing approach;
- packaging education reform with other types of reform (of the state or the economy).

Efforts to bolster the supply side:

- entrusting education reform to ministries with low turnover rates;
- increasing links with the outside world or global economy;
- creating independent pro-reform advisory councils.

Efforts to bolster the demand side:

- launching massive information dissemination campaigns;
- involving potential beneficiaries in reform design and evaluation;
- in cases of decentralization, granting greater financial autonomy to local entities.

Institutional setting determinants of societal cooperation with reform:

- teachers' union (or any cost-bearing group) links with opposition political parties hinder government-union cooperation;
- internal union fragmentation hinders union-government cooperation; external union fragmentation diminishes the power of unions;
- pre-empting strategic coalitions between cost-bearing groups and other societal actors.

Source: Corrales, 1999: viii.

Of course, education reform is not only found at the macro level. In fact, the behaviour of educators at each particular school or classroom undoubtedly impacts on attempts at change (Fullan, Hill and Crevola, 2006). In an exploration of educational change conducted several years ago in south-east Europe, Bassler posed some key questions:

[when] an education system [...] is in flux or in stasis, it is crucial to consider where [a certain] school is positioned politically. Is it a locus for change? Resistance to change? Inertia? Innovation? Is the position itself changing? Is it accountable to the state, the community, or both? (Bassler, 2005: 6).

Despite the clear importance of the broader political and socio-economic context, understanding of education reform has tended

to be limited by its focus on educational aspects without considering the broader role in societal reform (Riddell, 1999). Concern in relation to the internal or technical aspects of education system change is, of course, itself important but generally there have been gaps in factoring in the position of education within societies, which has a major impact on what is possible in terms of transformation.

A key external factor has been globalization and the information revolution, which have played a role in educational reform in the developed and developing world. Education policy-makers have become more aware of system-level changes in other parts of the world and have more opportunities to engage in education policy debates beyond their own borders. The chapters on Afghanistan and Kosovo in this volume illustrate that closed borders have meant that most efforts at education reform lag behind and post-conflict education reform focuses to some extent on efforts to ‘catch up’ with neighbouring countries or regions.

An outbreak of conflict, the emergence of peace, political shifts, increasing diversity, economic changes and globalization naturally all impact on efforts at education reform. It is not easy consistently to factor in how such external factors inform the difficult trade-offs that need to be made during reform. Decisions concerning equality of opportunity, school choice, innovation, resource allocation, student testing, teacher accountability and higher education all raise hard questions during a time of change.

Agents of change

Who or what brings change – innovation, reform or transformation – to education systems during periods of conflict and recovery? As we have seen, events or circumstances themselves are often agents of change – large-scale displacement, destroyed infrastructure and depleted budgets can force change and adaptation in the education sector. Positive innovation and reform, however, is typically led by individuals or an institution. In any given conflict or post-conflict situation, a whole range of actors is likely to be interested in putting forward their vision and pushing reforms in a certain direction. The question of who takes advantage of opportunities and serves as an agent of change is thus an important one.

The role of national actors should be central to any question regarding ‘who decides’. Political will and capacity are the key determinants of

a government's ability to lead or embrace change; either of these may be negatively affected by conflict (Moreno-Torres and Anderson, 2004). Communities themselves can also bring about change, with attention to civil society's role "increasingly being applied [...] both as part of an idealized model of decentralized government and also in the absence of effective government" (Slaymaker and Christiansen, 2005: 11). While key actors nearly always are – and should be – from within a country, a critical role is played by international actors in introducing innovation and "creating the opportunity for local actors to establish legitimate and sustainable governance" (Chesterman *et al.*, 2004).

National leadership

Political leadership, along with ministries and other governance structures, often plays a central role in education reform and transformation. Particularly important here are ministries of education. In some situations during or following a conflict, the education ministry has to be created or re-created. In Southern Sudan, for instance, there was no previous ministry and a new one had to be established. The new Afghan Government in 2001 inherited an empty building and needed to appoint new staff at senior levels. Elsewhere, ministries have continued to exist throughout periods of conflict but with minimal resources and without control of certain conflict-affected parts of a country, as in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. There are also some instances where the education ministry continues to function normally, except in relation to conflict-affected areas: this was the case in Sri Lanka and earlier, in Mozambique.

However, as new democracies 'flex their muscles', educational reforms can be a kind of casualty (Bassler, 2005). With new governments come new ministers, and the life span of ministers can be fairly short during a period of political transition. A change in leadership can derail change and marginalize those who had been associated with the reforms. This makes it particularly important to seek widespread consensus on education reform and to provide support and training for district- and local-level officers. Sinclair describes this focus on district and local education staff as "all the more important if reconstruction is seen as an opportunity to modernize and improve the structure of the education system and the quality and content of the education provided" (2005: 83).

Community involvement

Building on a new enthusiasm for education, communities themselves are sometimes agents of change for education during or following a conflict. Local stakeholders – principals, teachers, students and parents – can play an important role. In central and southern Somalia, where the education system has been in a state of collapse for 15 or more years, community education committees have taken on the daily task of running and monitoring schools. With external support, access and quality of education have been improving through the introduction of new curricula, teacher training, textbook provision and school rehabilitation (Save the Children UK, nd).

While the process of building ownership through dialogue and consultation can take time, this can pay dividends through the sustained commitment to change developed among stakeholders. In some instances, education authorities have been able to incorporate and build on community schools that emerged during a conflict. In El Salvador following the 1992 peace agreement, support was extended to the *escuelas populares*, which were run by local educators and had emerged in the regions where fighting was fiercest. This plan included teacher training and the purchase of educational materials (Marques and Bannon, 2003).

A chapter in this publication describes how community involvement is the cornerstone of the home schools established in Afghanistan. Cultural and geographic features make this involvement a significant contribution to access to education. The limited access of girls to schooling under Taliban rule reflected conservative views on education found especially in rural communities. This conservatism makes families unwilling to let girls go to schools some distance from the home, while geography also constrains young boys' access to school in some rural areas. Home schools rely on a community member as teacher, who is trusted and supported by the community. In Afghanistan, steps are being taken to integrate home schools progressively into the national education system, so that these community-led efforts made in the past will bear fruit in the future.

International actors

The role that international actors play as a catalyst and as support during and following a crisis can be of utmost importance. The fact

that countries may have been cut off from international good practice for years or decades means that the local perspective may be limited in scope. Hence it is important to work, as most international agencies do, through government departments and through NGOs staffed by national professionals, but also to incorporate a strong component of capacity development into assistance budgets and programmes.

At the system level, the experience of Cambodia illustrates the need for long-term donor commitment, but with the aim of building national capacity for system management. The case study on Southern Sudan, in contrast, shows that investment in the capacity of a ‘shadow’ education secretariat within a rebel group can bring dividends as the role of the group is transformed into one that is more formal and recognized. International commitment to education in Southern Sudan has been long term and has built trust, which has enabled the various national and international partners to work together.

The coordination of such external assistance is a hugely important issue in order that good use is made of scarce resources, as explored more thoroughly in this volume’s chapter on partnerships. Conflict-affected governments are often not in a position to provide strong leadership and assistance in this task is often needed. The use of ‘joint assessment missions’ in crisis or post-conflict situations has helped the UN, World Bank and other agencies to form a unified assessment of needs, including the need for capacity building and system development. However, the subsequent pattern of support may not always reflect a unified and coordinated approach. In some countries, a multi-donor trust fund or another pooled funding mechanism has been put in place to address this lack of coordination and to support education, among other sectors.

When positive change does occur, partnerships have nearly always played an important role in the success of education reforms. In Southern Sudan, partnerships between rebel – and later national – authorities and the international community have driven progress in education system development. In Colombia, partnerships between trade unions and human rights organizations – and in some aspects the government – provide some measure of protection for educators targeted by military groups. A number of international-level partnerships have also supported education efforts in conflict and recovery situations, as discussed in the chapter on partnerships. This includes the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Education Cluster, the Inter-Agency Network on Education in

Emergencies (INEE), and numerous donor partnerships and trust funds in the field.

One recent mechanism, the Cluster Approach, is meant to facilitate coordination and a predictable response by the international community. It was introduced in 2005 by the IASC, a global forum involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners and has since been rolled out extensively. The global Education Cluster, co-lead by UNICEF and Save the Children, was operational in 25 emergency-affected countries at the end of 2008. In many of these countries, the ministry of education also serves as a lead to the Education Cluster or is deeply involved in its work. These emergency-focused groups are increasingly linking with national education coordination committees working on broader education policy issues.

How these various actors lead or catalyse innovation and reform is an area that only recently is gaining attention. An important approach beginning to be explored in the fragile states literature relates to turnaround. By one measure, turnaround requires a sustained improvement in countries with persistent weaknesses in policies, institutions and governance (Chauvet and Collier, 2004; Collier, 2007). *Box 5* shows how research has pointed to the fact that education, through partnership and community-based development, can play a role in turnaround.

Box 5 Turnaround, education and community involvement

Aid programmes and projects in the sector have the potential to contribute to turnaround: Education actors do not need to sit back and wait for certain conditions to be met. They might contribute by:

- (i) bringing about sustainable change in governance;
- (ii) catalysing change outside the area/sector/theme of the original intervention;
- (iii) stemming negative spillover effects from one region or country into the other regions or a neighbouring country, as well as unintended consequences of aid projects.

Research has found that community-level initiatives play a particularly important role in aid effectiveness in fragile states. Given the role that community-driven and community-based development has played as “an important anchor for education interventions in fragile states, (t)his might suggest a key role for education services in contributing to turnaround”.

Source: Rose and Greeley, 2006: 3; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008: 485.

The chapters in this volume illustrate the variety of actors driving – and sometimes resisting – change in ways that might contribute to turnaround. The case study on Cambodia shows that reform has at various points been driven by communities and international actors, but now is being led by ministry and government authorities. In Afghanistan, community-based education provides an example of local leadership resulting in access and quality gains, especially for girls. The Kosovo case study on higher education illustrates the role that politically savvy – and in this case, cautious – individuals have had in promoting small-scale change that avoids opposition. The chapters on Rwanda and Angola both show international actors as influential agents of change, in the first instance in relation to history curriculum and teaching, and in the second stepping in to ensure education opportunities for excluded groups.

Conversely, those concerned with education do not always support positive change. A case in point is explored in the chapter on South Africa, with certain parents and education leaders pushing for maintaining a segregated system. Another example can be found in the case of Kosovo, where teacher training institutions actually resisted change to the process of pre-service teacher training. In the Sri Lanka and Uganda chapter on peace education, partnership between the formal system and civil society seems to have been resisted in both cases.

There are clearly windows of opportunity for education transformation that open during periods of conflict and recovery. At times of crisis, there is a loosening up of the usual rigidities found in education systems. There is at the same time a weakness in the capacity of national educators to use these occasions for system reform, because of operational constraints and sometimes lack of expertise on current good practice in education. To use these opportunities to the full, and to mitigate resistance to change, a committed partnership of national and international actors needs to work together to introduce innovation and reform, working towards a broader system transformation.

Chapter 3

Towards transformation

“If nothing ever changed, there’d be no butterflies.”

Author unknown

Despite the devastating impact of war and the challenges of recovery, a surprising resilience and ability to transform can often be seen within affected education systems. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including:

... the strong priority given to schooling by communities, which often strive on their own to keep schools open during conflicts; the high and immediate priority education typically receives from donors and countries once conflicts end; and the opportunities for education reform that post-conflict settings can present (World Bank, 2007: 88).

Despite its brutal nature, war and conflict do bring opportunity, as the chapters of this volume show. A number of themes related to education innovation and reform emerge from each of the included chapters. Some relate to the overall aims of EFA, especially improving education access and advancing education quality. Others highlight the introduction of innovation to better reach excluded groups and support peace and reconciliation. Important factors found to support transformation include the popular enthusiasm for education following conflict, moves to abolish school fees, furthering girls’ education, curriculum review and reform, teacher training efforts, innovative programmes such as catch-up or accelerated learning, and peace education. These issues are explored in some depth below.

Strengthening systems

The areas of access, quality and innovation can frame some of the most critical changes in education systems. Underpinning such areas of focus is often a need to strengthen education management. If the system of educational planning and management has broken down completely or is weak, it then becomes increasingly difficult to achieve sustainable

improvements in other areas. Capacity building that strengthens planning and governance structures from the earliest phase can accelerate further development in an education sector.

Governance and the attendant capacities of the education authorities vary widely depending on the country context. The education authorities may have significant capacity, as in Sri Lanka and Uganda; may have low capacity following a conflict, as in Timor-Leste and Southern Sudan; or at times seem limited in motivation to deliver services, as in Angola and Myanmar. This combination of factors is sometimes termed as ‘political will and capacity’ in the fragile states literature (Rose and Greeley, 2006; Moulton and Dall, 2006). Political motivation can negatively affect ‘commitment’ and a change in leadership can derail efforts or marginalize those who had been associated with reforms.

Even in countries where the education ministry in the capital has continued despite the conflict, there can be a lack of capacity – typically due to a combination of a lack of skilled people or a lack of staff budgets and insecurity. In Afghanistan, the Taliban left the education ministry as an empty shell in 2001; although there were some people from previous regimes and NGOs who had the relevant expertise, many had not worked in the education sector for years. Security issues, such as those in Afghanistan, often meant that efforts at system development are regularly damaged or delayed.

In the worst of circumstances, countries are so devastated by conflict that even the most basic tasks are difficult. Transport and communications may have collapsed or never existed, and there may not be a financial system to enable payments, including teacher salaries. Ensuring the material base to education – enough textbooks, safe buildings and adequate teacher salaries – is crucial. In conflict-affected countries and regions, funds are often not available at a level that maintains education quality, let alone enhances it. While an increase in resources can accompany a peace agreement and provide relief for a resource-starved system, this sometimes does not materialize or may end too quickly. The chapters on Angola, Cambodia, Kosovo and Southern Sudan all illustrate the long process of system development and ongoing support following a conflict.

In the case study of Cambodia, one finds an early reliance on relief and parallel systems of project management. The authors suggest that it took 15 to 20 years for the development of the national capacity for

appraisal and strategic planning, and imply that this should be prioritized earlier in other circumstances. In the case of Cambodia, “a minimum capacity to articulate a short strategic framework, with sequenced priorities and targets aligned with a realistic financing framework may have speeded up the transition to systemic reforms”. Weak government capacity in Cambodia led to parallel systems, whereas the post-conflict situation provided an opportunity to strengthen government capacity to plan, administer and monitor development programmes.

In contrast, in Southern Sudan, international support for the Secretariat of Education provided a basis for the later establishment of an education ministry. As noted in the related chapter, many Secretariat personnel transferred to the new ministry and continued their work. The nascent education system of Southern Sudan, despite all the difficulties, has grown in parallel with the peace process and its implementation, as highlighted in *Box 6*.

Box 6 Building education system capacity in Southern Sudan

In Southern Sudan, during the 1980s and 1990s, most education interventions could be characterized as ‘hit and run’ education. A training course might be conducted for one to three months and educational materials distributed from time to time, but rarely was there sustained support to schooling in a location.

In 2000, there was a shift from an emergency mode towards a more developmental approach to education, despite the ongoing war. The creation of the Secretariat of Education by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) coincided with greater acknowledgement that approximately two-thirds of the territory was fairly stable. Although not an official government entity, the Secretariat of Education quickly began to functionally fill the role of an education authority.

The Secretariat, based in Nairobi for most of its tenure, transitioned to the Ministry of Education along with the peace agreement of 2004, and moved into Southern Sudan proper. Led by the new Ministry, a range of donors and NGOs have continued to be involved in efforts to meet ambitious education targets. The peace agreement spurred action, with greater attention given to improving education management capacity and to following the action plans laid out in the education sector plan. The range of work has included drafting education policies, construction of infrastructure, creation of teacher training programmes and curriculum development.

Source: Sommers, 2005; and case study chapter.

Improving educational access

While primary completion rates for conflict-affected and fragile states lag behind those of other low-income countries, their progress can be faster than non-fragile counterparts (World Bank, 2007: 88). In the years following the end of a conflict, significant gains can be made in access. In reviewing the data for 12 countries affected by conflict, the World Bank found primary enrolment increased in seven of them in the year following the conflict compared to the year it began, even where 50 per cent or more of the schools were damaged or destroyed (2005: 22).

Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Sierra Leone are among the countries with enrolment surges spurred on by a new enthusiasm for the future. In Rwanda, “the decisive factor in restarting schools fast [was] the level of determination of the ministry”, and in the five years following the genocide, primary school enrolment had risen by 33 per cent (Obura, 2003: 56, 235). The policy of removing ethnic and regional quotas was one key factor in this and it had a major impact. While quality issues did not receive the same attention as access, over time students say they have seen improvements in curriculum, language policy and teacher quality.

A massive increase in enrolment followed the regime changes in Cambodia and Afghanistan – although at different paces – as further described by the chapters in this publication. In Cambodia, the first decade following the downfall of the Khmer Rouge regime saw a surge in primary school enrolment from a mere 200,000 to 1.6 million students. In Afghanistan, following the fall of the Taliban, enrolment increased around 700 per cent from approximately 774,000 to 6 million children in school, perhaps the biggest ever percentage increase in a school population.

In Southern Sudan, in contrast, the 2004 peace agreement led to some gains but there was no big surge in enrolment. Despite an ongoing commitment by the Secretariat of Education, as described in the related chapter, the starting base was so low that the focus necessarily remained on efforts to improve education management capacity and follow the action plans laid out in the education sector plan. These slow and steady efforts have led to slower, but perhaps more sustainable, progress in enrolment.

Popular enthusiasm

Surges in school enrolment, such as that seen in Rwanda, may partly be due to a population's hope for the future, created by an end to the conflict and a successful peace process. The window of time following the resolution of a conflict can provide one of the best opportunities to revive and build education systems, and there are particular opportunities around increases in access.

One way that such enrolment increases have been spurred on and sustained is through multi-phase initiatives – back to school, go to school and stay in school campaigns. These school attendance campaigns, typically led by a ministry of education through the support of UNICEF and others, involve major advocacy and communication efforts to mobilize communities, governments, partner organizations and donors. First used after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, *back to school* initiatives have become a key strategy to restore education in emergency situations and beyond. They have been carried out in countries such as Angola, Afghanistan, Granada, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste, among others. A back to school campaign was one of several tools used in Timor-Leste, as shown in *Box 7*.

Box 7 New governance and increased enrolment in Timor-Leste

During the UN-administered transitional period beginning in 1999 and upon independence in 2002, Timor-Leste was given a chance to rebuild a new education system following 25 years of occupation and centuries as a Portuguese colony. The hurdles seemed immense, with approximately 95 per cent of schools destroyed, a shortage of qualified teachers, disagreement over the language of instruction and no existing education administration. However, marked increases in primary school enrolment occurred in the first year following the end of the Indonesian occupation: net enrolment jumped to 75 per cent, a 10 per cent rise over the enrolment rate before the occupation.

These enrolment increases were attributed to a number of factors, but perhaps most important was an enthusiasm to learn under the new Timorese system. Other factors included the removal of required school fees and uniforms, and meals provided through a school feeding programme. However, a large number of over-aged students enrolled for the first time, creating an enrolment 'bulge' in the lower grades. Moreover, student-teacher ratios rose, with a national average of 62 to 1 and ratios in excess of 100 to 1 in remote areas.

Source: Nicolai, 2004: 85

Abolition of fees

One of the major barriers to education in many places, including countries affected by conflict, is the cost of schooling. Some post-conflict countries have announced the abolition of school fees as a means to accelerate progress towards the MDGs and EFA (SFAI, 2006). When this happens, big increases in enrolment often take place, including an element of backlog, with children of different ages entering or re-entering school now that financial constraints have been reduced.

One of the better known examples of an enrolment surge linked to the abolition of fees is in Uganda where, following a 1996 campaign promise, universal primary education (UPE) was introduced during a period of post-conflict recovery. The next year, primary school enrolment jumped from 3.4 million to 5.7 million. This policy “raised the expectation among parents that schooling would benefit their children”, yet limited quality improvements, high pupil-teacher ratios and disparities in the conflict-affected northern regions quickly led to drop outs (Moulton and Dall, 2006: 78). While prioritizing quantity over quality lead to some initial problems, progress on enrolment in Uganda has since provided space for a greater focus on quality issues such as the curriculum; as discussed in the chapter related to Sri Lanka and Uganda in this volume, subjects such as peace education are of increasing importance.

A key point in the long road to recovery for Cambodia’s education system was the abolition of school registration fees and the introduction of primary school block grants. The banning of initial registration fees was linked to the introduction of primary school block grants, and this was introduced nationwide from 2000-2002. Primary enrolment grew quickly by half a million students, at a similar pace to that following the initial regime change after the Khmer Rouge. Political pressure to abolish fees meant that the government dismissed calls for a more gradual approach; a better paced roll out may have better addressed implementation capacity and fears of corruption.

At the global level, the School Fees Abolition Initiative (SFAI) was launched jointly in 2005 by UNICEF and the World Bank, aiming to develop a knowledge base in this area, provide technical support to countries and further policy dialogue on the complexities of school fee abolition policies and the rights-based dimensions. By 2008, the initiative was engaged in supporting the school fee abolition efforts of more than 20 countries (Craissati, 2008). Some of the post-conflict countries in the

process of abolishing or planning to abolish school fees include Burundi, the DRC, Haiti, Liberia and Timor-Leste. All have found, however, that supplementary charges and costs such as books and uniforms continue and remain an obstacle to enrolment of the poorest children. *Box 8* discusses the experience of Sierra Leone in relation to abolishing school fees.

**Box 8 Enrolment surge through abolishing school fees
 in Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone's education system experienced a remarkable recovery in the years following the end of its decade-long civil war. In 2001, a year before the war's end, the government introduced the Free Primary Education Policy, which officially abolished school fees for all children in primary schools. This policy, along with the introduction of free West African Examinations Council examinations, led to a doubling of primary school enrolment from 660,000 to 1.3 million children in only three years.

Building on this success, the government has taken its policy of free schooling one step further. The government introduced the Girl-child Education Support Programme to get more girls into junior secondary schools in regions with the greatest gender disparity. In 2004, a free education policy coupled with the provision of books and uniforms was introduced for girls in Junior Secondary Schools in the northern and eastern regions. As a result, girls' enrolment at this post-primary level has increased significantly.

Despite impressive progress, major access challenges remain for Sierra Leone. Although the government abolished school fees, primary education is still not completely free because many schools impose a variety of charges on students' families. In 2004/05, about 25 to 30 per cent of primary school-aged children were out of school, and the gross completion rate in primary education was only 65 per cent. Ongoing issues around education quality are thought to have contributed to low enrolment and completion levels.

Source: GoSL, 2007; Wang, 2007.

Girls' education

Globally, of the 72 million children out of school, some 57 per cent are estimated to be girls (UNESCO, 2008). This gender gap is probably even greater in conflict-affected countries. Although there are exceptions, in most conflict and recovery situation, girls' education opportunities are more limited than that of boys. Constraints on girls' education are often more intense, notably due to deteriorating physical security and families'

reduced economic prospects. While boys face other kinds of problems, there are particular risks in locations where child recruitment is common. While it is important to deal with the challenges facing both genders, equitable access to quality education for girls in times of conflict and situations of displacement remains a particularly serious challenge.

Even under difficult conditions, windows of opportunity can open up for girls and women to access education, and to increase girls' attendance and retention in schools. In addition, there is growing consensus among education and development practitioners that when education quality improves for girls, it also improves for boys (Unterhalter *et al.*, 2004; Global Campaign for Education, 2003). In some cases, it is in situations of displacement where girls have their first chance to go to school. In others, education quality can improve through the recruitment of female teachers or assistants, gender training for all teachers or the introduction of a gender-sensitive curriculum.

In Afghanistan, cultural conservatism – and in many cases geographic isolation – too often has meant that girls have been unable to attend school. The Taliban's devastating policies against girls' education further limited opportunities. The case study in this volume describes how a number of community-based schools were started, partially to offer girls access. When the regime was overthrown in 2001, support for these community-based schools continued and has helped to extend coverage of the government education system. The case study on Afghanistan shows how the community schools programmes are linking with the national education ministry, so that the schools are progressively absorbed into the national system.

Another important example of innovation in girls' education includes the employment of female classroom assistants in countries such as Liberia (Kirk and Winthrop, 2006a). This is intended to protect girls from sexual harassment, but the assistants are also trained to help with classroom work. In addition, there have been efforts to establish a national code of conduct for educators – strictly monitored and enforced – to address the all-too-common exploitation of girls by male educators. Other practical ways of increasing girls' enrolment are shown in *Box 9*, through the experience of Darfur.

Box 9 Increases in girls' enrolment in Darfur

Girls' enrolment rates in Sudan are among the lowest in the world and within the country, the state of Darfur falls near the bottom of the league. Despite the positive move of establishing the Girls' Education Department within the Federal Ministry of Education in 2000, the problems of early marriage, parents' negative attitudes, some schools being too far away for safe travel and a huge lack of funding have meant that gender equity is still a far-off dream.

In Darfur, however, some girls have access to education for the first time within the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and girls' enrolment is reported to have risen. Several strategies have played a role in this increase. Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) have served as an important support for girls' education, as well as a mechanism for reporting problems and abuses. Some girls and young women have gained access to education through youth centres that teach subjects like Arabic, numeracy and basic English. Other strategies yielding positive results are adult literacy classes and the raising of awareness among mothers of the importance of education for their daughters.

Source: McKenna and Robinson, 2006.

Advancing education quality

Globally, improvements in education quality have not shown the same level of progress as have those in access. A recent World Bank Global Monitoring Report focused on education quality as one of the five key messages related to an assessment of progress on the MDGs.

Quality lags quantity – children enroll in school but don't always learn. Advancement in primary school completion has been rapid and encouraging in many countries. Yet cross-country evaluations suggest improvement in cognitive skills has often not kept pace (World Bank, 2007: 3).

While it is apparent that progress is slow, one challenge in measuring quality of education is the variety of different definitions. A rights-based approach to quality is central to most understandings, with a description of education quality found in Article 29 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. UNICEF identifies five dimensions of quality: learners, environments, content, processes and outcomes (UNICEF, 2002). Other actors such as UNESCO and the Global Campaign for Education have

developed their own frameworks for quality (Pigozzi, 2004; GCE, 2002).

Unfortunately, quality schooling is more often the exception than the norm in conflict-affected countries. In a multi-country study that included conflict-affected Liberia, Mozambique and Palestinian camps in Lebanon, schooling for some was characterized as being “run by inflexible bureaucracies”, and the authors observed that:

What is taught in school is often incomprehensible (in a language children have never heard) and unrelated to their lives. Teachers are harsh, unmotivated and unmotivating. Children drop out, having learnt little (Molteno, Ogadhoh, Cain and Crumpton 2000: 2).

Education quality is often negatively affected by ongoing tensions, chronically low inputs and outmoded teaching practices. Uneven access to quality education coupled with discriminatory content has at times not only been a result of the conflict but also contributed to it (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Tawil and Harley, 2004). Conflict can be aggravated by inequities in access and likewise by a bias in curriculum content, and associated weaknesses in textbooks and teacher training.

In a number of instances, the state is involved as a party to the conflict. In most of these situations, they also serve as the main education provider. In some ways it is unsurprising that bias and a certain world view then enters the classroom, given the nature of education. This was the case in Kosovo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and South Africa, as further explored in the related chapters. In Kosovo, the segregation of the Serbian education system in the 1990s led to the establishment of a parallel Albanian-language system and entrenched divisions in society in a manner that still endures. In Rwanda, a biased curriculum – particularly in relation to history – is seen as having contributed directly to the genocide and is now an area that few are willing to touch. In Sri Lanka, critics have argued how culturally biased textbooks have fostered a majority-oriented and exclusionary education (see case study on Sri Lanka and Uganda). In South Africa, continued ethnic and language divisions in some schools are seen as reinforcing apartheid-era discrimination and in need of change.

Despite the fact that education quality is notoriously difficult to define, indicators around school inputs, processes and outcomes such as

pupil-teacher ratios, teacher qualifications and expenditures can provide some sense of measurement in any given country (UNESCO, 2005). Moreover, there is a special importance in relevance of education in crisis-affected contexts; education for those affected by conflict should help children to survive and succeed, addressing issues of security, health, psychosocial support, conflict resolution and other life skills (Aguilar and Retamal, 1998; Sinclair, 2004).

In an effort to improve education quality in emergencies, chronic crises and early recovery, in 2004 INEE and its broad membership launched a set of *Minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction*, as discussed in *Box 10*.

Box 10 Quality indicators and the INEE Minimum Standards

Developed with the participation of over 2,250 individuals from more than 50 countries, the *Minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction* is the first global tool to define a minimum level of education quality, access and accountability in a manner that reinforces the right to life with dignity. The standards weave issues of quality throughout their indicators and guidelines, and cover a range of areas such as teaching and learning, community participation, access and the learning environment.

Several years after their launch, the INEE Minimum Standards were being used in over 80 countries, had been translated into 10 languages, and more than 1,000 people had been trained to use them. A companionship agreement was signed with the Sphere Project in 2008, recommending that the INEE Minimum Standards be used as a companion to and complementing the standards of the Sphere Handbook, *Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response*. This agreement signals an increasing acceptance of education as a humanitarian response, and can strengthen collaboration with other sectors.

Source: INEE, 2004; Anderson *et al.*, 2006.

Reform of curricula and textbooks

Curriculum reform following a conflict can be a significant opportunity to improve education quality. Attention to the curriculum in such settings is important “to avoid reproducing contents that at worst have contributed to conflict, and at best, have done nothing to prevent it” (Tawil and Harley, 2004: 25). However, in countries where violence has been appeased but tensions remain, reform of the curriculum is a difficult proposition.

In some instances, a hasty review of textbooks is needed to eliminate material that may endanger peace and contravene the quality requirements of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, Article 29, for the active promotion of peace, tolerance, human rights and international understanding. This was the situation with the reprinting of school textbooks in Iraq in 2004. All were subjected to a quick professional review centred on political issues. Likewise, the reprinting of textbooks for Afghanistan in 2002 involved using a version of the texts which omitted references to Kalashnikovs and weaponry, as found in earlier versions (Novelli and Lopes Cardoso, 2008).

However, a post-conflict change in governance offers an especially promising opportunity for a more thorough change in curricula and textbooks, which may have become out-of-date during a period of pre-conflict tension and actual conflict, and which may have contributed to the conflict through biased content, the glorification of war and a failure to build skills and understandings for peaceful citizenship. At the time of the transition to peace, there may be a willingness among the decision-makers and the citizenry to accept bigger changes than usual, and also donor interest in capacity-building and curriculum renewal.

In the case study on Sri Lanka and Uganda, two different approaches to peace education are explored: the integrative and the additive. In fact, these are important approaches in the education sector as whole. Changes in teaching, learning and content can either be integrated into existing curricula or added as 'extra-curricular'. Both methods have their place, with the former being farther reaching within the formal education system and the latter more flexible with its non-formal education design. The opportunities for education change described in this volume fall into both categories.

The chapter on Rwanda illustrates the complexity of the issues involved in building curricula and textbooks supportive of reconciliation. The teaching of history is especially controversial, sometimes being used deliberately to promote certain values and perspectives. After twentieth century international conflicts in Europe, there have been efforts by historians from the different countries to work together to develop mutually acceptable versions of history. Similar efforts have been made in countries emerging from a political transition (UNESCO, 2006). The Rwanda chapter here analyses the ongoing difficulties and political constraints regarding the teaching of history. It relates efforts

to introduce teachers-in-training to modern concepts of history teaching, based on an analysis of the perspectives of the various actors, rather than teaching a particular set of ‘facts’. *Box 11* shares some of the challenges of curriculum reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the teaching of history.

Box 11 Curriculum reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

One of the most prominent education needs identified in the Occupied Palestinian Territories following the Oslo Accords was the development of a new Palestinian curriculum. Writing started on the new syllabus in 1998 and quickly moved to textbook production, with the first textbooks for Grades 1 and 6 sent to classrooms in 2000. Unlike the Jordanian and Egyptian curricula previously used in Palestinian schools, the Palestinian curriculum includes new subjects – civic education, technology, home economics and environmental studies. It also introduces English in the first year and encourages an elective third language in addition to Arabic and English.

Despite some shifts designed to enhance quality – notably the inclusion of civic education – criticism of the new curriculum has focused on how ‘peaceful’ or ‘violent’ Palestinian children are taught to be. Some see the curriculum as awkward, with particular debate on how Palestinian history should be presented. The books also avoid mentioning many issues that affect Palestinian lives today: house demolitions, detention of prisoners and settlement expansion.

Nonetheless, education stakeholders – students, teachers, ministry officials and civil society alike – largely see this new curriculum as a major achievement. An independent study reviewing the impact of the curriculum found it had a positive impact on “students’ enthusiasm to learn” and to “teachers’ commitment and sense of ownership”.

Source: Nicolai, 2007.

Teachers and teacher training

Another important opportunity for improvements in education quality in conflict-affected countries is found in support for teachers, including training efforts and reform. The primary role of teachers when systems are in a state of crisis is consistently identified by experts in the sector. For instance, in a World Bank publication, Buckland claims that teachers are “the most critical resource in education reconstruction” (Buckland 2005: 49). Sommers reinforces this message, explaining that “school curricula, materials, equipment, supplies, and buildings may not

be available, but if teachers are present and able to respond, educating children can continue” (2002: 25).

The EFA aims for Universal Primary Education by 2015, yet there is an expected global shortfall of 18 million teachers. For sub-Saharan Africa, this entails the requirement of an additional 145,000 annual recruits, which is 77 per cent above the rates of increase in recent years, while South and West Asia are said to need an additional 3.6 million teachers overall (UNESCO, 2009: 13). The lack of teachers is thought to be a particularly glaring gap in conflict-affected countries.

Closely linked to the challenge of teacher shortages is the issue of teacher terms and conditions. One of the obstacles to teacher recruitment is teacher salaries, with conflict-affected states sometimes unable or unwilling to ensure adequate compensation due to limited budgets, weak capacity or poor disbursement mechanisms. International and local communities are thus sometimes asked to provide temporary education support, including coordinating and providing compensation for teachers. To address some of these issues, a draft set of *INEE Guidance notes on teacher compensation in fragile states, situations of displacement and post-crisis recovery* has been developed. This calls for all actors to “ensure the place of professional development and other aspects of training and support in contributing to teacher motivation”. (INEE, 2008: 1).

Formal efforts at teacher training – both pre-service and in-service – can slow or completely stop during times of conflict. The recovery period offers space for investment, as evidenced by the number of NGOs that often become directly involved in teacher training during the first several years of relative stability. When implemented in a two- to three-day timeframe, teacher training is a relatively easy intervention, quantifiable through the number of participants, and potentially improving teachers’ knowledge and skills in certain areas such as health education or psychosocial support. In chronic crises, ongoing teacher training has often featured strongly as an education response, with a longer-term investment leading to a more substantial focus on education quality.

In Kosovo, shortly after the conflict, it was not possible to coordinate the “flood of teacher-training initiatives” and “educators complained [...] of intense competition for teachers to participate ...” (Sommers and Buckland, 2004: 95-96). In 2001, a lead agency arrangement of coordination led to the formation of the Kosovo Educator Development Programme (KEDP). Over the next four years, beginning with summer

institutes, in-service teacher training became a coordinated affair that reached nearly all teachers in Kosovo with a basic package of skills. The case study on teacher training reform in Kosovo explores how working through both the national education system and along with local NGOs can lead to better opportunities to build up a programme more sustainable for the longer term.

Comprehensive teacher education, such as that developed in Kosovo, is an important contribution to the post-crisis recovery and development of a skilled workforce. It is also an opportunity to enhance national capacities of curriculum renewal and development, particularly to focus on peace, human rights, civic literacy and inclusive education. *Box 12* explores how teacher training was handled in the context of Liberia.

Box 12 Teacher training for Liberian educators

During nearly 15 years of war, almost half of Liberia's pre-war population of about 2.5 million was displaced, either internally or as refugees across the borders to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. During the war, a key example of innovation and scale-up were the teacher training efforts for Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugee teachers in Guinea.

In-service training, supported by the IRC and other actors, was provided to all refugee teachers on a continuing basis over a period of several years, complemented in the classroom with help from mobile trainers. This training of refugee teachers increased the number of teachers and their skills, eventually leading to recognition with an official teacher qualification in Liberia. Many of the teachers trained in camps have now returned and are working in Liberian schools.

Even so, in 2007, about 65 per cent of children in primary schools in Liberia were taught by unqualified teachers, and about 41 per cent of teachers have not completed high school. Moreover, only a small percentage of teachers are female, which does little to redress the gross enrolment rate of 69 per cent for boys compared to 40 per cent for girls. It is thus important that a focus on teacher training continues as Liberia enters a recovery phase.

Source: IRC, 2005; IRC, 2007.

Introducing innovation

Continued innovation is essential for meeting the myriad challenges faced by education systems in any country, but especially so in conflict-affected countries which have lagged behind educationally and face

difficult circumstances. Equally important is the ability to scale up successful innovation, thus reaching more affected children and young people. With crises occurring over larger and often insecure geographical areas, neither innovation nor scale-up is easy.

Many countries and regions are relatively isolated in the years prior to and during conflict, with little opportunity to exchange good practices or lessons learned across technical fields such as education. For example, in Kosovo, reports prior to 1999 “indicate that there was very little change, modernization or innovation” (Daxner, 2000 cited in Sommers and Buckland, 2004: 47). Yet, sometimes there are surprises. Although a system appears to be declining or dilapidated, on looking beneath the surface one may find “important change activities outside the official curriculum and the regular school hours” (Bassler, 2005). The chapter on Kosovo’s higher education system emphasizes the importance of small-scale change – and the need for quiet support for those agents of change – in a political environment fraught with constraints.

Education innovation generally is found at a fairly small scale. Flexibility in thought and action, along with additional human and material inputs, are central to its success. However, scaling up innovation is an important part of achieving a wider impact in education, whether in a country affected by conflict or in one that is more stable. As highlighted in the *2005 EFA Global Monitoring Report*:

Innovation at local level will not in itself give rise to more improvement in education. Raising the quality of education requires a broad, systemic approach sustained by political support and backed by sufficient investment to sustain key policy interventions, even if allocations to specific improvements are modest (UNESCO, 2005: 181).

Unfortunately, proposed large-scale education innovations too often remain little more than ideas eloquently crafted on paper. Unless centrally-sponsored, top-down reform efforts are matched by bottom up activity to support those changes at a school and classroom level, it seems to be difficult for them to succeed. Likewise, grassroots initiatives, once they have shown success, need endorsement and support at a central level to enable their integration into mainstream policy and practice. A lack of resources, both human and financial, often limits the scaling up of promising educational innovations.

Moreover, at times innovation can be self-perpetuating. The success of a good idea can beget another good idea and facilitate further support to test it out. However, like too much of a good thing, too much innovation in education can be confusing or have a negative impact. Innovation needs to be balanced with the familiar, so that teachers can continue to deliver lessons consistently and students can be clear on expectations.

There are a number of approaches that have been scaled up in conflict settings which illustrate the opportunities available, as seen especially in the chapters here on Southern Sudan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Afghanistan and Angola. Post-conflict situations offer the opportunity to transfer innovations that are considered good practice in modern systems. The case study of teacher training in Kosovo illustrates this, with updated education theory and the introduction of a stronger element of teaching practice. The case study of history teaching in Rwanda again illustrates attempts to introduce standard international practice. Here the aim has been to introduce teaching that shows multiple perspectives rather than one single authoritative statement about the past.

When education innovation does happen, it often seems to take place in areas outside of what might be considered the core areas of education, or beyond at least those defined as a focus by international development targets. In Liberia, non-formal, informal and vocational or technical education were found to be “the areas where the greatest innovations have taken place” (Women’s Commission, 2006: 11).

A number of education efforts specifically respond to issues arising due to conflict. These responses are perhaps less urgent in peaceful societies, although they may still be useful, as discussed in *Box 13*.

Accelerated learning and catch-up education

Accelerated learning programmes (ALP) and ‘catch-up’ education programmes are some of the most important and widespread education responses specific to conflict-affected countries. They differ in longevity, with an ALP lasting several years to support completion of primary education and a catch-up programme typically lasting one year, with the aim of integrating students back into the formal system. During an ALP or catch-up programme, learning is completed in a shortened time span, with an assumption that the older children and youth will learn faster. The programme “is frequently donor funded, short term in nature, and focused on access, retention, and completion” (Nicholson, 2007: 8).

Box 13 Education responses specific to conflict and recovery

One example of an education response that links directly to the impact of conflict is the ‘catch-up’ education programme for children in Angola, which was designed to enable them to enter primary school after their education was interrupted. The related case study in this volume also includes the accelerated learning programme of primary education for older students. Both could be useful for marginalized groups for many years – such as street children or working children – but might not be prioritized as a basic component of education in a country not affected by conflict.

The community schools described in the chapter on Afghanistan can also be seen as an innovation, needed primarily for difficult situations. Under the Taliban, they played an important role in reaching both refugees and girls. They are, however, also a useful tool for education system development in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan, where there are many isolated communities not large enough to have a normal school.

Peace education, dealt with in the chapter on Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, is another education innovation that is perhaps more urgent in conflict and post-conflict situations, though it covers life skills, human rights and citizenship education, which are needed everywhere. Peace education is also included in various ways and to varied extents in schools in developed countries.

Although not exclusive to conflict environments, these programmes have proven particularly suitable in reaching older children who have missed out on education due to their association with armed forces or armed groups, those living in areas where education access has been disrupted by conflict and those who have been displaced. Accelerated learning programmes using various models have been instituted in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Southern Sudan and Uganda. A number of these have been instituted by NGOs and other external agencies, with a few adopted by the respective ministry (Bethke and Baxter, 2009).

While ALP focuses on learning at a pace adapted to older students, there may also be a greater focus on life skills and vocational training than might be found in conventional education. Many developing countries will continue for some years to require courses of this kind for street children, working children and other marginalized groups. If possible, the ‘emergency’ intervention should build national capacity so that the expertise in this area is not lost when external assistance is withdrawn. This makes the difference between an opportunity for lasting change and

a programme that benefits only a particular group of conflict-affected young people at a given point in time.

As described in the related case study on Angola, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) initiated ‘catch-up’ courses for pre-adolescents in Angola, providing introductory courses on literacy, numeracy and life skills designed to allow entry to primary schooling, as well as accelerated learning to cover the essentials of the primary school curriculum. Special emphasis was placed on training teachers and supervisors in interactive and participative pedagogy. Many of the staff were able to enter the national teaching force as the emergency programmes were phased out. Another important example of an accelerated programme is found in *Box 14* on the case of Sierra Leone.

Box 14 Sierra Leone’s Complementary Rapid Education Programme for Schools

The Complementary Rapid Education Programme for Schools (CREPS) was introduced in Sierra Leone towards the end of the civil war (1992-2002). The aim of the programme was to provide a compressed education, of three years instead of six, for older children who were unable to access education or whose education was disrupted as a result of the war.

The supervision of CREPS was placed with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST) from the beginning, with the active support of UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The roles were divided, with the CREPS supervisor at MOEST charged with the overall responsibility of coordinating assistance, and UNICEF and NRC providing financial and technical support. This included the training of head teachers and teachers, the provision of school materials such as textbooks, exercise books, sporting equipment and incentives for the teachers, as well as support for monitoring and evaluation in the form of vehicles and motorcycles, among other things.

Largely seen as a success, the programme saw a marked increase in enrolment for older boys and girls over the six-year period. By 2002, the programme had recorded an overall enrolment of over 22,000 children between the ages of 10-16 years. A significant proportion of this enrolment was girls. Records also showed a high level of performance in the National Primary School Examination (NPSE), ranging from between about 75 per cent to 100 per cent success rate. While CREPS has recently been phased out, it contributed to education access and continuity for a large number of over-aged children following the war.

Source: Mansaray and Associates, 2006.

Conflict prevention and peace education

In countries affected by conflict, there are not only the usual challenges of education reform, but also the need to address the impact that armed conflict is having or has had on students, teachers and the school system as a whole. Equally, there is a need to address the impact that the education system has had or could have on the broader society. Education is essential in these situations for its role in providing stability and hope, coping with stress, creating safe spaces and building the values and attitudes that promote peace (Sinclair, 2002, 2004; INEE, 2004; UNESCO, 2005; IASC, 2007).

In recent years, there has been growing interest in the international community regarding a focus on conflict prevention and peace-building. In some ways, it is intuitive that both preventing conflict and building a sustainable peace can save lives, livelihoods and communities themselves. Education can play an important role in conflict prevention and peace-building, and there have been numerous calls in recent years for education content and pedagogy to support peace, tolerance, human rights and acceptance of diversity, as required under the Convention on the Rights of the Child – and indeed the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar instruments.

Education can be seen as a long-term strategy for conflict prevention, especially if concepts and practices of education for peace form the basis of new curricula, textbooks and teacher development (CIDA, 1999). Save the Children has identified four critical elements that are important for the role of education in peace-building and conflict prevention. This includes (1) inclusion and access, with free primary school and schools located close to home, (2) safety and protection, with schools safe from attack and a place where respect for human rights is fostered, (3) relevance, using a non-biased curriculum relevant to children and their context, and (4) accountability, with school management guarding students' welfare while taking the opinions of children, parents and community into consideration (Save the Children, 2008c: 17).

Peace-building comprises a number of different processes, including efforts at reconciliation. In the chapter on Sri Lanka and Uganda, the authors identify five dimensions of peace education linked closely to reconciliation efforts. If education can contribute to any of these five – changing the mindsets about the 'other', the construction of a more realistic worldview, peaceful relations between rivals, attitudes and skills

related to tolerance, and support for democratic values – it is hoped that it will have enhanced peace, whether at an individual or societal level.

Peace education can contribute to laying the foundations for lasting peace and serves as an important method for promoting reconciliation (Ardizzone, 2001; Baxter and Ikobwa, 2005; Salomon, 2002). Peace education can be taught both through formal and non-formal education; for formal schooling, debate continues on whether to integrate peace education into existing subjects or include it separately. Complementary non-formal programmes can increase the impact of the school programmes (Obura, 2002). In either instance, life skills such as conflict resolution, gender-sensitive behaviour and appreciation of diversity often form a core part of its contents (Sinclair, 2004).

Experience shows that such teaching requires in-depth teacher training together with well-piloted supporting course materials since teachers are new to some of the subject matter of peace education and often are reluctant to address ‘sensitive’ issues. This is true even in an environment such as Northern Ireland where teachers are familiar with facilitating class discussions and have the use of adequate classroom facilities, as shown in a recent evaluation of the new citizenship programme. It is all the more necessary where these conditions do not apply, as in many post-conflict states. Several other peace education and related efforts are described in *Box 15*.

Box 15 Peace education and related initiatives

The Peace Education Programme instituted by UNHCR in refugee camps in Kenya in 1998 involved the training of refugees and national educators. The programme was later extended to UNHCR refugee and reintegration programmes in several other countries (Baxter and Ikobwa, 2005). With refugee schools allotting a weekly period to peace education throughout Grades 1 to 8, there were also complementary peace education workshops for community youth and adults, and there were indications of this programme making a significant impact (Obura, 2002). It was later adapted through a joint programme with UNESCO to constitute a resource of the Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE, 2005).

If opportunities for this and other similar initiatives are not to be lost, there needs to be coordination of various international and national efforts. Other significant programmes include child-friendly schools, a major thrust of UNICEF; 'healing classrooms', an approach developed by IRC; the World Programme of Human Rights Education; adolescent life skills, including HIV and AIDS prevention, and other aspects of 'learning to live together'. At a national level especially, a coherent curriculum framework and related policies are needed (Sinclair, 2004).

Chapter 4

Facing constraints

“We’ve grown up with uncertainty; it was our education that gave us hope but sometimes even this was a real struggle. And for too many of my brothers and sisters school wasn’t even a possibility.”

Male teacher, Kosovo

While new opportunities are brought about by conflict, numerous constraints mean that positive change is not always possible. A major challenge to education innovation and reform is the nature of conflict itself – both the intensity of violence and scale of devastation. As Sommers has graphically described, “the tentacles of warfare ... may spread into the encampment where education exists, siphoning off children and youth, causing more displacement, making schools centers of conflict and terrifying students, teachers and parents” (2004: 47).

Detailing the obstacles to change, and potential means to overcome them, is the focus of much of the broad body of current conflict transformation literature. In addition, an emphasis on political change tends to be favoured over other kinds of change in society, such as the reform of basic services or improvements in livelihoods. In the words of Mitchell (2005: 21), the literature related to change:

... seems dominated by ideas about stalemate, exhaustion of resources, escalating costs and disappearing probabilities of ‘victory’. These may be crucial in the last resort, but even the most embattled leadership might also be willing to think about alternatives as a result of changes other than alterations in the balance of advantage in the struggle. What might such changes be and can they be regularly observed in successful peacemaking processes?

All of the chapters included in this volume have illustrated some level of constraints on and conditions for educational change. The cases on Colombia, Kosovo and South Africa have focused more explicitly on constraints, exploring tensions between ethnic minority groups, divisive

language policies and the impact of highly political environments on the possibilities for educational innovation and reform. All three of these case studies illustrate limits to positive change, giving an indication of how difficult such efforts can be. They also attempt to offer perspectives on how constraints can be turned around and used to identify conditions supportive of greater transformation of education systems.

The case study from Colombia is not about the development of an education system as such, but rather about the protection of participants in the system so that it continues to function. The study considers how national and international actors might better protect teachers and students from assassination, abduction and other abuses. The case study of Kosovo's University of Mitrovica yields advice on how to introduce positive change in a very difficult political environment. It suggests the importance of focusing on common goals in highly divisive environments, along with careful support for progressive individuals. The case study from South Africa considers how a government may have to use various tactics to achieve a system goal of more inclusive education, and how language policy can become mixed up in that. The study suggests that a more collaborative approach might be better than legal battles, but also reinforces the progress in South Africa that has brought such disputes in from the streets to the courts of law.

In these and other cases, ongoing tensions linked to conflict along with resistance and inertia within an education system can serve as considerable constraints to innovation and reform.

Ongoing tensions

In some countries, ongoing tensions and associated instability pose a major limitation to progress in the education sector. Instability can lead to general insecurity, with adverse effects on education and other activities. At times, the violence that accompanies instability is directed specifically at the education system. While limited figures exist for attacks on schools, students and teachers, in a UNESCO report on this issue O'Malley noted that "the number of reported assassinations, bombings and burnings of school and academic staff and buildings has risen dramatically in the past three years" (2007: 6). Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nepal, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Thailand and Zimbabwe were cited as among those particularly affected. Efforts to mitigate these attacks have included providing armed escorts, increasing patrols around schools,

creating school protection committees and shifting education to homes or the use of distance education.

The case study on Colombia shows the difficulties faced when attacks are perpetrated against teachers and students, as well as more specifically illustrating ways in which the government and other actors can assist teachers to improve their security. Measures have included legal strategies, such as pursuing cases to the level of the Inter-American Human Rights Court; special regional committees set up to deal with situations of death threats and the displacement of teachers; as well as funds to cover the cost of moving both families and belongings to a new location. Another strategy has been to provide training to educators using training manuals on human rights, international humanitarian law and conflict resolution.

Ongoing tensions and instability can also present problems within schools, as violence in society is often reflected in the classroom in the form of corporal punishment or bullying (Harber and Davies, 2003). Protection from sexual harassment is likewise required for students and teachers (Csaky, 2008). Such environments clearly put children at risk of physical or psychosocial harm, but beyond this there is also a risk in terms of cognitive development, with potential delays in skills such as literacy, numeracy and critical thinking if not appropriately nurtured (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003).

In countries experiencing an imposed or uneasy peace, opportunities for education change are not only limited by overt security threats. Education itself is never neutral – culture, language, history and social norms are all partially transmitted through a country's classrooms. In recent years an active international debate has developed around education's role in contributing to conflict versus its role in mitigation and recovery. A number of authors have described what is sometimes an ambiguous relationship between education and conflict (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Davies, 2004; Seitz, 2004; World Bank, 2005).

The case study from South Africa illustrates the problems arising when a minority group struggles to maintain its previous status, after political change. It also shows how divisive language policy can be and how it can intentionally be used in ways that promote segregation or desegregation. Schools teaching in Afrikaans face strong pressure to admit students from other social groups and to shift to a dual language

system. Some schools have taken their cases to the courts of law, though most have shifted gradually away from exclusivity.

Education can be used as a kind of ‘battleground’ and attempts to change access policies or curriculum content can lead to greater tension. In such situations, it is important that outside actors take care in their approaches to supporting education and in particular, beware of the politicization of their own aid agenda. According to Novelli and Cardozo, “many NGOs are increasingly concerned that they are becoming adjuncts and auxiliaries to the military adventures of the major Western Powers” (2008: 484). This is of particular concern in the education sector where, for instance, recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq saw certain investments in education being done with implicit aims of winning ‘hearts and minds’ in addition to broader educational objectives.

A classic example of the danger of linking political aims to education can be found in Afghanistan at the time of the Cold War. In the mid-1980s, a large-scale project, led by the University of Nebraska-Omaha, resulted in the development of a set of textbooks that promoted jihadist values as a way to fight the Soviet occupation. This project has continued to have repercussions 20 years on, with some of the textbooks reportedly still in use in religious schools or madrasas, there and in Pakistan (ICG, 2002). Stories like this illustrate why it is so important that the international community takes care in linking its aid to political or security outcomes rather than development outcomes.

The potential role of education in fuelling conflict has led to increasing calls for it to be included in any analysis of the causes of conflict, as well as an indicator for early warning of conflict. Of special importance is that the government commits itself to the equitable distribution of educational opportunity, with previously neglected regions and groups feeling that they have a stake in the future stability of the country. This can be difficult if there is still insecurity in certain regions. *Box 16* describes the challenges faced in Kosovo in terms of bridging an ethnic and language divide.

Box 16 Ethnic and language divisions in Kosovar education

Ethnic and language divisions can be a contributory factor to – or serve as an excuse for – tension and conflict. For example, in Kosovo, Albanians had struggled to receive an education in their native tongue since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Over time, national identity and education in the Albanian language have become interlinked, with “symbolic equality established between education in mother tongue and the demands for a national state” (Kostivicova, 2005).

Today, ethnic and language differences between Albanian, Serb, Roma, Bosniak, Ashkalia and Egyptian groups, plus the long road to final settlement regarding the territory, have meant that Kosovo continues to be a place of ‘parallel worlds’, as described in Sommers and Buckland (2004). With the facts of and the responsibility for the conflict disputed, clear education policies to promote values of respect and tolerance have had little immediate chance of success.

The case study of the University of Mitrovica shows the delicacy of achieving even small steps forward in such an environment. Tensions were so high at the time of writing that the heads of universities in Pristina and Mitrovica could not realistically be expected to meet within the territory, though they could meet on neutral ground in other countries.

Resistance and inertia

Beyond the challenge of coping with ongoing tensions, education innovation or reform can slow down or come to a standstill during a period of conflict, and an education system can “frequently experience fragmentation” (World Bank, 2005: 19). While insecurity or inequity can limit opportunities, the lack of adequate human and monetary resources can equally cause failure, along with inept, inefficient or corrupt administrations. Even when educational change does gain momentum, it too often proceeds without clarity or consensus on the desired vision, which can be equally detrimental.

Moreover, the politics and power plays of the emerging leadership can limit education opportunities for change. The frequent turnover of both ministers and ministry staff that often accompanies periods of conflict or post-conflict can slow or end certain reform efforts, as well as marginalize those who had been associated with the reforms. This has happened, for example, in both Afghanistan and Uganda (Moulton and

Dall, 2006). Leadership changes also slowed efforts at education reform in Cambodia, as described in the corresponding chapter.

The physical destruction wrought by war can lead to a kind of inertia in terms of education innovation and reform. With massive damage occurring, for example, at 95 per cent of schools in Timor-Leste, 85 per cent of schools in Iraq and 65 per cent of schools in Kosovo (World Bank, 2005), the associated need for repair and reconstruction can delay the focus on other kinds of opportunities for change. An initial donor focus on school reconstruction during a period of early recovery too often means that substantive areas of innovation and reform are left unfunded.

Another constraint to change is that education systems are sometimes seen as the guardians of tradition, a means to educate young people in the social, cultural and economic traditions of a nation. Teachers have been taught a certain way and, not surprisingly, reproduce those same methods when they lead their own classrooms. As those who hold leadership positions, including teachers, have been relatively successful in that they have gone through the existing or former education system, it can be difficult for them to see the need for any kind of education innovation or reform. For example, interactive pedagogy has been preached widely and introduced through assistance projects but with varying degrees of success in terms of scaling up and sustainability.

The conundrum of these multiple opportunities and constraints can be somewhat resolved by focusing on the potential – rather than the certainty – of education making a contribution towards “building peace, restoring countries to a positive development path and reversing the damage wrought by civil war” (World Bank, 2005: 86). The collection of case studies included here explores these opposing forces and focuses on the potential for positive change to education systems.

In order to support such education innovation and reform, along with those agents of change that promote it, there is a need for long-term external assistance. The requirement is not for huge budgets as much as for continuing interest and some finance. Significant change in a system takes time, resources and sustained political will. However, in most situations affected by conflict there is little time, constrained resources, limited political will and uneven technical assistance. Fragile environments and recovery situations offer the potential for sowing seeds of change, piloting new approaches and carrying out fundamental, basic

development steps such as building and rehabilitating schools, getting teachers back into classes and getting kids back into school. Support for education innovation and reform should extend over years but planting the seeds of change, demonstrating the potential for innovation and building the capacity to take changes to scale can happen now.

Chapter 5

Supporting positive change

“Not knowing when the dawn will come, I open every door.”

Emily Dickinson

Conflict is undoubtedly a catalyst for change of all kinds – with violence, displacement, new leadership, peace processes and reconstruction efforts all having an impact on education and indeed, much else in these societies. In an ideal world, the unequivocal preference would be for peaceful mechanisms of education change and development – common targets, concepts and programmes, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Education for All (EFA), the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), World Programme of Human Rights Education, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other tools that help create the will and capacities for gradual change in a good direction.

Yet opportunities undoubtedly arise when armed conflict causes a breakdown in institutions and people face disruption in their lives. This can lead to greater willingness to reflect on and change the way things are done. Every education system has rigidities, because of the people involved and due to the interaction of culture, economy, employment and education. The shifts that accompany conflict and recovery present perhaps one of the best opportunities for positive change for a country’s education system. As seen throughout the case studies in this volume, concerted efforts should be made to encourage considered and consensual renewal of education systems rather than the reconstruction and reinforcement of systems that may have contributed to the conflict.

Given the varied and constantly shifting landscape in conflict situations, there is no set formula for identifying and taking advantage of opportunities for change. Change can go in many directions and it is important to learn from both successes and failures. There are often tensions inherent in the available choices – the need for quick wins versus sustainable change, quality small-scale innovation versus a system-wide adoption of lesser quality, and building on the familiar versus introducing new approaches and methodologies.

Drawing from the case studies here as well as other writing on education and conflict, it is possible to identify a number of basic factors or conditions that facilitate opportunities for change and efforts at education progress. These include security; basic governance capacity; political consensus on a way forward; and long-term, secure funding, including mechanisms for disbursing money. These are preferable conditions for positive change and rapid reform; but even without their presence, there are possibilities for moving in a positive direction for education.

Lessons learned

The chapters included in this publication illustrate a variety of opportunities for education change in situations of conflict and recovery. Each has attempted to identify its own lessons or recommendations regarding opportunities for change. A consolidation of these would include the following:

Long-term investment is an important part of achieving major and sustained education gains during and following crises.

Continuing disarray and weak absorptive capacity mean that exclusively short-term interventions are unlikely to have a sustained impact in many conflict settings. While entry points to support change in the education sector may be greater during and after conflict, long-term support is necessary to ensure positive changes are progressive and lasting. Long-term education assistance is needed, as true transformation of education systems extends over years. An equally long-term venture is the development of a stable, trained and regularly paid teaching force, as well as the renewal and introduction of new curricula and textbooks.

The case studies in this volume show that where external agencies were committed for a sufficient period of time – from the medium to longer term – there was a positive impact in bringing the content and management of education programmes into line with modern standards. The NGO-supported home schools programme in Afghanistan and the catch-up programmes in Angola show how longer-term support can make a difference in targeted areas of education. Accompanying the national government through capacity development and support over a minimum period of five to ten years, as in Cambodia or Southern Sudan, appears to have been a good way for international actors to ensure that the opportunity for system transformation has been used to best advantage.

An early and coordinated focus on capacity building should underpin education system development in conflict-affected states.

Conflict often arises in fragile states where basic services have been neglected, sometimes for years. Opportunities for change involve context-specific processes of system development, and improvements in access and quality. One way to address the various challenges is to build capacity while a conflict is in progress. Once peace is established, then capacity development for staff and institutions at the central and local level becomes among the highest priorities.

The chapters in this volume illustrate the need for coordinated investment in capacity building and institutional development. The chapter on Cambodia particularly contributes to this conclusion and illustrates how gaps in coordinated planning and action can delay progress in education due to a combination of insufficient capacity and limited joint strategic planning. The Southern Sudan study makes an interesting contrast, where donors and educators had opportunities to build mutual trust and there was capacity building in advance of an agreed peace process. As changes in the education sector need to be located within broader public reforms, fiscal or otherwise, the ability to introduce education change and reform is often dependent on wider progress. In order to accelerate efforts at transformation, an early focus on capacity building needs to link closely with an inclusive policy planning process and the adoption of systemic reform, both within education and the wider setting.

Education innovation can boost access and quality objectives significantly, provided they include appropriate efforts towards alignment and scale-up.

Exposure to other ways of doing things can facilitate a change process. The introduction of innovative approaches is part of the ‘catching up’ that needs to happen in conflict-affected education systems. These are new opportunities to be forward-looking and to address the special needs of children and young people who have had their studies interrupted or have been through serious trauma. Where there are special programmes, they should be developed from the beginning with a strategy for how the country or region can incorporate activities or use developed expertise later for marginalized children. A fairly obvious but still important point is that innovations cannot be scaled up if they are too costly and if the government dislikes them.

The two case studies on Kosovo offer examples of this. The chapter on teacher training shows how officials' exposure to outside expertise and exchange visits enhanced and spurred on reforms in pre- and in-service teacher training. The case study on higher education in Mitrovica shows how small steps and low-key support can be important for positioning change agents for now and the future.

Innovative programmes like the NRC's catch-up education efforts in Angola can significantly increase learning opportunities for otherwise excluded children. In Afghanistan, the community schools supported by IRC and others are a classic example of an emergency response that is increasingly being integrated into a national system.

A focus on teachers, both in terms of training and conditions, is an essential area of support due to teachers' pivotal role in education delivery.

In instituting educational change, particularly in relation to teaching and learning, there is a natural and heavy reliance on teachers and their capacities. Support to ensure that teachers are both well trained and operating under decent conditions is a key means to support positive change. Quick, widespread and thorough system-wide teacher training using modern methods of child-friendly pedagogy is extremely important when taking advantage of and sustaining reform efforts. This may include training up volunteers and providing incentives when there is a shortage of trained teachers. Likewise, fair approaches to teacher salaries and incentives are needed.

A chapter in this volume shows how efforts to institute peace education throughout schools in Sri Lanka have been particularly dependent on teachers. Another chapter, on teacher training in Kosovo, focuses on the importance of adequate professional training. The Uganda portion of the chapter on peace education describes how unrealistic expectations that accompany short-term training are often a problem, although there is some evidence that even these can make a difference.

Investment in a curriculum and textbook development or renewal is a major opportunity for change that links closely with broader governance aims following conflict.

The development of a curriculum and textbooks is often a priority in conflict and post-conflict contexts. Without textbooks, interpretation of the curriculum falls solely on teachers; the availability of textbooks

and other resource materials is thus of utmost importance for children's ability to guide and strengthen their own learning. The adequate provision of textbooks means that content is delivered directly to students and represents a significant opportunity for change.

The aftermath of conflict presents a rare opportunity for the development or renewal of a curriculum and textbooks, including methodology-related changes, the updating of content and the inclusion of life skills, citizenship and peace education. This is especially important given that there is often a bias present in the curricula of conflict-affected countries. Case study authors here have referred to an exclusionary bias in Sri Lanka's curriculum and a bias towards a kind of revisionist and unified history in Rwanda. Efforts to review and remove such biases are essential for shaping students' world view and their understanding of others.

Efforts towards conflict prevention and peace-building should be infused across education interventions during and following a conflict.

Conflict prevention and peace-building are areas that need special attention in conflict-affected environments. Education, either formal or non-formal, has the potential to provide a place where children of different backgrounds can come together. But it needs to be remembered, as with the history curriculum in Rwanda or the ethnically-segregated systems in Kosovo, that states affected by conflict need time and space for change – and 'political memory' should be taken into account.

Lasting and peaceful inter-group relationships have an important part to play in changing mindsets about those who are different from one's self and efforts to construct a realistic world view. As shown by the case study on peace education, through non-formal peace education workshops in Uganda, there has been evidence that inter-group relations have been strengthened. At least on an individual level, participants moved some way towards viewing situations with the eyes of 'the other'.

In addition, clear policy is crucial to integrating conflict prevention or peace-building aims into the education sector. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the 1997 education reforms mandated peace education as part of the curriculum, even though its implementation has been less clear. In South Africa, lack of clarity and differing interpretations of language policies and their relation to inclusive education have led to court battles and worsened tensions.

The protection and security of students and teachers, along with that of the broader community and of aid workers, should be actively pursued in all conflict and recovery situations.

Ensuring that legal provisions and special protection measures are in place for both educators and students, and are respected by law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, is of utmost importance during and after conflict. This is equally important in the protection of aid workers. Addressing and drawing attention to particular violations is an important protection strategy for education. In-country human rights committees play a role in terms of oversight, as can international agencies such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Additionally, attacks on schools are included as one of six grave violations in UN Security Council Resolution 1612, and incidents should be annually reported to the UN Security Council.

Lack of protection can severely affect an education environment, as is illustrated by the case study on Colombia, where the targeting of teachers reduced their ability to serve as educators. Further evidence of the importance of protection is found in Afghanistan, where an increasing numbers of attacks on aid workers – including one of the authors in this publication – and on schools, particularly girls’ schools, have limited education access. In Colombia, the regulations that protect teachers have been put in place and used repeatedly over the past 15 years. Raising awareness on and capacity building in international human rights and humanitarian law has further played a role in keeping schools safe. Campaigns calling for schools as ‘zones of peace’, as well as negotiations with warring parties on the protection of schools, have occurred in Sri Lanka, Nepal and elsewhere and could be strengthened.

Strong partnerships, in their myriad forms, serve as a foundation for positive education change in conflict and recovery contexts.

As pointed out in the related chapter, approaches to partnerships and the aid monies that drive them are of central importance to the success of education provision in conflict and recovery settings. These partnerships need to facilitate and be integrated with a coherent and inclusive process of consensus-building within the society. Agents of change for education renewal can be found at all levels, whether amongst national authorities, local communities or international actors, but large-scale change needs a champion to move it forward. As a whole, positive change often comes

down to a small group of individuals who have a vision and work together to overcome the barriers they face.

Change typically begins at points of consensus, where various actors can agree. Authorities should be supported in listening and responding to the demands of communities; communities should be supported in making their voices heard. Community members are not always involved in the design of assistance programmes, and governments may feel overwhelmed by perceived donor pressures. Change on a national level often doesn't reach schools, and more localized change often doesn't have an impact on the wider system; these gaps need to be bridged. Partnerships at all levels are important to make that happen.

The opportunities for change explored within this volume are perhaps not world-shatteringly new ideas for education planners or emergency educators. Yet the fact that innovation, reform and even transformation of education systems has occurred is important in each instance. For every opportunity in education emerging during or after a conflict, a list of ten or more challenges limiting that opportunity can typically be made. While it is important to be cognisant of multiple constraints, the chapters included here show that positive change can be achieved and has been achieved, even under severe constraints in situations of conflict or recovery.

A number of the case studies mention the lack of evaluation and research as an obstacle to change. If opportunities for positive change in education during and after conflict are to be fully realized, it is important that more emphasis is put on learning from experience. However, more attention to learning lessons alone will not be enough. These lessons need to be fed into policy and programme, whether through the adaptation of existing standards and guidelines or through direct application in a specific situation.

The periods during and after conflict can result in some positive changes: wider windows of opportunity and renewed appreciation of peace. In other respects, they can worsen negative aspects: the common features of endemic violence and low capacity. Yet positive education change, reform and transformation has occurred regularly. It is these kinds of positive innovations and reforms, specific to the education realm, which the following case study chapters attempt to explore.

Section II
Case studies

Chapter 6

Reaching education goals in countries affected by crisis: maximizing partnerships

Eluned Roberts Schweitzer

Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development actors – bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs and the private sector. To support developing countries' efforts to build for the future we resolve to create partnerships that will include all these actors (Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2008: 3).

Introduction

It is perhaps some measure of success of donor and recipient country efforts that that the remaining major development challenges are largely in countries affected by poor governance, political instability, physical emergencies and internal or external conflict (Save the Children, 2006; OECD DAC, 2007*b*; UNESCO, 2009). States affected by emergencies and armed conflict are particularly susceptible to instability and to having governments that become perpetually 'fragile' (a term often not welcomed by countries struggling to overcome many difficulties). They are also the least likely to have the social or institutional resilience to overcome crises in the short term.

Challenges in delivering aid in these countries can include: a post conflict or emergency donor 'feeding frenzy', whereby countries in crisis are swamped with offers of aid which sometimes do not materialize; heightened corruption where demand for services and goods exceeds the capacity to provide them; and lack of trained personnel and materials to revitalize and rebuild services. The distribution of donor funding is affected by the politicization of aid, which has become more obvious since the 9/11 crisis, with donors funding countries which are important to international security agendas. Finally, in spite of years of efforts to secure donor collaboration, there is often insufficient coordination among donors, implementers and governments. Partnerships of governments,

civil society and the private sector are increasingly seen as key to addressing these issues, as no one provider or funder can solve them alone. The *2009 UNESCO Global Monitoring Report* strongly identifies ‘partnerships’ as key to improving educational funding and services.

Achieving EFA requires partnerships at many levels, between schools and parents, between civil society organizations and government, between state and non-state education providers (UNESCO, 2009: 241).

Each of the following chapters profiles examples of different kinds of partnerships for education in countries and regions affected by emergencies and prolonged crises. For instance, in Cambodia, there was an evolving donor and recipient government relationship with the balance of power shifting over time. Prior to the formation of a new government in Afghanistan, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) partnered with communities to drive a model of community-based education. Later on, these partnerships gained recognition by the formal education sector, which is a common sequence of education investment post conflict. As another example, in Serbia and the Republic of Georgia, NGO efforts (and personnel) formed the basis of new education ministries once recent conflicts were settled. In Colombia, partnerships across the human rights world have proven invaluable to efforts to improve protection and security related to education. It is these partnerships and the aid monies that drive them that increasingly determine the success of education provision in emergencies and immediate post-conflict settings.

This chapter reviews models of partnering between aid agencies, civil society and governments and the potential for creative new partnerships and aid modalities. It does not deal in depth with issues of community-level partnerships. It also highlights some of the challenges which still face aid agencies, civil society and recipient governments in forming these ‘partnerships’. In particular, as was reinforced at the Accra meetings in 2008, an increased emphasis should be placed on assisting country governments to take on more responsibility and drive aid agendas. It is important that our thinking on partnerships shifts out of the northern hemisphere. The chapter is based on a desk review of the literature and the author’s personal field experience in working with governments and implementing programmes for multilaterals and INGOs.

Concepts of partnership

What does partnering involve? The concept is used to describe relationships between organizations which address issues of advocacy, policy building, direct implementation, basic and applied research, plus the fostering of social agendas and monitoring accountability. A recent joint European Commission, World Bank and UN Development Group partnership formed to improve responses to emergencies and post-conflict crises issued the following statement:

We believe a common platform for partnership and action is central to the delivery of an effective and sustainable international response after disaster- and conflict-related crises. ... We are engaged in significant work to reform the processes used by national and international partners to assess, plan and mobilize support for recovery to countries and populations affected by natural disasters or violent conflicts. The purpose of the agreement is to harmonize and coordinate the collective assistance the institutions provide to countries. It calls on their staff to plan together and develop common tools, training and evaluation mechanisms. All donors and partners are invited to join this effort; enlarging the partnership can only contribute positively to speedy and coherent operational recovery responses around the world” (UNDG, 2008).

However, partnering is not always simple. The US-based NGO umbrella organization Interaction has highlighted issues that arise from a lack of clarity around the use of the ‘partnership’ label:

In relief and development assistance, ‘partnership’ is a term with many meanings and forms – from alliances to contracts to grantor-grantee relationships. Yet, the use of “partnership” stems from the growing conviction that solving a society’s problems requires a combined effort of diverse institutions, including aligning and combining competencies and functions. Oftentimes, ‘partnership’ brings together parties with very different objectives, resources and incentives around shared goals and equitable allocation of authority, efforts and resources. The international aid system now recognizes and even encourages ‘partnerships’, but provides little to no real guidance on how to equitably create and function in a partnership (Interaction, 2002: 105).

Relationships between aid actors, including donors of all kinds, multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, civil society, research institutions and the for-profit sector, are not always equal in nature. Partnering for a joint purpose is difficult administratively, costly in time and resources and involves, as any marriage, subsuming some needs of each partner for the benefit of the union.

Often programs are imposed on us, and we are told it is our program ... People who have never seen cotton come to give us lessons on cotton ... No one can respect the conditionalities of certain donors. They are so complicated that they themselves have difficulty getting us to understand them. This is not a partnership. This is a master relating to his student (Toumani Toure, 2006: 16).

Thus, arrangements sometimes described as partnerships with an assumption of equality are in fact anything but. There is a real danger here as well as an opportunity. We may well be continuing to be exclusive of actors and clients who are on the margins while using terminology that assumes inclusivity.

Inherent in the partnership discussion is the question of a wider and more influential role for civil society. Language relating to partnerships with civil society is in almost every ODA-related document. For example, as pointed out by Mingat and Bruns (2007), the indicative framework of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 issued by the Development Co-operation Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), assumes that communities and NGOs should be involved in physical reconstruction. The push for partnerships has strengthened the influence of civil society in many ways and they have taken on a wide variety of roles in advocacy, implementation, technical assistance, research and, of course, fundraising.

The balance of these roles has been changing. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) now commonly partner with private sector implementers, work directly with governments and have increasing influence on policy issues. Citizen-based organizations (CBOs) have been able to grow and take on more important roles within their own countries. However, given the variable strengths of INGOs and CBOs, and patchy on-the-ground coverage by such agencies, it is unrealistic to imagine that they alone can solve major funding or implementation issues. Indeed, the most important partnership is often forgotten – that

of donors and CBOs with the recipient governments. In these cases, the relationship is all too often still one of governments spending time and money to get a small portion of their non-salary budget needs, within parameters which they may not be able to achieve and which they may have prioritized differently if left to themselves. These partnerships are not those of equals.

The increased emphasis on partnering is also changing traditional organizational roles. If CBOs are only used for advocacy to support specific causes, what happens to their ability to critique? How representative are CBOs? How impartial are profit-making donors? What is the role for donors in assuring accountability when governments take increasing control over policy agendas but governance remains poor? Thus, although the principles of coordination and partnership are enshrined in development language and literature, and the spectrum of actors has increased, the partnership model moves in fits and starts, and raises some broad questions about agency and ownership of the aid agenda.

Trends in partnership formation

Currently there are several major trends in the way overseas development assistance partnerships are approached by donors, international agencies and civil society (these are not mutually exclusive). One approach is to push for issue-based investments which target specific needs. Global partnerships are formed to attack one specific development issue and demonstrate results. The Millennium Development Goals are an umbrella for one such broad issue-based partnership. Both approaches include a focus on outcomes, but the former approach is more targeted while the latter supports broader sectoral or country development. This approach has recently been more specifically applied to sectoral issues by large private foundations and trusts, such as Gates and Hewlett in the USA, in which partnerships are sought to push specific issue-based agendas.

These funds heavily emphasize partnerships with civil society and seek short and quick results for specific issues, most notably in health. This trend is recognized in the OECD Development Cooperation report (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2007) and has been reinforced recently in the Accra Agenda for Action. Significant private contributions have been made to specific initiatives such as the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the Global

Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). As a result of efforts to mobilize private resources on both the local and international levels, new structures in development cooperation have been created, which can be seen as either vertical programmes challenging – or complementing current budget support.

A second approach premises aid on good performance by recipient countries based on donor and recipient-agreed indicators. Partnerships are formed by donors to design the criteria, supply external funding, monitor implementation and sanction countries that do not adhere to the guidelines. The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) for education is one such partnership.

A third kind of partnership – that of recipient governments with new donors from the Gulf States as well as the Russian Federation, India and China – sometimes works outside the old aid architecture and is not always part of donor coordination efforts at all.

Partnerships, particularly between civil society organizations (CSOs) and other aid stakeholders, are often seen as a way in which bridges can be built across aid gaps. However, these bridges may not always be where they are most needed.

The split in approaches to aid, along with the presence of new donor participants, is important. It means that short-term needs-based activities and moves to get aid quickly to recipients do not necessarily tie up with longer-term development goals or efforts working with recipient governments to develop sustainable policies. Unless managed wisely, these differences have the potential to exacerbate the split in approach between groups wanting fast results on the ground and that use issue-based, vertical programming and multilateral agencies pushing for operationalizing donor coordination efforts.

Challenges to education partnerships with non-state actors

In spite of consistent efforts to press for increased funding and programming for ‘fragile’ and conflict-affected countries, challenges remain in persuading donors to fund education across the humanitarian/development divide. Partnerships such as the Clinton Global Initiative (NGOs, government and the private sector), networks such as the INEE and its Working Groups (such as that on fragile states, a cross-agency initiative linked to the Fast Track Initiative and the OECD Development Assistance Committee) and the Basic Education Coalition in the USA

(only NGOs) have stepped up advocacy and policy efforts with some positive results in terms of building awareness and improving the level of donor financing. However, there are a number of issues apart from levels of financing that affect the delivery of education services. These include a) the loss of trained staff, b) poor governance and a lack of transparency post conflict with consequences for disbursement and implementation, and c) new demands on non-state actors to provide services on an expanded basis. The following section considers varying roles for civil society in differing situations.

In acute emergencies or conflict situations

Just as non-state actors are becoming more competent and aware of the scope of their responsibilities in delivering and monitoring education delivery, recipient governments are increasingly able to take charge of the education response. In these circumstances, the job of service delivery-based organizations such as NGOs is to blend their contribution of supplies and technical expertise with an existing social service delivery system, not to supplant it. A difficulty here is the inherent tension within the relief and reconstruction agencies working in conflict settings between finding funding for crisis interventions and financing longer-term programming.

A second difficulty is that governments in conflict settings can be hostile, either to those affected by the conflict or those involved in it, as in Darfur. Governments can also be under pressure internally from many competing interests, making it difficult for them to put in place sustainable policies. A recent surge in attacks on NGO staff in current crisis situations may result in the curtailment of their activities. Other challenges for implementation in such circumstances are the expense of doing business, including security, and the unwillingness of qualified staff to work in dangerous settings.

In chronic crises

In emergency situations, INGOs and CBOs are most often the first responders, channelling funding from private and government sources in quick response programmes. However, in chronic crisis situations (the DRC, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan are examples), INGOs can be constrained by poor legal environments, hostility from governments and their own inability to play a leading role in transforming emergency

assistance into constructive policy and programme dialogue, and in capacity building beyond their own staff.

Stronger efforts are needed to enable INGOs and CBOs to maximize the current window of opportunity for civil society organizations to play a significant role in national programmes. Where governments are receptive and INGO staff skilled, this is possible. For instance, Save the Children has been working directly with the Government of Jordan along with other organizations to advise on policy and programming for Iraqi refugees. Working closely with the Ministry of Education, its programmes integrate children into the mainstream school system and assist host communities to withstand the introduction of new populations. There are many similar opportunities for expanded roles for non-government and multilateral players.

No longer is it the case that development actors can work outside of governments, which now have far more agency in determining the focus of donor aid. For example, the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan recently worked with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its contractors to alter the focus and reach of the Building Education Support Systems for Teachers (BESST) project to meet an immediate need for country-wide teacher development programmes. Although USAID still delivers aid through parallel funding, that funding is designated increasingly within the parameters of agreed sector strategies. It is necessary for all those engaged in development efforts to recognize that there has been considerable success in empowering aid recipient countries, including those experiencing chronic crises. Partnerships between governments and civil society are now essential.

In post-conflict and fragile states

Support for fragile states, including their education systems, falls into the ‘trust gap’ between donors and country governments and caused by poor governance in some of these countries (Sperling, 2007). This is compounded by the desire of recipient governments to borrow largely to rebuild infrastructure, the reluctance of donors to fund recurrent costs, and an emphasis on lending by multilateral banks for hard investments. Many new country governments see the investment in infrastructure such as roads and airports as the engine of economic growth and hence, social stability. The governance gap is particularly acute in ‘fragile’ states.

Few post-conflict governments invest immediately in education. The Republic of Georgia was an exception, in initially borrowing from the World Bank to bring systemic reform to the education system. This initial reluctance to invest in education is particularly important as many bilateral donor investments in fragile states are channeled more through multilateral institutions than through their bilateral funding. It is particularly significant then if multilateral agencies, as donors of a last resort, let fall their share of funding to fragile states. The assumption is that civil society can take up some of the post-conflict slack.

However, distrust of civil society can be higher than normal in post-conflict states and in those where the government is insecure. It is natural for new governments to wish to rein in the decentralization and fragmentation of authority that can emerge during and immediately after conflict. This can mean that it is harder to convince new governments of the merits of sharing policy-making and implementation with either donors or other partners. This is a second kind of ‘trust gap’ – the authority gap – under which new governments do not trust innovations put in place in times of social unrest and government dysfunction and sometimes rush to recreate systems that were previously in place. This can mean that opportunities for change are not maximized. Unless partnerships are strong during a crisis, innovations put in place during those times may well be lost.

Improving education partnerships in fragile states

In spite of these difficulties, partnerships are the way forward. The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) has recognized, along with a broad range of stakeholders, that fragile states that do not meet FTI standards need quick access to funding to improve education. Without this, the gap between programming in crisis and medium-term development programmes cannot be bridged. A recent Netherlands donation of US\$200 million to UNICEF was motivated by this need to fund education in emergencies and in fragile states, and to find a quick dispersing mechanism to do this. After considerable dialogue initiated by UNICEF with many involved parties, including civil society, donors, the Fast Track Initiative and the World Bank using the International Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) as a forum, the issue of how best to use this money to support countries unable to enter the FTI were brought to a conclusion.

A new fund – a multi-donor Transition Fund – has now been formed under UNICEF, which at the time of writing is receiving additional funds

from the European Union and the United Kingdom. However, picking up the partnership momentum, discussions are now underway through the Campaign for Global Education on the possibility of a broader Global Fund for Education, which could alter the impact of this effort. A more specific type of partnership for education is now operated by the Hewlett Foundation with Gates Foundation funding, to address the quality of primary education in Asia and Africa. This is an opportunity to link issue- or intervention-specific funding from donors such as the Gates Foundation to the broader macro policy frameworks developed under Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and initiatives such as FTI.

However, if not well linked, such initiatives run the risk of exacerbating the split between policy-based interventions and issue-based interventions, which was highlighted at the beginning of the paper. In addition, whatever mechanisms are devised, it is essential that partnerships with southern implementers be developed so they can take their rightful place as prime movers in the discussions on sustainable education programming.

A recent analysis of the applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected states reinforces the underlying principles of the declaration and also identifies a range of issues that exists and ways to address these during the ‘hopeful partnership’ (OPM/IDL, 2008: v) phase post conflict and beyond to reconstruction. Important here is the recommendation that the development community should:

Explore ways to balance predictability with flexibility. Development partners need to move towards more predictable and longer-term partnerships (for example, budget support) while retaining the flexibility to respond to increased periods of fragility (OPM/IDL, 2008: vi).

This pinpoints another key tension in the search for maximizing partnerships, between budget support for the long term and needed programme implementation support for the short term.

How can our efforts at partnerships be strengthened? The following are recommendations for further strengthening our ability to work together to achieve improved education services for children and young people affected by conflict.

Maximize existing mechanisms for effective partnerships

Existing mechanisms can work if taken seriously. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have drawn together donors and governments when truly consultative and not undertaken in a pro forma way to pave the way for multilateral lending. The use of pooled funding and budget support mechanisms gives governments the ability to manage their own affairs while working with a broad range of development actors to develop policies. Partnerships should be started early so that lessons learned during a crisis are not lost and civil society/government relations are positive from the start. One example of this is the involvement of Save the Children US in assisting the Government of Afghanistan with policy advice on early childhood development and teacher training. Donor working groups are sometimes considered useless, but are a simple mechanism for partnering and we need to ensure that these existing mechanisms are taken seriously by CBOs and NGOs as well as larger donors.

Open doors for new partnerships to become effective players in the larger aid structure

We need to work more closely with new players in the development field, both bilateral and private. If these new partnerships are not forged, the development lessons learned over the past 50 years will be lost.

Maximize opportunities for research, information sharing and technical cooperation

A renewed emphasis on monitoring development outcomes and on accountability for the use of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding has had a positive effect on the availability of funding both for research on education and research on conflict-affected countries and fragile states. Bilateral agencies such as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) support programme-based research, and longer term capacity building through initiatives such as the EQUIP programmes. The Government of the Netherlands recently formed a research partnership between the University of Amsterdam, the International Rescue Committee and the International Institute on Education Planning (IIEP) of the United Nations Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), of which this volume is a part. Save the Children US has a Save University Partnership for Educational

Research effort which brings the skills of young researchers to bear on programme evaluation. These new partnerships bridge the gap between academia and service delivery actors, which should be broadened and encouraged across the globe.

Focus on opportunities to creatively diversify implementation and disbursement mechanisms

This is the crux of improving education services in conflict and post-conflict situations, yet it is perhaps the most difficult to address. As yet, it has not emerged forcefully enough from the research agenda outlined above. We need new kinds of partnerships to improve the disbursement of funding in post-conflict and fragile states. Government acceptance of multiple service delivery mechanisms where governments are weak must be improved. Non-profit organizations, as well as the private sector, are needed to maintain services in addition to government oversight and service delivery. Communities can and are engaged in service delivery in emergencies and we need to reinforce their post-emergency role.

New financing mechanisms or funds for education will have little added value unless there are new implementation and disbursement parameters building on country systems. These should not only include central governments but also regional and local government offices as partners. Donors and UN agencies need to agree to at least partially and temporarily fund the overhead costs of NGOs and CBOs in the short-term post-conflict period as part of an emphasis on strengthening civil society. Innovations, such as the effort by UNICEF to disburse funds in Liberia through the regular banking system, or World Bank efforts in the early days of reconstruction in Bosnia Herzegovina to send social welfare payments through the existing post office system, open doors for new and creative ways of reaching aid recipients and can be applied to the education system. We need to devote more resources to these kinds of innovative efforts.

Ensure a balance between service provision funding and longer term state-building funding

As stated earlier, this is key to maintaining service provision in sectors such as education while building state capacity. Non-government actors, often criticized for ad hoc projects, cannot help build sustainable service delivery programming with short-term funding.

Conclusion

The international aid community needs to take a hard look at to what extent and why current ‘partnerships’ are effective, where they could potentially overlap and how best to use the new opportunities available. In reporting on the use of aid in Afghanistan, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) pointed out in March 2008 that the expected US\$10 billion of promised aid from major donors had not arrived and 40 per cent of what was given went back to the country of origin in fees. ACBAR recommends improved transparency, increased volume of aid, better measurement of the use of aid and, last but not least, “effective coordination between donors and with the Afghan Government” (Waldman, 2008).

This is an exciting time. We know enough about how aid does not work to be able to begin to ensure that it does, to overcome bureaucratic obstacles to funding limitations, and to make sure that humanitarian and development partnerships help attain development goals. In particular, we need to make sure that partnerships that support differing kinds of investments – those that are issue-based and those that are policy-based – work together to deliver aid quickly in emergency situations so as to restore services post conflict and to support governments in fragile states. We also need to build firmer partnerships with a range of research, private and public institutions in poorer countries. We need to ensure that citizens get basic services while building state capacity, and we need to make sure that partnerships are real, inclusive and not exploitative, otherwise we are in danger of losing the development lessons of the past and wasting exciting opportunities for changing education in crisis-affected countries and regions.

Chapter 7

Moving from innovation to policy: IRC's work with community-based education in Afghanistan

Jackie Kirk and Rebecca Winthrop

Jackie Kirk was killed in Afghanistan on 13 August 2008 while visiting the International Rescue Committee's (IRC) education programmes. For the past four years, she had worked closely with the children, teachers, communities and IRC staff involved in these programmes. Her compassion, insight and creativity helped thousands of Afghan girls and boys access better quality education. She was deeply committed to Afghanistan and to supporting education for all girls and boys affected by armed conflict. She will be forever missed.

Introduction

In the post-conflict context of Afghanistan, the education sector has achieved massive increases in enrolment. The current six million children in school represent the biggest ever school population – an increase from approximately 774,000 enrolled students during the Taliban period (World Bank, 2006, as cited in Human Rights Watch, 2006; Ministry of Education, 2006). According to Ministry of Education (2006) statistics, almost 4.9 million children and youth were enrolled in school in 2005, an increase of nearly four million children since the fall of the Taliban in 2002. The provision of opportunities for quality learning to meet this demand is now a major challenge.

This chapter describes the evolution of an NGO- and community-initiated model for the interim provision of quality primary education for children otherwise excluded from the formal system. The model, supported by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), among other agencies, is now integrated into the Ministry of Education's policy and programming as a complementary delivery mechanism for education. The strategies used by IRC in Afghanistan led to the relevant policy recommendations for similar contexts.

IRC is an international humanitarian agency providing relief and support for conflict-affected populations in over 30 countries, from emergency to post-conflict reconstruction. Given the power of education to support the protection and development needs of conflict-affected children, youth and their families, education is a core programming sector for the organization. IRC has been working with Afghan refugees in Pakistan since the 1980s and then inside Afghanistan since the late 1990s. IRC Afghanistan became well-established, with a sustained, quality programme of education support for communities.

This story of IRC's community-based education programming in Afghanistan is pieced together from the personal experiences of the authors, both of whom are IRC education advisers; from the input of IRC programme staff currently or previously involved with community-based schooling; and from programme documents, recent publications and data collected as part of USAID-funded research on complementary schooling (Kirk and Winthrop, 2006*b*). Experience has been documented over a series of research and regular technical visits to Afghanistan between May 2004 and August 2007, complemented by ongoing communication with field-based staff.

Education in Afghanistan

Education is a critical force in the process of reconstruction and peace-building in Afghanistan. However, five years after the ousting of the Taliban, the current government, although gaining strength and reach, is still unable to provide services and security to much of the population. While there has been progress in education and especially in redressing the large gender disparities in access to schooling, there are many remaining challenges.

Approximately 60 per cent of Afghan girls remain out of school, and 33 per cent of boys. For the more than two million girls who are enrolled, or approximately 40 per cent of the school population, the quality of education is questionable and school completion is far from certain (US Department of State, 2007). One of the most significant barriers for girls is the distance from home to school. Whereas boys can walk or use public transport to travel to a distant school, girls are rarely permitted to do so. Even where government schools exist, girls who live more than a short walk away may not be allowed to attend.

Many years of conflict and instability in Afghanistan have taken a heavy toll on education quality. In different ways and times education has been used as a political tool in the country's history and this remains in curriculum content, as well as the relations between parents and teachers, teachers and students, and communities and education authorities. The administrative and logistical systems for good governance of education have been destroyed, and the technical capacity of educators and administrators has also suffered. Children's psychosocial well-being is inevitably affected by many years of conflict and the ongoing social, economic and political uncertainties. Emerging research indicates that government teachers in Afghanistan use harsh and discriminatory methods, such as using corporal punishment on children from particular ethnic and linguistic groups, and with assumed political affiliations (Spink, 2005). As of 2005, out of 8,397 schools in Afghanistan, the Ministry reports that only 2,080 (25 per cent) were categorized as 'usable' and just over half of the schools had an actual building (Ministry of Education, 2006). There are not enough government school buildings and classrooms, and children attend school in a shift system for approximately 2.5 hours a day over six to nine months of the year, depending on the climate.

The community-based education model

Home-based or community-based schooling is one of the complementary education models used by governments, communities, NGOs and UN agencies around the world to ensure access to education, especially for marginalized groups of children such as girls, those in remote and rural communities, or those of ethnic and linguistic minorities (DeStefano, Schuh Moore, Balwanz, Harwell, 2006). In Afghanistan, it is not a new model, but rather one that developed in response to the political and cultural difficulties of providing education for children – and especially girls – in isolated settings, conservative communities and under the Taliban.

Afghan educators, including those working for IRC in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, trace the systematic use of the home-based school model to efforts by IRC and other organizations to provide alternative schooling options for girls living in the more conservative refugee camp communities in Pakistan (Kirk, 2004). The model quickly spread to a number of communities and was used by a range of NGOs working with Afghans, first in Pakistan and later inside Afghanistan. It was later endorsed by the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an association of Afghan educators in exile (Rugh, 2001).

Compared to government schools, community-based schools have several important, distinctive features such as proximity to students' homes, known and trusted teachers, small classes and generally strong student-teacher relationships. The basic model used by IRC in Afghanistan is one of single-sex classes or mixed classes taught by teachers in their home, their compound, or in a community space such as a mosque for about three hours a day, six days a week. Classes are started at the level required by the students in the community – usually Grade 1 – and each subsequent year, the teacher takes the class on to the next level.

In Afghanistan, it is essential to encourage women to become teachers, especially in the more conservative communities. Where this is impossible, communities are encouraged to select known and trusted male teachers. More often than not, this is the community's *mullah* or religious leader. Women teachers or trusted male teachers contribute to cultural accessibility; mixed community-based school classes are also more acceptable for parents of girls because the boys are from the same community. At the same time, the small scale of the one-class and one-teacher model makes it viable to establish single-sex classes in even a small village. Teachers are supported by the community through small cash and in-kind contributions. IRC provides material supplies, community mobilization, teacher training and classroom-based support.

The community-based school model promotes child-centered and active pedagogy with attention to students' well-being. Teachers know it is important that the students trust them, ask them questions and can share any problems. Students also generally perceive their teachers as men and women they can trust, ask advice from and ask to explain again if they do not understand (Kirk, 2004).

In other ways, however, the community-based schools mirror formal schools; they use the government curriculum with the same subjects and subject allocations, teaching and learning materials and academic calendars. This 'shadow alignment' with formal education is an important feature. Even in difficult times, when formal recognition of the schools was not possible, IRC used a 'shadow alignment' strategy to facilitate pathways for integration, recognition and the onward movement of students and teachers through the system whenever opportunities emerged.

Under the Taliban and in early post-conflict Afghanistan


During the Taliban regime, from 1996 to 2001, education for women and girls was banned, with basic education for boys a very low priority. Although there was consensus amongst international NGOs not to partner with the Taliban authorities, any organization wanting to work with communities needed to have the officials' approval. In this hostile environment, staff from IRC Pakistan – who had pioneered home-based schooling models with Afghan refugees – began in 1997 to work inside Afghanistan to support communities in providing girls with alternative schooling options. Beginning in Paktia province, the IRC's community-based education programming was gradually extended to neighbouring Logar, and to Nagarhar and Kabul provinces in 2001.

The Taliban was not a homogenous group and in some districts, local Taliban officials were much more likely to agree to the wishes of the communities, especially if supported by the local mullah. There was in some locations a 'window of opportunity' to creatively support girls' education due to a gap between official policy and local realities. In these communities, IRC could support home-based schooling for girls with the tacit approval of certain local authorities.

Nonetheless, these were dangerous times. Girls' classes were often forced to move location to avoid unwanted attention from the authorities, and girls' arrival at the teacher's home was carefully planned to be staggered. Measures were taken to protect women teachers, for example, by registering them under their husbands' names. In fact, the IRC's programme data for 2001 do not indicate the presence of any women teachers.

The fall of the Taliban, the installation of the government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in 2002, and the large-scale 'back to school' campaign that same year resulted in a massive increase in primary school enrolment, which has continued in the years following (see *Figure 7.1*). However, huge gaps in access have remained, especially in the rural areas. Even though girls and boys have officially been able to attend school and are encouraged to do so, government provision of education services has been vastly outstripped by skyrocketing demands, making community-based education models of ongoing relevance.

Figure 7.1 Primary school enrolment in Afghanistan from 2000 to 2004



Source: Ministry of Education, 2006.

A ‘back to school’ campaign in 2002 helped to reinvigorate the Ministry of Education (MOE) to start building its capacity to increase access and improve education quality. However, during 2002 and 2003, politics and power struggles within the government as a whole, and the Ministry in particular, made open dialogue around education in Afghanistan difficult. As the MOE was asserting its position within the government, it also struggled to assert its ownership of education content and processes and to achieve legitimacy on a national level.

For example, initially MOE officials of the new transitional authority stated that NGOs should disband and stop supporting home-based schools because government resources would be devoted to education services deemed to be of a higher quality, such as ‘properly’ constructed schools with fully trained teachers. It was not an easy time for NGOs keen to provide education to children who remained beyond the reach of the government, nor for communities that sought support to keep their children in home-based schools. The Ministry was focused on the establishment of a national education system of the highest standards possible and called for far greater regulation of NGO activities. This control was not only in terms of education policy and content; the MOE was also keen to control the resources available to the sector. Complicating this was the lack of both financial and technical resources within the Ministry itself (Spink, 2005).

At the central level, policy dialogue was limited and there were few opportunities for synergy between government and non-government education provision. Yet IRC sought collaboration whenever possible

and found other 'windows of opportunity' to do so, this time with provincial and local Ministry of Education officials. IRC was able to work closely with provincial officials to move ahead with a 'shadow alignment' strategy, including jointly developing processes for the integration of community-based school students into newly developing government schools. At the provincial and local levels, ministry officials were especially keen for IRC support because they were struggling to rebuild education with limited resources and support. IRC eventually, through ongoing discussions, secured registration of the programme with the MOE.

Transition from shadow alignment to integration

A fundamental feature of IRC's community-based school model is that it is a medium-term, transitional intervention rather than a parallel system. It is meant to provide education only until the government is able to provide access to formal government schools. The integration of community-based schools and community-based school students is seen as a means through which the government education system is strengthened and access to education for students is sustained.

IRC, in collaboration with provincial and local authorities and with valuable feedback from other NGO colleagues, developed an 'integration strategy' in 2003 as one of its main methods for carrying out its policy of shadow alignment in the new political context (Winthrop and Kola, 2003). The strategy identified a number of scenarios, which sought to strengthen the government education system as it evolved. In the first integration scenario, the students and teachers remain in the same place and the community-based school actually changes status and is taken on by the provincial education authorities as a 'government school'. In the second integration scenario, the home-based school ceases to operate and the students – and possibly the teacher – transfer to a nearby government school.

When neither of those options are possible, two other scenarios were identified – clustering and satellites. Clustering called for combining several home-based schools that were in close proximity to create one new government school. Satellite integration envisages linking isolated home-based schools administratively to a government school, thereby allowing children to continue schooling in their community but ultimately within the government system.

In addition to providing a platform upon which the government education system can rebuild, integrating home-based schools with government schools has a number of potential benefits for students, teachers and parents. Students are provided with government recognition of their learning. While prior to integration, students in IRC-supported community-based schools were able to move into government schools for higher grades without any difficulty – IRC provided the completion certificate for students and their educational records were delivered to the Provincial Education Office – the certification was not as widely recognized as the graduation stamp of a formal government school.

For parents, integration relieves the pressure to compensate the teacher, which is the norm at community-based schools. Free education may provide an incentive for more parents to send their children to school and it may also ensure that even if the economic circumstances of families are difficult, their children's education continues. For teachers, the prospect of being on the government payroll increases their job security, as the little payment and compensation teachers receive within the home-based school system is a common source of concern.

Community-based education in the recent policy context

Over time, there has been a gradual opening up of the MOE to NGOs, starting with greater acceptance of their activities. From 2003 on, relationships between NGOs and the government have generally become more collaborative. Factors contributing to this changing attitude include increased government resources, increased awareness of the effectiveness of non-government schools and educational provision, and increased acceptance of the need for collaboration and flexibility around government norms and standards. Coordinated advocacy amongst the major NGOs supporting community-based schooling, including IRC, is also likely to have influenced this change.

The policy document *Securing Afghanistan's Future* explains the shift as follows:

The Ministry of Education (MOE) has evolved during the past 18 months with regard to its views on the role of the ministry. At the beginning of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) the MOE emphasized its role as the sole producer of services and educational inputs (e.g. the producer rather than the purchaser of textbooks, furniture and so on). However, MOE has

begun to stress more the role of the NGOs and the private sector in service delivery and its construction department as a contractor rather than a builder. It has begun to emphasize its role as one of policy-making, regulating and monitoring service delivery, facilitating the roles of others and contracting for services (Government of Afghanistan, 2004: 13).

This shift was accelerated with the democratic election of President Hamid Karzai at the end of 2004 and the subsequent establishment of his administration. For IRC, this meant that between 2004 and 2005, almost 9,000 home-based students in IRC-supported schools were integrated into government schools, including 88 per cent of boys and 51 per cent of girls (Kirk and Winthrop, 2006c).

At the time of writing in 2008, the Karzai Government's Minister of Education, Hanif Atmar, had recently led the Ministry through a process of developing a community-based education policy, resulting in new and welcomed policy openings at the national level. This policy frames community-based education within the context of the MOE's commitment to quality education for all, as articulated in the National Education Strategic Plan (Ministry of Education, 2007). It allows for consolidation of the progress made in recent years, including the formal recognition of integration processes from community-based schools into government schools (Ministry of Education, 2006). Government 'hub schools', which support and oversee numerous community-based satellite schools, have been adopted and are a model which seems to be inspired by IRC's early integration models. This policy also paved the way for the integration of community-based teachers onto the government payroll, at least for one year. It also allows for community-based students to be registered officially as students within the formal MOE system.

While the political leadership has been the source of these policy shifts, they have also been pushed by developments in community-based education service provision, and especially the formation of an NGO consortium, Partnership for Advancing Community Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A), of which IRC is a member.² This consortium supported by USAID is able to operate at scale and to act as 'one voice' in policy and programming dialogue with the MOE. Harmonizing the work of four large community-based education providers, PACE-A has

2. PACE-A is led by CARE International and comprises IRC, the Aga Khan Foundation and the Catholic Relief Service.

been able to push for, respond to and challenge policy shifts from the MOE.

While positive, there is clearly some distance to go before the full potential of NGO and government collaboration can be reached, and the necessary government resources and capacity are available for further support to community-based schooling. This is especially so with regard to teacher salaries.

While the potential for educational transformation is quite important, the limitations and challenges of community-based education must also be recognized, and in particular the ‘tentativeness of home-based schooling’ (Kirk and Winthrop, 2006c). The continued functioning of a school depends very much on the one teacher – and in the case of women teachers particularly, on the continued commitment of their husbands and family. If a teacher leaves the community or their circumstances change, then the class may have to close unless a replacement teacher can be found. If the Ministry of Education is able to support these teachers with regular salaries – instead of the small cash or in-kind payment they receive from the community – this will lead to a more secure community-based school system. A regular salary may legitimize the teacher’s role and provide additional motivation for husbands and other family members to allow their wives and daughters to teach.

Conclusions and lessons learned

This short case study tells a story of the evolution of a complementary education model, which grew from a clandestine community innovation during the Taliban regime to an important element of the national education system in post-conflict Afghanistan. While there is still some way to go for the Ministry’s community-based education policy to be implemented successfully on the ground, we can, in retrospect, identify key factors that enabled the success of the community-based schooling model, including:

Community initiative. From its origins, the model is flexible and builds on community-level initiative. The dedication and commitment of community members and ownership of the school by community members is at the centre of the model’s success.

Identification of policy openings. The community-based education model that IRC has supported has evolved over time, adjusting to the different constraints and possibilities of the political climate. Throughout

this evolution, IRC always sought out 'policy openings' that would allow for collaboration with the authorities, whether at the local, provincial, or national level.

Shadow alignment. In addition to seeking out policy openings, IRC, along with other NGOs, ensured that the content and structure (for example, curriculum and schedule) of community-based schools aligned with the evolving government regulations. This strategy of shadow alignment facilitated collaboration with the government and, ultimately, uptake of the model when policy openings arose.

Education quality. It was strategically important that education officials making decisions about collaboration with the community-based schools, such as integration processes, were convinced of their quality. Evidence showed that students received higher quality education in IRC-supported community-based schools than in nearby government schools, with over two times the number of community school students completing their education through Grade 5. This was important so that community-based education was not perceived as a 'second-rate alternative' to formal education and that parents saw the benefit and retained their commitment to education.

Coordinated NGO advocacy. The widespread use of community-based education by communities and NGOs provided a critical mass of advocates for the model. The close collaboration of NGOs working on community-based education, supported in part by donors awarding grants for community-based education to NGO consortia, led to sustained advocacy for government recognition and uptake of the model.

Protection. In the current context of insecurity and increasingly, reports of attacks on schools, teachers and students – especially females – the strengths of the community-based model are again highlighted. Unlike the government schools, community-based schools are afforded a certain amount of protection because of their location and most significantly, the commitment and ownership of the community members themselves.

Currently, IRC and other NGO partners have been able to use the new opportunities provided by the MOE's National Education Strategic Plan (2006) to expand and develop the model, and to frame it within the government system. The relationship between the complementary model and the government system remains an important issue, especially in

a post-conflict context where the Ministry of Education may be weak and is working to assert legitimacy. If a complementary model is framed within the policy parameters and objectives of the government, then it can help to strengthen the government system and in this case potentially transform it to provide flexible and inclusive mechanisms for reaching all children, whether girls or those living in remote areas of the country.

We end with two complementary policy recommendations drawn from the case study but which have resonance and relevance beyond the context of Afghanistan. The first is that support for flexible, complementary models of education provision, which build on community initiative and engagement and are aligned with Ministry of Education policy and objectives, is a strategic intervention from the earliest stages of a crisis. Secondly, innovations for quality teaching and learning in the complementary models should be supported, nurtured and carefully evaluated in order to provide examples of effective strategies to inform national policy and programme development. In the case of Afghanistan, the models developed in the small-scale community-based education programme, such as teacher meetings, classroom-based training and the results achieved through them, can be shared with the education officials and policy-makers in order to inform and enhance the quality of national and government programmes.

Chapter 8

The Teacher Education Package (TEP) and NRC's emergency education support in Angola: 12 years and 212,000 children

Eldrid Kvamen Midttun

Introduction

In the early 1990s, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) started its development of mechanisms and tools to respond to the needs for education support during various phases of emergencies related to armed conflict. As a humanitarian non-governmental organization, NRC's main target groups are people who have had to flee into exile or to a safer place within their own country, be it at the onset of a conflict or at some point during unstable conditions.

Angola was the first country in which NRC served as a hands-on actor in the education sector. After an assessment in early 1995 it was decided that NRC would establish an office in the capital Luanda and work with authorities and UN agencies to identify geographical and thematic areas where the NRC mandate and experiences could best be put to use. In early 1995, a more peaceful period was expected and with it, a substantial return of refugees from exile and of those who had been displaced internally. It was clear also that the education sector was in poor shape, the war adding to years of neglect for the broader population.

This chapter will use the 12 years of NRC presence in Angola to highlight key aspects of support to the education sector. Having been phased out of Angola in late 2007, looking back allows for reflection on NRC's challenges, achievements and lessons learned. In Angola, the shifting situation in the country and evolving partnerships have offered a kind of model, with important recommendations for NRC and other agency programmes in other countries.

This chapter has been prepared by a long-time NRC education adviser, and is based on a combination of personal experience and in-house documentation. It provides an insider's perspective as to how one

NGO has approached opportunities for change in the education sector during and after conflict.

NRC's approach to education

Influenced by increasing global awareness of education needs and dialogue with interested actors, NRC developed its working principles and main style of responding to the education needs of its target groups from the early 1990s.

The overall goal of NRC as an education supporter is to “respond rapidly with a long term perspective” and in particular, help create opportunities for children and youth beyond the normal school-starting age, who have lost out on education due to conflict and displacement (NRC, 2006: 33). The objective is to get them into or back into the official system by offering an intensive and compressed ‘catch-up’ programme, normally for 8 to 12 months. For youth unable to spend three to six years in the formal school system, a non-formal education and training scheme known as the Youth Education Pack has been developed, although not in time for NRC to use in Angola.

As a short- to medium-term player, averaging seven to eight years in a country, the NRC will always face limitations in its achievements, especially in the education sector. Recognizing how multiple factors – many beyond NRC's control – will influence efficiency and results, the following have become the cornerstones of its support: (i) partnerships, (ii) capacity building, (iii) relevant subject matter, and (iv) participatory methods. Broadly speaking, these focus areas have proved to be valid over time and are being applied in most countries and situations in which NRC works in education. However, the real impact of NRC's work depends on a country's development following conflict.

Although there have been efforts internationally to harmonize some of the terminology used for the various types of interventions, for instance through the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), central terms are being used differently. *Box 17* lists the main terms used by NRC.

Box 17 Terminology of programmes for a backlog of uneducated children and youth

‘Catch-up’ or ‘bridging’ programme: compressed programmes of 8 to 12 months, mainly for ‘over-aged’ children beyond the normal starting age for first year primary school, for example 10- to 14-year-olds in Sierra Leone and 9- to 13-year-olds in Burundi. The main emphasis is on reading, writing and mathematics skills, enabling children to enter the normal school system with the basics for further learning. Most of the pupils are able to enter Grade 3, but some enter Grade 2 and others even Grade 1, depending on their scores on tests comparable to levels in the system. Depending on the context, other subjects such as civic or human rights education, health, environment and physical education, or sciences are added to the curriculum as needed. NRC regards the Teacher Education Package (TEP) for Angola as a catch-up programme.

‘Accelerated Learning Programme’ (ALP) or ‘accelerated programme’: ‘Accelerated Learning Programme’ is sometimes used instead of ‘catch-up’ or ‘bridging’. NRC distinguishes between the two, and uses ALP to describe a multi-year programme that allows a child or an adolescent to *enter and complete* primary school in a shorter amount of time, most often half of the normal period. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the six-year primary school period was condensed into three years, while in Southern Sudan the eight-year period became four years. The reasons for offering such a programme are either that there is no school system that catch-up children can transfer to, or that the ordinary schools have no capacity to receive over-aged adolescents and youth. Even rules that children beyond age nine cannot enter Grade 1 may make it necessary to have a parallel formal schooling opportunity.

Education for Angolan children

NRC’s entry into Angola in mid-1995 was preceded by 520 years of Portuguese colonialism, the slave trade, the rise of liberation movements and internal struggles for power, attempts at peace negotiations and finally the promising Peace Agreement signed in Lusaka in February of 1995.

Statistics at the time of the NRC assessment mission in January of 1995 estimated that “... 3.7 million people were directly affected by the war, as refugees, displaced or local victims (UNHCR, 1994). More than 2.8 million were dependent on food flown into the country because of widely damaged infrastructure or threat of mines – an estimated 15 million

mines had been spread during the war. At the time, UNHCR estimates suggested that some 280,000 refugees would seek repatriation, and that more than 1.2 million were internally displaced” (NRC assessment report, 1995: 5).

In government-controlled areas in Angola, the state of the education system had weakened after years of conflict added to previous neglect. Statistics in 1995 were scarce and at best limited to areas of the country controlled by the government. The Ministry of Social Affairs (MINARS), responsible for refugees and displaced persons in the mid-1990s, informed NRC that there were government plans to allocate 4 per cent of the national budget to the education and health sectors (MINARS, personal meeting with NRC, 1995). When hostilities resumed in 1998 and additional displacement ensued, some of the efforts made to get children into schools were interrupted.

In Angola during this time, education faced a special challenge of having to operate in both government- and rebel-controlled areas. Preparing to start working in Uíge province, NRC felt the need to meet education representatives from the opposition group UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) as most of the province at the time was under its control. The resulting effort was noted in a World Bank review:

Successful examples of effective support for formal schooling in war zones do exist, however. One such example took place in Angola in 1995, when UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council worked with education officials in both the national government and the UNITA opposition to develop a ‘neutral’ education curriculum for primary schooling. Both sides of the conflict, one of the officials involved in the initiative explained, saw the ‘merit to having a neutral program’. A UN education official supported this example with the general claim that ‘it’s possible to use a neutral education system with the government and rebel sides’ in a number of crisis situations (Sommers, 2002: 19).

For Angolans in exile, education access and quality varied, depending on whether they were in Zaire – later the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – Zambia, Tanzania or other countries. The language of instruction differed in different settings. Those in camp schools in Zambia were taught in English. Attempts by Angolans to use Portuguese in the

DRC were prohibited by the host authorities. About half of the refugee school-aged children were in local schools in some areas (UNHCR/NRC, joint assessment mission, unpublished report 1995).

A model for education response in Angola

The model for NRC's education response in Angola involved specific content and certain target groups. However, as time passed and the context changed, the programme response likewise evolved.

The tool: the Teacher Emergency Package

Through contacts with UNESCO-PEER in Nairobi in the early 1990s, NRC became familiar with the Teacher Emergency Package (TEP). The concept and dialogue inspired NRC's thinking and planning of its support to education in emergencies. The Teacher Guide built on participatory and child-friendly methodology was connected to a 'school in the box', with a defined content to facilitate a rapid response in an emergency situation. A minimum of teacher training was foreseen.

In mid-1995, the NRC education adviser seconded to UNICEF prepared a feasibility study to identify what type of pedagogical tool would be useful for the UNICEF version of the school in the box. Familiar with TEP and the similarity of circumstances where the concept had been used, the adviser recommended it for Angola. Subsequently approved by UNICEF as well as by the Ministry of Education, the development of the TEP for Angola started.

Keeping the concept and methodology, the Teacher Guide was translated, expanded and adapted. The Ministry of Education made it clear that it wanted a full-year programme adapted to the Angolan context, and three national educators were assigned to take part in the process. UNESCO-PEER oversaw its development and facilitated the first productions of the Teacher Guide and the Resource Kit.

Local procurement of a TEP kit at a reasonable cost was not possible in Angola in 1995. Therefore, the first 1,000 boxes for use by NRC and UNICEF were put together in Nairobi and shipped to Luanda. The next round of kits were made by local craftspeople and the contents purchased in Angola. Recreational items were added and the contents were modified to serve two teachers and classes of 25 children rather than classes of 40. In the battered environment of Angola in 1995 and after renewed fighting and displacement in 1998, the TEP kits were seen to be of great use and

the Teacher Guides and manuals were considered to be integral items in the 'package'. Their existence and use did not preclude the procurement or development of appropriate educational materials, such as Manuals of Physical Education, Mathematics, and so on, mostly in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.

The target group: displaced and out-of-school children and youth

Angola was the first country in which NRC took on a direct implementing role. Although the main working principles were in place, there were lessons to be learned as the programme developed. Originally, at the request of the Ministry of Education, the programme was formulated in such a way that it could be used for youth and adult students as well as for children (Midttun, 1998). Teacher training, school hours and schedules needed to be adapted according to the target groups.

For NRC, the main focus was to be out-of-school displaced children or adolescents, as well as those in the same situation locally. This meant the target group could include street children, orphans and separated children, or in short, children and adolescents with no access to school or with incomplete schooling. The project was designed so that needs of adults, men and women could be considered.

To start with, the bulk of the pupils were over-aged early primary children, aged 9 to 14. The target group later shifted to 12- to 17-year-olds, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Education and UNICEF, as younger children were enrolling in the TEP classes because of their good reputation and lack of admission fees. This left no space for older children with longer gaps in their education.

Changing approaches

Initially, NRC accepted UNHCR's invitation to support education in the Uige province in the north, where TEP would be used. UNICEF would introduce TEP in areas where the organization already had a presence. Separate training courses of different lengths were held. Political changes and resumed conflict forced new ways of thinking and of cooperation, some particular to Angola, but others applicable to other countries with NRC programmes.

From 1996 to 1998, NRC was involved in hands-on activities in Uige province, such as:

- dialogue with government and UNITA authorities in the province,

- dialogue with communities and selection of locations for TEP schools,
- challenge to communities to build classrooms,
- recruitment and training of teachers, and selection of future trainers,
- follow up and supervision of teachers at work.

For various reasons it was decided to start TEP schools where no schools existed. Linking up with existing structures in the provincial capital was difficult at the time – and children in UNITA-controlled areas would have been reached if existing schools had been used. As indicated in *Box 18*, the programme was confronted with several dilemmas at the time.

Box 18 Early dilemmas in providing catch-up education

Dilemma: What to do with the learners in the second year? As children could not move on to an existing school, a solution was agreed with parents in the community: the NRC would train teachers to teach the Grade 2 curriculum in the afternoon and the parents would pay them. NRC would continue to pay for TEP classes in the mornings. Adding years was foreseen, with the hope that official schools could be established. Contacts with the Ministry of Education in Luanda helped develop or provide appropriate learning materials. Grade 4 was being planned when the NRC had to evacuate to the neighbouring Zaire. The best solution, most commonly used by NRC, was to establish catch-up classes close to existing schools, or even attaching them by providing additional classrooms that could be used for regular classes later on.

Dilemma: The language of instruction. The dilemma of language of instruction was there from the start. Aspiring to provide a rapid response programme and in a context where Portuguese was the official language, all materials were developed in Portuguese. However, a number of local languages are spoken in Angola. To some extent, hiring teachers from within the local or displaced population who spoke the language of the children and had a command of Portuguese, compensated for the lack of local language instruction. It was also important that teachers and children knew and were able to communicate in the common national language of Portuguese. As the TEP was extended to 12 out of the 18 provinces, it would not have been possible to translate the TEP into several languages within a reasonable time frame.

During NRC's second phase of activity, from 2000 to 2007, the focus was on partnerships and the scaling up of activities. Working

separately, NRC and UNICEF did not use the same approach to training and establishment of the TEP. While UNICEF started out using the 'cascade' method, NRC coordinators preferred to use one trainer team to train all teachers. Also, although initially starting with a two-week training course, the NRC coordinators soon felt that five or six weeks of training were needed because of the low level of education among teacher candidates.

The renewed conflict did not stop education activities in most of the country. However, new ways of working had to be considered, and constructive discussions culminated with the Tripartite Agreement of Partnership between the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and NRC in late 2000. The Agreement, lasting until 2007 and never formally closed, saw some changes along the way but allowed for the scaling up of education activities and support that featured some impressive statistics.

Partnerships for educational response

In Angola, there was cooperation between the Ministry of Education, UNICEF, UNESCO-PEER and NRC from the very start. NRC was also conscious that it might be advantageous to seek cooperation with an international development NGO at some point before phasing out, in order to be sure of transferring some responsibility and ensuring international funding over a longer period.

The Tripartite Agreement

Based on some years of cooperation, the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and NRC in late 2000 signed the Tripartite Agreement of Partnership, with defined roles for each partner:

- The Ministry of Education, nationally and in the provinces, would decide which, where and how many teachers were to be trained. By keeping control of the numbers, they were able to keep track of teachers trained for the TEP, as well as expected additions to their payroll. This arrangement was meant to contribute to ensuring the teachers a job in the system after TEP classes were phased out.
- UNICEF, with field offices in most provinces, would prepare training sessions for the selected teachers, identify training facilities and organize travel or transport, food and accommodation.
- NRC would be responsible for the training of teachers and supervisors. Six mobile teams were established, with 14 trainers and assistants based in Luanda. From there the teams would visit

the provinces and train teachers and supervisors employed in the education system. Training sessions and the number of participants and children entering and leaving the TEP classes were kept track of using the NRC's statistics system.

This partnership agreement made it possible to scale up teacher training, the number of TEP classes and the supervision of teachers. With the number of trainer teams available, the Ministry also asked NRC to train all Grade 1 and Grade 2 teachers in two provinces. UNICEF took advantage of the same during its Back to School Campaign, asking that more than 1,800 teachers be trained.

One lesson learned by NRC was that the training of teachers in the ordinary school system – in particular, training in creating a good learning environment and in the use of a child-centred methodology, is beneficial for war-affected children. Such training makes the transfer of catch-up children easier, if they can enter an environment similar to the one they left.

Supervision and the need for follow-up with teachers trained for the TEP programme were pointed out by an evaluation team in 2000 (Johannessen and Romeu, 2000). The trainer teams, led by the pedagogical coordinator, gradually developed a supervision module as the basis for training sessions for provincial and municipal supervisors. It has since been translated into French and English and has been made available to other country programmes. It is expected that Angolan supervisors will make use of the module and their training as the school system is rehabilitated and extended.

Keeping track of the children after the TEP year

Those children who completed the TEP year and had their placement level decided were in principle able to enter formal schools. This is where NRC's statistics stopped and the Ministry's figures were entered. However, the Ministry did not see the need to mark former TEP children for special follow-up; once they were in the system, which was the key objective, they would be treated like any other children. While this is a positive view, the lack of statistics has prevented NRC and other actors from evaluating the 'fate' of the TEP graduates, to what degree they succeeded and whether they completed primary school, dropped out, or left for their home communities after displacement.

The NRC-initiated evaluation of 2005, trying to identify TEP children in or having completed primary school in Angola and Burundi, pointed out that such statistics would have been very useful.

However, according to the evaluator,

Tracing all TEP students to get aggregated data is close to impossible. [...] Tracing all students as they move on to regular school could be done, but would require a considerable burden on administration for the schools on a matter that does not seem to be a priority. And it would still leave out what happens to all the drop-outs – or those who moved back to the home area. What is probably the only viable option is using carefully selected focus groups, building on the initiatives already taken by NRC (Johannessen, 2005: 45).

Among the schools visited by the evaluation team, the drop-out rate of the TEP children varied from 7.8 per cent, considered very low, to 25 per cent. Indications are that TEP children dropped out more or less at the same rate as non-TEP classmates, and for the same reasons.

Neither of the partners saw the need for special certificates for the TEP – or for other school children. It was recognized that it might be useful for children returning to their home areas to be able to present a certificate indicating their entrance level to their return village school – even if the school system was the same. For refugees returning home, this is probably more common

Phase out and transition of NRC's efforts

In 2004, there were discussions between the Ministry of Education and partner implementers on whether to establish a three-year Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), using the TEP as the first year. Similar systems had been developed and put to use in Sierra Leone and Liberia, enabling in particular adolescents and youth above 13 and 14 years old to finish their basic education in a shorter time span. UNESCO-PEER by this time had, in cooperation with school system inspectors in the DRC, developed TEP 2 and TEP 3, which were brought to Angola for consideration.

The Ministry, supported by UNICEF, decided however to phase out the TEP programme and put in place the 'Atraso Scolar' – an accelerated alphabetization programme of 10 hours per week for three months,

followed by two nine-month years of 12 hours per week. The programme caters for youth and adults and will help improve statistics towards the EFA goals.

While some of the NRC-led activities had been taken over and transformed by the Ministry, others were still ongoing and needed the partnership of an INGO. Based on a global agreement of cooperation, the Danish organization Ibis agreed to take over activities in the Kwanza Sul province. Ibis was still able to take advantage of the NRC trainer teams while shifting activities into a development mode and linking up with NRC contacts in the provincial education sector.

Ibis is pursuing the same mode of working as NRC in the first phase – concentrating work in a limited area, which has benefited the province. The organization decided to move from the TEP model to other educational support, at about the same time as the government reforms called for another type of accelerated and literacy model to be implemented.

Angola and education in 2008

According to UNICEF, nearly “all the country’s four million refugees have returned, both those in exile and the internally displaced” (2008). As late as 2007, however, the Human Development Index indicated that 68 per cent live below the poverty line and 28 per cent in extreme poverty. In that same year, Angola ranked number 162 out of 177 countries on the index (UNDP, 2007: 232).

In its *2008 Humanitarian Action Report*, UNICEF states that: “The Government of Angola has assumed more responsibilities and has reoriented flows of aid progressively away from emergency programming towards development. [...] In this sense Angola’s priorities are: water, nutrition, and health, especially cholera” (2008: 60). Education is not mentioned among the priorities, even though UNICEF estimates the population between ages 5 and 18 to be 5.7 million, with a school attendance in 2006 and 2007 of 58 per cent. Figures from the government suggest that between one and three million youth – depending on the age ranges considered – are still without basic education.

Summing up after 12 years of NRC support

During the 12 years of the TEP in Angola, 212,000 children enrolled in the one-year catch-up programme, 104,250 of whom were

girls (NRC Angola, 2007). Most of these children and youth would not have benefited from basic education without the TEP – and the chance to transfer to the normal school system. Although many of the learners did transfer, the precise number of children who transferred and who completed primary school is not known.

Key statistics from 1996 to 2007 include:

- 212,000 children enrolled in the one-year programme;
- 3,188 teachers trained: 72 six-week courses; plus 1,880 in regular schools;
- 525 official supervisors trained: 60 two-week courses;
- 124 shorter thematic capacity building courses for trainers and supervisors;
- 14 trainers constituted six mobile teams for work in 12 of the 18 provinces reached with teacher training and TEP classes;
- parents helped construct 211 schools with 542 classrooms in 11 provinces.

There is little doubt that the Tripartite Partnership gave a high number of children and youth the chance to enter school and complete their basic education. Partnerships and the sharing of roles also made it possible to scale up training and interventions. NRC does not see the survival of the TEP model in itself as important, even though it has been adapted and subjects have been added to meet the requirements of the educational reforms. Rather, NRC measures its success in reaching a great number of children and youth who, without its response, may never have benefited from education. It is equally hoped that teacher and supervisor competence acquired through TEP training and practice will remain in Angola's school system.

Chapter 9

Expanding primary education access in Cambodia: 20 years of recovery

Mike Ratcliffe, John Lodge Patch and David Quinn

Introduction

Prior to 1970, Cambodia was perceived by many as the ‘riviera’ of Indochina. The education system was comparatively modern, underpinned by French colonial traditions and with an extensive school infrastructure, a network of regional universities and a strong cadre of well educated teachers.

This was devastated in the subsequent decade, firstly through civil war and more specifically during the Khmer Rouge regime that followed, which adopted a Maoist political philosophy and targeted the destruction of the elite (symbolized through this physical and human infrastructure). Schools were turned to rubble or used as shelters and feeding centres for forced agricultural labour. Regional universities were left to rot or ruin, often being overrun by cows, pigs and chickens. Highly sophisticated professors were either killed or reduced to impersonating subsistence farmers in order to survive. In summary, the education system was transformed into part of the Khmer Rouge’s ‘agricultural village ideal’.

This chapter tells the story of the restoration of the primary education system in the period from 1979 to the present day. It highlights the euphoria of re-opening and restoring schools, with the first quantum leap in primary enrolment occurring between 1979 and 1991, and including the positive and less positive legacies of this restoration period. The chapter then looks at the education system reconstruction phase from 1991 to 1999, when there was extensive donor involvement in the sector, yet during which time primary enrolment growth began to stagnate, although greater attention was paid to quality improvement issues.

In particular, the chapter focuses on key opportunities that allowed a more systemic approach to primary education reform from 1999 onwards. This contextual analysis emphasizes an assessment of the key factors

and personalities that helped stimulate and drive these opportunities for change, constituting potential lessons for elsewhere.

During this latter period, there was a specific opportunity for change in the planning and implementation of primary school block grants in Cambodia, designed to offset the costs of abolishing start-of-year school registration fees in 2000. Explored here is the introduction of the Priority Action Programme (PAP) financial mechanism in 2000, which for the first time in 30 years created a system that allowed funds for education to be channeled through the government's own financial management systems, rather than parallel donor-driven ones. The chapter argues that the introduction of PAP was more than simply a financing mechanism, but also a symbol of national pride and confidence. The Cambodian desire to assert country leadership led to better alignment of resources with primary education sector access and quality improvement priorities. In other words, the PAP innovation symbolized a further stage in post-conflict development transition from 'donorship' to 'partnership' and 'country ownership' of primary education reforms.

The chapter also demonstrates that over the period 2000 to 2003, significant primary education growth resulted in assuring greater access for the poor and equally focused on measures to improve quality and internal efficiency, such as student progression rates (which were low during the earlier post-conflict restoration period). The chapter highlights the challenges and constraints in sustaining these gains. Nevertheless, grasping these opportunities at some point during the development transition is critical.

Methodology and research process

This chapter is based primarily on practitioner experience, with the authors acting as policy advisers to the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS) in Cambodia over the period 1994 to 2008. The analysis draws on various reports on the education reform process in Cambodia, including those of the government (for example, strategic frameworks and annual sector performance reports), UN agencies (for example, Education for All assessments), Sida/UNICEF, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the European Commission. The report also draws on the authors' technical reports during and subsequent to their involvement in the reform process. This chapter and its conclusions solely represent the views of the authors.

Background to the conflict and its impact on education

Emergency relief and the restoration period of 1979-1991. The main conflict in Cambodia ended in 1979 after the downfall of the Khmer Rouge regime. The first post-conflict period of 1979-1991 is best characterized as a time of restoration or rehabilitation of the education service, following the virtual destruction of physical and human infrastructure. Over this period, primary school enrolment rose from an estimated 0.2 million to 1.6 million students, with teachers, primary school construction and teacher training largely funded by informal payments from parents and contributions from Eastern Bloc donors and Viet Nam.

Little information from this time is available on the poverty profiles of enrolment, and access strategies were not consciously pro-poor. Enrolment growth was largely due to post-conflict euphoria and a pent-up demand for primary education. Enrolment was often unregulated, with students as young as 5 years old or as old as 16 entering primary school. Teachers were recruited with a minimum of education (often having completed only four or five years of primary education themselves) from rural Cambodia.

In these early years, planning was largely ad hoc, led by an initial group of 10 dedicated professionals under the leadership of one of the current MOEYS' Secretary of State. Decision-making and prioritization were largely driven by networks of individuals and group loyalties, a situation that remains in part to this day (Hughes and Conway, 2003).

This period saw some progress, as communities gave increasing value to education, demonstrated in their willingness to participate in primary school financing and governance. Another benefit was the starting up of a central education administration, which evolved into a network of provincial and district education administrations and provincial teachers' colleges. This began to symbolize the restoration of the public provision for education destroyed over the previous decade.

One less positive legacy was that informal payments by parents for school running costs became institutionalized, though non-regulated, with a degree of acceptance of inequities in access to primary schooling. A second legacy was limited attention to internal efficiency (for example, grade repetition was rife as older students tried to grab as much education as they could). A third legacy was a cadre of untrained and, in many cases, reportedly untrainable primary teachers (many could barely read

or write) resulting in a focus on teacher upgrading rather than on creating future generations of primary teachers. Overall there was a vacuum in explicit demand for state provision of education services and limited understanding of the kinds of minimum standards of provision that could be expected. This is consistent with other post-conflict studies (Chand and Coffman, 2008).

Reconstruction period of 1991-1999. With the Peace Accord finally signed in 1991, the new Constitution enabled the formal establishment of an education ministry. The following period from 1992 to 1999 can best be characterized as a reconstruction period (described as the ‘donorship phase’ in Cambodian development literature), with extensive donor and NGO assistance amounting to US\$50 million per annum (Asian Development Bank, 2000). Primary education enrolment continued to grow from 1.6 million in 1992 to an estimated 2.1 million in 1999, although growth began to stagnate from around 1995/1996 (MOEYS, 1999). Improving information systems demonstrated that much of this growth was due to high rates of repetition, with high levels of drop-out and non-participation in the poorest districts.

There were a number of benefits from this reconstruction period. The MOEYS established a formal strategy review (UNESCO, 1993; Asian Development Bank, 1994) and policy development and planning processes, incorporating pro-poor reform strategies (MOEYS, 1995). MOEYS organizational mandates and structures for implementing reforms were established, alongside more predictable financing, primarily from external sources. There was also an opportunity to pilot direct school block grant mechanisms and assess the results, although these initiatives used parallel management systems to those of the government. Overall, gradually improving state revenues, supplemented by external assistance, were beginning to fill the previous vacuum of state provision of education services and establish an understanding of minimum standards that communities could expect.

Less positively, much of the reform remained donor-driven, with the majority of education resources off-budget and the creation of parallel technical and financial management systems. National ownership of the sector investment plan of 1995 (MOEYS, 1995) was uneven and it was perceived as an external assistance programming document rather than a sector reform strategy.

The two-party ‘dual system’ in each ministry, whereby ministerial portfolios were shared between the two main political parties – with Secretaries of State from both parties, including for education – undermined leadership coherence with sometimes conflicting loyalty networks. These political tensions were reinforced by the upsurge in political instability between the two main parties, Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) and Funcinpec, over 1997/98 and the last remnants of Khmer Rouge skirmishing.

The continued political instability during the period of 1991 to 1998 reinforced donor attitudes and to some extent that of the government: that Cambodia remained at the stage of post-conflict relief. Consequently, external assistance was motivated by providing inputs at the school level by the easiest means possible, with only limited attention paid to building up government institutions, structures and systems. Many of the more disadvantaged and remote provinces, especially those with a lingering Khmer Rouge presence, were off-limits for security reasons and consequently were under-served by the government and donors. A strong international NGO presence created a sense in some quarters of development partners being in competition with the government. This was exacerbated by high levels of recruitment of better qualified education ministry staff by development agencies, contributing to the draining of government capacity (Ratcliffe, 1996).

Transition to a more sustainable development phase, from 1999 onwards. The move to more systemic education sector development (characterized as the transition from ‘donorship’ to ‘partnership/ownership’ during the Consultative Group meeting of 2000) can be traced back to late 1999 and early 2000. The government’s own sector performance reviews (MOEYS, 1999) highlighted that despite extensive donor support, primary enrolment was stagnating and repetition and drop-out rates (especially for poorer communities) remained stubbornly high, alongside limited evidence of quality improvement.

There was also growing recognition amongst ministry staff and leading donors in the education sector that the continued use of parallel project implementation units and limited alignment of external assistance with sector priorities was undermining education aid effectiveness and potentially draining the capacity of MOEYS organizations and systems (Ratcliffe, 2000). Donor assistance strategies, including transitional recurrent budget support, began to adopt a longer time horizon.

This situation, combined with a more promising fiscal outlook, facilitated a more ambitious policy reform agenda and strengthened the understanding of minimum standards of state provision. This was positively reinforced by the sense and reality of improved prospects for political stability (for example, a new accord between the CPP and Funcinpec, and the dissolution of the Khmer Rouge), meaning that the government and development partners saw less risk in supporting efforts to strengthen national systems and capacity, with the reduced likelihood of further conflict and political instability.

Opportunities for change in education

An important opportunity was to align pro-poor education reforms with broader public financial management reforms. In 2000, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) introduced a new financing mechanism called Priority Action Programmes (PAPs), which facilitated the channeling of operational funds to schools and other organizations, through the government's financial planning and management systems, which apart from paying teachers – through hand-delivered bundles of cash to districts and schools – had not been used in any meaningful way for around 30 years.

The PAP mechanism constituted an opportunity in a number of ways, both politically and technically. The commencement of using government systems was a significant political signal of asserting country ownership of development planning and alignment of external assistance with education reform priorities and country systems. The PAP also pushed the education and finance ministries to work more closely on defining and resourcing education reform priorities and provided a rationale for the use of sector budget support by some donors.

The decentralization and de-concentration policy agenda began to take form at the same time and, through a block grant to schools, the PAP mechanism provided an opportunity to promote and implement aspects of the de-concentration policy. School/parent committees were given significant delegated authority on PAP spending decisions. PAP planning and management also required a greater role for central, provincial and district education departments for disbursing and accounting for these funds.

Another enabling factor was the positive 'bounce' in fiscal prospects after political instability during 1997 and 1998. Levels of donor assistance

were quickly restored and enhanced, alongside government measures to increase revenue generation and tax collection, and supported by the IMF. As a result, there was greater confidence amongst government and donor partners that any transitional donor support for recurrent costs could be assumed by the government in the medium to long term.

Another opportunity was the implementation of the World Bank-financed structural adjustment credit (SAC) loan in 1998. The establishment of the PAP mechanism was a key loan conditionality. Another conditionality was the demand for a significant increase in the education sector budget allocation. In reality, given that it was, at that time, out of the question to increase teacher salaries significantly, MOEYS had no real alternative to a PAP-type mechanism for disbursing the large increases in recurrent funding allocations.

The policy environment for such reform was made more conducive by the commitment of both MOEYS and development partners to a government-led partnership, resulting in a formal joint education sector working group and the signing of a statement of intent in 2000 and an agreement on partnership principles in 2001. Prior to 2000, the government and donors largely negotiated on a project-by-project basis, with limited donor coordination amongst themselves and limited commitment to donor harmonization. There was mutual recognition of the need to reduce the policy fragmentation associated with discrete donor projects and to ensure greater alignment of external assistance with the jointly agreed sector priorities set out in the Education Strategic Plan. These commitments were encapsulated in the formulation of a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to education reform (MOEYS, 2000).

Pro-poor reform in education

The primary education reform had five main components, designed to ensure improved and pro-poor access, internal student grade progression and quality assurance and capacity building. The components consisted of:

1. *pro-poor access*: the abolition of start-of-year school registration charges, alongside strong advocacy for the reduction of other informal payments by parents,
2. *pro-poor quality assurance*: the introduction of formula-based block grants to schools for education supplies, designed to benefit smaller schools in poorer areas,

3. *pro-poor internal efficiency*: the introduction of vacation-time remedial classes run by teachers, against specific norms and guidelines to reduce repetition and drop-out rates,
4. *pro-poor policy communication*: a nationwide public information campaign on registration charge abolition, with extensive monitoring at school levels,
5. *decentralized capacity building*: the establishment of around 200 PAP budget management centres (BMCs) within the provincial and district education offices, alongside financial channelling and accounting/reporting guidelines.

The PAP mechanism provided the opportunity for the ministry to publicly announce the abolition of the start-of-year registration fees paid by parents, which would be offset by the introduction of a block grant to each primary school. This block grant would provide a minimum level of operational funding for primary schools. The ministry also saw the opportunity of using the PAP mechanism to focus on strengthening government planning systems for education service delivery. The nationwide publicity campaign consisted of ‘don’t pay’ announcements posted inside and outside every primary school, and similar posters placed in all rural markets, cafés and shops, alongside TV and radio spots.

The abolition of school registration fees and the introduction of primary school block grants were phased in nationwide over the financial years 2000/01 and 2001/02. Calls for piloting and more gradual phasing in of these reforms on the grounds of low levels of implementation capacity, fear of corruption, and the risk of using financial systems that had not been fully operational for 25 to 30 years, were resisted by MOEYS and MOEF. One key factor was that there was significant political pressure to abolish fees, making selective targeting or piloting impractical. Another factor was the growing capacity within MOEF and MOEYS to lead the public expenditure planning process, alongside increasingly better harmonized donor assistance for public financial management reforms, initiated in 2000.

The coverage and impact of these reforms was extensive and immediate. Primary enrolment grew from 2.1 million students to over 2.6 million students in the space of two years, with growth concentrated in the poorest districts and communities. Coverage grew from 10 provinces to all 24 provinces over the same period, reaching 183 district education offices and over 8,000 schools. Repetition rates, especially in primary

Grades 1 and 2 also fell dramatically with around 200,000 students accessing remedial programmes. As monitored by the newly established MOEYS information department, there was little evidence of non-compliance with the registration charge abolition. Sample surveys indicated that parents and school/parent committees were highly aware of the registration charge abolition and PAP block grant entitlements under the well publicized financing formula (MOEYS, 2001b; MOEYS, 2002).

The immediate impact on strengthening financial planning and management mechanisms was more uneven. Over the first two years, the operational efficiency of the district budget management committees was uneven, especially in more remote provinces and districts with limited start-up capacity. PAP financial reporting and accounting systems were also of mixed quality, especially amongst district education offices. This was due in part to central, provincial and district planners and managers seeing PAP planning and management responsibilities as an addition to their workload, rather than being integral to day-to-day sector management responsibilities (Nak, Jongsma and Ratcliffe, 2002).

More positively, PAP budgeting and execution at the school level was encouraging, with the majority of schools formulating and implementing an expenditure plan consistent with operational guidelines. A Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) carried out in 2005 recognized that funds have reached schools with a low level of reported leakage, largely due to the simple design of the programme and its procedures as well as monitoring systems, which enabled a high degree of transparency and reduced (though not eliminated) opportunities for corruption (World Bank, 2005). There was an initial impact on stakeholder involvement in school management, as the majority of schools began to call parent meetings to discuss PAP spending priorities, with budget decisions shown in school/parent committee rooms and notice boards (MOEYS, 2003).

A comprehensive integrated public expenditure review and fiduciary assessment in 2003 judged the reform to be a significant success (World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 2003). However, the prospects for sustaining the impact of this reform are mixed. Implementing and regulating the abolition of other informal payments has been uneven. Furthermore, with increasing enrolment, there has been understandable concern about the quality of teaching and learning, in part due to the resulting high pupil-teacher ratios and slow progress in implementing

quality improvement reforms. Repetition rates have begun to rise incrementally, due in part to changes in the remedial programme strategy and the continuation of incomplete primary schools not offering a full grade range.

The sustainability of public financial management reforms appears promising. The PAP mechanism has been incorporated into a broader, but still results-oriented programme budgeting system. MOEYS is identified as a key pilot ministry for these reforms, based on the successful PAP implementation. Medium-term and annual budget releases have become more timely and predictable, overcoming initial problems. Central, provincial and district financial reporting and audit systems have improved as on-the-job experience and extensive staff training begins to take effect. This was broadly confirmed by a joint government/donor fiduciary assessment and public expenditure review (World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 2003).

Lessons learned, conclusions and policy recommendations

Post-conflict restoration and reconstruction create operational legacies that take time to overcome. The urgency of emergency relief, restoration and reconstruction resulted in operational approaches, such as informal payments by parents and high cost project interventions that were not sufficiently appraised with regard to their pro-poor impact and long-term sustainability. Insufficiently developed appraisal capacity within the education ministry and limited poverty impact monitoring information systems exacerbated these difficulties.

In the education reform process in Cambodia, putting these capacities in place took 15 to 20 years. It is not clear, in hindsight, whether this could have been otherwise. A recommendation is that an early priority in post-conflict situations should be strengthening sector agency capacity to make strategic choices and formulate realistic strategic plans, based on robust impact monitoring of programmes and donor financed projects. Strategic planning may not need to be fully comprehensive at the early stages, but requires joint adoption by key stakeholders.

The transition to systemic reforms may have been speeded up by a minimum capability to articulate a short strategic framework, with sequenced priorities and targets, aligned with a realistic financing framework. Greater effort by the MOEYS and development partners to build up networks and coalitions of like-minded government officials

and donor agency representatives may also have accelerated systemic approaches.

The early adoption of systemic approaches to reform is beneficial, although initially the approaches may not be ideal by international standards. A key lesson is that opportunities to build capacity in government systems can entail a high degree of risk but can equally result in high gains. A reform of this kind requires national systems that function to a minimum standard, in order to channel significant funding to the school level and open the way to abolish informal fees. Nonetheless, there may be a trade-off between the desire for an ideal system with one that will work in context and enable further improvement over time. The MOEYS took the decision to give responsibility to district- and provincial-level offices as part of a capacity building strategy of learning-by-doing; without this responsibility the desired capacity would not materialize.

Limited progress in establishing systemic reforms in the early to mid-1990s gave rise to a number of negative legacies that have not been overcome fully to this day. Many of the practices emanating from discrete projects become entrenched and legitimized as ‘islands of excellence’, which the government feels obligated to scale up. Many of these projects also create approaches and parallel incentive and reward structures that may not be sustainable, leaving a legacy with which the emerging national system has to compete, which is frequently impossible in resource-poor environments. Greater attention by government and development partners is needed in assessing the risks of not adopting systemic approaches early on, especially the negative risks of maintaining parallel systems.

Inclusive policy-making processes, cohesive leadership and partnership trust building are critical in accelerating the post-conflict transition to sustainable sector development. A cohesive and inclusive leadership that can positively draw on loyalty and interest networks derived from early post-conflict environments is critical for ensuring broad-based commitment to pro-poor education reforms. A cohesive education sector development partnership group, linked to formal and mutually accountable partnership arrangements (for example, a statement of intent) can help to secure such national leadership and ownership of sector reform strategies. The overall recommendation is that putting these partnership processes in place is critical, including demonstrable willingness amongst government and development partners to be mutually accountable and share risks (Than and Ratcliffe, 2006).

Locating sector reforms within broader fiscal and public financial management reforms is critical for post-conflict development transition. A key conclusion is that strengthening national capacity for leading sector policy and planning processes, alongside buy-in from development partners, is essential. Additionally, an improving fiscal outlook, especially domestic revenue generation, engenders greater national confidence to lead and own reforms. It also helps to provide incentives for more systematic medium- to long-term expenditure planning and risk taking that is less dependent on external assistance. The recommendation is that sector reform planning processes should not take place in isolation but should incorporate active engagement with fiscal policy and public financial management groups within the finance ministry.

Robust annual sector performance monitoring and strategic adjustment are critical for sustaining the impact of education reform. Education reform is easier to initiate than to sustain and reform fatigue constitutes a significant risk, especially in post-conflict to development transition. The recommendation is that priority needs to be given to setting up and sustaining robust and transparent sector performance monitoring systems that incorporate formal decision-making and actions on adjusting strategies that are no longer working in order to sustain the impact.

Further post-conflict and fragile states research on minimum conditions for initiating systemic sector reform is needed. The overall conclusion is that this kind of comprehensive nationwide sector reform requires a number of critical conditions to be in place, including political, institutional, fiscal and public financial management factors, and the role of development partners in the sector. Further research is needed on whether specific measures can be put in place earlier in post-conflict and fragile state environments to accelerate the transition from reconstruction to more sustainable development, which in the case of Cambodia took 15 to 20 years. In the case of Cambodia, further research on why the sector investment planning process in the mid-1990s failed to initiate genuine sector reform would be valuable, including the influence of development partners over that period.

Chapter 10

No looking back: the creation of a new education system in Southern Sudan

Emily Echessa, Margaret Ayite and Rose Wahome

Introduction

This is an overview of some of the key opportunities for change in the creation and development of Southern Sudan's education system. To understand the impact of conflict on education and how conflict contributed to shaping the current education system in Southern Sudan, a historical perspective is explored briefly. The chapter then moves on to outline the emergence of an education system since 1994, led by the then rebel group the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). It describes how the group gained support from various international agencies, with specific reference to Save the Children. The final section analyses the creation of a new ministry and system that is rooted in the SPLM's earlier interventions.

The authors based this chapter on their own work experience, including interactions with local communities and children. Each of the authors worked in the territory between 2004 and 2008 as an educationalist with Save the Children. While there is some attempt to draw on the literature, this is not an easy task. According to Brophy, "Between 1990 and 1999 there was almost complete absence of accurate information about the state of schools in Southern Sudan" (2003: 2). A particular effort to document education in Southern Sudan was undertaken by Marc Sommers in *Islands of education: schooling, civil war and the Southern Sudanese (1983-2004)*, which covers the second conflict period; this has been used as a core reference (Sommers, 2005). Additional resources shaping this chapter include that of the SPLM, United Nations, education forums, bilateral donors and other project documents.

Southern Sudan, conflict and education

Southern Sudan is part of Sudan, the largest country in Africa, with a population of 36.3 million (Joint Assessment Mission, 2005). Since

the nineteenth century until Sudan's independence in 1956, the southern part of the country endured extreme marginalization by the colonial administration, and subsequently suffered civil wars from 1955 to 1972 and from 1983 to 2005. During the latter war, Southern Sudan was under the control of the SPLM, with the exception of the major urban towns of Juba, Bor, Wau and Malakal, which were controlled by the northern government and were known as 'garrison towns'.

The estimated population of Southern Sudan in 2003 was 7.5 million people (NSCSE, 2004). An additional estimated 4.5 million Southern Sudanese internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees were living in camps around Khartoum, in various towns within Southern Sudan and in four neighbouring countries (NSCSE, 2004).

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the north and south in January 2005 marked the end of 21 years of conflict and paved the way for a transition, reconstruction and recovery period. Under the agreement, the SPLM formed the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), with Juba as the capital city and the seat of government. It was expected that a large number of those in exile would return home with the coming of peace.

Throughout its recent history, education in Southern Sudan has been of poor quality, with alarmingly low access rates, especially for girls. Education is guided by poor policies and marred by low investments by colonial and sovereign governments. Education in Sudan was characterized by delivery inequalities among geographical regions as well as between genders, religions and ethnic groups. These disparities contributed to the creation of intense discontent, resentment and 40 years of conflict.

A government minister once indicated that "the educational marginalization of Southern Sudan was one of the issues that led people to take up arms". The problem, he said, was deeply rooted in the constitution of the old Sudan, which created a number of historical imbalances (MOEST, 2006: 19).

Emergence of a new education system

Opportunities to initiate a Southern Sudanese home-grown education system emerged during the most recent conflict period. With vast areas of the south cut off from northern government control, a 1989 UNICEF-led initiative called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)

– drawing its membership from NGOs and other UN bodies – offered humanitarian aid to Southern Sudan (Sommers, 2005). This initiative transformed the way international agencies designed and executed their interventions, enabling many agencies to finally penetrate Southern Sudan. During this time, *ad hoc* basic education programmes, often led by communities, NGOs and faith-based agencies, multiplied. OLS also provided a major opportunity for both education actors and the SPLM to assert themselves.

In 1994, the SPLM seized the opportunity to create an autonomous education system in its controlled areas by establishing the SPLM Secretariat of Education (SOE), headquartered in Nairobi and in 1998 shifting base to Rumbek, Southern Sudan.

Since colonial times, there had never been a clear education policy for Southern Sudan. [Southern Sudan was] pushing for the development of its own, separate education system (Kosti Manibe, SOE, official speech in Maridi, 2005).

The SOE was headed by a commissioner and divided into six directorates: planning; administration and finance; quality promotion and innovation; gender and social change; general education; and higher education. The secretariat was male-dominated in all directorates, with the exception of the gender and social change directorate, which was led by a woman. Though thinly staffed, the SOE can claim a number of achievements with support from international agencies. This includes the drafting of an education policy and a primary education curriculum for Grades 1-4, supporting the initial formalization of teacher training, and preparing a five-year education plan in line with the EFA goals.

In 2003, the SOE published its first education sector plan (2004-2007). The plan aimed to increase girls' enrolment in primary education from 11 to 30 per cent (overall enrolment from 26 to 41 per cent), to enrol between 10 and 20 per cent of all adults in Southern Sudan plus half of all SPLA soldiers in literacy programmes; to establish vocational training centres for out-of-school youth including demobilized child soldiers; and to establish teacher training institutes. The plan hoped to steer Southern Sudan towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA).

Instrumental to the development of policy and planning, the curriculum, teacher training and schools infrastructure, was the

USAID-funded Sudan Basic Education Program (SBEP), which worked “directly in concert with the SOE” (Sommers, 2005: 83). SBEP was a CARE-managed consortium of various INGOs, including Save the Children and other international agencies.

Education after the peace agreement

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the SPLM/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) ushered in a new era full of opportunities – particularly for the education sector. The CPA outlines the creation of a Government of Southern Sudan with its own constitution, Legislative Assembly and decentralized State structures (CPA, 2005).

Within the CPA, education, including tertiary education, was given prominence. Section 2.8.5 devolves education administration to States and section 2.6.16 gives special attention to the most war-affected communities, stating that “additional educational opportunities shall be provided for war affected people” (CPA, 2005: 25). A GOSS education minister noted that: “The CPA provides for a decentralized system of governance; therefore, each State will largely be responsible for implementing education programmes in their respective locations” (MOEST, 2006: 17).

In September 2005, the Southern Sudan Transitional Legislative Assembly based in the capital city of Juba was inaugurated. Of the various Parliamentary house committees established in the Assembly, the education committee is the largest – demonstrating the level of importance attached to education by the Assembly (Consultative meeting, 2006). In October 2005, 20 GOSS ministers were appointed, pending two vacant posts (update meeting on CPA implementation, 2006). Among these new appointees was the Minister of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST). All senior SOE director generals officially occupied their former SOE positions in MOEST, which moved from Rumbek to the new seat of government in Juba. Likewise, the new MOEST inherited the SOE directorates (Education Sector Budget Plan, 2006-2009 in Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Southern Sudan, 2006). Although MOEST began to form, it operated below full capacity and lacked human, technical and financial resources.

In November of the same year, ten education state ministers were appointed, most of whom were familiar personalities who had been active in education processes during the conflict and transition periods. The devolution of education structures created an opportunity for the education sector to develop concurrently in all states. This was also an opportunity to strengthen the education system from the bottom up. Save the Children was nominated the lead agency for education in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, supporting the state government. New opportunities emerged as the period from 2006 witnessed new large-scale initiatives such as the UNICEF/MOEST-led Go to School campaign, the Girls' Empowerment Movement and the Save the Children Alliance Rewrite the Future campaign in collaboration with MOEST. In December 2005, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan was adopted. The constitution presented a major opportunity for the education sector as under Part II, Bill of Rights section 33, clause 1-2, the right to education without discrimination was enshrined along with the provision of free and compulsory education (Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan; 2005: 11).

In 2008, the MOEST tabled the Education Bill in parliament for debate and enactment, which has since been passed and granted presidential assent. A draft teacher's code of conduct has been shared with the ten state education ministries for review. Save the Children played a key role in the drafting of the two documents, providing one example of how support from external actors can encourage emerging education ministries to seize opportunities.

Opportunities as education evolved

Throughout the war and during the recent transition to peace in Southern Sudan, there have been numerous opportunities for change in the education sector. Here we highlight key evolutions in the overall system and curricula, teacher training, inter-agency coordination and the financing of education.

Education system and curricula

Most schools were implementing neighbouring countries' curricula throughout the conflict period, with no chance of a unified examination and certification system. In recent years, with support from the SBEP, UNICEF, Save the Children and other stakeholders, the SOE developed a

New Sudan 8-4-4³ curriculum, finalized up to Grade 4 and implemented on an emergency basis in SPLM-controlled areas.

Later, under the authority of the MOEST, all states in Southern Sudan were to adopt this new curriculum. The mother tongue was to be the language of instruction in lower primary and English in later years, a policy similar to the language policy instituted during the colonial regime. These changes were in contrast to the 8-3-4 system concurrently implemented in the rest of Sudan and in the government controlled areas within Southern Sudan. There, Arabic was and still is the medium of instruction at all levels, with English as a separate subject.

In 2006, a good proportion of the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) resources were allocated to UNICEF for the provision of textbooks to lower primary schools in Southern Sudan. To fill in the gap, Save the Children and other agencies began providing textbooks for upper primary Grades 5 to 8 and the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), based on content completed by the MOEST.

The SOE curricula for primary and alternative basic education were finalized in 2007 by the MOEST, with the support of a team of consultants hired by UNICEF. This diverged from the initial SOE-SBEP approaches of involving all stakeholders in curriculum development. The finalization of textbooks development, teachers' guides and proper syllabi suited to the context of Southern Sudan remained pending, especially for sensitive subjects like history, business education, Islamic religious education and Arabic. This programme, which condenses eight years of formal primary curriculum into four years, is one example of the curriculum innovation that emerged after the conflict. The idea of ALP was originally put forward in 2001 by Save the Children in collaboration with the SOE to cater for marginalized older children (demobilized child soldiers, vulnerable children, out-of-school girls and older children in formal schools) in Northern Bahr-El Ghazal. It was piloted in 11 community schools and later expanded to 61 schools covering three other states – Jonglei, Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal. The MOEST adopted ALP with plans to roll it out in all ten states as ALP was to receive the highest allocation of funds under the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).

3. 8-4-4 denotes the number of years in a complete education cycle: eight years in primary school, four years in secondary school and four years in university/tertiary education.

Teacher training

The SBEP spearheaded the construction of two teacher training institutes – Maridi and Aramweer Regional Teacher Training Institutes (RTTI), the latter administered by Save the Children, while the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) constructed the Arapi RTTI. At the county level, Save the Children constructed and handed over to MOEST the Panliet County Education Centre. Save the Children continued implementing the Phased Teacher Training and Women into Teaching courses initiated in the 1990s, while concurrently introducing the new in-service curriculum.

Building on existing teacher training programmes, the SBEP and stakeholders also developed a teacher education curriculum for pre-service and in-service teacher training. In late 2005, when SBEP funding ended abruptly, a void was left in the Southern Sudan education sector, which no partner had been able to match at the time of writing (September 2008). The teacher education department was the most affected and had still not received adequate support to finalize the incomplete modules.

The SOE initiated the Gender Equity Support Programme (GESP) which supported girls directly and indirectly through programmes designed by institutions such as primary schools and teacher training centres. Save the Children, for one, built gender strategies into its education programmes to support the SOE in increasing girls' participation. These ranged from the provision of sanitary kits to water and gender-friendly sanitation facilities, capacity building child rights clubs and parent-teacher associations on gender issues, and training teachers on gender-friendly methodologies.

A shortage of teachers, adequate teacher training and teacher remuneration continue to be challenging issues on the MOEST and GOSS agenda. Although the MOEST has initiated dialogue with its neighbours to supply 4,000 trained teachers to Southern Sudan to curb the shortage, this support has never materialized. Teacher remuneration, training and certification were issues that took time to be addressed by the MOEST, resulting in teacher strikes in 2006 that were joined by frustrated students losing learning hours. In its MDTF bid, the MOEST favoured the decentralization of teacher training and initially proposed to construct 20 County multi-purpose Education Centres (CEC) to train 14,000 additional teachers by 2011 (MOEST, 2006).

The SOE developed an intensive English language course for teachers aimed to support the transition to English in Southern Sudan. With financial and technical support from the SBEP, the SOE further developed an education management tool kit designed for education officials at the county and payam (district) levels. The work continues and Save the Children will continue to support the MOEST in implementing the training of 6,000 teachers by 2010.

Education coordination

In partnership with UNICEF and other actors, in 1993 the SOE established an education coordination mechanism for Southern Sudan. This mechanism, which convened on a quarterly basis, was known as the Education Coordination Committee. In 2004, this forum was rebranded the Education, Reconstruction and Development Forum (ERDF). Members included diverse local and international organizations working in the education sector as well as SOE officials and donors. To reduce duplication, regulate the sector and maximize resources, the SOE inventoried all education stakeholders, mapping out budgetary allocations and the type and regional locations of interventions.

When the MOEST took over, a reassessment of education coordination in Southern Sudan was at the top of the stakeholders' agenda. Coordination was viewed as weak and focused on information sharing and networking rather than robust planning and strengthening of the sector. In a UN work plan meeting in Lökkichoggio in 2005, a core review team was set up to develop a coherent coordination mechanism to assist the move from perpetual emergency into positive reconstruction and development. The group was also requested to review the overall coordination mechanism, forums and related processes. This served as an initial step in adhering to the coordination minimum standards of education in emergencies (INEE, 2004).

Shortly thereafter, UNICEF was officially mandated by the MOEST to be the lead agency supporting the Ministry. The ERDF was declared as the highest education stakeholders' coordination biannual forum, led by the MOEST. Several thematic groups were set up to feed into and provide technical support to the ERDF and consequently the MOEST. Save the Children continues to lead the ALP thematic group, the construction thematic group, the early childhood care and development (ECCD) thematic group and inclusive education.

Education financing

Initially, the SOE had no education budget. Budgetary targets were met through resource pooling and the involvement of other actors in the education sector. At this stage, it was difficult to visualize how the plans would work given the gap between the Secretariat's immense responsibilities and its limited capacity. There was very little funding for the Secretariat as there was no public revenue collection. The lack of resources meant that the SOE had a limited presence inside Southern Sudan in these early years. Along with other civil service sectors, the SOE personnel mainly worked on a voluntary basis. The lack of resources made it difficult to maintain connections between the top of the structure, the Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya and at the county to payam (division) levels inside Southern Sudan (Sommers, 2005). Although the communities had suffered tragically, they contributed in kind and labour to sustain schools.

As hopes of peace grew, the Sudan Basic Education Programme (SBEP) was established and funded by USAID to the tune of US\$20 million as a five-year programme from 2002 to 2007. The SBEP became a major source of funding and technical expertise for the SOE (SBEP-CARE, 2002). UNICEF was, however, the lead agency for the education sector although over time the SBEP took over that leadership. USAID, the first donor to fund education development during the conflict in Southern Sudan, shifted focus in its 2006-2008 strategy, reducing its support to education by withdrawing from the CARE-led Sudan Basic Education Consortium.

Opportunities for donor funding in the wake of the peace agreement were numerous. Pledges and commitments were declared, including at the 2005 Oslo donor conference for Sudan. International support through the World Bank-managed MDTF, the UN work plan, bilateral donors and international NGOs has increased over the years. However, this has not been to the requisite levels (Save the Children, 2007). The MDTF's US\$150 million earmarked for education over three years was severely delayed. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) increased its Basic Services Bridge Fund from US\$20 million in 2005 to US\$30 million in 2006 (Basic Services Fund, 2006). The UN work plan budget for education also increased from 5 per cent in 2005 to 6 per cent, but these education percentage allocations remained lower than other relief-related activities.

Streamlining and systemizing the MOEST education planning and budgeting process in line with the new GOSS Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) requirements was vital. In 2006, the MOEST invited its education partners to its first ever Education Budget Sector Working Group (EBSWG), to draft its 2007-2009 sector plans. Three NGOs were invited: Save the Children, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). A key expected output was the three-year budget sector plan 2007-2009 to guide the MOEST allocations and feed into the GOSS Development Framework designed to “guide overall budget prioritization” (MOEST, 2006). The MOEST submitted its final plan for approval to the MOFEP and education emerged as the second highest priority in the GOSS general budget after security (20.9 per cent). Education was allocated US\$17 million in 2005, which increased to US\$136.5 million in 2006, then dropped to US\$111.7 million in 2007 and US\$110 million in 2008 as education slipped to third priority (GOSS, 2008). Due to the low absorption capacity of the MOEST and subsequent underspending, a percentage of funds was returned to the treasury in 2007.

Current challenges

There is no doubt that the SOE and its education stakeholders have had major accomplishments and set the foundation for a home-grown Southern Sudanese education system. One experienced practitioner noted that “... with the progress made since the earlier 1990s, after 18 years of civil war and regular famine there are now more schools functioning and more children enrolled in Southern Sudan than there were before the outbreak of war” (Brophy, 2003: 2). In 2008, the estimated enrolment rate was 32 per cent. There were 428,747 boys and 427,714 girls in primary school.

The transition, recovery and reconstruction post-conflict period has had its share of challenges: “Implementation of the CPA is slow. Institutions and capacities are nascent throughout Southern Sudan, and the political and administrative infrastructure of the new governments remain weak” (USAID 2005: 2). The education sector has not been an exception; the ambitious plans and budgets developed have not been fully achieved. This reflects in part the low absorptive and technical capacities of the MOEST, despite the actions by donors, INGOs and UN agencies to provide long-term technical and capacity building support to their MOEST counterparts. In a recent study, Save the Children noted

that the “reasons for lack of progress, and thus continuing fragility in Southern Sudan, include [...] continuing pockets of insecurity, extremely low capacity of the new government at all levels, and the slow and in some cases ineffective implementation of pooled funding mechanisms” (2007b: 1).

Although free and compulsory education is a constitutional right, the challenge remains for the MOEST to actualize this right in its policies, decision-making processes, implementation, planning and budgeting as well as in monitoring and evaluation.

Conclusion and lessons learned

For Southern Sudan, the stage is set, the foundation laid and the wheels of education change are in motion. A plethora of opportunities at the country, regional and international levels wait to be harnessed. Demand for education by all age groups is on the rise as a peace dividend and constitutional right, yet the challenge remains to provide good quality education to all Southern Sudanese. Although notable accomplishments have been made by the new MOEST, together with education stakeholders, the journey has just begun.

Southern Sudan does not need to reinvent education but instead needs to tap efficiently into innovation and existing opportunities. The timing of peace coincides with abundant global opportunities which, if effectively harnessed, can fast track its education sector to achieve Education for All and the MDGs. With an emerging focus on education for conflict-affected fragile states, coupled with a growing global commitment of resources to education, Southern Sudan needs to grab these opportunities and run with them. Tapping into country, regional and international knowledge and resources, technical expertise and tried-and-tested education innovations should serve as a guide for Southern Sudan to avoid any pitfalls. If handled correctly, this can lead to quick, quality results and at the same time maintain the home-grown aspects of Southern Sudanese education.

Some of the lessons learned from the Southern Sudan education experience include:

- Building an education system in emergency situations can lay a strong foundation for the realization of long-term goals and objectives during recovery, reconstruction and development periods.

In Southern Sudan, the SOE created a new education system during the conflict and this later guided the creation of the MOEST.

- Rebel movements if committed are capable of steering the education of their people's choice with the support of donors and international agencies. Concerted efforts by the SBEP-USAID, Save the Children, UNICEF and other international agencies to support the SOE produced positive results that were far reaching.
- Conflict creates a plethora of educational opportunities and offers space for innovation, creativity, inclusiveness and the transformation of an education system tailored to suit communities' needs. SOE officials and education stakeholders have taken many of these opportunities and brought an ever-improving quality of education in Southern Sudan to ever-increasing numbers of children. Yet despite this success, there is still far to go.

Chapter 11

Power structures, politics and change in Kosovo's higher education system

Elizabeth Heath

Introduction

This chapter focuses on higher education in Mitrovica, Kosovo, a Serbian ethnic minority enclave formed after the war in 1999. Kosovo's higher education system has a complex history influenced by politics at the local, national and international level. Events affecting education provision range from the break-up of Yugoslavia to the Milosevic regime and more recent struggles over independence. By examining past, present and potential future university-level change and the political moments behind them, this paper discusses how a country's political environment has an impact on the way in which existing opportunities are viewed.

Kosovo was chosen because of its complex political history, which has regularly had an impact on education provision, reform and development. At the time of writing (2008), Mitrovica was a divided city in north Kosovo. It has been a site of many ethnic clashes, significantly in March 2004 and again in February 2008 when independence was declared by the Assembly of Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (ICG, 2004; OSCE, 2004). Kosovo Serbs live north of the Ibar River and Albanians live in the south. Kosovo's largest Serbian enclave is seen as the 'last bastion of defence' for Serbs in Kosovo.

Historically, the University of Pristina was Kosovo's only university. The bi-lingual university served Serb and Albanian communities. There are now two monolingual universities using the same name, 'University of Pristina'⁴; one serves Kosovo Serbs several miles to the north in Mitrovica and is the focus of this chapter.

4. There are two universities in Kosovo calling themselves the University of Pristina. From this point forward the universities will be referred to by their names under international law. Therefore, the Albanian language university located in Pristina will be called, 'University of Pristina' and the Serbian language university located in Mitrovica will be called, 'University of Mitrovica'.

The University of Mitrovica was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it is a key example of the importance of higher education in the region; as Serbs are a minority in Kosovo, their university is a linchpin for the Mitrovica enclave's survival. Secondly, the university's history illustrates the direct and indirect detrimental impact a country's political environment can have on higher education.

The university has played a contrasting and often conflicting role and sometimes has been used as a political football at the expense of education provision. However, it is notable that levers such as the EU's Bologna Process still left space for individuals to step in and begin change, within a largely oppressive environment. Progress has been made when organizations working with the University of Mitrovica have found common developmental ground.

Incremental change has proven possible at the University of Mitrovica. Supporting change both here and in similar environments, it is essential to maintain solidarity and be positioned for rapid change when a political stalemate is over. The lessons learned around finding common points of interest rather than continually focusing on a sensitive political environment may be relevant for cases elsewhere.

Methodology, research process and supporting organizations

Research for this chapter was undertaken from March to May 2007 in Mitrovica, Kosovo. Data collection was through a literature review, observation, participant observation, and semi- and unstructured interviews in formal and informal settings.

Due to the complexity of the situation in Kosovo, it was imperative that the research was framed on a number of levels. The University of Mitrovica was examined as the primary focus of change. However, as in other situations, processes and 'opportunities for change' at the university are more fully understood when placed within a wider political, economic and social framework (Dale, 2000; Dale, 2005). Indeed, analysing the politics was important as it is all-pervasive in the everyday lives of Kosovars.

Phase one of the research began with the identification of key moments in the university's past and tracking them against any significant political moments. Interviewing Kosovo higher education stakeholders made up phase two. Interviews were conducted with University of Mitrovica staff and students and staff from the United Nations Interim

Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the British Office and Spark. As a general rule, most first contacts were informal conversations and semi-structured interviews were a follow-up to the initial meeting.

Spark (formerly the Academic Training Association), an NGO working closely with the University of Mitrovica, supported the research. A base in their field office enabled the author's close observation of agencies working with the university.

Country context

Background to the conflict and impact on education

The UNMIK took over administration of the territory from Serbia in 1999. Since then, it has gradually passed responsibility to Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) (Sommers and Buckland, 2004). This Pristina-based authority is recognized only by Kosovo Albanians, while Kosovo Serbs refer to Serbia's authority and its Belgrade Government. This means several parallel structures exist in Kosovo including health care, law enforcement and education.

In 2006, international negotiations to decide Kosovo's future began in earnest. While the possibility of joining the EU has strengthened Europe's bargaining power with Serbia, Russia kept alive Serb hopes of keeping the province by declaring its intention to veto any resolution not acceptable to Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs (ICG, 2007).

According to one respondent, the local political situation in Mitrovica (North) has quite a reputation as, "a black hole of disappearing funds, corruption and intimidation" (personal communication). Several others described a 'mafia-run city led by so-called politicians': "On the political side, people here are embedded in activities linked to organized crime for personal profit. This is the main problem, Mitrovica (North) needs people with internal drive who care for the good of the community, but it doesn't have any" (personal communication). A small number of people hold power in Mitrovica North and there is a reluctance to change the status quo. As the university falls under the influence of local politics, this in turn has an impact on opportunities for change.

Furthermore, many post-conflict environments have a definite end to the conflict and enter a reconstruction phase. However, while the fighting has stopped in Kosovo, the region has been in limbo since 1999

and ethnic tensions simmer. Arguably, Kosovo is a post-*physical* conflict region in a period of *psychological* conflict, which significantly curtails reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The unstable environment, status talks about Kosovo's future, parallel structures, local political pressure and ethnic tensions are not conducive to a stable, thriving educational environment.

Current situation in education

Belgrade's 'temporary measures' in 1990 established Serbian as the only official language (Sommers and Buckland, 2004: 42). Before the war of 1999, ethnic tensions were further exacerbated when Serbian authorities reduced the number of secondary school places for Albanian students, creating an uneven distribution of education in Kosovo (Bush and Salterelli, 2000). Approximately 267,000 primary school students and 14,000 teachers were subsequently in parallel education systems (Daxner, 2000). However, since 1999, Kosovo has seen some successes in re-establishing primary education provision.

After the war, 27,816 education staff and 400,000 students returned to schools in Kosovo (Daxner, 2000). Significantly for teachers previously in isolation, the change opened up opportunities to receive teacher training, which had been absent for more than 10 years (Daxner, 2000). However, education services provided for children in Serbian are of a lower quality compared to those offered to other children in Kosovo (UNMIK, 2006: 5). This is due to the abuse of education for political purposes and parallel systems that ghettoize education in the Serbian language (UNMIK, 2006: 5).

Higher education in Kosovo has been particularly challenging because of the small number of universities (two) and the political significance which has been attached to them.

Part of Europe's bargaining power with Serbia is its potential integration into the EU. The Bologna Declaration in 1999 set out a European standard to which all higher education providers should conform. The Bologna Declaration aims to create a competitive European Higher Education Area with compatibility and comparability across Europe (Bologna Declaration, 1999). Areas such as transferable European credits and quality assurance are addressed by the Bologna reforms. Creating a European area of higher education was seen to "promote citizens' mobility and employability and the Continent's overall development" (Bologna Declaration, 1999: 1-2).

In 1999, many European countries had signed, or expressed agreement, to follow the Bologna Declaration. A key target for all European Union candidate countries is higher education reform to achieve the Bologna objectives. Both Kosovo universities have signed up for the Bologna reform; the University of Mitrovica is included in the Serbian Bologna process while the Kosovo Higher Education Bologna Process lists the Universities of Pristina and Mitrovica. While the universities look to different ministries of education, this is the first area of common ground they have shared since the institution divided. The University of Mitrovica therefore falls into an 'overlap' of Kosovo and Serbia's Bologna processes. The overlap enables the university to work openly with international organizations on Bologna.

Positive signs and constraints in education transformation during and since the conflict

Despite some challenges, at the time of research some positive education changes had begun in Kosovo. In general, education in Mitrovica has experienced some 'opening up' and space for critical thought since the 1999 conflict. Several initiatives have shown potential positive effects for the university and the region in the long term.

However, the 'opening up' is in constant conflict with a simultaneous 'closing down' by groups that would lose political leverage if reform continued. Understanding the constraints is central to understanding past and possible opportunities for change. This political constraint is often between people within the same ethnic group, where there is a reluctance to change the status quo. There is considerable ethnic tension between Kosovo's Serb and Albanian populations. This in turn is not helped by international organizations working in Kosovo that have placed a strong focus on reconciliation and multi-ethnic initiatives. It was clear from talking to many Serbs in Kosovo that the words 'reconciliation' and 'multi-ethnic' had begun to turn people against or away from otherwise useful or helpful initiatives.

Further to local-level constraints, there are several fundamental national-level constraints specific to Kosovo that have stalled and reversed education change. Serbian national-level intervention has been a reality at the University of Mitrovica. This intervention disregards the university's legal autonomy under international law. These national-level constraints contribute to complex political pressures for the university.

Key changes at the university, listed in *Box 19*, have rarely been the result of an internal strategic decision by university management. National and local political reach and influence alongside ethnic tensions have led to an unwillingness to change.

Box 19 Brief history of the University of Mitrovica

The University of Mitrovica has experienced key moments of radical change in its recent history. Each moment can be mapped against and explained by Serbia's national political agenda at that time. Key moments of change include:

- 1) the expulsion of Albanian students from the bilingual University of Pristina by Rector Papovic in 1991;
- 2) the change of university location. The Serbian academic community moved north into Serbia proper and then eventually settled in Mitrovica in 2001. The Albanian academic community went into hiding when first expelled and then resettled in the now abandoned University of Pristina buildings;
- 3) in 2002 the European University Association (EUA) conducted a site visit at the University of Mitrovica and concluded that significant progress had been made to establish the university (EUA, 2002);
- 4) with a new and more moderate Rector Gojko Savic, the university in Mitrovica received an accreditation licence from UNMIK and was officially named the University of Mitrovica;
- 5) politically progressive Rector Savic was removed illegally by the Serbian Ministry of Education in 2004 and replaced by Rector Radivoje Papovic;
- 6) as a reaction to the illegal move, UNMIK removed the University of Mitrovica's licence and the EUA called for an international boycott, leaving the university in total isolation from 2004 (EUA, 2004);
- 7) the University of Mitrovica replaced Rector Papovic and in response UNMIK issued a new licence accrediting the UM. This in turn enabled the EUA-led international boycott to be lifted in March 2007.

University of Mitrovica

Understanding the university's role

In 1999, tearing the University of Pristina in two was a radical change rooted in political motivations. The very administrative process of setting up a new institution is a major change. Certain factors, such as licensing, the common goals of the Bologna Process and European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) and the Mitrovica summer courses,

have helped the University of Mitrovica's development. On the other hand, hindering factors included a politically aggressive and nationalist rector, the de-licensing and subsequent boycott, and a severe lack of academic freedom. Progressive staff and students have had to find a balance between three constricting factors: firstly, local leaders wishing to maintain the status quo; secondly, the reach of the Serbian Ministry of Education and the demonstration that any rector can be replaced; finally, the fragile relationships between progressive locals and the international community.

It is important to understand the environment in which the University of Mitrovica operates to fully understand the significance of changes that did not occur due to national politics. There is a considerable political struggle locally at the university, which is quite separate from that at the national level. As mentioned earlier, Mitrovica is often described as a black hole of corruption and organized crime. Furthermore, it is a small place where everyone is known.

As they wish to stay in control, those in power in Mitrovica wish to maintain the status quo. Because the university and the Health Centre are the two biggest employers and are essential to keeping Serbs in Kosovo, they are subject to informal local power structures. Some University of Mitrovica students have close links with those in power and there is an information flow regarding university activities.

This subtle intimidation creates an extremely closed space because there is an understanding that information is passed directly back to local leaders. These 'so-called politicians' have a hold on the university. Respondents explained that as they wish to maintain control, those in power do not welcome change.

Finally, there is a temptation for the international community to pull a progressive local too far towards reform, thus alienating them from their colleagues. Furthermore, the international boycott of the university from September 2004 to March 2007 created two politically fixed positions and a stalemate. Teaching and learning suffered from this. This balancing act is the starting point from which any change has happened. What may appear as an insignificant incremental change has actually been negotiated against the odds.

Change at the University of Mitrovica

While the previous section described a tight operating environment for the University of Mitrovica, this section will set out how change has happened at the institution.

Flexible approach

A flexible approach with the University of Mitrovica has enabled a number of small incremental changes to come about. The university uses the name ‘University of Pristina temporarily located in Kosovska Mitrovica’ and as such is not able to sign agreements, contracts or memorandums of understanding with the name ‘University of Mitrovica’. In contrast, international organizations are only able to use the name ‘University of Mitrovica’ as it is the institution’s name under international law. A flexible approach, for example an exchange of letters, has enabled organizations to work officially with the university without either party using a name which is not possible for them.

Furthermore, the overlapping Bologna applications of Serbia and Kosovo have created a space for international organizations and the university to work together. The University of Mitrovica appears in both Serbia and Kosovo’s Bologna applications. This has enabled it to seek external assistance with Bologna reforms while remaining in line with the wishes of the Serbian Ministry of Education. In turn, international organizations can legitimately work with the university because it falls within Kosovo’s higher education system and therefore within their agencies’ remit in Kosovo.

There was also evidence of individuals within the international community who were exceptionally willing to find a route through an outwardly inhospitable environment for change. This can partly be attributed to their wish to show success prior to the introduction of the European Union governance team, imminent during the research period. However, the attitude still contributed to creating spaces for the university to introduce small changes.

Common ground

As previously set out, the Serbian and Albanian populations in Kosovo do not appear ready for ‘multi-ethnic’ and ‘reconciliation’ efforts. This has been illustrated by the failure of previous attempts to encourage communication between Kosovo’s two universities. During the research period, the University of Pristina held a higher education conference. It

was a few days after the University of Mitrovica had received its license and its management was invited to attend the conference. However, it was not politically possible for the University of Mitrovica's management to visit the University of Pristina to discuss Kosovo's higher education.

However, in late 2007, the rectors of Mitrovica and Pristina universities attended a higher education conference in Dubrovnik. The conference covered European higher education. By having a common goal that was removed from local politics both rectors were able to attend, which in turn created a space for communication that did not exist in efforts at the local political level.

Other educational initiatives offering participants new skills have successfully recruited students from different ethnic backgrounds. For example, Kosovo Serbian and Albanian students attended leadership training that was offered to the top students in the 2007 Summer University courses held in Macedonia, Pristina and Mitrovica. When asked, students were fairly relaxed about the ethnic mix on the courses because it had 'an international feel and was on neutral ground'.

Due to the build up of resentment in Kosovo locals towards international organizations, it is likely that development initiatives that take place on neutral ground and focus on common goals rather than 'international community' reconciliation goals would be more warmly received. Reconciliation as a secondary or tertiary aim to an initiative was more acceptable in Kosovo's political climate at the time of research in 2007.

Incremental change

The third and final item to discuss regarding how change happens at the University of Mitrovica relates to the size and visibility of change. As already explained, Kosovo's universities have experienced dramatic changes. Many of these were the result of national-level intervention – for example, the removal of Rector Savic by the Serbian Ministry of Education.

In contrast, the changes discussed above are small, incremental and are highly sensitive to different stakeholders' goals. By creating small, incremental change, which essentially falls 'under the radar', change can be more sustainable and at less risk of national intervention. Therefore this requires international agencies to have considerable local knowledge to support appropriate level change.

The examples in the previous section demonstrate how change happens at the University of Mitrovica. The flexible approach, through an exchange of letters along with individual initiative has enabled the university to take part in Mitrovica summer courses for two years. Furthermore, the Bologna overlap has enabled the institution to receive external funding and training, and to create a European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) department with trained staff.

Finding common ground has created space for both universities to work towards European higher education goals and be represented at the same conference. Having both rectors in the same neutral space created an opportunity for communication between the institutions. Similarly, leadership training providing skills relevant to all students created a space on neutral ground for students from different backgrounds to communicate. Small, incremental changes can begin to shift education institutions located in an inhospitable environment.

Opening up: a balancing act

The current changes at the University of Mitrovica, most noticeably the Mitrovica summer courses, ECTS reform and the finding of common ground, are important for the university at present and may be instrumental in setting the stage for change in the future.

The Mitrovica summer courses create space for openness and critical thought. Students and professors from universities in eastern Europe, western Europe and the USA have joined students and professors from the University of Mitrovica for two weeks each summer in Mitrovica (ATA, 2006). This provides an opportunity for the institution's students and professors to experience teaching and learning methods that encourage critical thought. This is important because there is a general lack of free media in the region and many students described a 'one book, one course, one professor and one exam' method of teaching and learning.

There are few external opportunities for students and professors at the university to experience different methods of teaching and learning. However, the Mitrovica summer courses and projects such as the ECTS department training and set-up provide much needed opportunities. Such opportunities have gradually provided students with space for critical thought, which may contribute to creating a 'critical mass'. By providing students now with tools to critically evaluate their environment, it is possible that when the region enjoys political stability in the future the foundations will be in place to support more substantive reform.

A balancing act exists between the need to create small, incremental changes that sit 'below the radar' and the requirements of NGOs to write annual reports detailing successes. It essentially comes down to tension between long-term goals versus short-term glory.

For instance, in January 2007, one international agency opened its Higher Education Division in Kosovo. However, during the research period in April 2007, the future of the department was already under discussion due to a lack of results. In a situation as politically complex as Kosovo, it is unrealistic to achieve dazzling results in three months. However, where should the line be drawn between a short-term need to report to donors and a long-term need to create small, incremental changes?

In this environment, there has been a visible rush among agency staff in Mitrovica to claim ownership of any larger-than-normal changes. However, change at the university is small, incremental and very long-term, and takes place in a politically unstable environment. Therefore, the end goal of visible results may or may not be achievable. It is a *possibility* that creating space for reflection will contribute to a 'critical mass' resulting in firm foundations for radical change in the future. In the meantime few external organizations or donors seem willing to take the risk of radical future change, and therefore support for higher education development is limited.

Conclusions and lessons learned

Education in Kosovo is sometimes used as an arena for political positioning rather than a space for progress and change. If this is how political leaders are using education, what kind of positive transformation is possible, and how?

At the University of Mitrovica, new opportunities have been identified in common goals, for example the Bologna Reform, which is in direct competition with the constraints of politicization. The post-conflict political situation in Kosovo has almost closed the space for opportunities for change. The university's history has demonstrated that radical change is often met with opposition if it conflicts with the political aims of those with influence.

However, subtle change and development has been achieved successfully through small, incremental changes. On the one hand, this attracts little attention from groups or people with the power (either

officially or by intimidation) to stop the development. However, the changes are barely visible and to serve as a catalyst, a deep understanding of the complex political issues is needed. Donor countries and agencies funding development and which have limited knowledge of the complex situation have seen little return or few examples of success and have tended to withdraw their funding.

From these conclusions, certain change-related policy advice emerges for ministries of education, NGOs, UN agencies, donors and inter-agency coordination bodies. These lessons include:

1. The lack of a physical conflict does not necessarily mean 'post conflict'. Ongoing psychological divisions should be taken into account when assessing opportunities for educational change or transformation.
2. The politicization of an educational institution can be highly detrimental to the development and progress of that institution. International organizations should not further politicize institutions. Diversionary tactics like finding common goals are more useful than creating politically fixed positions that result in a stalemate.
3. In environments of deep-rooted ethnic division spanning decades, an indepth understanding of the situation is vital for supporting successful changes. This knowledge enables international organizations to identify opportunities for change and how best to use them.
4. It is essential to identify and support progressive individuals in seemingly closed environments; however, the individual and any relationship with international organizations should be treated as extremely fragile.
5. Time and energy should be invested in small, incremental changes, which can 'sit under the radar' in politically unstable environments. Supporting this type of change is essential to maintain solidarity and be positioned for rapid change when the political stalemate is over. It is more sustainable and at less risk of national intervention but requires international agencies to have considerable local knowledge.

Chapter 12

Resisting change: former Afrikaner schools and education reform in post-apartheid South Africa

Jacob R. Boersema

Introduction

In all stories of change there is also resistance. Understanding the perspectives of a losing party following a conflict, particularly of the people who had been in power themselves, and their reasons for resisting change, can provide useful lessons for wider efforts at change in education. As one example of resistance, this chapter focuses on the struggle over desegregation and languages of instruction in former Afrikaans schools in South Africa.

Education, and more specifically the language of instruction, was an explosive political issue during apartheid. For example the apartheid government proposed that Afrikaans, together with English on an almost 50:50 basis, would be introduced as the medium of instruction in three grades in some black schools. The instruction was that pupils in the final year of primary school and the first two years of secondary school at selected schools in Soweto were to start learning two subjects (mathematics and social studies) in Afrikaans and the remainder in English (for some grades, some subjects were already being taught in English as of 1975). This meant that all subjects apart from languages were to be taught in ‘foreign’ languages and not in the vernacular.

When this instruction was more systematically enforced in 1976, it was evident that black students did not want to be taught in the language of their oppressors. Violent protest spread around the country and the government used extensive violence to repress and curtail the protests. The uprising marked the political awakening of a new generation of black youth and the beginning of the end for the apartheid regime.

In the new post-apartheid political order, the tables of power have turned. Fifteen years after the first democratic election, the African

National Congress (ANC) has established a firm political majority. The process of the negotiated transition, which started in 1990 and culminated in the first democratic election in 1994, led first to a Government of National Unity, which included the ANC and the National Party (NP); the latter left the government in 1996.

The current ANC government argues that Afrikaans cannot be the single language of instruction at schools because it would function as a mechanism for exclusion. This argument has strong historical resonance. As the ANC chairman of Ermelo, a small agricultural town in the middle of Mpulanga province, puts it: “They cannot down-throat Afrikaans to the next generation.” In Ermelo, an ongoing dispute on this issue centres on a former Afrikaner school. Single-medium Afrikaans schools are seen as prohibiting the integration of black and white youth and limiting access to well-run schools for English-speaking black youth. However, as this case study demonstrates, the government has had to fall back on the legal system to force the shift in Afrikaner schools to dual-medium schools.

In turn, many Afrikaners feel their minority concerns are not recognized by the government. They argue that the ANC does not respect their right to an education in Afrikaans as one of the 11 official languages of South Africa. Moreover, the government is pursuing reform through what some see as illegal means, as the constitution clearly allows for single-medium schools as a possible option.

The opposing views and interpretations of the dispute have resulted in a series of legal battles between school governing boards of single-medium Afrikaans schools and the government. The first argues for the right to sustain single-medium Afrikaans schools and education in one’s mother tongue while the second, with various legal arguments, stresses that the resulting exclusion needs to be resolved.

The analysis in this paper highlights how political power shifts after a conflict. The analysis of the current legal battles surrounding desegregation and language policies clarifies two specific issues. Firstly, the muddled and conflictual nature of these legal struggles is a consequence of education reform based on the negotiated settlement ending apartheid. This negotiation entailed a concession on both sides, but most of all ensured a large deal of autonomy for former white schools, including Afrikaner schools.

Secondly, these court cases cannot be interpreted only as a means to overcome racist-inspired resistance to desegregation and redistribution, but should also be seen in light of legitimate Afrikaner concern for creating a multicultural polity in South Africa. This is a tension that is not exclusive to South Africa, but for instance is also debated in western Europe in relation to single religion schools. This chapter addresses the origins and ongoing nature of the current resistance by some Afrikaners to education change. While this issue merits attention, it should be stressed that desegregation through cooperation seems the only viable policy alternative in post-apartheid South Africa. The current legal battles, while conflictual and straining race relations, are nevertheless an immense sign of progress for the country.

Methodology

As part of a PhD at the University of Amsterdam focusing on the experience of Afrikaners after apartheid, this chapter is based on newspaper and document analysis, court reports and interviews with education experts, consultants and lawyers.

It discusses a number of lawsuits pertaining to desegregation and language of instruction issues by former Afrikaner schools, primarily through the case of Ermelo. This case brings to light many of the underlying issues in the high-profile string of legal disputes about education reform between the Afrikaner community and the ANC. In Ermelo, interviews were conducted with the school director, school personnel, teachers, parents and students, and also with politicians and people working in the education department of the province of Mpumalanga.

Interviews were conducted in Afrikaans and English and lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. The independent fieldwork was conducted from April to June 2007.

Education reform in South Africa

The opportunities for change in South Africa after the first democratic election in 1994 were both substantial and daunting. For some of the population, South Africa's relatively high education standards (particularly for Afrikaner schools), good infrastructure and considerable resources – in comparison to most other post-conflict countries – could all be marshalled to effect change. This opportunity could assist to effect change for the majority black population who previously had experienced relatively limited educational opportunities both in terms of access and

quality. The challenge was daunting as education reform would have to overhaul a school system initially designed for the separation of races and the reproduction of inequality.

Under the Bantu Education Act from 1953 to 1990, blacks and so-called coloureds (a term commonly used to refer to individuals of mixed race) received an education that was grossly inferior to that provided to whites. The system was unequal, authoritarian and racist, providing first-class schools for the white population and disturbingly low quality schools for the majority 'black' and 'coloured' population (Carrim, 1998).

The white National Party government in the waning days of apartheid made several arrangements to protect the quality of the privileged white education institutions in the post-apartheid years. Policies dressed up as cost savings led to the semi-privatization of white schools. This involved the creation of school governing bodies in every school, with responsibility for admission and language policies, the school ethos and the fees used to supplement state subsidies. The bodies, elected by the parents, also assumed ownership of the fixed property and equipment of the school (Dolby, 2001; Fiske and Ladd, 2004).

The measure ensured both the control by white parents of school policies and a substantial transference of education resources from the state into private hands. It subsequently became the primary mechanism for the National Party to negotiate the speed of transition in education institutions dominated by whites (Fiske and Ladd, 2004: 65). Arguments for greater state control of schools were further thwarted by great suspicion among many black South Africans towards the role of the state, given its role as suppressor during apartheid.

Furthermore, the transition to democracy in South Africa happened at a time when neoliberal politics came into vogue, along with a belief in the necessity of democratization through decentralization. Both approaches were adopted uncritically by the ANC (Chisholm and Fuller, 1996; Bond, 2000).

Economic efficiency, cost cutting, market-led reform and fiscal austerity dominated education policy after 1994 over any pursuit of redress or fight against inequality (Schneider, 2003; Chisholm and Fuller, 1996; De Clercq, 1997; Oldfield, 2002). Expenditure on education – while

relatively high – dropped from 20 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 17 per cent in 2005 (UNICEF, 2008). Gaps in terms of support for advantaged and disadvantaged schools widened, particularly because white parents increasingly paid for their schools that only catered for white children (Karlsson *et al.*, 2002; Lemon, 2005). Former white schools in affluent areas can charge high fees that enable them to maintain excellent facilities and purchase extra teachers through the governing body, while controlling the intake of black students.

The ANC in the South African Schools Act (SASA) endorsed the school governing bodies and extended this system to all schools in the country. This legitimized an institution that was partially set up for white schools to control admission and prevent desegregation.

Desegregation and Afrikaner resistance through language policy

Desegregation and integration in education are issues at play primarily in former white schools where high education standards attract many new black and coloured students. As a general rule, white students have not opted to attend former black schools, which historically have had far lower education standards due to the former apartheid policies.

The South African state has struggled to address the issue of segregation, because it has limited control over education institutions (Moodley and Adam, 2000; Motala and Singh, 2002; Christie, 2006). Nevertheless, continuing efforts to achieve control have now resulted in the significant desegregation of former white schools. For instance, the majority of former Afrikaans schools have changed to double-medium or to single-medium English institutions, partly through pressure from the Education Department. The number of schools that remain single-medium Afrikaans has dropped from 1,800 in 1994 to just under 300 in 2008. The challenge remains for the government to push beyond desegregation and to devise strategies for integration at schools, for instance by stimulating the use of mother-tongue education in other languages beside English and Afrikaans. This is an issue that has currently been taken up by the government.

The challenge of setting up appropriate policies to facilitate integration is furthered by middle-class resistance, obstructing reform and integration (Lemon, 2005). Resistance by the white minority to desegregation and integration can be explained as racist fears but also as

a perceived fear that education standards will drop. Schools that attract a diverse student body have considerable adjustments to make financially, culturally and linguistically.

Resistance to desegregation can take several forms. The first and most important mechanism by which schools have been able to resist desegregation is through fees and admission policies. School governing bodies are able to make integration a class issue. High fees and rules of admission are used to keep formerly-white schools predominantly white. The ANC government has tried to counter these efforts through a fee-exemption policy, but has not been very successful (Soudien, 2004; Lemon, 2005).

Here, the focus is on the contested issue of language policy at former Afrikaans-medium schools, which occurred primarily in the northern parts of South Africa. Although the issue affects only a few schools, the way desegregation is pursued has a bearing on the white Afrikaner population, given the importance most Afrikaners place on education in the mother tongue (Giliomee, 2003).

Schools that provide education in Afrikaans only are often accused of exclusionary practices, as in the northern region, most of the black population does not speak Afrikaans. The official language policy in South African schools is 'English plus one other language', Therefore often the language of instruction is mostly English or Afrikaans, and sometimes both, but rarely officially in any of the other nine official languages; although in many schools the vernacular is used as a major language of instruction. Therefore, receiving an education in a language other than one's mother tongue can have serious, negative consequences for competence in education, and also contributes to a feeling of exclusion as it often leads to monoculturalism in school cultures (Nkomo and Mckinney *et al.*, 2004). This means that the culture of the majority is preferred and dominates over other cultures represented in the school population.

The South African Constitution and the South African Schools Act explicitly endorse education in the mother tongue and multilingualism, while still including the possibility of single-medium schools.

Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure

the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account: (a) equity (b) practicability; and (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices. (South African Constitution, Section 29(2))

Since 1994, the ANC government has, however, promoted the use of English in schools and universities. The preference for English over the other official languages seems to be driven by a desire to make English the *lingua franca* of South Africa. This fits with the interests of global capital but is also stimulated from the bottom up, where English is seen as a sign of upward mobility. This preference has resulted in continuous pressure from the government to allow English as a second language at Afrikaner schools. A focus on decentralization in education reform has left the ANC government with a glaring lack of policy tools to enforce such change legitimately. It has, therefore, had to push its agenda through intervening in school policies that challenged the authority of school governing boards on various issues from language to admission policies. These interventions have led to a series of high-profile lawsuits between the various regional and provincial departments of education and several former Afrikaans schools. The various arguments used by the state, both in court and in the media, during these lawsuits suggests these interventions are not only aimed at fighting exclusionary practices at schools, but also can be interpreted as ‘symbolic politics’ to assert the authority of the state over these schools (Jansen, 2002).

The case of former Afrikaans schools

Afrikaners consistently argue that education reform and desegregation should not be incompatible with the protection of their own language rights in their educational institutions. They feel current strategies of education reform force schools to become dual medium and are therefore impinging on a constitutional right to create, retain and govern their own cultural educational institutions.

Ongoing disputes with the government fuel increasing feelings of marginalization. As a lawyer of one of the Afrikaans schools puts it: “Afrikaners feel threatened; they feel their cultural heritage is infringed by cases like this. They feel their language is not respected.”

Lawsuits are a costly and time-consuming way to resist policies, both for the government and for schools. But for schools they are often the only effective way to counter reforms put forward by provincial education departments. Governments tend to have the largest resources to win the long legal battles, while few schools can collect the resources to sustain the legal dispute. The cases highlighted here should therefore not be seen as the rare exception, but as exemplary of a much broader dissatisfaction with dual-medium and integration policies. The high threshold for legal resistance, and its limited success, thus obscures the potential extent of opposition to government policies.

The increasing number of lawsuits appears to demonstrate the inability of the government to fully achieve its goals of desegregation and integration through policy mechanisms. As the gap between policy aims and the available mechanisms grows wider, the possible ways for the state to achieve its goals are limited and it has few other options besides pushing its policies through reliance on its role as protector of the constitution. It forces the judicial system to defend its policies in the final instance. In this way, conflicts about desegregation are displaced from the policy arena and wider society to the institutional site of schools. Solutions are only found through a long series of court cases (Sayed, 2002). While this method of resolution has its own problems, it does represent significant progress from a time when racial conflicts on education led to violent oppression and conflict in the streets.

The slow nature of the legal process can usually serve the purposes of the state, if the final verdict takes into account new facts from the field. The lawsuit in 2002 by a single-medium Afrikaans school in Middelburg against the Mpumalanga provincial education authorities is an example. The court ruled that the school in principle had the right to remain a single-medium school, but English-speaking children had already been included in the school by the department, meaning that the school had the duty to provide an English-medium education.

Similar reasons were given in the Northern Cape after a long legal process in 2004 and 2005 in which three schools challenged a desegregation experiment. The Northern Cape High Court ruling in favour of the department argued that:

It would be a sad day in the South African historical annals that hundreds of children remained illiterate or dropped out of school because they were excluded from under-utilized schools

purportedly to protect and preserve the status of certain schools as single-medium Afrikaans schools. (Northern Cape High Court ruling).

In its verdict, the court seemed to weigh the provision of quality education against the right to prefer the status as a single-medium Afrikaans school. While at first glance this seems convincing, a question that remains is whether there is necessarily a trade-off between the two.

The defeat in both lawsuits made some Afrikaners feel concerned about the slow speed of the courts, which they felt could lead to a double-medium institution. Following the lawsuit in Middelburg, a number of other schools in both Limpopo and Mpumalanga agreed to become dual medium after pressure from the government. Although other school governing bodies also felt under government pressure, they chose to fight harder for their survival. The Chairman of the School Governing Body of Ermelo High School clearly expresses this sentiment:

I think when a lot of them look back today, they say we were wrong – we didn't have the guts to stand for what we believed. The pressure came from the government to say go double medium and the guys were not prepared to stand up. And for those schools that are willing to stand up to this they have the law to back them even if the government tries to go around the law – the law is behind us.

In December 2003, a case emerged at the Mikro Primary School in Kuilsriver, a single-medium Afrikaans school in the Western Cape. Mikro Primary School managed to get an interdict ruling that preserved its single-medium status. The Appeal Court in May 2004 ruled against the Western Cape Education Department and said that the school did not have to allow for English learners. It argued that the school governing body had the right to determine the language policy, as the mere fact of having Afrikaans as the language of instruction is not against the Constitution. The Court argued that to overturn decisions in relation to language policy by governing bodies, provincial departments should keep a track record of how many learners requested schooling in a language that was not provided by schools in the vicinity (Supreme Court of Appeal – court ruling).

The ruling predicted the strategy of the Department of Education of Mpumalanga in the case in Ermelo. Since the abolition of apartheid, Ermelo High School has, given its fine academic performance, maintained

a tense relationship with the Provincial Department of Education and the ANC, which saw the single-medium Afrikaans school as a symbol of the past. As the ANC chairman of Ermelo explained: “They don’t want to adjust to the new conditions that are prevailing in our country. They want to have their own and exclude others. It is a symbol of apartheid.”

After several disputes over the years, Ermelo High School and the school governing body were forced by the department to adopt a new language policy early in 2007, thereby bypassing the body’s authority. The school governing body, determined not to be overruled in this instance, quickly filed a lawsuit, which instigated an unlikely sequence of events.

The school governing body firstly applied for an interdict against the case and in the first court ruling, by Afrikaner Judge Prinsloo, the appeal was granted. But signalling the political sensitivity of the case, the next week a new court application was filed and this time the plaintiff included the national Minister of Education, supported by a few black parents. In an unusual judicial step, the Judge President of Pretoria High Court did not refer the case back to Judge Prinsloo or the acting judge, but presided himself over a full bench, granted leave to intervene and set aside the interim verdict, while he refused any substantial reasons to do so. In June, a petition to the High Court for appeal to go the Court of Appeals, often routinely granted in any case where another court could reasonably come to another decision, was turned down.

The dispute over the status of Ermelo High School as an Afrikaner school split Ermelo’s agricultural community in half and pitted the sides against each other. On the one side was the white Afrikaner community of Ermelo plus the wider Mpumalanga, supported by numerous pro-Afrikaans organizations around the country. Most of them saw the lawsuit as another effort by the national government to erase Afrikaans from South African society. Spearheaded by the chairman of the school governing body, they had the feeling the semi-privatized school was being taken away from them. As the chairman put it: “It is money from the parents of the last 13 years that has made the school what it is. They have paid for the new fitness room and the auditorium. We laid the first brick ourselves!”

On the other side was the majority black community in Ermelo, led by the local branch of the ANC. They argued that opening up the school to dual-medium instruction was the only way to foster co-existence in the community.

In October 2007, the case came before the Pretoria High Court and the judges were unequivocal about their viewpoint. They argued that the position of the school and its governing body “is reminiscent of the pre-democratic era, when the educational rights of white learners were better catered for than those of learners of a different colour. Under the present Constitution, all learners have equal rights to state facilities, irrespective of language or colour.”

The judges added that the right to a single-medium public education institution was clearly subordinate to the right of every South African to education, where there was a clearly proven need to share education facilities with other cultural groups. They said:

The point of departure cannot be that there is any state school or public place which is a so-called ‘no go area’ for any of the official languages. That would make nonsense of section six of the Constitution of South Africa, which declares 11 languages to be official languages of the country. The section applies to every inch of the ground in this country.

The court’s interpretation of education law and the constitution clarified interpretations of different passages in the law for future disputes. Given the nature of the arguments, it seems difficult to envision any future legal protest by Afrikaners to oppose dual-medium schools. However, it should be emphasized that the way the court case was decided, the lack of cooperation and the absence of a workable consensus on the process of integrating Afrikaner schools, does give cause for concern about the future of race relations in South Africa.

The government is currently redrafting the South African Schools Act to alter the balance of power between the school governing bodies and the provincial departments, giving more authority to the latter. In the future, this will most likely affect schools that find themselves in situations similar to that of Ermelo High School.

Conclusion

At the onset of the first democratic government in South Africa, there were great opportunities for change in relation to the education system. In this paper we looked at the opportunities and resistance in relation to desegregation and language policy.

The lawsuits discussed herein illustrate radically different perspectives. Afrikaners argue that they have a right to single-medium schools and to education in their mother tongue, that they have financed the school resources themselves, and that the standards of education are dropping. They argue that the government should invest more in schooling, instead of using the resources of the Afrikaner community to do so. The government argues in return that single-medium language policies, other than that of English, lead to exclusion; that dual-medium schools should be the norm; that resources from the government are forthcoming; and that the redress of resources is a legitimate and important goal.

Both sides have valid arguments, and find legitimacy in the constitution and the education laws. The dispute goes to the heart of what transition after conflict means. Three constraining factors for change can be distilled from the analysis:

- The protective measures taken by the government of the National Party before 1994, particularly the establishment of school governing bodies to make schools fairly independent, characterized the transition from apartheid to democracy. It could be anticipated that the measures would frustrate education reform and the integration of schools after 1994.
- The ANC's adoption of neoliberal policies produced inherent contradictions in the process of education reform where change, such as desegregation, is not fully supported through policy measures.
- There is a reliance on lawsuits for policy enforcement, not only at the final instance, but also as a predetermined new battleground to force change, rather than the building of consensus and the use of progressive reform efforts.

Change has nevertheless been realized:

- The number of Afrikaans schools that remain single medium, or essentially segregated, has dropped from 1,800 in 1994 to just under 300 in 2008.
- Resistance has been overcome by a series of lawsuits, either by the state winning the case or by its assuring preferred outcomes.

The question is perhaps not whether opportunities have been realized but at what cost:

- Afrikaners feel increasingly marginalized, as shown by the emotional intensity surrounding the cases, as evidenced in the media and the

support expressed for Ermelo High School by parents and others from the Afrikaans community.

- It is not only the government's reliance on a series of lawsuits to pursue education reform and to overcome resistance that is problematic, fostering as it does a conflictual polity. The unusual judicial procedures followed also leave the judiciary vulnerable to political influence. Instead, the government should strive for sound, legitimate and well-reasoned policies, and possibly, some compromise.
- The current drive for the Anglicization of education does not bode well for future education initiatives in the other 10 official languages besides English.

Key lessons:

- To pursue change in education, sometimes policies need to be forced through and it is clear that change is not going to satisfy everybody. But the current government's over-reliance on lawsuits, and in particular its handling of the Ermelo case, leaves it vulnerable to accusations of political interference in the judiciary. This undermines people's trust in the rule of law, particularly those of minorities, and should be avoided.
- Current strategies for education reform and desegregation in South Africa are negatively affected by defensive strategies pursued by the Afrikaner authorities before the final transition. While at the time of transition these strategies had a positive function by way of abating fears that the authorities would completely lose control of their education institutions, today the effects of the strategies seem detrimental to the goal of Education for All. As is evidenced by the controversial role of school governing bodies, there seem to be few other options than gradually to remove their ability to obstruct further desegregation and integration. However, a more cooperative spirit in policy-making seems more beneficial and productive than the current trend of policy initiatives that polarize.
- Political space for Afrikaners to come to terms with the new conditions in South Africa which is pivotal in a post-conflict situation, seems significantly reduced by the polarizing nature of the ongoing court battles. Afrikaners' perception of being threatened or unwanted, and even of not belonging, obstructs their full integration in the new South Africa.

- In a multicultural post-conflict country like South Africa, policies need to balance the concerns of social justice and education access with the rights of cultural minorities.

Chapter 13

Building new realities for teacher training in Kosovo

Dukagjin Pupovci

Introduction

In March 1989, using threats of military force, the Government of Serbia imposed a number of measures implementing centralized rule from Belgrade. Continuous oppression by Belgrade against ethnic Albanians in the following decade escalated into a bloody war, which was ended in June 1999 by a NATO-led military intervention. Kosovo was placed under the protection of the United Nations. In February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government declared Kosovo independent from Serbia. However, this has not been recognized by the United Nations.

In the period 1990 to 1999, Kosovar Albanian students and teachers were deprived of education opportunities in many ways. Perhaps the most potent symbol of this prejudice was the ethnic divisions introduced in almost all primary schools in Kosovo, in which school buildings were often divided with brick walls. Following the war, numerous analyses of education pointed out the quality of teaching as one of the aspects requiring immediate attention. The Thematic Review of National Policies for Education in Kosovo, carried out in September 2000 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2001), brought important recommendations for reforming Kosovar in-service and pre-service teacher training.

This chapter analyses the opportunities in teacher training since 1999, both in-service and pre-service. The first experienced radical changes, moving from almost no activity prior to 1999, to chaotic excess brought about by the international community, to finally emerging as a relatively coordinated system five to six years later. Pre-service teacher training in Kosovo has evolved from academic-based subject training programmes to those with stronger pedagogical content aimed at developing teaching skills and understanding of children.

It should be noted here that the exploration of teacher training does not deal with Serbian schools in Kosovo. These schools recognize the authority of the Government of Serbia only and refuse to participate in any education reform driven by international or Kosovo authorities. In addition, following the advice of the Government of Serbia in spring 2006, Serbian teachers terminated their work contracts with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) en masse and continued to receive their salaries from Belgrade.

Background to the conflict

Following the ending of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, Milošević's regime expelled Albanians en masse from state and public employment. Around 90 per cent of Albanians working in the administration and 70 per cent of those working in public and socially-owned enterprises were dismissed. The regime shut down the University of Pristina and nearly all high schools, closed down or muzzled Albanian-language media, brutally repressed Albanian political activists, and established a generalized system of apartheid in Kosovo, where the Serb minority ruled with the backing of the military, police, and political and economic might of Belgrade.

Following the refusal of the government in Belgrade to sign the Rambouillet Accord, which anticipated a strong international military presence in Kosovo, the North Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign began on 24 March 1999. Right after the launch of the campaign, Serbian forces followed with a process of 'ethnic cleansing' and expelled an estimated 850,000 people from the country. Hundreds of thousands of people also fled their homes and sought refuge in other parts of Kosovo.

The war ended on 10 June 1999 with Serbian military and police forces withdrawing, and the peacekeeping force of 45,000 NATO-led troops assuming responsibility for the region's security under the auspices of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Within three weeks, some 500,000 Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo. By November 1999, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 808,913 out of 848,100 people had returned. However, an estimated 164,000 Serbs and thousands of Roma fled their homes, fearing retaliation by the Albanian majority (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Some of them settled in areas with the majority Serb population in Kosovo,

forming isolated enclaves south of the river Ibar and a compact territory bordering Serbia north of the river, while others moved to Serbia.

Impact on education

In 1990, the Kosovo education system came under so-called ‘temporary measures’ aiming to impose compliance with the new Serbian curriculum and laws. This was effectively implemented by appointing administrators loyal to the regime and who had absolute power with respect to school management, including the employment and dismissal of personnel. This step to bring the Kosovo schools under the control of Belgrade triggered a reaction by the Albanian political movement to legitimize a ‘parallel system’. This system operated from 1991 to 1999 under the control of the non-recognized ‘Provisional Government of Kosovo’ in exile.

The parallel schools, while openly conducted and therefore officially tolerated, were at the same time subject to repression. Teachers and organizers were frequently arrested, intimidated and beaten by the police, as detailed by various human rights organizations (Davies, 1999). The system was funded by voluntary contributions from Kosovo Albanian residents, as well as contributions from Albanians in the diaspora. Teachers in the ‘parallel system’ were regarded as heroes who helped sustain the only centrally-administered segment of Kosovar statehood, which was tolerated by the Serbian authorities.

Given the circumstances, there was little if any accountability regarding education quality. Due to the shortage of school space, the classes often had to be reduced from 45 minutes to 30 minutes, and sometimes even 20 minutes, which inevitably promoted teacher-centered classrooms and rote learning. There was virtually no in-service training for teachers and very little awareness of emerging learner-centered approaches.

During the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, catch-up classes were organized in tent schools and host communities for about 150,000 refugee children in Albania, 30,000 in Macedonia and 2,000 in Montenegro (UNICEF, 1999). NGO-led in-service teacher training initiatives in neighbouring countries marked the first exposure of Kosovar teachers to learner-centered methodologies. Those initiatives set the stage for teacher training projects mounted in Kosovo by numerous agencies and NGOs that flooded into Kosovo in the second half of 1999.

Restarting the education system

One of the first post-war priorities for the UNMIK was to restart the education system; however, the physical condition of schools represented a serious constraint to the success of the exercise. Rebuilding, refurbishing and re-equipping were the main characteristics of this emergency phase. The initial assessment of school infrastructure in post-war Kosovo was bleak: 38.9 per cent of schools were severely damaged or completely destroyed and 24.2 per cent were damaged but still repairable. Most of the schools had undergone looting or the destruction of school furniture (UNICEF, 1999). Key steps taken towards the re-establishment of education services in Kosovo included the procurement of free textbooks for all children in Kosovo, the heating of school buildings and the payment of stipends to teachers in the absence of a salary scheme (Daxner, 2000).

The first initiative towards broader education reform was 'Developing the new Education System in Kosovo' (DESK), initiated by UNMIK in October 1999. For six months, working groups composed of Kosovar and international stakeholders produced reviews of the education system at all levels. However, DESK failed to actively produce solutions and the process was officially dissolved in June 2000 due to the pressure of time and lack of funding.

During this emergency phase, Kosovo was awash with international agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, wishing to promote programmes in education. As there were many different types of supporters and donors it was not always easy to identify in which capacity they acted: as sources of manpower and material, as contractors, handling agents or consultants (Daxner, 2000).

Early teacher training efforts

Since the parallel system in Kosovo reflected the need for the survival of the education system rather than for its development, Kosovo was not party to the debate concerning teacher education that was taking place in the last decade of the twentieth century. Teachers in Kosovo received no in-service training for almost a decade, nor any type of professional support leading to the improvement of teaching.

In a reverse of this scenario following the war, numerous international agencies established a supply-driven market of professional development opportunities for practising teachers in Kosovo. The offers varied from

training programmes focusing on general teaching methodologies and creating learner-centred classrooms, to very specific types of training such as the integration of students with disabilities, psycho-social support and dealing with controversial issues such as AIDS or reproductive health. The most common approach in 1999 and 2000 was to provide one- to three-day-long workshops that ended with some type of certification.

At this time, considerable attention was paid to producing ‘multiplier effects’ by providing training for trainers and cascading it down to schools. This often ended up with more gains in quantity than in quality. In fact, Kosovar educators complained that there was such intense competition for teachers to participate in training courses and workshops in some areas that teachers could spend more time in training than in the classroom (Sommers and Buckland, 2004). Most of these initiatives were short-lived and unfortunately failed to strengthen local capacity for training provision.

This fragmentation and lack of sustainability created the need for more coordination among donors and implementing partners. Hence a lead agency approach was introduced, assigning unified responsibility for ensuring both the delivery of services and the building of capacity in the identified area (Sommers and Buckland, 2004). Lead agencies were nominated for curriculum development, pre-school education, teacher training, vocational education and training, and special education, among others.

The Kosovo Educator Development Programme

The Kosovo Educator Development Programme (KEDP), sponsored by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), served as the lead agency for teacher education reform in Kosovo, helping to build the new Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST), supporting new policies and standards for the sector. It also trained ministry officials in management and leadership techniques, school directors (principals), and teachers in learner-centred instructional methods. KEDP supported the new Faculty of Education at the University of Pristina, including the provision of scholarships for 20 of its students to study at the University of Calgary.

To engage key stakeholders in the implementation of the KEDP, the Project Steering Committee (PSC) was constituted in 2001 and met regularly throughout the life of the project. The committee was expanded

over time to include senior representatives of the new ministry and all relevant stakeholders in Kosovo. The PSC functioned as the coordinator of the teacher education renovation process in Kosovo. In addition, the KEDP organized regular coordination meetings with other donors and implementing agencies, facilitating the flow of information on teacher training.

In this phase, the KEDP was a sector-wide intervention that used ‘project tools’ (technical assistance, an office and budget outside the ministry) as well as programme-type methods at the same time. The Project Steering Committee increasingly functioned as a sector planning and coordination body, and included representatives of the ministry, the university, NGOs (such as the Kosova Education Center or KEC) and donor organizations (Jackson, 2006). However, coordination was carried out in a participatory manner to avoid a regulatory approach and to allow enough room for other initiatives to develop.

The first objective of the KEDP was to help establish the Teacher Training Review Board (TTRB), which had the key role of monitoring the quality and standards of teacher education and teaching practice in Kosovo. As such, the TTRB had an advisory function to the ministry and was responsible for approving pre- and in-service programmes for the training, retraining and professional development of teachers. Guided by KEDP expertise, the TTRB developed standards of professional practice and teacher licensing regulations, but was often constrained by the limited capacity of the ministry to implement approved policies and regulations.

Although there was a coordination mechanism between the lead agencies, and the UNMIK exercised certain supervision of their work, the executive tasks were usually carried out under the leadership of the respective agencies (Pupovci and Hyseni, 2002). One of the key challenges in exercising the coordination role was the fact that not all donors and implementing agencies can be or want to be coordinated. Thus, there were agencies that did not participate at all, or at least not in their full capacity, in KEDP-led coordination activities.

Reforming teacher education

The transition from an emergency to a developmental phase was marked by actions focused on building an education system that meets reasonable modern standards. A number of donor-funded projects

addressed issues such as quality of teaching and textbooks, or aimed to create and empower structures to deal with various aspects of quality in education. These included both in-service and pre-service teacher training.

An education policy statement by the UNMIK at the beginning of 2001 anticipated an important role for teacher training:

Teacher training will play the central role and be the core of the reforms, providing much needed experts for implementing new curricula. Teachers will transplant the new mindset into schools; they will translate needs into learning processes. They will be the critics and the agents of the changing environment. These are high stakes. We are convinced that, with all respect to the accomplishments of the past, experience acquired in the old system is not a relevant criterion for being an educator or getting assigned to reform tasks (Daxner, 2001).

In-service teacher training

Two years after the end of the conflict it was clear that in-service teacher training in Kosovo had shifted from an emergency to a developmental approach. With support from CIDA, numerous donor agencies and Kosovo-based organizations (like the KEC), local capacity to deliver training programmes was built. Teams of Kosovar trainers were trained and training materials were developed in local languages.

Dissemination was done in a more organized way by gradually enrolling teachers in training programmes and focusing on the quality of provision rather than on 'all-inclusiveness'. In many cases, school-based training was organized, involving teachers and administrators from targeted schools as trainers. In 2004, the MEST reported that a remarkable 50 per cent of the 23,000 practising teachers in Kosovo had participated in at least one training programme.

The first impact evaluation of an in-service teacher training programme, called Reading and Writing for Critical Thinking (RWCT), took place in the spring of 2003 (Pupovci and Taylor, 2004). The findings of this evaluation illuminated the significant impact that the training had on the classroom and overall school environments across Kosovo. It also indicated that the school-based provision of training was more effective than training based on individual enrolments.

Students have realized that (the) teacher is not the dominant person. He is rather a coordinator for them. Students like that their life experiences are valuable for school. For social science, it's important. Students are not just learning abstract things. They can link everyday life with school. (An interviewed teacher) (Pupovci and Taylor, 2004).

An extraordinary feature of the in-service teacher training system in Kosovo has been the high motivation of teachers to participate in training programmes despite low salaries and the non-applicability of licensing regulations. The demand for in-service training programmes has increased enormously in recent years, with teachers expressing their willingness to help cover the training costs (Zgaga, 2006). This shift from incentives-based to fee-based participation in professional development is due to teachers' increased awareness of the importance of creating a child-friendly learning environment.

The demand for teacher training has also had an impact on education policy-making in Kosovo. Starting with the fiscal year 2004, the MEST has a separate budget line for in-service teacher training, which is used for the purchase of training services from different providers. Similarly, some municipalities provide funding for in-service training to the schools in their area of responsibility. One example that shows the convergence of bottom-up and top-down approaches to in-service training is the World Bank-funded project on improving education participation (World Bank, 2003). The participating schools were encouraged by the ministry and local authorities to use the grant funding for the purpose of professional development, and many of them did so.

Inevitably, the provision of quality programming creates a demand among teachers, which again builds the capacity of providers for the development of new programmes. Kosovo had virtually no public institutions and no non-governmental groups that were able to act as training providers. Some donors adopted the 'institutional approach', demonstrating a firm commitment to develop training capacity in the public sector, while others felt that investment in the non-governmental sector was justifiable.

An example of the latter is the Kosovo Education Centre (KEC), a local organization that developed a major part of its programming through its own system of provision rather than through the annual summer institutes organized by the KEDP. As the most prominent local

organization focused on teacher training, the KEC received support from and participated in numerous events organized by the KEDP. This culminated in the transferring of a portion of KEDP programmes and resources to the KEC in mid-2007 as the Canadian project phased out.

Initial teacher education

A key finding of the *OECD Thematic Review of National Policies for Education* carried out in Kosovo in late 2000 was that “the concept of teaching as a profession is missing from the teacher training curriculum” (OECD, 2001). Initial teacher training in Kosovo used to be mainly academic and heavily subject-based. Practice teaching represented 11 to 14 per cent of the workload in pre-service programmes for pre-primary and the first cycle of primary education (Grades 1-4), 2.2 to 4 per cent in programmes for the second cycle of primary education (Grades 5-8), and less than 1 per cent of the workload in programmes for secondary teachers (Pupovci, 2002).

The *Education Policy Statement 2001* makes an explicit reference to the reform of initial teacher training in Kosovo, announcing plans to replace the existing fragmented structure for teacher training with a unified Faculty of Education. This was one of the main components of the KEDP programming, which helped to train the professors, develop courses and programmes, and provide resources and an effective management system.

Of all the components of the KEDP, pre-service capacity building proved to be the most difficult to implement. Like many post-Communist universities in eastern Europe, the University of Pristina was a base for old-guard resistance to change, hyper-politics and corruption. In spite of the fact that the Faculty of Education was supposed to be a completely new academic unit within the university Pristina, in reality it was created in September 2002 by merging one academic unit and four teacher training institutes based in four different towns of Kosovo.

In an attempt to accommodate most of the existing programmes and teaching staff in the new institution, the University of Pristina created an institution that reversed a number of agreed policies, including limits on student intake to the Faculty of Education and the disbanding of earlier teacher training institutes. Disputed elections at the University of Pristina in 2004 resulted in the temporary withdrawal of the Canadian

scholarship component, triggering local resentment. The situation was only stabilized in 2006 following new appointments at the university.

The exposure of Kosovar teachers and policy-makers to information on learning-centred methodologies, along with the leading role of the KEDP in developing the programmes of the Faculty of Education, influenced the representation of practice teaching in curricula, which increased to 25 per cent of students' workload. In addition, courses from the field of education began to constitute 30 to 50 per cent of the workload (Zgaga, 2006).

Although the initial plan was to build capacity for the provision of in-service training within the Faculty of Education, this was only partly achieved, primarily due to organizational reasons and a shortage of human resources. In the academic year 2006/2007 the Faculty of Education, in cooperation with the ministry, started to pilot a special, bachelor-level programme for practising teachers holding qualifications from former teacher training institutes in order to help them meet the basic licensing requirements.

Lessons learned

Although the provision of in-service teacher training in Kosovo was part of the emergency response to the post-war reconstruction of Kosovo, it gained even more importance when Kosovars and international actors began to think about designing a new education system. The lead agency approach undoubtedly played a significant role in reforming the teacher training system in Kosovo. However, one of the weakest points of this approach was coordination between lead agencies managed by the 'owners' of the process – the UNMIK authorities during the interim phase and, later, the Ministry of Education.

A couple of years after the end of the conflict, Kosovo was a huge graveyard of training programmes that had been delivered only a few times and reached very limited numbers. No matter how good the programmes were, after phasing out donor interventions there were virtually no resources and no capacity to support further delivery or institutionalize them. It appears to be very important to establish cooperation with local organizations that are able to sustain programming and to invest in building their capacity. Most of the training programmes structured in that way managed to scale up and sustain themselves beyond the initial donor support.

The new Faculty of Education is a major departure from previous pedagogical training at University of Pristina in that the Faculty is developing a substantive relationship with the school system and has introduced new programmes, instituted a successful practice teaching component, and seeks to improve the quality of instruction by professors and the quality of students recruited to the faculty.

In retrospect, one of the major downfalls in teacher education reform in Kosovo was that unfortunately, there were no clear links between teacher training and curriculum reform. This was partly due to the different approaches of the lead agencies responsible for curriculum reform (UNICEF) and teacher training (KEDP). Whereas the KEDP assumed main responsibility for the implementation of teacher training programmes and for coordination of the activities in the field, UNICEF supported the Ministry of Education to drive the process of curriculum reform. The General Curriculum Framework was developed in 2001 but was never officially approved, whereas grade curricula were approved year after year but rarely were accompanied by training targeted to facilitate their implementation.

In addition to creating a critical mass of change agents among teachers it is equally important for donor agencies to work with local authorities in formulating and instituting new policies and systems for implementation. One outstanding example is the Teacher Training Review Board, which was begun by the KEDP and has been run successfully by the ministry for several years.

Through this progress and its limitations, it is apparent that genuine reform of teacher training in a post-conflict society requires some basic pre-conditions:

1. *Peace must be established and be durable*

Although some training of Kosovar teachers was carried out in refugee camps, sustainable reform of teacher training is not possible amidst an open conflict. Alleviating inter-ethnic tensions typical of a post-conflict society may facilitate cooperation between ethnic groups in the reform process.

2. *Intervention must be long-term and involve substantial funding*

Short-term interventions in Kosovo raised educators' awareness on learner-centred methodologies and managed to create some demand for professional development. However, most of those training programmes

were not sustained beyond the donor support. Long-term interventions with substantial funding can promote change at multiple levels and reach a significant number of critical agents of change – teachers, administrators, parents, schools, and so on.

3. *Cooperation should be built with local partners*

It is of utmost importance for implementing agencies to build local partnerships, thus contributing to capacity building and sustaining the results of the intervention. Depending on the context, those partners may be public or private institutions, but they need to be committed to the reform process.

4. *Coordination and alignment with other initiatives*

Typically, multiple initiatives targeting the education sector may be in place concurrently and in order to optimize the results, some coordination among them is needed. Ideally, the government would assume this responsibility, which, if carried out successfully and combined with demand-driven technical assistance, may set the stage for the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in the education sector. Nevertheless, in many cases the government needs help in exercising the coordination role, so the donor partners should be ready to provide this type of assistance by setting up and supporting the appropriate mechanisms.

In post-conflict settings that are stable, and in cultures that value learning, the strengthening of education systems, practices and human resources can yield long-term benefits for the society as a whole. Schools can teach democratic values, not only through curriculum content, but also through teaching methodology. Teachers who are skilled and secure can and often do construct learning environments that create some of the features of democracy. Students who experience such ‘educational democracy’ come to expect similar practices from their civic and political leaders. Therefore, teacher training in a post-conflict society can have a very high return of investment to improve democracy.

Chapter 14

Political violence against teachers in Colombia: opportunities for change in the midst of conflict?

Mario Novelli

Introduction

While teachers are often victims of political violence during times of conflict and civil war, there is little research and documentation on the extent, the particularities, and the strategies developed to overcome this type of serious human rights violations. Recently, UNESCO has begun to raise the profile of attacks on education (O'Malley, 2007), and this chapter seeks to contribute to this awareness raising by exploring the situation of Colombian educators who have long been subject to widespread violation of their human rights through political violence.

As we can see from *Table 14.1*, between 1991 and 2006, 808 Colombian educators were killed, 2015 received death threats, 21 were tortured, 59 were 'disappeared', and 1008 were forced to leave their homes and jobs for fear of violence.

During a UN mission to Colombia in 2003 on the 'right to education', Katarina Tomasevski, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education for the UN Commission on Human Rights, was shocked at both the levels of persecution and the failure of the Colombian Government to bring to justice the perpetrators of these violations. She noted that:

The realization of the right to education cannot be imagined without the protection of the human, professional, trade union and academic rights and freedoms of teachers. The Special Rapporteur recommends that immediate measures be taken to remedy the absence of their protection in Colombia (UN Economic and Social Council, 2004: paragraph 41).

This chapter seeks to analyse the ways in which political violence is affecting teachers and the trade union organizations that represent them, and what 'opportunities for change' they have developed to remedy the

absence of protection in Colombia. In doing so, the case of Colombia may also offer insights, experience and strategies to address political violence that might prove useful in serious human rights situations elsewhere.

Table 14.1 Select human rights violations against educators (1991-2006)

Year	Murder	Death threat	Disappearance	Forced displacement	Torture
1991	44	2	1	0	3
1992	28	3	1	0	5
1993	14	0	3	0	0
1994	38	0	2	0	3
1995	31	1	4	0	4
1996	69	163	6	1	0
1997	84	285	1	261	0
1998	49	228	3	425	0
1999	39	365	3	26	0
2000	60	37	13	136	2
2001	84	49	7	26	0
2002	94	20	4	3	0
2003	49	212	3	89	0

Source: Database of ENS, 2007.

Methodology

The fieldwork for this research was carried out in Colombia during April and June 2007 with the assistance of the Colombian human rights organization NOMADESC and in consultation and coordination with Education International, Federacion Colombiana de Educadores (FECODE), the Colombian Teachers Trade Union representing nearly 300,000 teachers, and several other trade unions, human rights and social organizations involved in education in Colombia. During this period, visits were made to the cities of Cali, Bogotá, Medellín, Antioquia, Buenaventura and several surrounding rural areas. Over 50 semi-structured interviews with teacher trade unionists, teachers, human rights workers, and social movement and political leaders were carried out.

Literature documenting specific cases and statistical data on human rights violations against educators from three well known and internationally endorsed datasets – produced by the Colombian National Trade Union School (ENS), the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) and the Centre for Research and Popular Education (CINEP) – was

gathered. Secondary literature produced by Colombian trade unions and human rights organizations was also gathered.

Background to the country study: political violence in Colombia

The conflict in Colombia has its roots in the highly unequal distribution of wealth and political power in a country bestowed with a wide range of natural and human resources (Fernandez, 2003), coupled with a history of government failure to deliver equitable social and economic reform. Instead, the bullet and the bomb have been the preferred option for conflict resolution, from the assassination of presidential candidate Gaitan in 1948, which led to over 200,000 deaths, to the systematic elimination of opposition forces, social movements and trade union leaders, which continues to date (Gonzalez *et al.*, 2002; Pearce, 1990; Reiniciar, 1995).

Since the early 1960s, a low-level civil war has been fought between Marxist- inspired guerrilla movements (the two largest being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, and the Army of National Liberation or ELN), the Colombian security forces and far-right paramilitary organizations. The far-right paramilitary organizations were originally set up with Colombian military assistance and US military guidance during the Cold War but have evolved into complex illegal armies with shadowy links both to sections of the Colombian military and to drug trafficking cartels (Human Rights Watch, 1996, 2000, 2001; Romero, 2007). This assertion is backed up by an ongoing political scandal in Colombia known as the 'parapolitica', which has shown the links between politicians elected in 2001 and paramilitary organizations. The politicians are alleged to have signed 'el pacto de Rialto' (the pact of Rialto), a letter committing themselves to the paramilitary project. Since then, 14 members of the Colombian Congress, the Chief of the Secret Police, two departmental governors, six mayors and 15 fifteen further politicians have all been arrested and accused of working with the paramilitaries (Romero, 2007).

While all armed actors have been involved in serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, during the past two decades it is these right-wing paramilitary organizations that appear to have been responsible for the vast majority of political violence against the civilian population, including massacres, selective assassinations, torture, rape and forced disappearances (Human Rights Watch, 1996,

2000, 2001; Stokes, 2004; Hylton, 2003). They have also declared and waged war on trade union organizations, with teachers' unions as one important target (Amnesty International, 2007). An estimated 2,515 trade unionists were assassinated between 1986 and 2006 (Correo Montoya, 2007).

The conflict has been fuelled since the 1980s by the increasingly important role that Colombia occupies in the international drugs trade, which has enriched many of the warring factions. Since the 1990s, the conflict has also been complicated by government attempts to implement a wide range of political and economic restructuring and austere measures, which have led to confrontations between trade unions, social movements and the state over the processes of privatization of national industries and natural resources, and budget cuts in public services such as health and education (Ahumada, 1998, 2001; Castillo, 2000). These multi-dimensional roots to the conflict in Colombia have increased both its intensity and impact. Currently over three million people are internally displaced, political homicides per annum range from 3000 to 6000 and Colombia has one of the highest murder rates in the world (Duncan, 2006; RET, 2004). Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2007), some 49.2 percent of the population remain in poverty.

Education, teachers and conflict in Colombia

The education system in Colombia, and teachers in particular, have been affected in a range of direct and indirect ways by the ongoing armed conflict. Firstly, education budgets have come under pressure from the government's need to cut costs to fund the armed conflict. Between 1991 and 2002, the Colombian government's military spending more than doubled (from 1.7 per cent of the GDP to 3.6 per cent) (SIPRI, 2007). Meanwhile, spending on education has been far more erratic. Between 1994 and 1996, spending increased from 3.09 to 5.03 per cent of the GDP. By 1999, this had dropped to 2.74 per cent in response to fiscal austerity measures (CCJ, 2004). Between 2000 and 2004, education spending again increased from 3.6 to 5.1 per cent of the GDP (Corpoeducacion, 2006). However, spending on education as a percentage of total government spending decreased from 16.9 to 11.7 per cent between 1999 and 2004 (UNESCO, 2006: 316).

While progress has been made towards the Education for All targets (official statistics suggest that 90 per cent of both boys and girls are in primary school – (UNESCO, 2007), many of the out-of-school

children have been displaced by the armed conflict. Furthermore, as Tomasevski (2006: 201) notes, “The scope of exclusion from education is not known because guesstimates of the size, structure and distribution of the population are based on the 1993 census”. According to CODHES (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento) (2006), of the estimated 3,832,527 people who have been displaced due to the conflict in Colombia, over half are of school-going age.

Schools can also become embroiled directly in the conflict. The Colombian Commission of Jurists (Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2004: 68) notes that between 1996 and 2003, 71 schools suffered attacks by guerrillas (57 per cent), paramilitaries (15 per cent) and state agents (14 per cent), often during combat between the different groups. In interviews, several teachers mentioned how, particularly in rural areas, the military and police would often set up camp close to schools, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. Similarly, schools are often used by the different armed groups as both a place to sleep and to hold meetings for the purpose of political propaganda.

Students have been forcibly recruited from schools by both guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Human Rights Watch (2003b) estimated that there are more than 11,000 child soldiers in Colombia. The Colombian military has used schools as a potential terrain for recruiting soldiers and informants. In Arauca, a campaign entitled ‘Soldier for a Day’ took children to military barracks where they could dress up in camouflage uniforms and learn about helicopters and armed cars (Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ), 2004: 64). Teachers who challenge any of these situations can become targets of the state, paramilitary and rebel groups.

The CCJ estimates that between 1996 and 2003, 186 students were murdered for socio-political reasons (2004: 60). In some areas, teaching staff have come under pressure from local rightwing paramilitary organizations concerning the content of their classes. In one case documented in a UNICEF-sponsored book (Cameron, 2001), a child witness notes:

Not long afterwards my teacher was killed. Some men wearing masks came into the classroom and shot him, right in the middle of our lessons. They didn’t give him a chance to say anything. One of the masked men lifted our teacher’s dead body by the back of his shirt and spoke to us. “This man had to die because he

was teaching you bad ideas. We can kill all of you as well so don't get any bad ideas if you want to stay alive.”

As they have a regular salary or pension, both working and retired teachers have been subject to financial extortion and blackmail from illegal armed groups. The type of situations outlined above have strong psychological effects on both children and teachers, and the CCJ (2004) estimates that since 1991, over 1,000 teachers have permanently left their jobs due to fear of violence.

The relationship between conflict, education, and education reform and restructuring is another area of concern. Since 1990, a series of education reforms have been attempted. While reform and restructuring within the education sector has taken place across the world (Robertson *et al.*, 2007), in a zone of conflict it can have particular ramifications, as is the case in Colombia. When teachers and students challenge or resist measures of decentralization, fiscal austerity or privatization in Colombia there is a tendency for the protest to become highly polarized and for leaders and activists to be targeted by both state and paramilitary forces as ‘subversives’. In this sense, the major teachers unions become easy targets of attack and are liable to suffer human rights violations during periods of education reform (FECODE, 2007).

Furthermore, it is important to note that teachers may be targeted not only because of their specifically education-related activities. Teachers maintain a broader societal status, particularly in rural areas, and thus often become involved in local conflicts. Similarly, they may be engaged in local and national political parties and/or with the broader national and local trade union movement, which might place them under scrutiny from armed groups on either side of the political spectrum.

What appears clear from the interviews conducted with key informants, statistical databases on human rights violations such as Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ); and Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP) as well as major human rights reports on the assassination of trade unionists in Colombia (Amnesty International, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 1996, 2000, 2001; Romero, 2007; Correa Montoya, 2007), is that while all the armed actors have been involved in the murders and violation of human rights, it is the right-wing paramilitary organizations that have carried out the vast majority of the violations against teacher trade unionists.

Having laid out a broad panorama on the Colombian conflict, its relationship to education and the role of teachers therein, this chapter will turn next to the strategies that have been developed to overcome this violence.

Strategies to mitigate and manage the violence

In response to the violence, a series of related and overlapping initiatives have been developed by FECODE to address teacher insecurity, ranging from human rights training to the provision of special protection measures for threatened teachers. This section provides an outline of some of these major initiatives.

Legal strategies

Along with other trade union and social organizations in Colombia, FECODE has brought human rights cases to the Inter-American Human Rights Court (IAHRC). This court has the ability to sanction national governments for their failure to enforce and protect human rights. One landmark case was that of the teacher and trade union leader, Isidro Caballero and friend Carmen Santos, who on 7 February 1989 ‘disappeared’ and were subsequently murdered by members of the Colombian military in the Department of Santander. After an extensive investigation, the IAHRC found the Colombian Government responsible in December 1992 for their murders and ordered that the families of the victims be compensated (Comission Andina de Juristas, Seccional Colombiana, 1994). This case is seen as an important milestone in the history of the Colombian human rights movement, as it highlighted not only the military’s role in the killings but also the attempts by a broad range of state civil servants and departments to cover up the case.

Related cases have also forced the Colombian Government to provide special protection measures for threatened trade union and social leaders which, as shown below, have now become institutionalized through a range of national legal measures.

Due to a series of court cases and sustained pressure from FECODE regarding the plight of threatened and displaced teachers, the government has developed a series of legal provisions regulating the situation. Decree 1707 of 1989, Decree 1645 of 1992 and Decree 3222 of 2003 allow threatened teachers to be relocated to different parts of the administrative department or if necessary to another department, without loss of earnings.

Through these legal procedures, special committees were set up in each Department to deal with death threats and the displacement of teachers. The special committees are made of representatives from the Ministry of Education, the Departmental Educational Authority, FECODE and the Regional Public Prosecutor. The committee is tasked with evaluating the level of risk in each individual case and providing temporary and permanent solutions to the situation, in accordance with (as much as possible) the wishes of the threatened teacher. Measures include funds to cover the cost of moving both family and belongings to the new location and special protection measures. They also involve the provision for inter-departmental agreements to allow teachers to move to a different Colombian department, if necessary.

In 2003, this was further developed with the creation of the Working Group on the Human Rights of Teachers, which includes FECODE, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and various Colombian state authorities that assess the risk of individual teachers and provide administrative and financial support. To date, over 300 teachers have been beneficiaries of ‘special protection measures’ ranging from mobile phones to armed bodyguards and bullet-proof vehicles. *Table 14.2* highlights the type of measures provided.

Table 14.2 Protection measures provided by the Committee for the Evaluation of Risks for Trade Unionists

Number of beneficiaries	302
Number of departments covered	28
Number of trade unions attended	33
Means of protection	
Radio phones	33
Mobile phones	53
Protection schemes	22
National travel tickets	36
International travel tickets	17
Temporary relocation support	363
Support for moving	8
Other humanitarian assistance	2
Bullet-proofing of union headquarters	10
Bullet-proof jackets	29

Source: Ministry of Interior and Justice (2007).

There are, however, a range of ongoing disputes over the efficacy of these measures to protect teachers and the lack of trust between

education trade unions and the Colombian authorities (interview with FECODE leader, 2007). It was emphasized by many of the informants that neither the decrees to facilitate teacher mobility nor the special protection measures were sufficient to fully protect threatened teachers, nor did they address the underlying roots of the violence directed at teachers. Furthermore, in many areas the committees were not functioning. However, of those interviewed, it was felt that these mechanisms were worthwhile but needed to be strengthened, and that the balance of decision-making power needed to shift in favour of the victims and their representatives.

Human rights capacity building

In the 1990s, in response to the widespread human rights violations against teachers, FECODE began the process of setting up human rights commissions in each of its affiliates in order to create a national human rights network. The job of the human rights commissions is to represent teachers on the special committee for threatened and displaced teachers, coordinate work with other NGOs and human rights organizations at the local, departmental, national and international levels, raise awareness of human rights violations against teachers, train representatives in the different areas of the department, maintain and manage a database of human rights statistics for their union, and raise awareness amongst teachers of human rights issues and mechanisms for their protection (interview with Amanda Rincon, April 2007).

This process was consolidated in 2004 through the Human Rights Training Programme supported jointly by Education International, the US-based National Education Association and FECODE. Three training manuals on human rights, international humanitarian law and conflict resolution were produced and tailored towards the needs of human rights activists within FECODE, and training was carried out across the country. The courses provided participants with a comprehensive understanding of the roots of the Colombian conflict; the history of human rights and international humanitarian law; and the skills and strategies to defend human rights locally, regionally, nationally and internationally through the Colombian courts and via mechanisms such as the Organization of American States Inter-American Human Rights Court.

Linked to the objective of capacity building and awareness raising, in 2007 FECODE launched a national campaign, *La Escuela: Territorio Neutral en el Conflicto Armado* (School: a neutral territory in armed

conflict), to try to encourage all of the armed actors in the Colombian conflict to respect international human rights and humanitarian law, and to keep the education system and the education community out of the armed conflict. It remains to be seen how this initiative will develop.

Despite these advances, it is widely recognized that human rights training should be expanded across the teaching profession. It was also widely expressed that coordination and organization within and between the different human rights commissions needed to be strengthened and that there was a lack of systematic work being carried out both regionally and nationally in gathering testimonies, data and counselling. Furthermore, the quality of the work being carried out by the different human rights commissions of affiliate organizations was highly uneven, due to a lack of resources and experience, and also to the lack of priority given to human rights work by some affiliates.

Transnational human rights advocacy

At the international level, the human rights department of FECODE has facilitated the involvement of major human rights organizations in the trade unions' situation and representatives of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have intervened several times. These organizations engage in lobbying, the production and distribution of 'urgent actions', the compilation of reports on the human rights situation in the region, and high level visits to representatives of the armed forces, the government and supranational organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). The involvement of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, along with the court cases in the Inter-American Human Rights Court, is seen by the trade unions' leaders as providing a cordon of protection within which they can carry out their activities. These organizations have particular skills and abilities to influence governments by applying selective pressure and lobbying.

Two important events have occurred in recent years, which signify that the situation of widespread human rights violations in Colombia is becoming more 'visible'. The first has been the setting up in 1996 of a UNHCHR mission in Colombia, the mandate of which is to monitor the human rights situation. The second is the creation of a special ILO mission to Colombia, which began in June 2007. Both of these are seen as high-level political sanctions by the international community for the failure of the Colombian government to provide human rights protection for its citizens.

Despite several positive advances over recent years, both representatives of FECODE and several human rights leaders emphasized the need to improve coordination with international organizations and the need to develop new contacts and links in a range of countries. Several interviewees also felt that the office of the UNHCHR in Colombia was not pressuring the Colombian Government strongly enough.

Understanding the strategies and opportunities for change

Having laid out the context and the strategies used in recent years, the conclusion now explores some key insights. Firstly, while teachers have been targeted by all armed actors, right-wing paramilitaries appear to be the main violator. Furthermore, their well-documented relationship with sections of the Colombian military and sections of the political establishment is deeply troubling. As a result, the question arises as to how this type of ‘state-linked’ political violence can be influenced and ultimately stopped.

Sluka (2000) argues that there are two major theories that explain why states resort to mass political violence. The first is a ‘structural-functional’ explanation that argues that the state is essentially too weak to gain control and legitimacy and therefore uses violence as a functional necessity in order to maintain order and stability. The second is a ‘power-conflict’ theory which argues that states use violence because they are unafraid of the consequences, because of their strength and unchecked power, not “because the state is weak, but rather because they are strong and can get away with it” (Sluka, 2000: 30).

The trade union and human rights organizations, both national and international, understand political violence as emanating from the ‘power-conflict’ theory and seek to utilize local, national and transnational mechanisms to ‘encourage’ Colombian state enforcement and protection of the human rights of teachers. They seek to use local, national and international legal and political mechanisms to make these human rights violations ‘visible’ and increase the political cost of their continuation. Within this strategy the development and success of legal, capacity building and transnational advocacy is patchy and uneven. A more systematic approach is needed in all of these areas, which requires both increased political commitment and access to additional resources.

On the other hand, major international donors appear to adhere to the ‘structural-functional’ approach and seek to strengthen the ‘weak’

or ‘fragile’ Colombian state through assistance packages. They have been very slow to criticize the Colombian government for its appalling human rights record and reluctant to exert their full influence to modify its behaviour. By doing so, they weaken the effectiveness of the campaigning work carried out by FECODE and its partners, lessening its political impact.

Returning to Tomasevski’s report on the right to education in Colombia, she notes:

The failure of what we call ‘the international community’ to react when a government violates some human rights obligations easily becomes perceived as a license to violate them all, as the case of Colombia illustrates clearly and painfully (Tomasevski, 2006: 201).

As highlighted in the title, ‘opportunities for change’ do indeed exist in this situation, and there is an enormous amount of accumulated knowledge and experience in human rights defence and protection within the education sector. But improvements require a concerted effort from all stakeholders – trade unions, the Colombian government and the international community – to ensure that the inevitable processes of societal conflict in Colombia are managed through dialogue and negotiation, not violence. At the very least, all armed actors need to respect the education system and allow it to become ‘a neutral territory in the armed conflict’, allowing teachers and students to learn together without the threat of violence pervading every aspect of their lives.

Chapter 15

Teaching for peace – overcoming division? Peace education in reconciliation processes in Sri Lanka and Uganda

Mieke T.A. Lopes Cardozo and Anika May

Introduction

“Schools need to bring peace, especially in a country like Sri Lanka, a multicultural society. The different communities must understand each other. Now there are misunderstandings. That is why we have to introduce peace programmes. Students only read the school texts. Not about the outside world. You have to bring the outside world to the children in school, for their understanding.”

Sri Lankan teacher in an urban Tamil-medium school

“I believe in the good of these programmes. But programmes need to be focused on the specific needs of these people, otherwise they are useless. We really have to sit and think about ‘What do these people really need?’ Maybe it would be best to do that together with these people, or at least some of them.”

Former participant in a non-formal peace education programme,
Gulu, Uganda

Changing an unstable and violent situation into one of peace is not an easy or straightforward task. Education, and more specifically peace education, can contribute to laying the foundation for lasting peace. In fact, a number of writers claim that this constitutes one of the most important methods for promoting reconciliation (Asmal *et al.*, 1997; Calleja, 1994; Chadha, 1995; Chetkow-Yanoov, 1986; Gordon, 1994; Kriesberg, 1998). In places like Sri Lanka and Uganda, with their history of conflict and where outbreaks of violence have reoccurred, reconciliation enhanced through innovative forms of peace education can be an important part of conflict resolution and peace building.

Drawing on case studies from Sri Lanka and Uganda, this chapter reflects on the potential contribution of peace education in reconciliation processes. Both case studies provide insights into the potential of peace education and its constraints. An initial section will introduce the complexities of the subject and elaborate on characteristics that are relevant for reconciliation efforts. The second section will analyse the two case studies, focusing more on formal peace education in Sri Lanka and non-formal peace education in Uganda. In the case of Sri Lanka, the design and main actors of formal peace education, along with different models of teaching and learning at the primary education level, are discussed. In Uganda, specific attention is paid to the design and implementation of non-formal peace education training. Both case studies reveal a number of challenges for peace education. These are discussed in light of opportunities for change in education and society as a whole.

For both case studies, predominantly qualitative data was derived from semi-structured interviews, observations and focus groups in the period between February and June 2006. In Sri Lanka, the National Peace Council, Ministry of Education, National Institute of Education, UNESCO, UNICEF, GTZ and Caritas, among others, cooperated in this process. In Uganda, informants were primarily trainers and former participants in the non-formal peace education 'Alternatives to Violence Project' (AVP), implemented by a small Ugandan NGO based at the Makerere University in the capital Kampala, of which one of the authors conducted an extensive, country-wide evaluation in spring 2006.

Paving the way: peace education and reconciliation

Peace education programmes have developed from a few small-scale initiatives promoting non-violence into a recognized sector within the field of international development. Attention to peace education seems to go hand in hand with an increasing interest in peace building, reconciliation and conflict prevention efforts over the past two decades (Seitz, 2004: 13).

Peace education programmes differ significantly in terms of ideology, objectives, focus, curricula, contents and practices (Bar-Tal, 2002: 28). Equally, there are a number of different labels used for this concept: peace education, peace-building education, education for conflict resolution, education for human rights, education for mutual understanding, global education, education for democracy or citizenship,

critical pedagogy, education for liberation, environmental education and life skills education (Ardizzone, 2001: 1; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 23; Davies, 2005: 61; Simpson, 2004: 1). Sinclair introduces an umbrella term for these related initiatives, using UNESCO's concept of 'learning to live together' (2004).

There are generally two different approaches to peace education (Carson and Lange, 1997 in Simpson, 2004: 3). Firstly, the *integrative approach*, which is part of the formal curriculum and offers students the opportunity to reflect critically upon peace and existing inequalities. Secondly, the *additive approach*, where classes remain separate from the existing curriculum and take place as non-formal education. Advocates of the first approach generally argue that schools have the authority, legitimacy, the means and the conditions to build a peaceful society (Bar-Tal, 2002; Davies, 2005; Bretherton *et al.*, 2003). Supporters of the second approach state that non-governmental peace education programmes have more flexibility in design, with fewer restrictions from the government (Ardizzone, 2001: 4-6; Burns and Apeslagh, 1996: 122). There are others that argue for a combination of both approaches "to create a more balanced programme" (Simpson, 2004: 3). Similarly, Bush and Saltarelli assert that "approaches solely focused on either formal or non-formal peace education are doomed to failure", since both approaches could and should ideally complement each other (2000: 33).

Most peace education initiatives are designed for children (aged 7-15) and youth (15-24). There seems to be a lack of early childhood and adult peace education programmes among the existing initiatives.

In recent times, the relatively young discipline of peace education has increasingly been acknowledged as an instrument to contribute to long-term peace-building and reconciliation efforts (Porath, 2003; Salomon, 2002, 2003; Salomon and Nevo, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2002). If existing definitions of peace education are considered, we will find that all forms touch upon issues at the core of reconciliation processes, acceptance of the 'other' and overcoming collective prejudice, equally on intra-personal, inter-personal and inter-community level – the three levels where education can have a major impact (Smith in DFID, 2003: 50).

While the theories surrounding peace education are becoming increasingly clear, putting theory into practice is challenging. Both peace education and reconciliation are rather new disciplines in a process of development and change. The nature of both subjects is complex and

their achievements are difficult to measure (Harris and Morrison, 2003; Harris, 2002). Additionally, the discipline of peace education suffers from a lack of in-depth evaluation, resulting in few examples of ‘lessons learned’ that can lead to better programme design (Salomon, 2003; Salomon and Nevo, 1999; Seitz, 2004).

In reviewing the literature on peace education, it is clear that there is no single concept of what peace education is or should be. Drawing from a number of authors, however, it seems possible to distinguish five main dimensions of peace education, which are inter-linked and particularly relevant to the promotion of reconciliation. When included in a wider process of peace building and reconciliation, peace education programmes should:

1. attempt to change people’s mindsets about the ‘other’ (Salomon and Nevo, 1999: 5);
2. aim to construct a realistic world view (Bar-Tal, 2002);
3. promote lasting, peaceful relations between present or former rivals, based on genuine support by the majority of the group members (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31);
4. develop new attitudes and conflict resolution skills such as tolerance, self control, sensitivity to others’ needs, empathy, critical thinking and openness (Burns and Aspeslagh, 1996; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 25);
5. support and implement democratic values and attitudes, creating an environment that enhances social justice and equality (Bloomfield, 2006; Hirseland, Cecchini and Odom, 2004; Seitz, 2004).

When elaborating on the two case studies, these five dimensions are used to analyse the extent to which formal peace education in Sri Lanka and non-formal peace education implemented by an NGO project in Uganda support the process of reconciliation.

The case of Sri Lanka: roots of ethnic and social divisions

Sri Lanka is a relatively poor country, with unequal opportunities for its multi-ethnic and multi-religious people. The Sinhalese majority – principally Buddhist – represents 74 per cent of the population and lives mostly in the south. Tamils – primarily Hindus – account for 18 per cent of the population and primarily inhabit the north and east of the island (Perera, 2000: 1). Both the Dutch and British colonisers introduced administrative systems that emphasized the separation of

communities (Richardson, 2005: 27, 29). Within the education system, the European powers privileged the Tamil minority, a situation that continued beyond independence in 1948 (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000: 10). As power changed hands, a Sinhalese nationalist revival followed, emphasizing local language, culture and religion. In this new 'Sinhalese nation-state', minorities experienced disturbing levels of exclusion, including limited access to higher education (Orjuela, 2003: 198). The neo-liberal structural adjustment programme at the end of the 1970s and democratic governance failures afterwards were also root causes of social instability and unrest (Richardson, 2005: 39-42). Together, these led to unequal socio-economic opportunities in Sri Lanka, which still exist today.

Tamils mobilized protests against perceived injustices, first non-violently, but from the 1970s onwards also through militant groups (Orjuela, 2003: 198). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became the best known and most powerful separatist Tamil movement on the island. The LTTE and the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan Government have been at war since 1983. After two decades of fighting, the government and the LTTE formalized a ceasefire in February 2002, with Norway mediating the peace negotiations. The first years of the ceasefire were relatively peaceful. However, in early 2006, when this research was conducted, the conflict had escalated again. At the time of writing in early 2008, the situation remains unstable.

Rising poverty and unemployment, worsened by the tsunami in 2004, and slow development in conflict-affected areas, threaten Sri Lanka's social sector improvements. The education, health, water and sanitation systems were severely damaged in several regions, and internal displacement has torn communities apart. For more than two decades, there has been (and still is) a severe breakdown of trust and mutual understanding and the need to restore peaceful relationships is pressing.

Sri Lanka's education system

Since independence in 1948, education has been a major priority for the Government of Sri Lanka (Perera, 2000: 1). Education is free up to tertiary level and compulsory between the ages of 5 and 14. In 2005, UNESCO estimated an enrolment rate of 95 per cent in primary education and 71 per cent in secondary education. Due to the ongoing conflict and related refugee movements and insecurity, the education situation in

the northern and eastern parts of the country is less encouraging. As a response to the instability in the country, the 1997 education reforms introduced several concepts relating to peace education into general education policies (see *Box 20*).

The medium of instruction in Sri Lanka is the mother tongue, and is thus either Sinhala or Tamil. English is included as a subject in the curriculum from Grade 3 onwards. In all government schools, the two official languages should now be taught to all children as part of the core curriculum. In reality, this is often not the case due to a lack of sufficiently trained teachers.

Historically, as a consequence of the geographical location of different ethnic communities, children have been segregated by medium of instruction (Balasooriya, Perera and Wijetunge, 2004: 393-369, 402). This segregation leads to the further polarization of society.

The population has through the years become polarized into relatively clearly defined ethnic groups, who speak different languages, go to different schools, know little about each others' religions, receive different (but often equally biased) media reports, and learn a history that glorifies 'the self' at the expense of 'the other' (Orjuela, 2003: 202).

Peace education in Sri Lanka

There is broad consensus in Sri Lanka on the need for the integration of peace education into all subjects as part of a whole-school approach, as evidenced from its own policies. Thus, it is not a separate subject in the national curriculum. Primarily implemented within the formal system, some non-formal peace education initiatives do exist, such as NGO programmes on sport or art events for children of different backgrounds.

The Ministry of Education and the National Institute of Education (NIE) both focus on the integration of peace education in formal schooling, mostly at the primary level, and each has a separately operating peace education unit. The Ministry of Education works through a decentralized system with zonal peace education coordinators, and provides in-service training and funds for extra-curricular activities at schools. The NIE's main duty is to develop the national curriculum. NIE provides pre-service peace education training to teacher students and, similar to the Ministry of Education, in-service training to principals and teachers.

Box 20 Peace education in the 1997 General Education Reforms in Sri Lanka

Reforms focus on five major areas: (1) extending educational opportunity, (2) improving the quality of education, (3) developing practical and technical skills, (4) education and training of teachers, (5) management and resource provision.

- Concepts relating to peace education – national harmony, democratic principles, human rights, gender equality and environmental conservation – will be built into Social Studies and other subjects, where appropriate. This will help in developing and re-enforcing the proper attitudes and patterns of behaviour relevant to social responsibilities, civic consciousness, national integration and harmony.
- Extra-curricular activities will help to develop qualities of leadership, team work, ideas of cooperation, organizational and practical skills, concern for others and a sense of justice and fair play.
- Values and morals are taught continuously through all subjects.
- The teaching of religion contributes greatly to the building up of correct values and morals. Pupils will also learn to understand the religious practices of other groups of children and also to understand and respect other cultures.
- This implies that responsibility for value education rests firmly on the shoulders of the principal, the teachers and adults in the child's environment. The teaching and learning environment if properly oriented will include justice and fair play in pupils, regardless of caste, creed, or social class [...]. The pupil must be able to distinguish right from wrong, not on the basis of a particular culture but also on the basis of universal acceptance.

Source: General Education Reforms, 1997.

The UN has made an impact in this area in Sri Lanka. UNESCO's peace education guide for teachers is widely used at the policy level. UNICEF's Education for Conflict Resolution programme was implemented in the early 1990s and shows many similarities with current peace education initiatives.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the main actors in the non-formal education sector in Sri Lanka. However, the space in which NGOs can currently operate to implement peace education programmes is limited, and it is relatively difficult to cooperate with schools (Orjuela, 2003: 195, 198). For example, based on an interview with an NGO worker, it was learned that the Sri Lankan government attempts to 'keep

politics out of schools'; NGOs, seen as politically-oriented organizations, have limited access to schools. Instead they organize activities, meetings and workshops outside of the school. However, "the relatively limited outreach of civil society peace education [in Sri Lanka], the slow nature of attitude change, and the importance of external events suggest that the impact of civil society peace education on public opinion is so far relatively modest" (Orjuela, 2003: 202).

Even though all the headquarters of the main actors are located in the capital, there appears to be a lack of cooperation and coordination.

Analysis: the five dimensions

This section begins to offer an analysis of peace education practices in primary schools in Sri Lanka. It looks at whether and how these methods relate to the five dimensions of peace education highlighted earlier.

How does Sri Lankan formal peace education deal with changing mindsets about 'the other'? Within the formal education system, there seems to be a lack of attention to this first dimension. Although Sri Lankan academics, NGO workers and teachers all expressed a need to address this, the biggest challenge is culturally exclusive textbooks. In a way, the system appears to be anti minorities, because the Sinhala nationalist ideology is persistent in some textbooks, such as those dealing with Social Sciences. One academic stated that this approach makes religion and ethnicity exclusive, instead of comparative: "Sri Lankan education is not creating responsible citizens, but instead it creates religious and ethnic aware citizens who are allowed to think in exclusive terms. Thus, textbooks are not racist, but they are exclusive."

Do Sri Lankan teachers work towards the construction of a realistic world view? With regard to this peace education objective, teachers are crucial actors, as "the success of peace education is more dependent on the views, motivations, and abilities of teachers than traditional subjects are" (Bar-Tal, 2002: 33). According to the 1997 reforms, trainee teachers are expected to develop the skills of empathetic listening, democratic leadership, developing children's self esteem and conflict resolution through role plays (Perera, 2000: 1). They are supposed to integrate concepts relating to peace education such as national harmony, democratic principles and non-violent conflict resolution skills into their regular classes, using a child-centred approach. However, as argued by

Balasooriya, Perera and Wijetunge, these expectations might be too high, given the often poor quality of teacher training (2004: 407-408).

In addition, not all national colleges and teacher colleges seem to incorporate elements of peace education into their regular pre- and in-service programmes. In Sri Lanka, there are two different types of teacher training colleges. Students of the teaching profession attend the National Colleges of Education for three years and undertake an internship at a rural school the following year. The teacher training colleges train in-service teachers who entered the teaching profession without a certificate. Weaknesses in teacher training constrain teachers' capacity for critical reflection and the use of child-centred practices.

How are lasting, peaceful inter-group relationships created?

Unfortunately, the creation of such relationships is severely hindered by the segregated school system. In some instances, interaction between members of opposing groups can lead to a decrease in prejudice and hostility (Allport, 1954; Tal-Or, Boninger and Gleicher, 2002; Kadushin and Livert, 2002: 120). As a way to counter this separation, sports events, art competitions and language camps are designed to create opportunities for children of different backgrounds and schools to 'mix and meet'. Although the ministry takes on a limited number of such activities, most of the 'mix and meet' initiatives are organized by NGOs in the non-formal sector. For financial reasons, these activities are often only organized for a relatively small group of the total school population and therefore their impact remains limited.

Is there any evidence of teaching non-violent attitudes and skills in Sri Lankan classrooms?

In the 'model schools' and 'non-model schools' included in the research, children were stimulated to develop their creativity and play through the extra-curricular activities of drama, paintings, songs, poems and sporting events. According to Davies (2005) and Bar-Tal (2002), creativity, humour and play form essential elements of any peace education programme. Children learn how to be a team player and how to cooperate, but also how to be creative, thereby training non-violent patterns of communication and behaviour. In addition, exercises for inner peace are sometimes included and said to help develop non-violent attitudes. In Sri Lanka, a predominantly Buddhist nation, the argument for inner peace is widely acknowledged in the context of peace education: "Peace in mind will bring peace within the family, which in

turn will bring peace to the village, the country and ultimately the world” (Orjuela, 2003: 203).

Are students stimulated to practice democratic values and attitudes? An example to illustrate this is the creation of a peaceful school environment, which could include democratically organized schools and friendly relationships – among students, between students and school staff, and a cooperative relationship with parents and the community (Hart, 2002; Simpson, 2004; Davies, 2005; Bretherton *et al.*, 2003). It appears that while democratically organized schools do exist, they are still the exception in Sri Lanka.

Thus, in the Sri Lankan school environment there seems to have been a lack of attention paid to improving mindsets towards the ‘other’ and towards the construction of a realistic world view. There has been only limited attention to the promotion of peaceful relations and democratic values and attitudes. Although through the peace education framework, non-violent attitudes and skills are taught on a more regular basis, the success of this is dependent on the attitudes and skills of teachers. Moreover, most of these initiatives are instigated by non-formal actors. So far, only the first steps have been taken in the formal peace education sector in Sri Lanka to develop the five dimensions of peace education relevant for reconciliation.

The case of Uganda – roots of ethnic and social division

Uganda, a landlocked country home to 53 officially recognized ethnic groups, is characterized by huge ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity (Broere and Vermaas, 2005). Disparities among the different ethnic groups in Uganda date back to pre-colonial times. Since the sixteenth century the political sphere has been dominated by the four kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ntooro, Ankole and Buganda in the south-west of the country. When the British colonizers proclaimed their protectorate in 1894, they used the existing administrative structures of the four kingdoms and mostly involved the Baganda people – from the Buganda kingdom – in running the colonial administration (Broere and Vermaas, 2005: 7). The resulting social division was accompanied by growing economic disparities in the different regions.

After independence in 1962, ethnicity remained a strong influence in national politics. Virtually every Ugandan president gained power via a military coup, each time replacing major parts of the state apparatus

with people of his own tribal origin (Quinn, 2005: 3; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990: 196; Leggett, 2001). The first democratic elections in the history of Uganda took place in February 2006, confirming the leadership of Yoweri K. Museveni, who has ruled the country since 1986. In the past two decades, almost every part of Uganda has been exposed to political violence, with some regions affected more recently, particularly the northern districts referred to as Acholiland (Finnström, 2005, 2003).

The 20-year-long war between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), officially settled by a peace agreement in May 2007, had a devastating impact on the social fabric of the Acholi society. It led to the forced displacement of more than 90 per cent of Acholiland citizens, a full 10 per cent of the Ugandan society (Broere and Vermaas, 2005: 46; CSOPNU, 2006). The war had a severe impact on the education infrastructure in the affected districts, with many schools destroyed and a significant lack of trained teachers. This further widened the gap between the developed and well educated south and the poor and less educated North (CSOPNU, 2006, 2004; Finnström 2005; Broere and Vermaas, 2005).

As the ethnic composition of the different regions is extremely homogenous, regional disparities in development mean that the living standards of whole ethnic groups can be extremely diverse. This can present a major obstacle to social stability and unification.

Peace education in Uganda

Democracy, peace and human rights, three major subjects of 'value-oriented education' (Hirsland, *et al.* 2004; Simpson, 2004; Porath, 2003), do not yet have a specific role within the Ugandan national curriculum and the formal education system despite their fundamental relevance for reconciliation. The few authors who have elaborated on peace education in the Ugandan context identify an urgent need for its introduction into the formal school curriculum (Tuyzere, 2003; Mugumya, 2003). In secondary schools, citizenship education is an element of the subject 'political education', which is not taught in all schools. Also, in some schools 'religion' as a subject contains elements of citizenship education.

The new primary school curriculum, including citizenship education, was introduced in the beginning of the 2007 academic year. According to the Director of the National Curriculum Development Centre, the

process of curriculum change for secondary schools is still ongoing. The new subjects emphasize the fifth dimension of peace education in the context of reconciliation, namely the teaching of democratic values and the knowledge of fundamental citizens' rights and duties.

In the non-formal sector, a number of international institutions are active in the field of peace education, both in and outside schools. The British Council focuses on the stimulation of a democratic culture in schools in its Interaction Leadership Programme, primarily addressing school leaders and teachers. The Danish NGO Mellempfolkeligt Samvirke is implementing its 'Education for Peace' programme in refugee settlements in Southern Sudan and northern/north-western Uganda, focusing on human rights, democratic principles, constitutionalism and good governance. The UNHCR, in cooperation with UNESCO and local civil society partners, has run its Peace Education Programme in refugee settlements in the northern and north-eastern parts of Uganda, focusing on the teaching of non-violent conflict resolution skills for children as well as adolescents and adults (Sommers, 2001).

The analysis here focuses on the Alternatives to Violence Project (AVP), implemented by a small Ugandan NGO called the Civil Peace Service Project, based at Makerere University in Kampala. Although it was originally created outside of Uganda and receives funding from international and bilateral external partners, all trainers and programme coordinators are Ugandans.

The concept of AVP was developed in the USA in 1975 by members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). In 2003, the Civil Peace Service Project at Makerere University began to include AVP training cycles and since then has trained more than 400 people from different sectors of society and from all regions. AVP training involves three-day workshops primarily addressing adolescents and adults. The overarching goal is to develop alternatives to violence as part of a conflict resolution strategy, thereby reducing the level of societal violence. Another focus is the questioning of personal perceptions of 'the other' in order to evoke change. The programme comprises three training levels – basic, advanced and training for trainers. It is presumed that after the participants complete all three levels they will be able to function as facilitators. Despite their Quaker background, the initiators of AVP view the programme as non-denominational and culturally universal.

Analysis: the five dimensions

The teaching and learning methods used in the non-formal peace education programme of the AVP are analysed in this section, looking at how and to what extent they stimulate reconciliation.

To what extent is changing the mindset towards ‘the other’ a focus of AVP training? AVP puts a strong focus on viewing situations through the eyes of ‘the other’, through exercises where stories about daily life situations have to be told from different viewpoints. Moreover, interviews with former participants showed that AVP training has a positive effect in the elimination of ethnic prejudice. Participants represented different ethnic groups, who in their daily lives would have very limited opportunities to interact. The workshops gave them the opportunity to meet and interact in a protected, supportive setting, as illustrated by this statement by a former participant:

I come from a place where there is tribal conflict and there are a lot of racial clashes. And I must admit that I myself thought that’s how it should be. [...] Now I realize that we are all human beings. I have learned from them just like they learned from us.

Are participants on AVP taught a realistic world view and if so, how is this approached within the training? A realistic world view is one that does not glorify certain viewpoints at the expense of others, but embraces different positions and realities. AVP seems to stimulate the development of such a world view on the personal level, as expressed by a former participant: “I learned ... that every answer is correct. There is nothing wrong. And you must learn to respect people’s opinion, and not look at yourself as the perfect one.” However, this second dimension requires an awareness of the responsible and powerful position of the trainers. On this point, AVP has some shortcomings, as after three short training blocks, which may not be sufficient for the development of the required self-reflection skills, the scheme enables participants to facilitate training courses.

Does the training stimulate the creation of lasting, peaceful inter-group relations? Peaceful inter-group relationships are constituted by peaceful relationships among individuals and their behaviour towards members of other groups (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Tal-or, Boninger and Gleicher, 2002). Despite the short-term nature of AVP training, the intensive, shared training experience seems to stimulate positive personal

relationships. Numerous former participants and trainers stated that long after the workshop, they were still in contact with fellow participants from other parts of Uganda. However, one former participant critically noted that unity is not sufficiently explored beyond the mere sharing of a training experience. The development of lasting, positive inter-group relations appears to be more a by-product of the training than a purposefully achieved endeavour.

To what extent are non-violent attitudes and skills for conflict resolution enhanced? More widely, workshop approaches are frequently criticized as too short-term to initiate real change in negative, deconstructive attitudes and practices (McCauley, 2002: 247; Tal-Or, Boninger and Gleicher, 2002: 90). However, in this case the assumption was contradicted by many former AVP participants, who stated that their participation in the programme helped them to develop and further improve their skills for constructive, non-violent conflict resolution. The following example illustrates this: “Usually when you travel by taxi there are people who shout at you. [...] (it is) from those role plays where we have practised that I realized ... that I am just going to be like this violent taxi conductor. Then I take a deep breath and try to stay calm. This is different than it used to be before AVP.” Although most participants acknowledged the continuous challenge of transferring theory into practice in their daily lives, the level of detail with which they analysed even minor personal conflicts up to three years after the training was significant.

Are participants stimulated by the AVP training to practise democratic values and skills? Here the incorporation of democratic values and skills is distinguished on two levels, (a) in teaching, and (b) in content; the latter cannot be incorporated fully without the former (Bickmore, 2005). Some of the basic principles of a democratic environment, such as non-violent communication, equality, participation and participatory decision-making (Knight and Pearl, 2000; Bickmore, 2005) are incorporated in AVP. The workshops usually consist of very little trainer input and theory. Everyone is encouraged to contribute actively in training. The content side, however, reflects a different picture. Given that Uganda is still in transformation towards a democratic state, it is surprising that corresponding values and their importance for long-term peace building were hardly ever touched upon within the observed training. In this sense, AVP seems partially to be ignoring the political nature of peace education.

AVP seems to be particularly strong in stimulating the development of non-violent conflict resolution skills. To a certain extent, it is also successful in teaching people acceptance of 'the other'. AVP seems to achieve some positive but limited results with regard to promoting peaceful relationships and supporting democratic values. It is least successful in teaching a 'realistic world view', as the materials do not refer to Ugandan realities.

Challenges and opportunities across borders

A discussion of the main challenges and possible opportunities for Sri Lankan and Ugandan peace education should be viewed as tentative. The first challenge in both countries is the socio-political context; conflict, poverty, inequality and segregation persist, and disparities among different regions are difficult to address in a 'one-size-fits-all' response. Programmes, including their content and design, should as far as possible be adjusted to specific local needs, thereby gaining relevance.

In order to face this challenge and to enhance real change in society, peace education has to be integrated into a wider process of peace building. Different actors should work towards the same goals and coordinate their efforts. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case in either Sri Lanka or Uganda. The present situation in Sri Lanka leaves little space for structural reconciliation efforts. However, the first step towards a bottom-up 'cultural reconciliation' process is already being taken through formal peace education (Bloomfield, 2006: 27). In Uganda, educational achievements towards reconciliation are so far rather unintended by-products of peace education activities, but in the examined case, this did not form a conscious element. Success could be increased if other attempts at initiating reconciliation in Ugandan society are accompanied in the future by a wider educational campaign.

A comparison of these cases suggests that reconciliation through education should not be left entirely to either the state or NGOs. A combined effort is required to maximize the scope and success of peace education. In Sri Lanka, actors in the non-formal sector must be allowed to fill the gaps left by the government, and be a critical decision-making partner with regard to peace education programmes. In Uganda, there is a need for widespread and long-term investment in formal peace education initiatives, as well as better communication about and coordination of existing non-formal initiatives. In both cases, a lack of dialogue and

cooperation means that formal and non-formal initiatives miss the opportunities for complementarity.

Another remaining challenge is the provision of quality teachers with sufficient training and supervision. Only teachers who feel secure after being trained will use what they have learned in classrooms. A well-trained teacher would ideally also have the capacity and creativity to analyse the needs of a specific community and adjust training materials accordingly. However, a lack of training often restricts teachers from implementing promising initiatives.

A final identified opportunity is that of continuous programme reflection through evaluation and following up. Many authors have stressed the lack of quality evaluation in the field of peace education (Seitz, 2004: 62; McCauley, 2002; Fountain, 1999: 31). Whereas limited funding often does not allow for an extended following up or in-depth evaluation of a programme, investing in evaluation can mean investing in quality and thus impact. By neglecting its importance, peace education implementers miss the opportunity to learn from their own failures and strengths.

Conclusion

While certain opportunities have been seized in Sri Lanka and Uganda in terms of peace education, it is clear that more can be done. Based on the presented case studies, successful peace education approaches there and elsewhere need to:

- be tailor-made to the needs of a specific socio-political context,
- be included in a wider process of peace building and reconciliation,
- address the five identified dimensions relevant for reconciliation:
 - 1) changing mindsets about ‘the other’,
 - 2) constructing a realistic worldview,
 - 3) the (re)construction of lasting, peaceful inter-group relationships,
 - 4) the teaching of non-violent attitudes and skills,
 - 5) practicing democratic values and attitudes towards social justice and equality,
- involve better coordination of efforts between both formal and non-formal actors,
- include genuine political will for long-term investment,

- involve training and guidance for teachers, the most crucial actors,
- incorporate ongoing monitoring and evaluation.

Peace education and reconciliation initiatives cannot succeed on their own. Like many other nations, Sri Lanka and Uganda have a long way to go to create unified and just societies where people live together in peace. There remain issues in both societies that cannot be addressed solely by education initiatives, such as severe disparities in wealth distribution. As long as these grave socio-economic inequalities and injustices among different groups in society continue to exist, the impact of peace education and the chances of reconciliation will naturally be limited. Nevertheless, when widely implemented through both formal and non-formal programmes, peace education can play an important role in raising awareness, promoting tolerance and addressing the profound social injustices and inequalities that underpin contemporary conflicts.

Chapter 16

Teaching history: looking for unity in Rwanda's classrooms

Sanne Bijlsma

Introduction

“Teaching Rwandan history is like teaching hate – it creates differences.”

Amouri, secondary school student, Kigali

A fear of polarization underlies the current absence of an official Rwandan history curriculum in the classrooms of this country in transition. Amouri, like many other Rwandans, acknowledges that teaching history in Rwanda has, at times, been used as a political tool to divide the society. Rwandan history has been divisive and tragic. Education has been a part of this story, with the hatred of the 1994 genocide partly caused by the teaching of a biased account of the country's history.

Following the genocide, the Rwandan Government responded by putting a moratorium on the teaching of Rwandan history. Different interpretations of history and its linkages with politics caused the subject to become a sensitive issue. The silence over the official history to be taught in Rwandan classrooms continues to date (2008), with no new official history curriculum developed thus far. Despite the silence over history in the classrooms, it is again being used as a political tool in a so-called ‘politics of memory’. In this case, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) uses history to promote unity and reconciliation instead of relying on the divisive language that was used in the build up towards the genocide in which more than 800,000 people were killed.

This chapter focuses on the political dimension of history and will shed some light on the difficulties concerning its teaching in post-conflict societies by illustrating the case of Rwanda. It will start with a short overview of the research process and will show how education became politicized in the past. A synopsis of the process of writing a new curriculum through to the summer of 2007 will also be

provided. In this chapter, the political dimension of history is considered as the major constraint for teaching history, which has implications for the development of the curriculum as well as for teaching itself. After considering the obstacles to teaching history in Rwanda, the possibilities for change will be explored and related policy recommendations suggested for other post-conflict countries.

Background to the research

The notion of 'never again' is core to the policies of the GoR throughout its various responsibilities. Education is especially used as a tool to promote an ideology of national unity and reconciliation, and is thus seen as a mechanism to bring about positive change.

Never Again Rwanda (NAR) is the name of the local NGO that hosted the author for two months during spring 2007. NAR is a young and upcoming human rights and peace building organization located in the Rwandan capital of Kigali. It aims to promote a constructive exchange of ideas to prevent violent conflict and help remedy their effects. NAR highlights the importance of focusing on youth, as more than 60 per cent of Rwanda's population is under 20 years old. The youth have a significant role in ensuring the future stability of Rwanda and the African Great Lakes Region. In support of this research, NAR provided insight into the complex reality of Rwanda, along with various contacts, which resulted in interviews with over 30 students, teachers and experts. These interviews revealed that the divisiveness of Rwandan history is the main constraint to developing a new history curriculum for the country.

Country context: when education divides

The 1994 genocide left Rwanda, a small landlocked country in the Great Lakes Region, with a painful legacy. It is often argued that the whole population was directly or indirectly affected. Nearly all Rwandans alive today know people who killed or have been killed.

Education is seen as one of the causes of the outbreak of violence in 1994 because it was used to divide Rwandan society. The Rwandan educational system was characterized by injustice, discrimination and a version of history that served the people in power. Newbury (1998: 7) has argued that the 1994 genocide was based on 'mental maps of history'. These mental maps resemble what people hold as a memory of the past and can be manipulated to serve political power. In Rwanda, education and especially the teaching of a certain history played a role

in constructing biased mental maps of history and laid the foundation for discrimination and hate of the ‘other’.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the colonizers declared that only Tutsis could be officials in the government and excluded Hutus from higher education (Des Forges, 1999). They created a Tutsi monopoly of power for the years to come, which depicted the Tutsi as winners and the Hutu as losers. Before independence in 1962, there was no official history that taught about Rwanda. The curriculum, as in many other colonies, officially contained only European history. If taught at all, Rwandan history was a Belgian version of history.

After independence there was no real ‘break’ with the past and distorted historical perceptions continued to be included in civic education classes, the whole curriculum and the education system itself (Rutembesa, 2002). However, as power relationships shifted it was now the Tutsi who were discriminated against. The ironically named *équilibre ethnique et régional* quota (an ethnic and regional quota system which effectively enabled ethnic discrimination) made enrolment for Tutsis very difficult. This was introduced alongside an account of history in which the Tutsis were portrayed as foreigners and invaders. The exclusion of the Tutsi from different parts of society, including education (in similar ways that Hutus had previously been excluded), was one of the reasons for the 1994 genocide.

The education system suffered during the genocide. Schools closed abruptly with the outbreak of violence, and teachers and children alike were killed. Once the genocide was over, the new government succeeded in getting the children back to school quickly despite their fear of returning to what had in some places been a scene of horror. Obura (2003) acknowledges the amazing feat of determination and courage of the Ministry of Education and Sport (now the Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research) to re-open schools after the new government took power in July 1994.

Because of the new policies of the GoR, almost all Rwandan children currently have access to primary education. Goals set at worldwide conventions, such as the Millennium Development Goals and that of Education for All, are integrated in Rwanda’s strategy for the educational sector. The Rwandan Government is working towards VISION 2020, a framework for Rwanda’s development, presenting the key priorities and providing Rwandans with a guiding tool for the future. The key priority

set out for education is the same as in all its policies: establish a culture of national unity and reconciliation. The first step after the genocide, therefore, was to “imbue school ethos with the philosophy of national unity, reconciliation and healing, with emphasis on the attributes that bind all Rwandans together, purposely downplaying divisive factors in order to eventually eliminate them” (Obura, 2003: 86).

Teaching history in political environments

“What is not confronted critically does not disappear; it tends to return as the repressed”

LaCapra, 1994: 126

There is a need to address the issue of teaching history and developing a working curriculum in Rwanda. The absence of a curriculum represents a threat to the process of unity and reconciliation and risks a potential return to conflict, since it might give rise to alternative accounts of history based on former ethnic identities. Successful implementation of the curriculum offers Rwandans an opportunity to come to grips with their past and move to a culture of peace and reconciliation. Before moving on from the major constraints to the process and describing the opportunities available to countries like Rwanda to further the process of curriculum development, efforts to create a history curriculum in Rwanda until the present day will be outlined.

Overview of the process of curriculum development

There has been a demonstrated consensus on the need to reconstruct the history of Rwanda. However, until five years ago, few concrete advances other than conferences and seminars had been made. In 2003, Facing History and Ourselves (FHAO) began a partnership with the University of California Berkeley's School of Education and Human Rights Center, the National University of Rwanda and the Rwandan Ministry of Education's Education for Reconciliation project, providing consultation and training for Rwandan educators as they created a new, post-genocide history curriculum for the country. In 2004, a workshop on the teaching of history was conducted with all stakeholders. After that, sub-groups started to gather material on the different periods of history. This material was evaluated and resulted in a history resource book entitled *The teaching of history of Rwanda: a participatory approach* (Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research of Rwanda, 2006).

In 2006, as a first step in the actual teaching of issues related to the genocide and unity and reconciliation, 60 teachers were trained in this participatory approach by the FHAO, with a plan to train more teachers in the future. In the year prior to this, the Ministry of Education had released a life skills handbook for primary school teachers. Genocide, peace and reconciliation, good governance, individual rights, gender issues and the environment were covered in the handbook (Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research of Rwanda, 2006). In March 2007, the department of history at the Kigali Institute of Education (KIE) organized a workshop on teaching Rwandan history, which discussed the political dimension of history and its implications. An upcoming challenge at the time of writing in 2007 was to develop a working history curriculum for secondary schools. Despite having the history resource book from the FHAO to draw on, the finalization of the process is not expected soon.

Education for unity and reconciliation: the constraints

Before exploring ‘positive change’ and further possibilities, it is important to outline the major constraints to the process. The political dimension of history is in itself a major constraint. Although subjects such as mathematics have been used to teach division and hate; for example as indicated by a senior Ministry of Education official in Rwanda who mentioned that it is not unusual for a teacher to say “You have five Tutsis, you kill three – how many are left?” (Bird, 2003); history is always political and not seemingly as objective to teach. “He who controls the past controls the future; he who controls the present controls the past”, wrote George Orwell in his famous dystopian novel *1984*. This is especially the case in countries where history is very divisive and therefore the relationship between history and power is very important. Those in power can construct their own politically correct version of history by magnifying or deleting certain events in order to justify their policies.

In Rwanda, the politics of memory is reflected in any discussion of history. There are currently two main narratives on history and both of them are related to an ethnic group. For example, if you call the 1959 events in which a number of Tutsis were killed a ‘revolution’, you are associating with a Hutu version of history. The Tutsi version of the same event talks about the first ‘Tutsi genocide’. This politics of memory is to be seen as the context in which the process of developing and teaching

a new history curriculum is taking place, since education is one of the major tools for realizing a collective memory on the past.

Although the current Rwandan political leaders claim to have a neutral and inclusive version of history, some argue that certain periods of history are glorified and others denied. The current official discourse on history, unity and reconciliation have been put to the forefront by magnifying those years in which there were fewer problems with ethnic identity and the Rwandese lived together in relative peace. This positive lens on history is part of the government's policies of unity and reconciliation and, as such, is reflected in the education system.

Although Rwandan history is not officially taught in Rwandan classrooms, the official rhetoric of the Rwandan government is very present in education. This is reflected in students' accounts of history which almost always reflected government rhetoric on unity and reconciliation. This dominant discourse was also encountered by Malkki (1995) and Eltringham (2004: 161) who, during their research in Rwanda, came across narratives that were told (and retold) in such a similar manner that they were almost formulaic. Although there is no official history in place, it appears it is being taught in less formal ways.

Despite the 'success' of the government in dominating the debate over history, one could say it limits the process of unity and reconciliation in the long run by not leaving much room for critical assessment. The government-supported discourse is rarely questioned, because the post-conflict climate limits open discussion about historical events. This indirectly stifles teaching and learning. The way history is 'taught' at the moment leaves little room for discussion:

Students commonly expect to learn a singular, unitary 'truth' from their teachers. Challenge, debate, and analysis are discouraged and could be seen as provocative. If there can be only one 'official' truth regarding past events, the particular memories of each sub-group will be either denied or repressed (Stover, 2004: 244).

History classes without the possibility of debate appear to be a barrier to the process of unity and reconciliation. Since history is such a sensitive topic, most teachers find it difficult to teach. They are faced with students from different backgrounds who are in some cases afraid to discuss certain topics. Charles, a teacher in a village near Kigali, said that he did not want to teach anything which was not on paper:

As a teacher I am always afraid my students will judge me on who I am. Although I am teaching in the most neutral way possible, they are probably thinking whenever I talk about controversial issues, “He is a Hutu, so he is lying!” For neither group am I extreme enough in my accounts of history. (personal communication).

Impartiality is difficult in Rwanda. Even if you want to be neutral and identify yourself as a ‘Rwandan’, the fear of being ascribed to one group or another is a complicating matter. Without teacher materials and guidelines for instruction, teachers of history are reluctant to teach sensitive issues in history, because they do not know how to and do not want to cause trouble. The political dimension of history therefore has major implications for the actual teaching of the curriculum.

But before its implementation in Rwandan classrooms, the curriculum needs to be finalized and, again, the political dimension of the subject plays a big role. A lack of money and allocated capacity for curriculum development slows down the process. At the time of research in 2007, only two people were officially working in the Ministry of Education on the development of the curriculum. Despite the emphasis by the Ministry of Education on the creation of a history curriculum, funding for wide-scale production of material has yet to be found, which means that even when the curriculum is finished it may not be implemented easily in the schools.

Next to the lack of allocation of money and people, there is a risk of duplicating efforts, since many bodies are working on writing Rwanda’s history. This includes the National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC), the Kigali Institute of Education, Facing History and Ourselves, the Institute for Democracy and Peace, the National University of Rwanda and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). A curriculum developer for NURC argued that

There are a lot of people involved in this process: NURC, the National University of Butare and different other stakeholders from the civil society. We and the government must have a good argument [for the people of Rwanda to accept this version of history] if we are presenting this new history curriculum, but it is very complex and that is why it is taking so long! (Personal communication).

A colleague from NCDC argued that the process is slow simply because there are so many people involved, but “we do not want to make the same mistake as in the past, so all the stakeholders must be involved to make sure history is properly taught from this time onwards” (personal communication).

Education for unity and reconciliation: possibilities and change

The dominant discourse at the moment is one of fear of repeating the mistakes of the past. This seems to imply a search for the ‘true’ version of history to be included in the curriculum so that the GoR can conclude the never-ending debate on history in Rwanda.

However, there have been positive changes in the approach of late, with the involvement of Facing History And Ourselves (FHAO) influencing the development process of the history curriculum, especially in the methodology to be used. Instead of waiting for the official curriculum to be finished, they have begun training teachers in the new participatory methodology of teaching history. It remains to be seen how long it will take to implement this methodology as teachers are not used to it and the political will to push its implementation is lacking. However, new methodologies are important. One of the barriers to change appears to be the predominant teacher-centred pedagogy in Rwanda. Instead of teaching one version of history, the new approach is to give students the skills to analyse different interpretations of history. Teachers then function more as a guide to constructivist paths to understanding than as a dispenser of knowledge, attitudes and values.

This handbook for teachers takes a case study approach which seeks to discourage teachers of history from presenting lesson information as ‘facts’ which need to be memorized for examination purposes. Rather, the new approach encourages teachers to present lessons for discussion, reflection and for students to try to make connections with their own lives and those of the communities in which they live (Rutayisire, interview April 2007).

Participatory approaches to teaching history were proposed by FHAO, because with the learner’s involvement in the use of sources, documentation materials and interpretation, they argue that there will be a more objective interpretation of facts. NCDC and FHAO realize that this is far from easy, since schools lack materials and teachers are not yet used to this methodology. But the gains include the bottom-up production of

knowledge. “Interaction is important, because we have different groups of people in Rwanda and we need to exchange our different perspectives, to overcome our differences”, said a member of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. In fact, this methodology has now been taken to the level of policy:

The participatory approach in the teaching of the history of Rwanda helps the learner to have access to interpretations after participating actively in their development. Nothing is imposed by the teacher and consequently, everything comes from individual and collective critical analysis which is developed methodologically (The Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research, 2006).

Progress has been made, but at the same time the process is slow and political will seems to be missing. For the moment, however, they are teaching history through civic education and ‘propaganda’, and thereby putting unity at the forefront. Although this seems positive, it may also limit space for other discourse and points of view.

An additional opportunity can be found in the willingness among Rwandan youth to change. They seem dedicated to unity and are looking for a better future without the ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi. In information for tourists, the GoR writes that “Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated: [it is] a country whose past truly is the past, whose present is peaceful and politically stable, and whose future beckons evermore brightly with each passing year”. It is this image, which is being taught in Rwandan schools and society, that is becoming internalized by the children and young people of Rwanda. During the author’s stay in the country, many young people echoed the idea that they “speak the same language, have the same traditions and culture, have lived together in peace before the genocide, and can be one people again ...”.

In a certain sense, these ‘formulaic’ accounts can be seen as a positive development. It is positive that Rwandan youth identify themselves with the government’s view on history, identity and a bright future. If Rwandan youth are able to resist the pull of ethnic identity and conform to the new national identity of *Banyarwanda* (the term used to cover *all* Rwandans), this will promote reconciliation and offer an alternative to ethnic division.

On the other hand, these accounts do not seem to be internalized by all Rwandans and the 'one nation discourse' is challenged on a daily basis by other discourses. These discourses are still mainly grounded in the ethnic identity perspectives in which different interpretations of history are key. Now that these former identities are neglected and forcefully replaced with the national *Banyarwanda* identity, there is a possibility that tensions will rise again since there is no room for debate, and structures and relations in society are still based on these former cultural or ethnic identities.

This opportunity for change caused by the receptiveness of the youth therefore needs to be placed in the political context of Rwanda, where the constraints are huge and the space for debate is limited. In Rwanda, there is still much focus is on the 'genocidal ideology', thereby dividing society into the 'victims' and the 'perpetrators'. In order to grasp the opportunities presented, the GoR could open up space for debate and equip students with the skills to make their own judgments about the past, which will also help them in the future to judge difficult situations.

Conclusions and policy recommendations

Preparing a new history curriculum is a daunting task and in Rwanda there are many obstacles to its creation. The political dimension of debates surrounding history is a major barrier to getting a working curriculum in place. This has implications for the way history is interpreted, the way the government deals with issues related to history and the process of the subject's curriculum development.

The development of the curriculum and methodology is a first step, but of course the task of implementation remains. Here again, the political dimension is key, since teachers are often reluctant to teach about sensitive historical issues. Teachers have an important role in this reconciliation process, because of their importance in society in regard to instilling social and cultural values. A strong teacher training programme is therefore essential, when the history curriculum is finally implemented.

From this case study we can derive some 'lessons learned', which can also be seen as recommendations for other states emerging from conflict and facing difficulties surrounding the teaching of history.

1. Since history is at the heart of many conflicts it is important for states emerging from conflict to take advantage of this opportunity

for change and address the subject with a concrete plan of action and a time frame. The danger of not addressing history in a formal way provides space for conflicting interpretations, propaganda and ‘silences’ imposed on sensitive issues within history for political reasons.

2. UN agencies, NGOs, donors and inter-agency coordination bodies should focus more on the content and methodology of education programmes in conflict or post-conflict countries, since dealing with quantitative data such as enrolment rates is not sufficient.
3. Students should not be taught one ‘correct’ version of history only, but should be confronted with different perspectives. They should be equipped with the skills to make their own critical assessment based on these different interpretations and perspectives. Solid teacher training and educational materials need to be provided in this respect, to give teachers more tools to teach about politically oriented subjects such as history.
4. The various stakeholders should be consulted in any process of writing a curriculum, but a participatory approach should not be allowed to slow down the process of curriculum development. It is very important to include teacher training institutes from the beginning, so that implementation can be arranged as early as possible. Even without official curricula in place, teacher training institutes can start teaching new methods.
5. The involvement of ‘outsiders’ such as the NGO Facing History And Ourselves presents an opportunity to countries like Rwanda as they may introduce different approaches. FHAO did not wait until the official curriculum was finished before starting with teacher training. Such initiatives improve the potential for adoption and scale up. However, strong involvement of the different stakeholders from the beginning is important for ownership.

A participatory approach to history will change the way students are taught, but in Rwanda’s context, alternatives to this approach are limited. It seems that the only alternative is silence; a silence which some in Rwanda would say has been there for the past 13 or more years. Since politicians and academics are not able to come up with one true version of history, there is no other way forward than to engage in a debate about the critical issues of history in classrooms.

As Karl Popper said: “There is no history, only histories.” In the long run, a diversity of perspectives is likely to give the most positive result.

Students will get to know the different narratives about their country's history and can discuss these differences in the safe environment of the classroom, developing critical thinking for use in their day-to-day lives. If one really wants to promote unity, in the classroom or in society, there is a need for openness towards the idea of diversity: different interpretations should be discussed and students should be trained to make a critical assessment of a diversity of historical narratives.

References and further reading

- Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP). No date. *Education statistics for primary and secondary schooling in Afghanistan*. Kabul: APEP.
- Aguilar, P. and Retamal, G. 1998. *Education as a humanitarian response*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund
- Ahumada, C. 1998. *El modelo neoliberal*. Bogota: El Ancora Editores.
- Ahumada, C. 2001. *¿Que está pasando en Colombia?* Bogota: El Ancora Editores.
- Amnesty International. 2007. *Colombia killings, arbitrary detentions, and death threats – the reality of trade unionism in Colombia*. London: AI. Retrieved 17 November from: <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR230012007>
- Anderson, A.; Martone, G.; Robinson, J.P.; Rognerud, E.; Sullivan-Owomoyela, J. 2006. *Standards put to the test: implementing minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crisis and early reconstruction*. London: ODI Humanitarian Practice Network.
- Ansell, N. 2005. *Children, youth and development*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Ardizzone, L. 2001. "Towards global understanding: the transformative role of peace education". In: *Current Issues in Comparative Education* (pp. 16-25). New York: Teachers College Columbia University.
- Asian Development Bank. 1994. *Education sector strategic study, Cambodia*. Manila: ADB.
- Asian Development Bank. 2000. *Report of secondary education investment advisory technical assistance*. Manila: ADB.
- Asmal, K. et al. 1997. *Reconciliation through truth*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- ATA. 2006. *ATA annual report 2006*. Retrieved 23 August 2007 from: www.spark-online.org/uploads/yearreport2006/yr2006.html

- Balasooriya, S.A.; Perera, L.S.; Wijetunge, S. 2004. "Education reform and political violence in Sri Lanka". In: S. Tawil, A. Harley (Eds.), *Education, conflict and social cohesion* (pp. 375-433). Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education.
- Ballentine, K. 2005. "Peace before profit, the challenges of governance". In: K. Ballentine, H. Nitzshke (Eds.), *Profiting from peace: managing the resource dimensions of civil war* (pp. 447-480). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bar-Tal, D. 2002. "The elusive nature of peace education". In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practise, the research* (pp. 27-36). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Bar-Tal, D.; Bennink, G. 2004. "The nature of reconciliation as an outcome and as a process". In: Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.), *From conflict resolution to reconciliation* (pp. 11-38). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Basic Services Fund (BSF). 2006. *Basic services fund secretariat*. Retrieved 9 April 2009 from: <http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:cU6E7ZqdsLkJ:www.bmb.mottmac.nl/files/page/217220/SudanBSF.pdf+Basic+Services+Fund+2006&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk>
- Bassler, T. (Ed.) 2005. *Learning to change: the experience of transforming education in South East Europe*. Budapest, Hungary: Open Society Institute.
- Baxter, P.; Ikobwa, V. 2005. "Peace education: why and how?" In: *Forced Migration Review*, 22, 28-29. Retrieved 17 November 2007 from: www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/22/contents.htm
- Ben-Porath, S.R. 2003. "War and peace education". In: *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 37(3).
- Berg-Schlosser, D.; Siegler, R. 1990. *Political stability and development: a comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda*. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Berry, C. 2007. *Education aid in fragile states: delivering it effectively*. London: SPIRU.

- Bethke, L.; Baxter, P. 2009. *Alternative education: filling the gap in emergency and post-conflict situations*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO and CfBT Education Trust.
- Bickmore, K. 2005. "Teacher development for conflict participation: facilitating for 'difficult citizenship' education". In: *International Journal of Citizenship and Teacher Education*, I(II), 2-16.
- Bird, L. 2003. *Surviving school: education for refugee children from Rwanda, 1994-1996*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- Bleeker, M. 2004. "Introduction and recommendations". In: M. Bleeker, J. Sisson (Eds.), *Dealing with the past – critical issues, lessons learned, and challenges for future Swiss policy* (pp. 5-10). Swiss Peace KOFF Series, 2/2004.
- Bloomfield, D. 2006. "On good terms: clarifying reconciliation". In: *Berghof Report No. 14, October 2006*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- The Bologna declaration of 19 June 1999*. 1999. Retrieved 23 August 2007 from:
www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-Main_doc/990719BOLOGNA_DECLARATION.PDF
- Bond, P. 2000. *Elite transition: from apartheid to neo-liberalism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press and Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press.
- Brannelly, L.; Ndaruhutse, S. 2008. *Education finance in states affected by fragility*. INEE framing paper prepared for the INEE Policy Roundtable, 27-28 October, 2000.
- Bray, M. 2004. "Sharing the burden of financing: government and household partnerships for basic education." In: *Economic Affairs*, 24(4), 22-26.
- Bretherton, D.; Weston, J.; Zbar, V. 2003. "Peace education in a post-conflict environment: the case of Sierra Leone". In: *Ethos*, 11(2), Australia.
- Broere, M.; Vermaas, P. 2005. *Uganda – landenreeks*. Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut van de Tropen (KIT) Publishers.

- Brophy, M. 2003. *Progress to universal primary education in Southern Sudan* (a short country case study for EFA monitoring report). Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/2004, Gender and Education for All: the Leap to equality. Paris: UNESCO.
- Bruns, B.; Mingat, A. 2007. *Achieving education for all, a new policy and financing framework*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Buckland, P. 2005. *Reshaping the future: education and post-conflict reconstruction*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Burns, R. 2000. *Three decades of peace education around the world*. Paper prepared for conference for higher education for peace, Norway, pp. 1-8 (as printed from web page). Retrieved 1 August 2007 from:
www.peace2.uit.no/hefp/contributions/papers/Burns_Robin_plenum.pdf
- Burns, R.; Apeslugh, R. 1996. *Three decades of peace education around the world: an anthology*. New York: Garland Pub., Chapter 1 (pp. 3-24), Chapter 2 (pp.25-69), Chapter 6 (pp. 113-128), Chapter 19 (pp. 321-340), Chapter 21 (pp. 361-378) and Chapter 22 (pp. 379-396).
- Bush, K.; Saltarelli, D. 2000. *The two faces of education in ethnic conflict: towards a peace-building approach to education*. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre.
- Call, C.T.; Cousens, E.M. 2007. *Ending wars and building peace*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- Calleja, J. 1994. *Alternative trends to peace-building: a collection of critical essays*. Malta: Mireva Publications
- Cameron, S. 2001. *Out of war: true stories from the front lines of the Children's Movement for Peace in Colombia*. New York: Scholastic Press. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from:
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/colombia_14738.html
- Carrim, N. 1998. "Anti-racism and the new South African educational order". In: *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 28(3), 301-320.
- Castillo, R.E.J. 2000. *www.neoliberalismo.com.co: balance y perspectivas*. Bogota: Ancora Editores.

- CERG, 2008. *Desktop study on the effects of education on fragility*. Oxford: Conflict and Education Research Group.
- Chadha, N. 1995. "Enemy images: the media and Indo-Pakistani tensions". In: M. Krepon, A. Sevak (Eds.), *Crisis prevention, confidence building and reconciliation in South Asia* (pp. 171-198). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chand, S; Coffman, R. 2008. *How soon can donors exit from post-conflict states?* Washington, DC: Centre for Global Development.
- Chapman, A.R. 2002. *Approaches to studying reconciliation*. Presentation to the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions, Stellenbosch, South Africa, November 2002.
- Chauvet, L.; Collier, P. 2004. *Development effectiveness in fragile states: spillovers and turnarounds*. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University.
- Chesterman, S.; Ignatieff, M.; Thakur, R. 2004. *Making states work: from state failure to state-building*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Chetkow-Yanoov, B. 1986. "Improving Arab-Jewish relations in Israel: the role of voluntary organizations". *Social Development Issues*, 10, 58-70
- Chisholm, L.; Fuller, B. 1996. "Remember people's education? Shifting alliances, state-building and South Africa's narrowing policy agenda". In: *Journal of Education Policy*, 11(6), 693-716.
- Christie, P. 2006. "Changing regimes: governmentality and education policy in post-apartheid South Africa". In: *International Journal of Educational Development*, 26(4), 373-381.
- CIDA. 1999. *Education and peacebuilding – a preliminary operational framework*. Ottawa: Annette Isaac Consulting/CIDA.
- Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER). 2008. *Guidance note on early recovery*, in cooperation with the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition. Geneva: UNDP.
- CODHES. 2006. "Más o menos desplazados". In: *Codhes informa*, Boletín de la Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, No. 69. Bogotá, Colombia. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: www.codhes.org/Info/Boletines/BOLETIN69DEFINITIVO.pdf

- Coletta, N.J.; Cullen, M.L. 2000. *Violent conflict and the transformation of social capital: lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia*. Washington DC: World Bank Publications.
- Collier, P. 2003. *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy*. Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- Collier, P. 2007. *The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collier, P.; Hoeffler, A. 2004. *The challenge of reducing the global incidence of civil war*. Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, Copenhagen Challenge 2004. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University.
- Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ). 2004. *El disfrute del derecho a la educación en Colombia*. Bogota: CCJ.
- Comisión Andina de Juristas, Seccional Colombiana. 1994. *El caso Caballero y Santana – Colombia en la corte Interamericana*. Bogota: CAJSC.
- Corpoeducación. 2006. *Informe de progreso educativo Colombia*. Bogota: Corpoeducación.
- Corrales, J. 1999. *The politics of education reform: bolstering the supply and demand; overcoming institutional blocks*. The Education Reform and Management Series, II(1). Washington, DC: Global Education Reform, World Bank.
- Correa Montoya, G. 2007. *2515 o esa siniestra facilidad para olvidar. 21 años de asesinatos sistemáticos y selectivos contra sindicalistas en Colombia (1986-2006)*. Medellín: Escuela Nacional Sindical.
- CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). 2005. *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army*. Retrieved 9 April 2009 from: www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf
- Craissati, D. 2008. *Free primary education and equity: some research questions linked to policy and implementation*. Meeting of the International Working Group on Education (IWGE), New York, 10-11 June 2008, Glen Cove. SFAI and UNICEF.

- Crisp, J; Talbot, C.; Cipollone, D. (Eds.) 2001. *Learning for a future: refugee education in developing countries*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Csaky, C. 2008. *No one to turn to: the under-reporting of child sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers*. London: Save the Children.
- CSOPNU (Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda). 2004. *Statement on the escalating conflict in northern Uganda*. Press release 27 February 2004. Kampala: CSOPNU.
- CSOPNU (Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda). 2006. *Counting the cost – twenty years of war in northern Uganda*. Kampala: CSOPNU.
- Dale, R. 2000. “Globalisation and education: demonstrating a ‘common world education culture’ or locating a ‘globally structured education agenda’?” In: *Educational Theory*, 50(4), 427-448.
- Dale, R. 2005. “Globalisation, knowledge economy and comparative education”. In: *Comparative Education*, 41(2), 117-149.
- Davies, L. 1999. *Education in Kosovo*. Report to the British Council.
- Davies, L. 2004. *Education and conflict – complexity and chaos*. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Davies, L. 2005. *Making education more inclusive: democracy building and citizenship for all*. Paper prepared for the expert meeting on Researching Quality of Education for All in the South: Main Research Issues and Current Gaps, University of Amsterdam, 29-30 August 2005.
- Daxner, M. 2000. *Education in Kosovo: from crisis to recovery and transformation*. Pristina: UNMIK Department for Education and Science.
- Daxner, M. 2001. *Education policy statement 2001*. Pristina: UNMIK.
- De Clercq, F. 1997. “Policy intervention and power shifts: an evaluation of South Africa’s education restructuring policies”. In: *Journal of Education Policy*, 12(3), 127-146.
- Des Forges, A. 1999. *Leave none to tell the story*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

- DeStefano, J.; Schuh Moore, A.; Balwanz, D.; Harwell, A. 2006. *Meeting EFA: reaching the underserved through complementary models of effective schooling* (EQUIP 2 Working Paper): Washington, DC: AED.
- DFID (Department for International Development). 2003. *Education, conflict and international development*. Position Paper of the British Government.
- Di Giovanni, A., et al. 2005. *Forgotten voices – a population-based survey of attitudes about peace and justice in northern Uganda*. Berkeley: International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, University of California.
- Dolby, N.E. 2001. *Constructing race, youth identity and popular culture in South Africa*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Dorn, C. 2005. "Evaluating democracy: The 1946 US education mission to Germany". In: *American Journal of Evaluation*, 26(2), 267-277.
- Duncan, G. 2006. *Los señores de la guerra*. Bogota: Planeta.
- Eltringham, N. 2004. *Accounting for horror: post-genocide debates in Rwanda*. London: Pluto Press.
- Enslin, P. 2002. "South Africa: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a model of peace education." In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practise, the research* (pp. 37-47). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- EUA. 2002. *University of Mitrovica: report of EUA site visit, 10-13 December 2002*. Retrieved 21 February 2007 from: www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/uni_mitrovica_report_eua-kos-enl-t05.pdf
- EUA. 2004. *EUA statement on the dismissal by the Serbian Minister of Education of the rector of the University of Kosovska Mitrovica*. Brussels: European University Association.
- Fagerlind, I.; Saha, L.J. 1989. *Education and national development*. (2nd edition) Oxford: Pergamon.

- FECODE. 2007. *La lucha integral por los derechos humanos y Fecode*. Bogotá: FECODE. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: http://fecode.edu.co/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=159&Itemid=31
- Fernández, H.V. 2003. *La política antisindical de las elites dominantes y los supuestos privilegios de los trabajadores de ecopetrol*. Medellín: Escuela Nacional Sindical.
- Finnström, S. 2003. "Living with bad surroundings. war and existential uncertainty in Acholiland, northern Uganda". In: *Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology*, 35.
- Finnström, S. 2005. "For God and my Life – war and cosmology in northern Uganda." In: P. Richards (Ed.), *No peace – no war. an anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts* (pp. 98-117). Athens, USA: Ohio University Press.
- Fiske, E.B.; Ladd, H.F. 2004. *Elusive equity. education reform in post-apartheid South Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Fountain, S. 1999. *Peace education in UNICEF, Working Paper* (pp.-1-44). New York: UNICEF. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: www.unicef.org/girlseducation/files/PeaceEducation.pdf
- Franco, S. 2003. "A social-medical approach to violence in Colombia". In: *American Journal of Public Health* 93(12), 2032-2036. Washington DC: American Public Health Association.
- FTI, 2007. *Progressive framework for FTI support to education in fragile states*. Fast Track Initiative.
- Fullan, M.; Hill, P.; Crevola, C. 2006. *Breakthrough*. Thousand Oaks: Corwin Press.
- Giliomee, H. 2003. *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- Giliomee, H.; Heese, C. et al. 2005. *Afrikaansmediumonderrig op skool en van die menings van ouers in alle gemeenskappe oor die huidige stand van skoolonderwys*. Pretoria: Die Vrye Afrikaan.
- Global Campaign for Education. 2002. *A quality education for all: priority actions for governments, donors and civil society*, Briefing Paper. Brussels: Global Campaign for Education.

- Global Campaign for Education. 2003. *A fair chance*. Brussels: Global Campaign for Education.
- Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. 2007. *An evolving partnership, the global fund and civil society in the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria*. Geneva: The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria.
- Gonzalez, F; Bolivar, I; Vasquez, T. 2002. *Violencia política en Colombia*. Bogota: CINEP.
- Gordon, H. 1994. "Working for peace in the Middle East: the educational task". In: E. Boulding (Ed.), *Building peace in the Middle East: challenges for states and civil society* (pp. 311-317). Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Government of Afghanistan. 2004. *Securing Afghanistan's future (2004): Technical Annex on the Education Sector*. Kabul: Government of Afghanistan.
- Government of Sierra Leone. 2007. *Education sector plan*. Freetown: Sierra Leone Ministry of Education, Science and Technology.
- Government of Southern Sudan. *Revenue, transparency and pro-poor spending* (PowerPoint presentation). Sudan Consortium, Paris, 10 March 2006.
- Greaney, V. 2005. *Textbooks, respect for diversity and social cohesion*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Harber, C.; Davies, L. 2003. "Effective leadership for war and peace." In: M. Brundrett; N. Burton; R. Smith (Eds.) *Leadership in Education*, pp. 132-146.
- Harbom, L. (Ed.). 2006. *States in armed conflict 2006*. Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
- Harbom, L.; Wallensteen, P. 2005. "Armed conflict and its international dimensions, 1946-2004". In: *Journal of Peace Research*, 42(5), 623-635.
- Harris, I.M. 2002. "Conceptual underpinnings of peace education". In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practise, the research* (pp. 15-26). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

- Harris, I.M.; Morrison, M.L. 2003. *Peace education*. (Second Edition). North Carolina/USA: McFarland Publishers.
- Hart, J. 2002. "Children's clubs: new ways of working with conflict-displaced children in Sri Lanka". In: *Forced Migration Review*, 36-39.
- Hirsland, K.; Cecchini, M.; Odom, T. 2004. *Evaluation in the field of education for democracy, human rights and tolerance. a guide for practitioners*. Gütersloh/ Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: www.unhcr.org/cgi-in/texis/vtx/research/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3b8a1bd84
- Hughes, C.; Conway, T. 2003. *Understanding pro-poor political change: the policy process, Cambodia*. London: ODI.
- Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC). 2004. *Report card: progress on compulsory education*. Kabul, Afghanistan: HRRAC.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1996. *Colombia's killer networks: the military-paramilitary partnership and the United States*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1999. *Abuses against Serb and Roma in the new Kosovo, 11(10)*. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kosov2/#_1_9
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2000. *Colombia – the ties that bind: Colombia and military-paramilitary links, 12(1)*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2001. *The "Sixth Division" military-paramilitary ties and US policy in Colombia*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2003a. *Killing you is a very easy thing for us. Human rights abuses in southeast Afghanistan*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2003b. *"You'll learn not to cry": child combatants in Colombia*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

- Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2006. *Lessons in terror: attacks on education in Afghanistan*. New York: HRW. Retrieved 9 September 2008 from:
www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/index.htm
- Hylton, F. 2003. "An evil hour". *New Left Review*, 23 (September-October).
- IASC. 2004. *Guidelines for HIV/AIDS interventions in emergency settings*. Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
- IASC. 2005. *Gender-based violence interventions in emergency settings*. Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
- IASC. 2007. *Mental health and psychosocial support in emergency settings*. Geneva: Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
- ICG. 2002. *Pakistan: madrasas, extremism and the military*. Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- ICG. 2004. *Collapse in Kosovo* (ICG Europe Report No. 155). Pristina: International Crisis Group.
- ICG. 2007. *Kosovo's final status*. Retrieved 30 August 2007 from:
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3225&l=1
- IDEA. 2004. *Good fences make good neighbours*. Retrieved 30 July 2007 from:
http://archive.idea.int/newsletters/2004/Feb_Mar04/srilanka_workshops.htm
- INEE. 2004. *Minimum standards for education in emergencies, chronic crises and early reconstruction*. Paris: Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies.
- INEE. 2005. *Inter-Agency Peace Education Programme: skills for constructive living*. Paris: UNESCO.
- INEE. 2008. *INEE guidance notes on compensation in fragile states, situations of displacement and post-crisis recovery*. Guidelines for piloting phase, released September.
- Interaction. 2002. *African Liaison Program Initiative: ensuring successful partnerships*. Retrieved 30 August 2007 from:
www.interaction.org/alpi/partnership.html
- IRC. 2005. *Leveraging learning: revitalising education in post-conflict Liberia*. New York: International Rescue Committee.

- IRC. 2007. *Teaching well? Education reconstruction efforts and support to teachers in post-war Liberia*. New York: International Rescue Committee.
- Jackson, E. 2006. *Ten thousand agents of change: education for nation-building in Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro*. (Performance Review of the Educator Development Program). Unpublished personal report.
- Jansen, J.D. 2002. "Political symbolism as policy craft: explaining non-reform in South African education after apartheid". In: *Journal of Education Policy*, 17(2), 199-215.
- Johannessen, E.M. 2005. *One step closer, but how far? A study of former TEP students in Angola and Burundi*. Oslo: NRC.
- Johannessen, E.M.; Romeu, J. 2000. *Evaluation of Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) in Angola*. Oslo: NRC. Luanda: UNICEF.
- Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for Sudan. 2005. *The Joint Assessment Mission, volume III, cluster reports*. Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) for Sudan.
- Kadushin, L. 2002. "Friendship, contact and peace education". In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practise, the research* (pp. 117-126). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Karlsson, J.; McPherson, G., et al. 2002. "A critical examination of the development of school governance policy and its implications for achieving equity". In: *The state, education and equity in post-apartheid South Africa*. E. Motala, J. Pampallis (Eds.) Burlington, USA: Ashgate.
- Kiplagat, B. 2002. "Reaching the Nairobi peace agreement". In: *Protracted conflict, elusive peace. Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda. Accord Issue 11 (2002)*, 10-14. London.
- Kirk, J. 2004. *IRC Healing Classrooms Initiative: A follow-up study in Afghanistan*. New York: IRC.
- Kirk, J. 2008. *Building back better: post earthquake responses and educational challenges in Pakistan*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.

- Kirk, J.; Winthrop, R. 2006a. "Eliminating the sexual abuse and exploitation of girls in refugee schools in West Africa: introducing female classroom assistants." In F. Leach, C. Mitchell (Eds.), *Combating gender violence in and around schools* (pp. 207-215). Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books.
- Kirk, J.; Winthrop, R. 2006b. *Meeting EFA: Afghanistan home-based schools* (EQUIP 2 Case Study). Washington, DC: AED.
- Kirk, J.; Winthrop, R. 2006c. "Home-based schooling: access to quality education for Afghan girls". *Journal of Education for International Development*, 2(2) p.1-9.
- Kostovicova, D. 2005. *Kosovo: the politics of identity and space*. London: Routledge.
- Knight, T.; Pearl, A. 2000. "Democratic education and critical pedagogy". In: *Urban Review*, 32(3), 197-226.
- Kriesberg, L. 1998. *Constructive conflicts: from escalation to resolution*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- LaCapra, D. 1994. *Representing the holocaust: history, theory, trauma*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Lederach, J.P. 2001. "Civil society and reconciliation". In: C. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, P. Aall (Eds.), *Turbulent peace: the challenges of managing international conflict* (pp. 841-854). Washington DC: USIP.
- Legget, I. 2001. *Uganda – an Oxfam country profile*. Oxford: Oxfam Publications.
- Lemon, A. 2005. "Shifting geographies of social inclusion and exclusion: secondary education in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa". In: *African Affairs*, 104(414), 69-96.
- Lopes Cardozo, T.A. 2006. *The state of peace education in Sri Lanka: in peace or in pieces?* M.Sc. Thesis International Development Studies, ISHSS/UvA. Submitted August 2006.
- Mack, A. 2007. *Global political violence: explaining the post-Cold War decline*. Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series. New York: International Peace Academy.

- Macrae, J.; Shepherd, A.; Morrissey, O.; Harmer, A.; Anderson, E.; Piron, L.; McKay, A.; Cammack, D.; Kyegombe, N. 2004. *Aid to 'poorly performing' countries: a critical review of debates and issues*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Malkki, L. 1995a. *Violence, memory, and national cosmology among Hutu refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago University Press.
- Manning, R. 2007. "OECD DAC development cooperation report". In: *OECD Journal on Development*. Retrieved 30 August 2007 from: www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_33721_40056608_1_1_1_1,00.html
- Mansaray and Associates, 2006. *Evaluation of the Complementary Rapid Education Programme for Schools (CREPS)*. November, Draft 2. Sierra Leone: Unpublished.
- Marques, J.; Bannon, I. 2003. *Central America: education reform in a post-conflict setting, opportunities and challenges*. CPR Working Paper No. 4. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Martone, G. 2007. *Educating children in emergencies: an unexpected lifeline*. August. New York: IRC.
- Masako, S. 2005. *Japan and Germany under the US Occupation: a comparative analysis of post-war education reform*. Studies of Modern Japan Series. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- May, A. 2006a. *Dealing with the past – experiences of transitional justice, truth and reconciliation processes after periods of violent conflict in Africa*. Retrieved 30 March 2008 from: www.c-r.org/our-work/uganda/documents/Dealing_with_the_Past.pdf
- May, A. 2006b. *Teaching peace – transforming conflict? Exploring participants' perceptions on the impact of informal peace education training in Uganda*. M.Sc. Thesis International Development Studies, ISHSS/UvA. Submitted November 2006.
- McCauley, C. 2002. "Head first versus feet first in peace education". In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practise, the research* (pp. 247-259). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- McKenna, M.; Robinson, J. 2006. "The conflict effect: challenges and opportunities for girls' education". In: *Equals*, 17.

- Midttun, E. 1998. *Brief history and main features of the TEP for Angola 1995-1998* Oslo: NRC.
- Midttun, E.; Hoaas, V. 1995. *UNHCR/NRC assessment mission to Zaire and Zambia, 7-20 October; assessment of needs for Portuguese language training among Angolan refugees, before expected return.* Luanda: UNHCR. Oslo: NRC.
- Miller, V. 2005. "Where's the peace? What's the education? A closer look at existing curricula; questions asked of peace education curricula." In: B. Lowry; A. Harder; V. Miller (Eds.), *And the children shall lead them: an NGO journey into peace education* (pp. 81-130). Monrovia CA: World Vision International.
- Millo, Y.; Barnett, J. 2003. *Educational development in East Timor.* Working Paper No. 1. Melbourne: School of Development Studies, Melbourne University.
- Ministry of Education of Afghanistan. 2003. *Developmental plan of Ministry of Education 1383-1394/2004-2015.* Kabul: Ministry of Education of Afghanistan.
- Ministry of Education of Afghanistan. 2004. "Education and Vocational Training Public Investment Programme". In: *National Development Plan and Budget 1383-1385.* Kabul: Ministry of Education of Afghanistan.
- Ministry of Education of Afghanistan. Teacher Education Program team. 2005. *TEP Three Year Plan.* Kabul: Ministry of Education of Afghanistan.
- Ministry of Education of Afghanistan. 2007. *National Education Strategic Plan for Afghanistan, 1385-1389.* Kabul: Ministry of Education of Afghanistan. Retrieved 9 September 2008 from: www.MOE.gov.af/National%20Education%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf
- Ministry of Education of Sri Lanka, Presidential Task Force on General Education. 1997. *General education reforms 1997.* Ministry of Education of Sri Lanka.
- Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research of Rwanda. 2006. *The teaching of history of Rwanda; a participatory approach.* Rwanda: NCDC/The Regents of the University of California.

- Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Southern Sudan (GOSS). 2006. *Education Sector Budget Plan, 2007-2009*. Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Southern Sudan.
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 1995. *Education Investment Plan 1995-2000*. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia.
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 1999. *Education for All: end of decade review report*. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia.
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 2000. *Report on Joint MOEYS/donor seminar on sector wide approaches for education reform*. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. Retrieved 22 August 2008 from: www.moeys.gov.kh/details-directions01-02/swap/swapd.htm
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 2001a. *Education Strategic Plan 2001/5*. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia.
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 2001b. *Education Sector Performance Report* (presented at joint annual education sector performance review). Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia.
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 2002. *Education Sector Performance Report* (presented at joint annual education sector performance review). Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia.
- Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia. 2003. *Education Sector Performance Report* (presented at joint annual education sector performance review). Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Cambodia.
- Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Southern Sudan. 2008. *Budget Sector Working Groups: terms of reference* (PowerPoint presentation). Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Southern Sudan.

- Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Southern Sudan. 2008. *Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning: approved budget 2008, budget-at-a-glance*. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Southern Sudan.
- Mitchell, C.R. 2005. *Conflict, social change and conflict resolution. An enquiry*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Miwa, K. 2005. *Investing in Afghanistan's future: a strategy note on the education system in Afghanistan (Report 31563-AF)*. South Asia Region, Human Development Unit: World Bank.
- Molteno, M.; Ogadhoh, K.; Cain, E.; Crumpton, B. 2000. *Towards responsive schools: supporting better schooling for disadvantaged children*. London: Department for International Development/Save the Children UK.
- Moodley, K.; Adam, H. 2000. "Race and nation in post-apartheid South Africa". In: *Current Sociology*, 48(3), 51-69.
- Moreno-Torres, M.; Anderson, M. 2004. *Fragile states: defining difficult environments for poverty reduction*. London: Department for International Development (DFID).
- Motala, E.; Singh, M. 2002. "Introduction". In: *The state, education and equity in post-apartheid South Africa*. M. Enver and J. Pampallis (Eds.) Burlington, USA: Ashgate.
- Moulton, J.; Dall, F. 2006. *Delivering education services in fragile states: lessons from four case studies*. Creative Associates International, Inc. and The Iris Center for USAID. Retrieved 8 April 2009 from: www.beps.net/publications/Final%20BEPS%20Report.pdf
- Mugumya, L. 2003. "Human rights: an insight into Uganda's education sector". In: D. Nkurunziza (Ed.), *Towards a culture of peace and human rights in Africa* (pp. 113-127). *African Peace Studies Vol. 1*. Kampala/Uganda: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Mundy, K. 2008. "From NGOs to CSOs: social citizenship, civil society, and 'Education for All' – an agenda for further research". In: *Current Issues in Comparative Education*, 10(1/2), 32-40.

- Nak, S.; Jongsma, D.; Ratcliffe, M. 2002. *Evolving sector wide approach to education in Cambodia and the role of strategic planning process*. Paper presented at UNESCO/IIEP workshop in Paris, December 2002.
- Nesse, P.; Stensrud, L.; Sundvoll, S. 1995. *Assessment report (reiserapport), Angola 23-30 January*. Oslo, Norway: NRC.
- Newbury, C. 1998. *The cohesion of oppression*. New York: Colombia University Press.
- New Sudan. 2001. *Accelerating learning opportunities for all, summary of presentations and recommendations* – Symposium on Education, Yambio. New Sudan.
- New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation (NSCSE)/UNICEF. 2004. *Towards a baseline, best estimates of social indicators for Southern Sudan* (NSCSE Series Paper 1/2004). New York: UNICEF/Juba: New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation.
- Nicholson, S. 2007. *Accelerated learning in post-conflict settings: a discussion paper*. Paper presented at a seminar on Accelerated Learning: New Opportunities for Children at Risk, World Bank Institute, Save the Children and INEE at Addis Ababa, 15-17 November 2006.
- Nicolai, S. 2004. *Learning independence – education in emergency and transition in Timor-Leste since 1999*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- Nicolai, S. 2007. *Fragmented foundations: education and chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO/Save the Children UK.
- Nicolai, S.; Triplehorn, C. 2003. *The role of education in protecting children in conflict*. Humanitarian Practice Network paper No. 42. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Nkomo, M.; Mckinney, C., et al. 2004. *Reflections on school integration – colloquium proceedings*. Johannesburg: HSRC PRESS.
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). 1995. *Assessment report*. Unpublished personal documentation.
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). 2006. *Core activity policy documents, education policy*, Oslo: NRC.

- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Angola. 2007. *TEP – No ponto de mira – de educação em emergência a recuperação do atraso escolar. 12 anos com TEP*. Luanda: NRC.
- Novelli, M.; Lopes Cardozo, M. 2008. “Conflict, education, and the global south: new critical directions”. In: *International Journal of Educational Development* 28(4), 473-488.
- Obura, A. 2002. *UNHCR peace education programme: evaluation report*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Obura, A. 2003. *Never again: educational reconstruction in Rwanda*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- Obura, A. 2008. *Staying power: struggling to reconstruct education in Burundi since 1993*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- OECD. 2001. *Thematic review of national policies for education – Kosovo*. Paris: OECD. Retrieved 30 August 2007 from: www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/thematic-review-kosovo-yug-kos-enl-t05.htm
- OECD. 2007a. *Fragile states: policy commitment and principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations*. DAC High Level Meeting, 3-4 April 2007.
- OECD Development Assistance Committee. 2007b. *Principles for international engagement in fragile states and situations*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD Development Assistance Committee. 2007c. *Development cooperation report 2007*. Paris: OECD.
- Oldfield, S. 2002. “The South African state in transition: a question of form, function and fragmentation”. In: *The state, education and equity in post-apartheid South Africa*. M. Enver and J. Pampallis (Eds.) Burlington, USA: Ashgate.
- O’Malley, B. 2007. *Education under attack*. Paris: UNESCO.
- OPM/IDL. 2008. Evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration: thematic study – the applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict affected situations.
- Orjuela, C. 2003. “Building peace in Sri Lanka: a role for civil society?” In: *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(2), 195-212.

- OSCE. 2004. *Spot report: 18 March 2004*. Pristina: OSCE Office of Political Affairs.
- Oxfam, 2006. *Free quality education for every Afghan child*. Oxfam Briefing Paper 93. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Paris, R.; Sisk, T. 2007. *Managing contradictions: the inherent dilemmas of post-war statebuilding*. New York: International Peace Academy.
- Patti, J.; Espinosa, A.C. 2007. "Citizenship competencies in Colombia: learning from policy and practice". In: *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 25(1), 109-125.
- Peacebuilding Commission, 2007. Retrieved 30 August 2007 from: www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding
- Pearce, J. 1990. *Colombia: inside the labyrinth*. London: Latin America Bureau.
- Perera, L.S.; Ministry of Education and Higher Education Sri Lanka. 2000. *Education for All: the Year 2000 assessment final country report of Sri Lanka*. Presented at the World Education Forum, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka, 2000. Retrieved 31 March 2008 from: www2.unesco.org/wef/countryreports/sri_lanka/contents.html#cont
- Phillips, D.; Ochs, K. (Eds.) 2004. *Educational policy borrowing: historical perspectives*. Oxford: Symposium Books.
- Pickering, J. 2006. *Donorship principles and good practice: a summary of indicators and interpretations of good practice*. London: ODI Humanitarian Policy Group.
- Pigozzi, M.J. 1999. *Education in emergencies and for reconstruction: a developmental approach*. UNICEF working paper series. New York: UNICEF Program Division. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: www.unicef.org/girlseducation/files/EducEmerg.PDF
- Pigozzi, M.J. 2004. "The ministerial viewpoint on quality education". *Prospects*, 34(2), 141-149.
- Pinheiro, P. 2006. *World report on violence against children*. New York: United Nations.

- Porath, Sigal R. Ben (2003). "Radicalizing democratic education: unity and dissent in wartime," *Philosophy of Education Yearbook* 245-253.
- Pupovci, D. 2002. "Teacher education system in Kosovo". In: *Metodika*, 3(5), 125-145. Retrieved 1 August 2007 from: www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/teacher_education_in_kos-enl-t05.pdf
- Pupovci, D.; Hyseni, H. 2002. *Policy on education for democratic citizenship and the management of diversity in south-east Europe – Stocktaking Research Project*, Country Report: Kosovo. IBE UNESCO – International Bureau of Education, Geneva in cooperation with CEPS – Centre for Educational Policy Studies, University of Ljubljana, Kosovo.
- Pupovci, D.; Taylor, A. 2004. "Critical thinking in Kosovo – a framework for change". In: *Metodika*, 5(8), 7-22.
- Quinn, J.R. 2001. "Dealing with a legacy of mass atrocity: truth commissions in Uganda and Chile". In: *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 19(4), 383-402.
- Quinn, J.R. 2005. *What of reconciliation? Traditional mechanisms of acknowledgement in Uganda*. Paper prepared for presentation at the conference 'Reconciliation' held by the Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Research Group, The University of Western Ontario, London/Canada in May 2005.
- Quinn, J.R. 2006. "Beyond truth commissions: indigenous reconciliation in Uganda". In: *Review of Faith and International Affairs (Spring 2006)*, 4.1.
- Ratcliffe, M. 1996. *Mapping survey of NGO assistance for education*. Report as part of Asian Development Bank technical assistance support to education in Cambodia. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
- Ratcliffe, M. 2000. *Sustaining the education policy review and development process: forward look*. Report as part of Asian Development Bank technical assistance support to education in Cambodia. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
- Reardon, B. 1997. *Tolerance – the threshold of peace: Unit 1/ teacher-training resource unit*. Paris: UNESCO (The Teacher's Library).

- Refugee Law Project. 2004. *Behind the violence: causes, consequences and the search for solutions to the war in northern Uganda*. Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 11, Kampala, Uganda.
- Reiniciar. 1995. *Genocidio contra el partido político Unión Patriótica en Colombia 1985-1993*. Bogotá: Mimeograph.
- RET (Red de estudios de espacio y territorio). 2004. *Dimensiones territoriales de la guerra y la paz*. Bogota: Universidad Nacional.
- Richardson, J. 2005. *Paradise poisoned: learning about conflict, terrorism and development from Sri Lanka's civil wars*. Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES).
- Riddell, A.R. 1999. "The need for a multidisciplinary framework for analysing educational reform in developing countries". In: *International Journal of Educational Development*, 19(3): 207-217.
- Robertson, S.; Novelli, M.; Dale, R.; Tikly, L.; Dachi, H.; Ndebela, A. 2007. *Globalisation, education and development: ideas, actors and dynamics*. London: Department for International Development.
- Romero, M. 2007. *Parapolítica. La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos*. Bogota: Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris.
- Rose, P.; Greeley, M. 2006. *Education in fragile states: capturing lessons and identifying good practice*. Paper prepared for the DAC Fragile States Group. Paris: OECD.
- Ross, M. H. 2000. "Creating the conditions for peacemaking: theories of practice in ethnic conflict resolution". In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(6), 1002-1034.
- Rotberg, I. (Ed.) 2004. *Balancing change and tradition in global education reform*. Lanham: Scarecrow Education.
- Rugh, A. 2001. *Models, policy options and strategies: a discussion paper in support of Afghan education*. UNICEF Afghanistan.
- Runde, D. 2006. Director of the Office of Global Development Alliances, United States Agency for International Development (USAID). OECD Observer No. 255.
- Rutembesa, F. 2002. "Le discours sur le peuplement comme instrument de manipulation identitaire". In: *Peuplement du Rwanda; enjeux et perspectives*. Cahiers du Centre de gestion des conflits, No. 5, Université Nationale du Rwanda, pp. 73-102.

- Salomon, G. 2002. "The nature of peace education: not all programmes are created equal". In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practice, the research* (pp. 3-14). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Salomon, G. 2003. *Does peace education make a difference?* Retrieved 22 November 2007 from:
www.construct.haifa.ac.il/~cerpe/workshopPapers.html
- Salomon, G.; Nevo, B. 1999. *Peace education: an active field in need for research* (unpublished manuscript). Haifa, Israel: University of Haifa.
- Samady, S.R. 2001. *Education and Afghan society in the twentieth century*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Save the Children. 2003. *The children of Kabul*. Kabul, Afghanistan: Save the Children.
- Save the Children. 2006. *Rewrite the Future: Education for children in conflict-affected countries*. London: Save the Children.
- Save the Children. 2007a. *Last in line, last in school: how donors are failing children in conflict affected fragile states*. London: Save the Children.
- Save the Children. 2007b. *Treading a delicate path: NGOs in fragile states – case study of Southern Sudan*. Unpublished report. Save the Children.
- Save the Children. 2008a. *Education in emergencies: a toolkit for starting and managing a programme*. London: Save the Children.
- Save the Children. 2008b. *Last in line, last in school 2008: how donors can support education for children affected by conflict and emergencies*. London: Save the Children.
- Save the Children. 2008c. *Where peace begins: education's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding*. London: Save the Children.
- Save the Children/Global Challenge. *Country plan for Southern Sudan 2005-2009*. Unpublished report. Westport, US: Save the Children.
- Save the Children Sweden. 2002. *Youth education: the Southern Sudan experience*. Stockholm, Sweden: Save the Children Sweden.

- Save the Children UK. (No date). *Basic education programme, Hiran and Togdheer regions Somalia/Somaliland*. London: Save the Children UK.
- Sayed, Y. 2002. "Democratising Education in a Decentralised System: South African policy and practice". In: *Compare: a journal of comparative education*, 32(1), 35-46.
- SBEP-CARE (Sudan Basic Education Project-CARE). 2002. *Project information*. Retrieved 9 April 2009 from: www.care.org/careswork/projects/SDN093.asp
- Schneider, G.E. 2003. "Neoliberalism and economic justice in South Africa: revisiting the debate on economic apartheid". In: *Review of Social Economy*, 61(1), 23-50.
- School Fees Abolition Initiative (SFAI). 2006. *Status report and business plan for 2006/2007*. Retrieved 28 September 2007 from: www.fasttrackinitiative.org/library/Cairo/SFAI_Status_Report.pdf
- Seitz, K. 2004. *Education and conflict: the role of education in the creation, prevention and resolution of societal crises – consequences for development co-operation*. Frankfurt: GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit).
- Shapiro, I. 2006. *Extending the framework of inquiry: theories of change in conflict interventions*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management/ Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.
- Simpson, K. 2004. "Making connection: holistic teaching through peace education". In: *Canadian Social Studies*, 38(3). Retrieved 28 September 2007 from: www.quasar.ualberta.ca/css
- Sinclair, M. 2002. *Planning education in and after emergencies*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- Sinclair, M. 2005. *Learning to live together: building skills, values and attitudes for the twenty-first century*. Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education (IBE). Retrieved 28 September 2007 from: www.ibe.unesco.org/publications/compar_edu.htm

- Slymaker, T.; Christiansen, K.; with Hemming I. 2005. *Community-based approaches and service delivery: issues and options in difficult environments and partnerships*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Sluka, J. (Ed.). 2000. *Death squad: the anthropology of state terror*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Smith, A.; Vaux, T. 2003. *Education, conflict and international development*. DFID Issues Paper. London: Department for International Development (DFID).
- Smith, D. 2004. *Trends and causes of armed conflict*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Sommers, M. 2001. *Peace education and refugee youth*. Retrieved 30 March 2008 from:
www.unhcr.org/cgi-in/texis/vtx/research/opendoc?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3b8a1bd84
- Sommers, M. 2002. *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit and Education Team, Human Development Network: children, education and war: reaching Education for All (EFA) objectives in countries affected by conflict*. The World Bank Working Papers (Paper No. 1, June 2002) (Page 19). Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Sommers, M. 2004. *Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- Sommers, M. 2005. *Islands of education: schooling, civil war and the Southern Sudanese (1983-2004)*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO.
- Sommers, M.; Buckland, P. 2004. *Parallel worlds: rebuilding the education system in Kosovo*. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO International Institute for Education Planning.
- Soudien, C. 2004. “‘Constituting the class’: an analysis of the process of ‘integration’ in South African schools”. (p. 89-114) In: L. Chisholm (Ed.), *Changing class: education and social change in post-apartheid South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Sperling, G. 2006: *Closing trust gaps: unlocking financing for education in fragile states*. Recommendations for the 4th FTI Partnership meeting, Cairo, Egypt, 13-14 November 2006.

- Sperling, G. 2007. *The trust gap*. Washington, DC: Center for Foreign Relations.
- Sphere Project. 2004. *Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response*. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Spink, J. 2005. "Education and politics in Afghanistan". In: *Journal of Peace Education*, 2(2), 195-207.
- Spink, J.; Karyar, N.M.; Atmar, Z. 2004. *Situational analysis: teacher education and professional development in Afghanistan* (Afghanistan Teacher Education Project (TEP)). Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
- SPLANA. 2004. *Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on implementation modalities of the protocols and agreements*. Naivasha, Kenya. Retrieved 28 September 2007 from:
www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/implementation_coversheet.pdf
- SPLM. 2002. *Education policy of the New Sudan and implementation guidelines: the interim constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005*. Sudan: SPLM.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2007. *SIPRI military expenditure database*. Retrieved 8 September 2007 from:
www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html
- Stokes, D. 2004. *Terrorising Colombia: America's other war*. London: Zed Books.
- Stover, E. (Ed.) 2004. *My neighbor, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stromquist, N. 2008. "Revisiting transformational NGOS in the context of contemporary society". In: *CICE*, 10(1/2) p.41-45.
- Tal-Or, N., Boninger, D.; Gleicher, F. 2002. "Understanding the conditions and processes necessary for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice". In: G. Salomon, B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education around the world: the concept, the practise, the research* (pp. 109-116). New Jersey/London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

- Tawil S.; Harley A. (Eds.) 2004. *Education, conflict and social cohesion*. Geneva: UNESCO IBE.
- Than, P.; Ratcliffe, M. 2006. *Monitoring elusive capacities: a chronology of events*. Paper presented at LeNCD International Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, 3-5 October 2006.
- Than, P.; Ratcliffe, M.; Buentjen, C. 2006. *Joint approaches to capacity development in MOEYS: reflections and analysis*. Paper presented at the LeNCD International Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, 3-5 October 2006.
- Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. 2008. *Accra agenda for action*. Paris: OECD's DCD-DAC.
- Tomasevski, K. 2006. *The state of the right to education worldwide: free or fee: 2006 global report*. Retrieved 28 September 2007 from: www.katarinatomasevski.com/images/Global_Report.pdf
- Tomlinson, K.; Benefield, P. 2005 *Education and conflict: research and research possibilities*. Slough: NFER
- Toumani Toure, A. 2006. *Kicking the habit: how the World Bank and the IMF are still addicted to attaching economic policy conditions to aid*. London: Oxfam.
- Tuyzere, A. 2003. "Introduction of peace education in secondary schools: a strategy for promotion of peace in Uganda". In: D. Nkurunziza (Ed.), *Towards a culture of peace and human rights in Africa. African Peace Studies 1*, 73-85. Kampala, Uganda: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- UNHCR. 2005. *Global refugee trends: statistical overview of populations of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and other persons of concern to UNHCR*. Field Information and Coordination Support Section, Division of Operational Services, UNHCR Geneva.
- UNDG. 2008. *Press release on agreement for joint post-crisis assessment and recovery planning*, 25 September 2008. Retrieved 8 January 2009 from: www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=806
- UNDP. 2007. *Human Development Report 2007/2008: fighting climate change, human solidarity in a divided world*. New York: UNDP.

- UNESCO. 1993. *UNESCO: worldwide action in education*. Paris: UNESCO
- UNESCO. 2004. *The right to education: report submitted by Katarina Tomasevski, Special Rapporteur, addendum: mission to Colombia (1-10 October 2003)*. New York: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. 2005. *Education for All: the quality imperative*. EFA Global Monitoring Report. Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. 2006a. *Strong foundations: early childhood care and education*. In: EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007. Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. 2006b. *Fostering peaceful co-existence through analysis and revision of history curricula and textbooks in southeast Europe: preliminary stocktaking report*. Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. 2007. "Strong foundations: early childhood care and education". In: *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007*. Paris: UNESCO.
- UNESCO. 2008. *Education for All by 2015: will we make it?* EFA Global Monitoring Report. Paris: UNESCO and Oxford University Press.
- UNESCO. 2009. "Overcoming inequality; why governance matters". In: *UNESCO Global Monitoring Report 2009*. Paris: UNESCO and Oxford University Press.
- UNESCO Institute for Statistics. *Education in Bolivia statistics* (until 2005). Retrieved 11 March 2008 from:
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=289&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country=680&BR_Region=40520
- UN General Assembly. 2004. *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: 59th session.
- UNHCR. 1994. *Populations of concern to UNHCR: a statistical overview (1994)*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- UNICEF. 1999. *Education situation report no. 1 – bringing children back to school in Kosovo*. Pristina: UNICEF. Retrieved 28 September 2007 from:
www.seerecon.org/kosovo/documents/education_sitrepl.pdf

- UNICEF, 2002. *Quality Education for All: from a girl's point of view*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund. Retrieved 9 April 2009 from:
www.unicef.at/fileadmin/medien/pdf/qualityeducation-eng.pdf
- UNICEF. 2003. *School baseline assessment report, Southern Sudan*. New York: UNICEF. Retrieved 28 September 2007 from:
www.unicef.org
- UNICEF. 2007. *Sri Lanka reaches out to children and families displaced by escalating conflict*. Retrieved 30 July 2007 from:
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sri_lanka_39647.html
- UNICEF. 2008a. *UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2008*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund.
- UNICEF. 2008b. *Education statistics: South Africa*. New York: UNICEF. Retrieved 29 December 2008 from:
www.childinfo.org/files/ESAR_South_Africa.pdf
- UNICEFAfghanistan. 2004. *UNICEFAfghanistan proposal for education, January to December 2004*. Kabul: UNICEF Afghanistan.
- UNICEF/Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Southern Sudan. 2006. *Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces (RALS)*. New York: UNICEF/Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Southern Sudan.
- UNMIK. 2006. *Strategy for the development of pre-university education in Kosovo*. Pristina: UNMIK.
- UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict. 2007. *Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for children and armed conflict including the Machel Review*. Paris: UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict.
- Unterhalter, E.; Kioko-Echessa, E.; Pattman, R.; Rajagopalan, R.; N'Jai, F. 2004. *Scaling up on girls' education: towards a scorecard on girls' education in the Commonwealth*. London: Beyond Access Project (Institute of Education and Oxfam GB).
- USAID. 2005. *Strategy statement 2006-2008*. Washington, DC: USAID. Retrieved 28 September 2007 from:
www.usaid.gov

- USAID. 2006. *Education and fragility: an assessment tool*. Washington: USAID.
- US Department of State. 2007. *Background notes: Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Retrieved 9 September 2008 from: www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm
- Waldman, M. 2008. *Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan*. ACBAR Advocacy Series. Kabul, Afghanistan: Agencies Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR).
- Wang, L. 2007. *Education in Sierra Leone: present challenges, future opportunities*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Winthrop, R. 2006. "Emergencies, education and innovation". In: *Forced Migration Review, supplement: education and conflict*. July 2006. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre.
- Winthrop, R.; Kola, M. 2003. *IRC Afghanistan Education Strategy 2003-2006*. IRC: Afghanistan.
- Women's Commission. 2004. *Global survey on education in emergencies*. New York: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.
- Women's Commission. 2006. *Help us to help ourselves: education in the conflict to post-conflict transition in Liberia*. New York: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children.
- World Bank. 2003. *Education Participation Improvement Project – PAD*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved 9 September 2008 from: www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_03042604002460
- World Bank. 2005. *Cambodia – Public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) in primary education*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank/Asian Development Bank. 2003. *Cambodia: enhancing service delivery through improved resource allocation and institutional reform: integrated fiduciary assessment and public expenditure review*. Washington, DC: World Bank/Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.
- World Bank. 2007. *Colombia 2006-2010: a window of opportunity*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- World Bank/The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2007. *Global Monitoring Report: Millennium Development Goals, confronting the challenges of gender equality and fragile states*. Washington DC: World Bank/The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- World Food Program (WFP). 2005. *Compilation of some basic school statistics*. UNICEF Kabul.
- World Education Forum. 2000. *The Dakar framework for action: education for all: meeting our collective commitments*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Zgaga, P. (Ed.) 2006. *The prospects of teacher education in south-east Europe*. Ljubljana: South East European Education Co-operation Network.

In the same series

Never again: educational reconstruction in Rwanda

Anna Obura, 2003

Surviving school: education for refugee children from Rwanda

1994-1996

Lyndsay Bird, 2003

Parallel worlds: rebuilding the education system in Kosovo

Marc Sommers and *Peter Buckland*, 2004

Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction:
challenges and responsibilities

Marc Sommers, 2004

Learning independence: education in emergency and transition
in Timor-Leste since 1999

Susan Nicolai, 2004

Islands of education: schooling, civil war and the Southern Sudanese
(1983-2004)

Marc Sommers, 2005

Fragmented foundations: education and chronic crisis
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Susan Nicolai, 2007

Staying power: struggling to reconstruct education in Burundi since 1993

Anna Obura, 2008

Building back better: post-earthquake responses and educational challenges
in Pakistan

Jackie Kirk, 2008

Certification counts: recognizing the learning attainments of displaced and
refugee students

Edited by *Jackie Kirk*, 2009

Rapid response: programming for education needs in emergencies

Jonathan Penson, *Kathryn Tomlinson*, 2009

Donors' engagement: supporting education in fragile and conflict-affected
states

Laura Brannelly, *Susy Ndaruhutse* and *Carole Rigaud*, 2009

IIEP publications and documents

More than 1,200 titles on all aspects of educational planning have been published by the International Institute for Educational Planning. A comprehensive catalogue is available in the following subject categories:

Educational planning and global issues

General studies – global/developmental issues

Administration and management of education

Decentralization – participation – distance education
– school mapping – teachers

Economics of education

Costs and financing – employment – international cooperation

Quality of education

Evaluation – innovation – supervision

Different levels of formal education

Primary to higher education

Alternative strategies for education

Lifelong education – non-formal education – disadvantaged groups
– gender education

Copies of the Catalogue may be obtained on request from:

IIEP, Publications and Communications Unit

info@iiep.unesco.org

Titles of new publications and abstracts may be consulted online:

www.iiep.unesco.org

The International Institute for Educational Planning

The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is an international centre for advanced training and research in the field of educational planning. It was established by UNESCO in 1963 and is financed by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions from Member States. In recent years the following Member States have provided voluntary contributions to the Institute: Australia, Denmark, India, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

The Institute's aim is to contribute to the development of education throughout the world, by expanding both knowledge and the supply of competent professionals in the field of educational planning. In this endeavour the Institute cooperates with training and research organizations in Member States. The IIEP Governing Board, which approves the Institute's programme and budget, consists of a maximum of eight elected members and four members designated by the United Nations Organization and certain of its specialized agencies and institutes.

Chairperson:

Raymond E. Wanner (USA)

Senior Adviser on UNESCO issues, United Nations Foundation, Washington DC, USA.

Designated Members:

Manuel M. Dayrit

Director, Human Resources for Health, Cluster of Evidence and Information for Policy, World Health Organization (WHO), Geneva, Switzerland.

Carlos Lopes

Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), United Nations, New York, USA.

Jamil Salmi

Education Sector Manager, the World Bank Institute, Washington, DC, USA.

Diéry Seck

Director, African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, Dakar, Senegal.

Elected Members:

Aziza Bennani (Morocco)

Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Morocco to UNESCO.

Nina Yefimovna Borevskaya (Russia)

Chief Researcher and Project Head, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Moscow.

Birger Fredriksen (Norway)

Consultant on Education Development for the World Bank.

Ricardo Henriques (Brazil)

Special Adviser of the President, National Economic and Social Development Bank.

Takyiwaa Manuh (Ghana)

Director, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana.

Philippe Méhaut (France)

LEST-CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, France.

Xinsheng Zhang (China)

Vice-Minister of Education, China.

Inquiries about the Institute should be addressed to:

The Office of the Director, International Institute for Educational Planning,
7-9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Paris, France

Opportunities for change

Education innovation and reform during and after conflict

The book



War and conflict have a considerable negative impact on the education sector. However, even as education systems are damaged or destroyed by violence, multiple opportunities emerge for positive innovation and reform. This book describes efforts of education authorities – and the agencies assisting them – as they take advantage of the opportunities for change that emerge out of periods of conflict and early recovery.

Case studies from Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Kosovo, South Africa, Southern Sudan, Sri Lanka, Rwanda and Uganda explore conditions that contribute to strengthening education systems. Curriculum reform and innovative teacher training approaches are shown to be key parts of quality improvement processes. Moreover, the introduction of alternative education programmes and subjects such as peace education are identified as contributing to positive education change.

Experiences outlined here suggest that the protection of students and teachers should be coupled with conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives.

The importance of strengthening education partnerships is highlighted as a particularly critical component of response. Education innovation and reform should be supported for the long term, and prioritized and promoted to ensure that opportunities for positive change are fully realized during and after conflict.

The editor

Susan Nicolai is a senior specialist on education in crisis, and has worked for the UN, Save the Children and other NGOs. She is the author of several books on education in emergency settings, including IIEP-UNESCO, Save the Children and ODI publications.



United Nations
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization



International Institute
for Educational Planning